OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS INTERNATIONAL IN
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT
MINUTES OF THE MEETING
11 December 2024
Chairperson: H.E. Dr. Adamu Mohammed
ABDULHAMID (NIGERIA)
1._
Let me start by welcoming the
Director-General and the DDG Hill and all the participants to this meeting of
the Trade Policy Review Body which was announced by Convening
Notice _WTO/AIR/TPR/170 on 20 November 2024. I am pleased to
see so many of you here in person as well as online.
2._
The purpose of this meeting is
for Members and Observers to undertake their annual overview of developments in
the international trading environment which are having an impact on the
multilateral trading system, as provided in Paragraph G of Annex 3 of the
Marrakesh Agreement.
3._
As mentioned in the Airgram,
today's discussion is assisted by the Director-General's Annual Report which
provides a comprehensive overview of the overall state of global trade, of
significant developments in the implementation of trade policies by WTO Members
and Observers, and an update on several trade policy issues affecting the
trading system for the period between mid‑October 2023 and mid-October 2024.
The Report was circulated in document _WT/TPR/OV/27 on 20 November 2024.
4._
The Trade Monitoring Report
makes it very clear that the principal purpose of the exercise is to further
enhance transparency. It is intended to be purely factual and has no legal
effect on the rights and obligations of WTO Members. I think it is important to
emphasize that this even if you are all very familiar with the trade monitoring
exercise.
5._
Allow me also to take a moment
to recognize the work that has been undertaken to follow up on the important
outcomes of the 7th Appraisal of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
concerning Trade Monitoring. First, to facilitate Members' participation in the
exercise using IT and digital solutions, the Secretariat has continued to
develop and implement the digital platform in the Trade Monitoring Database
which allows delegations to submit and verify their trade measures. More and
more delegations are using this platform, and of course, those that continue to
do so. Second, this is the first year where the Trade Monitoring exercise
applies to maintain a high level of engagement and participation, the
Monitoring Exercise continues to regularly reach out to and invite delegations
to submit their trade measures. To support this effort, and to further promote
inclusiveness and transparency, you will be aware that a WTO Trade Monitoring
Update was issued in early July this year as a preliminary stocktake to the
Report before you today. Finally, the 7th Appraisal highlighted the
need for the TPRB to serve as a forum for information-sharing on trade policies
and practices and today's meeting is another opportunity to do so.
6._
The consensus outcomes of the 7th
Appraisal, and the discussions that preceded them, recognize the value of the
trade monitoring exercise, and demonstrate that Members place a premium on the
ability of this non-legal peer-review to contribute to transparency and
predictability in the multilateral trading system. I urge you to continue to
support this exercise and collaborate with the Secretariat in making it as
inclusive as possible.
7._
Now, I do not wish to go into detail
with respect to the main substantive findings of the Report as I am sure you
have already taken note of those. The Director-General will shortly provide you
with her main takeaways. However, I believe we all recognize that the Report
before you comes at a time of great uncertainty for the global economy in
general, and international trade in particular. Geopolitical tensions and
several conflicts are having specific and important ramifications for the flow
of trade. This is worrying from both a systemic point of view, but equally
importantly from the point of view of traders who face increasing uncertainty
in their day-to-day operation.
8._
With these introductory
remarks, I will now give the floor to the Director‑General to introduce her
Report. Following this, I will invite delegations to share their views and
comments. Madam Director-General, you have the floor.
9._ Thank you, Ambassador H.E. Dr. Adamu Mohammed ABDULHAMID (NIGERIA)
for
your introductory remarks.
10._
Excellencies, ladies, and
gentlemen. I am pleased to join you today to discuss the latest WTO Trade
Monitoring Report and take stock of recent trade policy developments.
11._
You all will have seen my
Report which was circulated to Members on 20 November, in document _WT/TPR/OV/27 and its Addendum.
12._
You are all familiar with how
the Report is prepared and our efforts to ensure inclusiveness and transparency
in delivering this factual overview of trade policy developments over the past
12 months. The Trade Monitoring exercise is there to assist you, the
Members, to get a sense of developments in the trading system that stand out,
to understand emerging trends, and to undertake a constructive, non-legal peer
review on matters of shared concern.
13._
You
have seen the Report, so I will not list its findings - I am more interested in
hearing what you have to say and listening to you engage on the substance of
the trends and developments identified since October 2023. However, allow me to
share with you a few of my main takeaways.
14._
Let's start by acknowledging
something we all know and which the Chair, Ambassador Adamu just refer to: the global
trading environment appears increasingly fragile, uncertain and precarious.
15._
But to clear, trade has shown
resilience to all the shocks of recent years, to Members' benefit. I really do
want to stress this, let's also remember that trade is showing quite a bit of
resilience. In October, economists reported that the volume of world
merchandise trade had expanded at a moderate 2.3% year-on-year pace in the
first half of 2024, on track to grow by a projected 2.7% for 2024, and 3.0% in
2025. This represents an improvement over the 1.1% decline in merchandise trade
volumes seen in 2023. And these projections are in line with the projections
for global GDP growth. Normally trade grows faster feast into GDP, this time
they are growing intended.
16._
Nevertheless, the resilience we
have seen we had to admitted it looks fragile, amid geopolitical tensions increasing
protectionism and the unilateral measures described in this Report. Conflict
and climate change continue to cause human suffering, while disrupting trade
and economic activity. And as the IMF recently observed, the trading system
routinely gets blamed for trade imbalances that are largely the product of
domestic macroeconomic forces within leading economies. In other words, in some
big economies, we have a domestic consumption problem while in others we have
an excessive problem. We need to investigate these issues and try to see how we
can deal with them macroeconomically. Yet the fact is that trade remains an
important part of the solution to the challenges of our time – from accelerating growth and job creation,
to ensuring food security and tackling climate change. That is why we need to
shore up the rules-based trading system – to reform and re-invent it to
withstand the current pressures and keep delivering for people everywhere, and
for the planet. This has consistently been my message to you, and it was at the
core of what I said to G20 leaders in Brazil last month.
17._
Turning to the Report's
findings, let me start with the good news, because it's too easy to overlook
the fact that there are genuine positive developments. For instance, Members
continue to introduce liberalizing measures. Trade-facilitating measures introduced
during the 12 months leading up to the middle of October – measures such as
tariff reductions, simplified import procedures, and the removal of
quantitative restrictions – covered an estimated USD 1.4 trillion worth of
traded goods. Moreover, that amount is up almost half a trillion dollars from the
USD 977.2 billion covered by trade facilitating measures in the
previous reporting period, from October 2022 to 2023. Another positive trend
comes from services trade: the report finds that the majority of the 134
services-related measures introduced over the past year were trade
facilitating.
18._
Now for the not-so-good news. The
Report shows that during the 12 months leading up to mid-October, the value of trade
covered by the 169 new restrictions was USD 888 billion. That's half a
trillion dollars more than the value of trade covered by restrictions
introduced in the preceding year, which was USD 337 billion.
19._
In addition, there is little
meaningful roll-back of existing trade restrictions. That means the stockpile
of trade restrictions continues to grow. As of mid-October 2024, the stockpile
of import restrictions in force was affecting an estimated USD 2.94
trillion representing 11.8% of world imports. That too is half a trillion
dollars more than the comparable figure from last year's report, which was USD 2.48
trillion or almost 10% of world imports.
20._
Export restrictions are also
gaining momentum. In the 12 months leading up to mid-October,
export-restricting measures covered almost USD 277 billion in traded goods
– well above the USD 159 billion covered by such measures introduced
during the previous reporting period. The accumulated stockpile of export
restrictions since 2009 is estimated to affect 3.2% of world exports, worth
about USD 786 billion). An important silver lining here is that our
tracking of export restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers put in place
since the start of the war in Ukraine in late February 2022 shows that these
have decreased significantly, today covering an estimated trade value of USD 11.8 billion,
down from USD 30 billion a year ago.
21._
The Report also describes the
latest developments on issues including trade remedies, economic support
measures, the phase-out of COVID-19 related measures and the increase in trade
concerns reported across WTO committees.
22._
Before closing, allow me to also to reiterate that the Trade Monitoring
Exercise is only as strong as Members want it to be. Your participation is
crucial, and you recognized this at the 7th Appraisal of the
TPRM last year. I thank all those that have participated and urge all
delegations to help us strengthen this transparency exercise. As requested by
you, efficiency, inclusivity, and transparency remain at the core of the WTO's
trade monitoring work, and we will keep up our efforts to improve.
23._
I
will be here for a little while and then unfortunately I have to leave but DDG Hill
will be my eyes and ears and will be here until the end.
24._
Thank you.
UNITED STATES
25._
We thank the Secretariat and
Director-General for the work that went into drafting the Report of the
Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment that was
circulated in document _WT/TPR/OV/27 on 20 November 2024 and the Addendum.
26._
The United States and other
Members have raised since 2022 that the report's invention and usage of the
terms "trade facilitative" and "trade restrictive" as a
problematic lens to analyze measures and global trading developments.
27._
We note the Secretariat has
clarified trade remedies are a separate category that may be implemented in
response to market distortions. We welcome this important distinction.
28._
However, we don't see value in
having the Secretariat categorize trade-related measures into binary terms like
"trade facilitative" or "trade restrictive", which can
distort the intent and impact of individual policy measures and ignore their
wider context.
29._
Furthermore, this analysis is
misleading for the reader, who could easily take the terms to indicate the WTO's
determination of value on what measures are "good" and "facilitative",
or "bad" and "restrictive". A neutral and objective WTO
Secretariat should not evaluate and frame Members' measures in this way, which
strikes us as prejudicial to Members' exercise of their rights and obligations.
30._
It is the role of Members,
working in various WTO committees and through TPRs, to monitor each other's
trade measures and, when they deem appropriate, raise concerns. A neutral and
objective WTO Secretariat should not be appearing to put its thumb on the scale
to characterize Members' measures in positive or negative terms, or to suggest
approval or disapproval of measures, particularly based on non-transparent
criteria.
31._
We understand that the WTO made
efforts to address some of these concerns by replacing the term "trade
restrictive" with "other trade-related measures" when referring
to measures referenced in the Annex. However, this effort created additional
problems without resolving the issue. It's still very easy to draw the
conclusion that those "other measures" are the "trade
restrictive" ones referred to in the reporting.
32._
Further, it is now less clear
to the reader what data and methodology the Secretariat has used to reach its
conclusions on trade restrictive measures, and if this approach has been
applied consistently across all Members included in the report.
33._
The terms "trade
facilitative" and "trade restrictive" are not precise enough to
describe commitments that Members have made in the WTO or measure global
economic trends. We re‑iterate our concerns that this is too simple a lens to
analyse world trade and appears to prejudice our exercise of our rights and
obligations.
34._
It is useful to remind
ourselves that in a Member-driven organization, a neutral and objective
Secretariat is accountable to the Membership. Therefore, its approach to its work
– including monitoring – must reflect Members' consensus.
35._
The United States has begun giving thought to a sensible way
forward, and we intend to reach out to Members to discuss this issue further
next year.
CHINA
36._
I would like to start by
expressing gratitude to the Secretariat for preparing this comprehensive Report
and DG for her profound remarks.
37._
China appreciates the Secretariat
efforts in producing this well-crafted overview and analysis on global trade
trends, leveraging its expertise. This Report is an important public good
produced by the Secretariat. To some extent, it functions as a form of soft constraint,
encouraging members to exercise restraint in implementing restrictive measures.
These efforts should be valued through the active participation by Members in
the reporting and verification processes. It is disappointing to witness a
slight decline in Members' participation for this reporting period, comparing
with the previous year, particularly the absence of a major trading Member in
this important exercise.
38._
In this report, three trends
warrant our attention. First, surge in the trade coverage for trade restrictive
measures, which was increased from 337.1 billion to 887.7 billion — a 2.63 folds
increase compared to a 1.47 folds increase in facilitating measures. The share
of trade covered by import‑restrictive measures reached its highest level since
2020. Second, the trade coverage associated with national security
considerations is estimated to be 79.6 billion. Though a fractional portion of
world trade, yet not negligible. Third, trade between hypothetical trading
blocs defined by the UN voting patterns, has grown 4% slower than within-bloc
trade since early 2022. While there are no overt signs of fragmentation, these
trends highlight the growing influence of geopolitical factors on economic and
trade issues, diverging from the fundamental goals of trade — serving for
people and promoting prosperity.
39._
In the reading of this report,
it is also noticed that responses were given to Members' comments and
suggestions raised in the last December meeting, including statistics on the Report
downloads and visits to the monitoring database. This transparency is
commendable. However, the Report notes that one topic was not substantively
covered in the report as certain Member do not "wish" the Secretariat
to do so. I am wondering how the criteria used in selecting coverage of this Report
is set and whether accommodating the preference of certain Members reduce the
transparency of this monitoring process.
40._
I also want to say a few words
about support measures, where "industrial policies" and "industrial
subsidies" are reported. While most Members recognized industrial policy
as a crucial tool of economic growth, the definition and scope of industrial
policies and subsidies are not yet clear within the framework of WTO
discussions. While referencing research outcomes from other organizations, caution
is essential. For example, applying the OECD concept of "below-market
borrowing" to state enterprises requires careful consideration to avoid
potential misinterpretations.
41._
That is why we always value
deep discussion and dialogue among WTO Members. In fact, in times of
difficulty, it is even more crucial for Members to engage in consultations and
dialogue within the framework and platforms provided by the WTO. A strong and
effective WTO cannot be demanded; it must be built through the collective
efforts of its Members. Each Member has a responsibility to contribute to this
shared endeavour, fostering an open, inclusive, and non‑discriminatory
environment for economic cooperation.
EUROPEAN UNION
42._
Welcome back DG from your long
trip. It's wonderful to have you back in our town. So thank you so much for
being with us today.
43._
I'd like to first start by
welcoming this report and by thanking the Secretariat for adjusting it after
the review that we did 18 months ago so the reports now coming out once a year.
There are increased use of digital tools and there's an effort to introduce
metrics. I think all of those are positive developments so we want to thank you
very much for that and I think as a general matter we very much support that
trade monitoring is a core function of the Secretariat so we think that's very
legitimate for you to go out and ask both governments, but also other public
sources, for information that you need in order to give your assessment of the
changes in the world's economy.
44._
And I agree, I think we would
very much agree with the thrust of the report, which is that it's a mixed
picture. So, on one side, globalization is still there,
but on the other side, there are some first discernible trends, which, of
course, if they continue, they can be quite significant over time, because we
know that when there are shifts in trade patterns, you only see them very
little at the beginning, but over time, as they compound, they can be quite
significant. And this comes, I think, to the core of this report, for
which I think we would very much suggest that we should have a working session,
an informal working session to discuss really look at what this report should
aim to do to be as informative as possible for Members, because there are two
different things. One is the mechanics, the mechanistic assessment of
restrictions which governments are adopting, and the other is research and
other indicators that show that trade flows are changing the world's economy.
45._
You have on page 16 on your
evidence of fragmentation, you have a first hint. But
it's no more than a hint, because it's just one page, and it's one publication.
But I think that's something we are very interested in. We are equally
interested in a discussion in this Organization.
46._
I note the comments made by my
colleague from China about how industrial policies impact the interests of
other WTO Members, and how they can change the terms
of trade between, in some cases, very large trading blocks.
47._
And you yourself, Director-General,
just mentioned in your introductory comments the question of macroeconomic
imbalances and the fact that there are some significantly
large economies, and it could also be mine because we're a large economy, but
that have significant trade surpluses or deficits, and that these are perceived
to be a significant source of friction within the trading system,
and we have to find answers how to manage those, and obviously there's a part
of the response belongs in the financial community, in the IMF, and the
secretaries and ministers of finance, and part of it is very much a trade
issue, and it's our task really to think through how trade can contribute or
trade rules to reduce those tensions over time, because that's what helps
the durability of the trading system over time if it's perceived to be fair.
48._
And for us, what we've tried to
say very much also to colleagues from developing countries is that if there is
unfairness that is created in the very large economies, almost invisibly, it
can have an immense effect on the development prospects of developing
countries. And that's a responsibility for me, but in the equal vein, Chinese
economy, the American economy, the large and increasingly wealthy economies
have a responsibility to ensure that their industrial policies aren't
impediments to the development of perhaps the less developed parts of the Organization.
49._ I'd just like to say a few comments on the mechanistic aspects,
because I know they're quite hotly debated. A colleague from the US has just
made a few comments, and it's very difficult to get this right. So I don't
think we are – it's impossible to get it right. So you can work your whole
life, and every year there will be somebody who will put his hand up and say, I
don't agree with this characterization
or that characterization, but I think that we could have a working meeting just
go who went to see if we can establish at least a common set of parameters so
that you don't have the controversy next year and that you can feel at ease
when you are setting up your work.
50._
I would just give you one
example with the problem of a overly mechanistic approach. It's a thousand days
since the illegal evasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. We have very
strong views in Europe on this, so I don't need to repeat that. But the report
says that our trade facilitating measures as EU is one measure. And then we introduced, I think, three
tariff quotas in agriculture, and they are three trade-restrictive measures. So
you have one measure which opens up everything, if I understand well, and then
you have three measures which restricts. But it's three against one, and it's very difficult to compare
because, in fact, this is overwhelmingly a liberalizing policy that we have
pursued, because we try in every way we can to support Ukraine in its struggle
for justice.
51._
But I think I just want to
conclude by thanking you and thanking the Secretariat for this work, because I
know there's a lot of work that goes into it. And we are very happy to
continue, again, developing the metrics better. I think there's a first, you've
had a first go at it, but I think there's room for improvement also for
comparing how much this report is looked at compared to the annual trade
reports and to other reports that the WTO publishes so that in a few years
time, we'll have a very good overview of which products the Secretariat makes
are felt to be the most useful for stakeholders. And that's not just us as
government representatives, but also the wider community.
52._ But thank you very much, and I look forward to working on this in
the next weeks. Thank you.
JAPAN
53._
The Trade Policy Review Meeting
and this monitoring are at the core of the WTO's monitoring function for
Agreement implementation, which serves to enhance the transparency of measures
taken by Members, and Japan appreciates the work of the Members and the
Secretariat in contributing to the preparation of the WTO Trade Monitoring
Report.
54._
This Report, which maintains
basic neutrality and transparency and provides concise analyses and
explanations based on material prepared under the responsibility of the
Secretariat, with references to OECD and IMF reports, is useful for
understanding the situation surrounding the policies implemented by Members.
55._
In order to further enrich this
Report, the participation of more Members is essential. In this regard, it is
very regrettable that the number of Members participating in the monitoring
exercise has decreased each year since 2020. Japan hopes that more Members will
participate in this exercise, and we are willing to consider ways to improve
the situation together with other Members.
56._
This year's report reveals an
increase in government industrial and other support policies against a backdrop
of geopolitical tensions and frequent and escalating climate-related crises.
57._
During the period covered by
the Report, the value of trade covered by both trade restrictive and trade
facilitating measures has increased significantly compared to the previous
report in December 2023, in particular the value of trade covered by trade
restrictive measures, which has increased by about 2.6 times, according to the Report.
58._
We are closely monitoring the
impact of these developments on trade, and Members are encouraged to do more to
maintain and improve transparency in policymaking.
59._
On the other hand, the Report
also points out that new opportunities are emerging in international trade and
the global economy. As the WTO responds to today's international trade
situation, there are some areas where updating the rules is desirable, such as
investment facilitation and the digital sector. We would like to work with all
Members to bring the IFDA and the E-commerce Agreement into the WTO rulebook.
60._
The multilateral trading system
is an essential international public good that underpins the prosperity and
stability of the international community. It is imperative that, through all
discussions to address the concerns in this report and to respond to new
opportunities, Members continue to collectively defend and promote the
multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core.
61._
Regarding the Trade Policy
Review meetings held this year in 2024, a total of 14 review meetings were held
this year, during which trade- and investment-related measures of 14 countries
were reviewed. In particular, four LDC Members - Angola, Malawi, Mozambique and
the Solomon Islands - have been reviewed this year, bringing the total number
of LDC Members reviewed to 33 out of a total of 37. We believe that TPR
exercise is useful in assisting LDC Members to improve their understanding of
the WTO agreements and to help them implement them. In this regard, we find it
valuable that the Secretariat continues to provide technical assistance and
capacity building to LDCs, including through workshops.
62._
Based on the agreement at the
Seventh Appraisal of the TPRM, the frequency of monitoring reports has been
reduced from twice a year to once a year from this year onwards, allowing us to
analyse the general situation of the international trade environment over a
longer period of one year. We therefore support the continuation of this
practice.
63._
Regarding the procedure for the
submission of advance written questions, Japan appreciates the ongoing efforts
to introduce an online tool, which is expected to reduce the burden on the
reviewed Member and the Secretariat and to further increase efficiency, thereby
enhancing the substance of the question-and-answer procedure.
64._
Japan appreciates the role of
the TPRB in contributing to greater transparency in world trade and in the
trade policies and measures of Members and will continue to actively contribute
to the TPR.
65._
Thank you.
DIRECTOR-GENERAL ADDITIONAL
REMARKS
66._
Thank you very much, and I want
to thank those Members who have made remarks, and we'll be looking now to see
the opinions of others. I just wanted to say I'm very interested in your views
because this monitoring exercise should be done with you, and as Japan
remarked, the number of Members participating has been decreasing. Someone
referred to the utility of the report and I want to reassure you that we have
absolutely no interest in working on a report that is not useful or meaningful
to Members. We want it to be meaningful. We want you to engage. We want it to
be a useful report. I thank the EU for recognizing that based on your remarks
last year, which I remember very well, we have tried to change and improve the
report. We lowered the frequency, and we tried to consider all the other
suggestions. As the EU mentioned, it's never perfect, but we tried and we are
very open to listening to your suggestions, to listening to whether you want
the report done at all or not. I strongly support the idea of an informal
workshop or an informal consultation to try to discuss some of these issues.
This should help us provide the report with the appropriate backing and deal
with any controversies therein. And decide what we want to go ahead with every
Member supporting. That's what I would really like to see. And in that regard,
I want us to consider carefully the issue of the neutrality of the Secretariat.
I wish to say a strong word on that. I know when there's a little bit of
dissension or discomfort, the Secretariat bears the brunt, and we have big
broad shoulders. But I also want to assure you that we do our very best. We do
not gain anything from it not being neutral. So we try to report in with that
in mind. I agree and would also like to express my strong support for looking
at the definitions. Yet, we should avoid politicising the report and I believe
very strongly in this.
67._
I want to be very frank with
you. Sometimes when outsiders look at our reports, they question out figures
because Members insist on the Secretariat not covering several issues. And we
end up compromising in so many areas that impact numbers. Some scholars are
doing similar work and their definitions are broadly accepted. I wish to
reiterate that we are ready and willing to look at the reports and explore
ideas and suggestions. At the same time, if we continue with a situation where
we try too hard, the utility of the report is also called into question.
68._
Because others out there may be
looking like they have more of the truth. They can also go to websites and
other places and gather the information and make the report. But we're here to
serve you Members. But let the WTO Secretariat serve you in a way that provides
you with a meaningful report. And this is why I strongly support the suggestion
of and informal working group or consultation where we could address issues
with respect to the terms used in the reports. We have a trade facilitation
agreement and we must have a good idea of what trade facilitation means when we
concluded that agreement. We have trade-restrictive measures, new concerns and
the fact that 21st century issues are now on the table. We should discuss and
address these issues, but we should also avoid politicising the report so that
we can keep it balanced and as neutral as possible.
69._
The comment on the research,
what is the objective? Is it to share some research? Is it monitoring? We can
also listen to you and see the balance you want in the report, and we are
willing to share that we have lots of good information we can share if Members
are interested in that direction. In other words, we will depend on you. I will
end on the note of encouraging you all to pursue this consultation or workshop
so we can sort out what we want the report to focus on so that it is useful and
meaningful to Members. I will be very interested in the outcome.
70._
Thank you, Chair.
CANADA
71._
Thank you, Chair, and thank
you, DG, and DDG Hill, and thank you very much to the Secretariat for your very
hard work in putting together this report. I'll be very brief. I just wanted to
say, add my voice to discussion to say that we of course feel that the
monitoring and transparency function of the WTO is extremely valuable and that
we agree sometimes there is scope for improvement as with many things and that
we're happy to participate constructively in any discussions that may be held
in this regard.
HONG KONG,
CHINA
72._
Thank you Chair and good
afternoon colleagues. Hong Kong, China would like to thank the DG and her team
for compiling the Annual Overview, which provides very useful information at a
time when the global economy is grappling with growing uncertainties due to
geo-economic fragmentation, slower economic growth, and climate change-related
crises. The report offers timely updates on the latest developments in the
implementation of trade policy measures and the state of the international
trading environment, making a valuable contribution to enhancing transparency
of the multilateral trading system. Just some quick observations from us:
·_
First, while the gradual
recovery in goods trade is encouraging, we are mindful that less developed
regions are likely to be the most vulnerable to potential challenges in pursing
economic development. We hope that all WTO Members could work collaboratively
to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth.
·_
Second, the significant
increase in the coverage of import-restrictive measures introduced during the
review period is also quite alarming. We remain concerned about the growing
stockpile of import restrictions in force, which has continued to expand steadily
since 2009 both in value terms and as a percentage of world imports. We urge
WTO Members to refrain from introducing new trade-restrictive measures and
critically review the necessity of existing ones and to repeal them once
circumstances no longer warrant their continuation.
·_
Third, during the review
period, we note that the average number of trade remedy initiations was 28.2
per month, up from 16.7 in the last report, though still lower than the peak in
2020 (36.1). The monthly average of trade remedy terminations recorded was 9.3,
the lowest average since 2015. We call on WTO members to exercise caution and
restraint when considering the use of trade remedy actions so as to avoid
creating unnecessary restrictions to trade.
·_
Finally, we note that 76
Members, representing 45.8% of the WTO membership, replied to the DG's initial
request for information on measures taken during the review period and requests
for verification. This is a slightly lower response rate as compared to the
last annual report and we would like to echo our Japanese colleagues and urge
more WTO Members to actively participate in this meaningful exercise to enhance
transparency and predictability of trade policy development.
73._
Thank you Chair.
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
74._
Your
Excellency, the Russian Federation is very welcome the decision of the seventh
appraisal of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism to reduce the frequency of the
Monitoring Reports. This decision allows us to make a more balanced look at
trends and challenges in the global trade.
75._
We
are also appreciate the work that the Secretariat has done in analyzing trade
measures taken by Members states and tendencies in the world trade. We welcome
the Secretariat view that the unilateral restrictions create greater
uncertainty for the global economy.
76._
At
the same time, we would like to add that not only these measures contribute to
the expansion of crises. We underline that policies of some Members such as reckless
monetary policies, imbalanced green policies as well as other measures
affecting price spikes in primary commodities, food security and rising energy
prices were given disproportionately less consideration like in the previous
reports.
77._
We
believe that the Secretariat should continue to contribute to the
de-politicization of the WTO by demonstrating its objectivity and impartiality
in the performance of its functions, including in the preparation of analytics.
78._
Thank
you.
UKRAINE
79._
Mr.
Chair, Ukraine takes note of the Annual Overview Report as
contained in document _WT/TPR/OV/27. This report confirms once
again the negative impact of the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine on the
international trade. We encourage the WTO Secretariat to further monitor impact
of the Russian Federation's armed invasion of Ukraine on international trade and particularly on world food security.
80._
The Russian Federation
continues to destroy intentionally the critical civilian infrastructure of
Ukraine, thus endangering the international trade for my country and for our
trading partners, first of all in agricultural products. The Overview Report elaborates
on Russian fertilizers but does not mention that at least 6 million tonnes of
Ukrainian grain was stolen by the Russian Federation since its invasion. Russia
continues to drain the resources of the temporarily occupied Ukrainian
territories with the use of complex smuggling operations. This includes
blending the stolen Ukrainian grain with other shipments, engaging in illegal
exports under falsified phytosanitary certificates, and hiding vessels' data.
Russia profits from such marauding under the guise of supporting global
consumers. The use by Russia of food as a blackmailing tool should be condemned
81._
With
regard to the Overview Report itself, as we indicated several times before, we would like again to
draw the Members' and Secretariat's attention to the repeated attempts to call Russia's full‑scale armed invasion of Ukraine "a war in Ukraine" or "a conflict in
Ukraine". This factually is not correct and
does not correspond to reality. Such language fails to reflect objectively what
is the root cause of the disruptions in Ukraine's trade. Such language
discourages from participating in the overview. The only reason of the current
state of Ukraine's economy and trade is the ongoing war of aggression of the
Russian Federation against my country, which continues for the third year.
82._
The
Director‑General has appealed not to politicize the overview process. In this
regard the WTO Secretariat could use
the internationally recognized and adopted qualification of what the Russian
Federation has been
doing in Ukraine since 2014 as contained in numerous
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. We
hope that this and any future Annual Overview
Report will be corrected respectively to
factually reflect the illegal actions of one WTO Member against another WTO
Member.
83._
Thank
you.
CAMBODIA
84._
Thank you Chair for the floor
and DG for her insightful remarks and encouragement.
85._
Like other delegates, we would
like to extend our appreciation to the Secretariat for their diligent efforts
in compiling the Annual Report on Developments in the International Trading
Environment. The comprehensive review and transparency efforts embodied in this
report are invaluable in fostering informed dialogue among WTO Members.
86._
We welcome the insights shared
in the Report, especially the focus on measures that facilitate trade and the
progressive steps taken by Members in support of a sustainable and resilient
trading system. Initiatives such as the reduction of import tariffs, the
simplification of procedures, and the phased withdrawal of pandemic-related
restrictions highlight a collective commitment to enhancing global trade
dynamics.
87._
We note that the report
underscores challenges such as increasing trade restrictions, rising
geopolitical tensions, and evidence of trade fragmentation. These developments
pose risks to the multilateral trading system, emphasizing the need for
reinforced collaboration among Members. Furthermore, the continued growth in
trade remedy measures signals a pressing need to address underlying tensions
through transparent and rule-based approaches.
88._
Cambodia reaffirms its
steadfast commitment to the principles of transparency and inclusivity as
fundamental pillars of the multilateral trading system. We are dedicated to
fulfilling our obligations under WTO agreements and contributing to the
collective goal of a stable and equitable global trading environment.
89._
Moving forward, to advance
these objectives, we hope to:
·_
First, enhanced transparency
mechanisms: encourage Members to actively utilize and improve the WTO's trade
monitoring and reporting tools, fostering greater accountability and
understanding of trade measures.
·_
Second, addressing trade
fragmentation: strengthen cooperation to counter trade fragmentation trends by
promoting inclusive trade partnerships and fostering dialogue on emerging
concerns.
·_
Third, focus on capacity
building: enhance technical assistance and capacity-building efforts to enable
developing and LDC Members to adapt to evolving trade practices and leverage
opportunities.
·_
Last but not least, the support
from WTO Members on the smooth transition measures in favour of countries
graduating from the LDC category are essential. These will help to address the
structural vulnerabilities of graduating countries and safeguard their
development trajectory during that critical phase.
·_
To conclude Chair, Cambodia
remains committed to actively engaging with WTO Members to overcome challenges
and maximize opportunities for a balanced and inclusive trading system.
90._
Thank you, Chair.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS
BY DELEGATIONS
UNITED STATES
91._
We would like to thank everyone
for the insights, and I also wanted to thank the WTO and the Director General
again for their hard work on this. Additionally, we support the working groups
with Members to further discuss the scope and methodology of the reporting. We
also support the intervention from the Ukrainian delegate and have made similar
points since 2022 and we look forward to more balance reporting on this issue
in future reports.
92._
Thank you so much.
UNITED KINGDOM
93._
Thank you, Chair. And we'd also
like to thank the Secretariat for the report on the monitoring exercise. And
like Canada, we'd be willing to participate in any informal discussions that
take place on this. We would also like to thank Ukraine for their statement and
the points that they made in relation to Russia's illegal and full-scale
invasion of Ukraine, and hope that these are taken on board.
94._
Thank you very much.
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
95._
Thank you, Chair, I have to
take floor again, just to comment on issues raised today. We strongly reject
any reference to the UN document and its content. The WTO is not in part of the
UN system.
96._
Thank you.
CANADA
97._
Thank you Chair, my apologies
for taking the floor again, I just wanted to add my voice in support of
Ukraine's statement.
JAPAN
98._
Japan would like to echo the EU
and Canada regarding the support for Ukraine.
99._
Thank you.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL HILL'S CLOSING
REMARKS
100._ Thank you for giving me the floor, Chair.
101._ This has been an invaluable opportunity to take stock of recent
trade policy developments with you, and to hear delegations' comments and
considerations regarding the Report.
102._ I would like to sincerely thank the delegations for their
participation in today's discussion and concrete contributions towards the
Report.
103._ Members have established trade monitoring as one of the core
functions of the WTO and transparency as one of the pillars of a
well-functioning multilateral trading system. Their value becomes even more
evident during periods of economic uncertainty, as the experience of the COVID‑19
pandemic taught us.
104._ From today's discussion, it is evident that delegations broadly
share the concerns highlighted in the report regarding the global economic
outlook overall, and international trade in particular. And in this context,
many of you have expressed support for the facts and transparency provided by
the trade monitoring exercise.
105._ Indeed, your support and active engagement are central to the
effective and meaningful trade monitoring exercise. Members' timely
contributions are crucial for preparing factually accurate up‑todate
reports. This, in turn, not only further strengthens the trade monitoring
process, but also deepens the constructive stakeholder relationship between
Members and the Secretariat.
106._ I also wish to assure you that we have taken careful note of all the
comments made today. I will convey the last ones to the Director-General, but
she had stayed here for more interventions, and you can see as a Secretariat, we
will continue building on the valuable inputs you have given in the past and today
and reflect on how to further improve and streamline the trade monitoring
exercise as we move forward, taking into consideration of course of all the
concrete suggestions made today.
107._ I just wanted to thankyou the Chair, for the opportunity.
CHAIRPERSON'S CLOSING REMARKS
108._ Thank you, DDG Hill, for those observations.
109._ I think we have had a constructive and efficient meeting.
110._ I have taken good note of your interventions and suggestions. As you
know, last year's Appraisal in document _WT/TPR/500 contains an explicit reference to the understanding among Members
that the TPRB can address and decide on specific items for improvement during
the period before the next Appraisal which Members agreed should take place no
later than 2027. In this respect, and taking into account your comments today,
I will consult with delegations in the weeks to come on how we might approach
this in the most appropriate and constructive manner.
111._ Finally, allow me just to make a brief remark on the participation
in this Report. The ability of the monitoring exercise to deliver factual and
up-to-date information depends, to a very large extent, on the input of
Members, in terms of providing and verifying information which can often only
be obtained from you, the Members. Overall, the Secretariat receives good
cooperation from a large number of delegations. However, some regions remain
chronically underrepresented in the provision of requested information.
112._ For the current Report, there was a participation rate of under 50%
of the membership, representing approximately 77% of world imports. This is,
frankly, too low a participation rate given how important transparency and
predictability are for policymakers and business alike.
113._ In other words, there is room for improvement, and I urge you to
redouble your efforts to participate and assist the Secretariat in ensuring the
high quality and accuracy of the Monitoring Reports.
114._ Before I close the meeting, I would like to remind you that the next
TPRB meeting will take place the day after tomorrow, on 13 December 2024, with
the second day of the TPR of the Solomon Islands. I look forward to seeing you
again then and I wish you all a very good evening.
115._ I hereby call this meeting closed. Thank you for
your participation.
__________