FUNDAMENTALS FOR WTO REFORM

COMMUNICATION ON BEHALF OF THE ACP GROUP

The following communication, dated 27 November 2025, is being circulated at the request of the delegation of Barbados on behalf of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group.

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1  Introduction

1.1.  The ACP Group remains committed to the WTO and the foundational principles of the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. The ACP Group believes that a strong, rules‑based, multilateral trading system, that guards against unilateralism, is crucial for the economic security, predictability in trade, and development of all WTO Members but especially for the smallest, most vulnerable and least developed. Nonetheless, the ACP Group sees scope for reform of the WTO in a manner which is Member‑driven, fair, open, predictable, transparent and which addresses the needs, interests and concerns of all Members.

2  Key Principles for the ACP Group

2.1.  For the ACP Group, the objective of WTO reform should be to improve how the system delivers for the development and advancement of all WTO Members, particularly developing and least‑developed countries.

2.2.  In this context, the following six (6) key principles should be embedded in the WTO reform process and outcome:

·_              Openness: the process must be open and accessible to all Members.

·_              Inclusivity: the agenda for reform must include interests and concerns of developing and least‑developed Members and the process must allow for their full participation and must structurally integrate development priorities and ensure that issues of interest to developing countries are not relegated to the background.

·_              Consensus‑based: agenda‑setting, identification of solutions, and decisions must be based on consensus.

·_              Special and Differential Treatment (SDT): the principle of SDT must be preserved, while considering how to allow for clear voluntary opt outs.

·_              A holistic approach to WTO reform should be adopted, avoiding fragmentation of debates in multiple settings. In this regard, the General Council (GC) should have oversight of the process, and all relevant documentation should be available on a specific portal for Members to access.

·_              Transparency: deliberations, processes, and documentation should be shared, in a timely and clear manner to allow all Members to engage effectively.

3  Reaffirmation of Support for the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the WTO (Marrakesh Agreement)

3.1.  Among other things, the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement recognizes that the relations of WTO Members in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.

3.2.  The ACP Group reaffirms its support for these key tenets of the Marrakesh Agreement and efforts toward achieving them need to intensify. Undoubtedly, while many developing and least‑developed countries have made strides in their integration into the global economy, challenges remain acute. The ACP Group renews its support for and commitment to the fuller integration of developing and least developed countries into the global economy including a considered approach to implementation of the existing rules and any new rules that effectively achieve this objective.

3.3.  With respect to additions to Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement, Members should consider the following elements: 1) Have the Marrakesh principles been respected? 2) what are lessons learnt on the existing plurilateral agreements in Annex 4? 3) Does the process preserve the structural integrity of multilateralism? 4) Can the agreement for insertion into Annex 4 achieve the consensus provided for in Article X.9 of the Marrakesh Agreement?

4  Decision‑Making

4.1.  The ACP Group supports decision making by consensus. In this regard, the ACP Group reaffirms the ACP Communication of May 2024 contained in document _WT/GC/W/932.

4.2.  The Marrakesh Agreement decision‑making rule includes that first WTO "shall continue the practice of decision‑making by consensus." The decision‑making processes must remain open, transparent and inclusive in order to maintain trust and integrity.

4.3.  Decision‑making reform should strengthen, not weaken, the collective voice of developing country Members. Consensus guarantees against the marginalization of small economies but is also a guarantee for larger Members. Members must avoid institutionalizing informal or selective participation that risks undermining the multilateral character of the WTO. In essence, the consensus rule is not the problem because consensus‑based decision‑making has allowed WTO Members to converge on many elements where Members achieved success in delivering on key outcomes.

4.4.  All Members must be included and clear about what is presented for decision and ensured that elements required for all Members to join consensus are explained before adoption. In addition, adequate time should be provided for the full membership to timely consult with their capitals.

5  Development

5.1.  As noted above, the Marrakesh Agreement recognizes that Members are at different levels of development, and that developing countries require flexibilities to industrialize, diversify, and transform their economies and to implement the rules. This is not just longer time periods or capacity building. The ACP Group is not seeking to renegotiate these principles, but rather to make them work better in practice.

6  Special & Differential Treatment

6.1.  Special and Differential Treatment must be operationalized—not just as best endeavour clauses, but as an integral part of any Agreement or treaty. It must include capacity building and where relevant, Aid for Trade ‑ which we see as partnerships for trade, investment and development ‑ to support implementation. The fact is however, that SDT across many agreements has not been effective or workable for most developing countries that need it. Mere transition periods alone have not worked. There is need for deeper analysis on why existing SDT has not met its intended needs and where it has worked.

6.2.  In addition, there are examples within the WTO rule book where 'differentiation' with a small 'd' had worked. These include the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) Article 27.4, the Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA) Section I, in the Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Article 31 bis opt out, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) framework. There is value in better understanding how these processes have worked.

6.3.  SDT should not be seen as an exception or privilege; it is enshrined in the mandates and an essential feature of a fair and development‑oriented multilateral trading regime. SDT must be precise, effective, and operational. More use of the voluntary opt‑out approach by developing countries who have determined they do not require SDT, would be one way to advance discussions. It must however be noted that as a treaty‑based right linked to the level of economic development, decisions by a Member not to use certain flexibilities is up to them. It should not create a precedent or obligation for other Members. In a similar vein, we also welcome any commitments by developed countries to ensure they do not benefit from 'reverse SDT'.

7  Level Playing Field, Fairness and competition

7.1.  Fairness in WTO reform goes beyond institutional arrangements. It means confronting the structural imbalances that persist in many of our existing agreements, dating back to the Uruguay Round, in areas such as agriculture subsidies, fisheries subsidies, and industrial goods. It is imperative to bring some equity in the obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture and correct the historical asymmetry whereby the support instruments used extensively by developed countries for their industrialization are now prohibited for developing countries. Reform must offer sufficient space to enable industrialization and structural transformation. The playing field may never be fully level, but the WTO can and must ensure that developing Members are enabled to participate and integrate into global trade without taking on new or disproportionate obligations, which do not improve their development reality.

7.2.  Larger economies are expected to be more responsible in how they negotiate and in their level of ambition in face of asymmetries amongst the membership. If possible, in the meantime, while deliberations on globally agreed rules are underway, developed economies could also take voluntary commitments that still contribute to the multilateral trade agenda such as inter alia, on trade distorting industrial, agriculture and fisheries subsidies.

7.3.  On agenda setting, all Members should be provided with the same opportunities and process to place items in any WTO body for discussion and, where relevant, decision.

7.4.  For developing countries, fairness in the system also means access to markets, technology, and finance. A reformed WTO must work for all, by ensuring that the rules do not reinforce inequality, and instead ensures that all Members can arrive at prosperity and sustainable development.

7.5.  It is important that WTO Members observe and respect the transparency rules and notification obligations in the institution. Without transparency, it is difficult for the rules to function effectively. Reforms to the notification and monitoring systems should avoid placing undue additional obligations on developing and LDC members.

8  Restoring a fully functional dispute settlement system

8.1.  The paralysis in the dispute settlement pillar of the WTO, resulting from the absence of the Appellate Body disproportionately harms developing countries that rely on international law to assert their rights. WTO reform must prioritize the restoration of an independent and fully functional binding two‑tier dispute settlement system that is accessible to members, especially those with limited resources.

9  Conclusion

9.1.  The ACP Group remains constructively engaged in this process. The ACP Group's call is simple: a WTO reform that is inclusive in process, fit for purpose for all Members, and follows the Marrakesh mandate that recognizes the goal of development. Only then, can we restore trust and confidence in the multilateral trading system and ensure that it truly delivers for all Members, large and small, developed and developing alike.

9.2.  The ACP Group continues to support an MC14 outcome that gives the WTO a clear and focused work programme on reform.

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