COMMUNICATION FROM THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND
PACIFIC COUNTRIES (ACP) GROUP,
THE AFRICAN GROUP AND THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDC) GROUP
The
following communication, dated 17 November 2025, is being circulated
at the request of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) Group, the
African Group and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group.
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1 Background
1.1. This
document is being submitted by the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP)
Group, the African Group and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group in
response to the ongoing discussions on the financial situation of the Trade
Facilitation Agreement Facility (TFAF or Facility) Trust Fund, which calls for
strategic reflection on the future of this vital multilateral tool.
1.2. The
TFAF currently finds itself in a complex financial situation that necessitates
an assessment of its future role. Nevertheless, we would like to emphasize that
the Facility is a key part of the architecture of the Trade Facilitation
Agreement (TFA), providing unquestionable value added to all Members. It would
therefore be premature to consider dismantling it.
1.3. The
purpose of this communication is threefold: first, to express our firm belief
in the need to preserve the functions of the TFAF; second, to provide a
constructive analysis of the specific challenges and potential risks for
developing and least developed countries (LDCs) if its functions were dispersed;
and third, to encourage active discussions among Members with a view to
establishing a consultative approach aimed at strengthening, simplifying and
ensuring the sustainability of the TFAF as an agile and targeted financing
instrument.
2 Position
statement and legal basis
2.1. The
ACP, African and LDC Groups are submitting this document to express their
constructive position and their commitment to maintaining the functional
integrity of the TFAF, and to propose alternatives to scenarios in which the
Facility's structure would be weakened.
2.2. The
TFA is a unique agreement in that the binding implementation commitment for
developing countries and LDCs (Section II) is inseparable from technical
assistance and capacity building (TACB) (Section III). The TFAF provides a
concrete and innovative illustration of the concept of special and differential
treatment (S&D).
2.3. While
the role of the TFAF is not to finance the full implementation of the TFA – a
commitment made by donor countries through their traditional assistance
mechanisms – the Facility is the multilateral and neutral guarantee of the
fulfilment of this commitment.
2.4. Therefore,
calling the Facility into question, without analysing the risks of an
equivalent alternative, upsets the balance of the TFA and affects the ability
of developing countries and LDCs to fully honour their obligations.
2.5. The
ACP, African and LDC Groups welcome the significant progress made by their
members, including the fact that 93% of the measures notified under Category C
by developing and LDC Members are scheduled to be implemented in the next five
years, i.e. by 2030 (figures from September 2024). However, the continuing
existence of a major funding gap remains a source of concern, as many countries
still need to secure the necessary assistance partnerships for all these
measures. Maintaining the functions of TFAF direct funding is therefore crucial
to bridge this gap.
3 Contesting
the diagnosis and risk analysis
3.1 Defending
the strategic value of the TFAF
3.1. We
recognize the operational challenges that the TFAF may have faced in the past.
However, we note that the partners recognize the quality and relevance of the
work carried out. We would therefore like to engage in dialogue on the claims
that the TFAF no longer has a central role to play in supporting developing and
least developed country Members. Its current situation is mainly due to funding
difficulties, not the questioning of its management or its strategic relevance.
3.2. The
gravity of this situation is further illustrated by the impact of the fund's budgetary
situation for 2026, which has led to an absence of financial allocations, i.e.
CHF 0.00, for key activities, most notably the subsidy programme and technical
assistance and capacity building initiatives. This de facto
suspension of the main support functions, at a time when Category C deadlines are
being reached, is an extremely worrying sign.
3.3. The
TFAF is the only technical assistance and capacity building mechanism entirely
dedicated to the TFA. It has demonstrated its ability to engage swiftly and
easily with Geneva-based missions and capitals in order to discuss
implementation challenges and, where appropriate, to propose assistance,
including direct funding.
3.4. This
direct funding covers targeted micro-needs and urgent gaps (e.g. short-term
training for officials involved in border checks, ad hoc legislative
assistance, and the acquisition of specific software). This support is a vital
complement to the TACB provided by other means and is crucial for the next five
years of implementation.
3.2 Analysis
of risks relating to functional integration solutions (dilution)
3.5. The
TFAF Secretariat has raised the possibility of delegating some of its functions
to other mechanisms, most notably the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) or
the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF).
3.6. We
believe that such a proposal requires a thorough and rigorous analysis. It is
vital to assess the operational feasibility of this transfer in concrete terms and
to anticipate the potential impact on the effectiveness of TFA implementation
assistance.
3.7. The
main risk of this approach is that assistance specifically dedicated to the TFA
will be diluted. The integration of targeted TFA capacity-building needs into
existing assistance structures with broader or very specific mandates, could
lead to their absorption.
3.8. For
an entity such as the EIF that focuses on general trade strategies, TFA
assistance could be sidelined in favour of broader thematic priorities, not to
mention that only LDCs are covered by the EIF.
3.9. In
the case of the STDF, the mandate of which centres exclusively on sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) measures, the transfer of the entire TFAF mandate (which
covers a wide range of non-SPS measures) would prove to be ineffective for a
significant share of TFA technical assistance requests.
3.10. Moreover,
the transfer of the Facility's mandate to the above-mentioned structures (EIF
or STDF) without the prior guarantee of additional and long-term resources
would have a de facto impact on their operational capacities. These
bodies would be forced to assume new responsibilities without any increase in
resources, which would comprise the effectiveness of their existing mandates as
well as that of the new transferred tasks.
3.11. Lastly,
the transfer of responsibilities and the possible addition of new
administrative procedures could increase the burden on beneficiary countries. Our
capitals could see the effectiveness of assistance diminish, which would be
detrimental to the national ownership of TFA projects and therefore to the
speed and sustainability of TFA implementation.
4 Challenges
and key issues for developing countries and LDCs
4.1. The
dismantlement proposal raises fundamental questions that merit consideration by
the Committee on Trade Facilitation before any decision is made:
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