NOTIFICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER
ARTICLES 18.5 AND 32.6 OF THE AGREEMENTS
replies to QUESTIONS POSED BY China[1] REGARDING THE NOTIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES
[2]
The following communication,
dated and received on 6 May 2025, is being circulated at the request of the
delegation of the United States.
_______________
The United
States thanks China for its questions regarding the notification by the United
States, and provides the following responses:
Question 1
The newly added 19
CFR Sec. 351.108 (a) stipulates that "(a)ll merchandise from the nonmarket
economy exported to the United States and subject to an antidumping proceeding
by entities in the nonmarket economy determined by the Secretary on the basis
of record information to be part of the government-controlled entity may be
assigned the antidumping cash deposit or assessment rate applied to the
government-controlled entity." However, the panel in US – ANTI‑DUMPING METHODOLOGIES
(CHINA) (DS471) found that the Single Rate Presumption is a norm of general and
prospective application inconsistent "as such" with Arts. 6.10
and 9.2, and that the application of the Single Rate Presumption in the 38
challenged determinations was inconsistent "as applied". The United
States didn't appeal on such findings. Please elaborate the United States'
considerations for formally incorporating the Single Rate Presumption norm
which has be found inconsistent with the WTO Rules by an effective DSB report
into its Federal Regulations.
Reply:
China's
statement that 19 CFR § 351.108(a) "incorporate[es] the Single Rate
Presumption" is incorrect. Section 351.108(a) indicates, "When the
Secretary determines that a country is a nonmarket economy country in an
antidumping proceeding pursuant to section 771(18) of the Act, the Secretary may
determine that all entities located in that nonmarket economy country are
subject to government control and thus part of a single, government-controlled
entity" (underline added).
Question 2
The newly added 19 CFR Sec. 351.109(f)(2)(ii)
stipulates that "(i)f the Secretary determines that weight-averaging
calculated dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates established for
individually investigated exporters or producers could result in the
inadvertent release of proprietary information among the individually
investigated exporters or producers", the Secretary will compare the
simple-average and weighted‑average dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates for
the individually investigated exporters or producers using public data, and
apply the one that is numerically the closest to the weighted average rate
calculated using the business proprietary data. Please confirm:
(1) if it's possible that an all-others rate calculated
using the above methodology higher than the weighted average rate of the
selected (or individually investigated) exporters or producers and,
(2) if yes, how such methodology could be
consistent with Art. 9.4 (i) of the Anti‑dumping Agreement.
Reply:
China's question is based on a hypothetical situation. The United
States respectfully declines to respond to speculative matters not in
existence. U.S. laws are fully consistent with all
WTO obligations, including obligations set out in the AD Agreement.
Question 3
The newly added 19 CFR Sec.
351.109(f)(2)(iii) stipulates that "(i)f the estimated weighted average
dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates established for all
individually investigated exporters and producers are zero, de minimis, or determined entirely under
section 776 of the Act, the Secretary may use any reasonable method to
establish an all-others rate for exporters and producers not individually
examined, including averaging the estimated weighted average dumping margins or
countervailable subsidy rates determined for the individually investigated
exporters and producers."
(1)_
Will this methodology violate Art. 9.4 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement, as the zero, de minimis and facts-available-based dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates, which are determined for the individually investigated exporters and
producers, are not "disregarded" as required?
(2)_ How will the U.S. investigating authority
average "the estimated weighted average" dumping margins or subsidy rates?
(3)_ Has the U.S. investigating authority
envisaged any other "reasonable method" to establish the all others
rates?
Reply:
U.S.
laws are fully consistent with all WTO obligations, including obligations set
out in Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement. Under 19 CFR 351.109(f)(2)(iii), if the
countervailable subsidy rates or estimated weighted average dumping margins
established for all exporters and producers individually investigated are zero
or de minimis rates, or are determined
entirely under section 776, the administering authority may use any reasonable
method to establish an all-others rate for exporters and producers not individually
investigated, including averaging the weighted average countervailable subsidy rates
or estimated weighted average dumping margins determined for the exporters and
producers individually investigated. As explained in the Proposed Rule, the Statement of
Administrative Action Accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (SAA) "provides
that 'the expected method is for Commerce to weight-average such rates to
determine the non-selected respondents' rate.' However, the SAA also states
that if the expected method 'is not feasible, or if it results in an average
that would not be reasonably reflective of potential dumping margins for non‑investigated
exporters or producers, Commerce may use other reasonable methods.'" 89 Fed. Reg.
57299. Any determination to use any other reasonable method will be fact
specific.
Question 4
The newly added 19 CFR Sec. 351.109 (d)
stipulates that "(t)he Secretary may waive individual examination of an
exporter or producer selected to be an examined respondent if both the selected
respondent and the petitioner file waiver requests for that selected respondent
no later than five days after the Secretary has selected respondents."
Please explain the purpose of this paragraph, and elaborate why such an
artificial selection of sampled respondents could be consistent with Art. 6.10
of the Anti-dumping Agreement.
Reply:
Under 19 CFR
351.109(d), Commerce may waive individual examination of an exporter or
producer if both the selected respondent and petitioner file waiver requests
for that exporter or producer no later than five days after Commerce has selected
respondents. When Commerce limits its examination to a reasonable number of
exporters or producers, Commerce determines the exporters or producers to be
examined based on either a sample of exporters or producers that is statistically
valid based on record information or the number of respondents that can be
reasonably examined based on the largest volume of exports of subject
merchandise from the exporting country. Use of the waiver provision under 19
CFR 351.109(d) is not limited to when Commerce selects respondents based on
sampling; that is, as indicated in the Proposed
Rule:, "[i]f Commerce determines to provide such a waiver and
had selected the waived respondent based on an analysis of the largest
exporters or producers, proposed § 351.109(d) provides that Commerce could
select the next largest exporter or producer to replace the waived respondent."
89 Fed. Reg. at 57297.
Question 5
The revised 19 CFR Sec. 351.301 (c)(3)(i)(B)
stipulates that "(a)ll submissions of factual information to measure the
adequacy of remuneration under Sec. 351.511(a)(2) in a countervailing duty
investigation are due no later than 45 days before the scheduled date of the
preliminary determination." Please clarify that, if a new allegation on
subsidy programs related with the adequacy of remuneration after this deadline,
will the interested parties be granted any extension for providing related factual
information?
Reply:
In
the Final Rule, Commerce explained that if a new subsidy "less than
adequate remuneration" (LTAR) allegation is filed on or near the due date
specified in 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(c)(2)(iv)(A), and the deadlines for benchmark
information submissions have passed or are imminent, Commerce will determine
that such deadlines do not apply to those allegations and would likely
establish a separate schedule for the interested parties to provide them with
sufficient time to submit benchmark information. See 89 Fed. Reg. at 101711.
Question 6
The revised 19 CFR Sec. 351.525 (b)(6)(v)
stipulates that "(i)f there is cross-ownership between a corporation
providing electricity, natural gas or other similar utility product and a
producer of subject merchandise, the Secretary will attribute subsidies
received by that provider to the combined sales of that provider and the sales
of products sold by the producer of subject merchandise if at least one of the
following two conditions are met: (A) a substantial percentage, normally
defined as 25% or more, of the production of the cross-owned utility provider
is provided to the producer of subject merchandise, or (B) the producer of
subject merchandise purchases a substantial percentage, normally defined as 25%
or more, of its electricity, natural gas, or other similar utility product from
the cross-owned provider." Please explain the reason why the U.S. chooses
thresholds of 25%?
Reply:
As Commerce
explained in the Final Rule, the purpose of this regulation "is to provide
both clarity to the public with respect to the agency's treatment of
cross-owned utility providers and to provide more consistency in Commerce's
treatment of cross-owned utility providers." 89 Fed. Reg. at 101743. The
25 percent threshold also "provides useful regulatory guidance that will
assist Commerce in determining which cross-owned companies need to provide full
questionnaire responses." Id. Commerce further noted that, in its view, "a
utility company providing 25 percent of its output to one company indicates a
significant level of dependency and dedication to one customer, and a company
that purchases 25 percent of its energy needs from one supplier has also become
engaged in a significant supplier relationship." Id.
Question 7
The revised 19 CFR Sec. 351.525 (d)
stipulates that "(f)or countries experiencing an inflation rate greater
than 25% per annum during the
relevant period, the Secretary will normally adjust the benefit amount
(numerator) and the sales data (denominator) to account for the rate of
inflation during the relevant period of investigation or review in calculating
the ad valorem subsidy rate." Please explain how will the investigating
authority do the adjustment, and why the threshold of 25% per annum is chosen.
Reply:
How Commerce will normally adjust the benefit
amount (numerator) and the sales data (denominator) for countries experiencing
an inflation rate greater than 25 percent per
annum during the relevant period is explained in great detail in the
Final Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 101749-101751. Please refer to those pages of the
Final Rule for a response to this question. As further explained in the Final
Rule, Commerce's past administrative experience led it to determine that an
inflation rate of 25 percent constitutes "high inflation." 89 Fed.
Reg. at 101750.
Question 8
The revised 19 CFR Sec. 351.526 (d)
stipulates that the deadline to rebut the presumption that non-recurring
subsidies continue to benefit a recipient in full over an allocation period
notwithstanding an intervening change in ownership shall be the same as the
respondent's or government's initial questionnaire response. Please clarify,
with respect to programs initiated upon new allegations or found in the
investigation, if the respondent or government will have any extension for
submitting relevant information.
Reply:
The United
States understands China's question to be asking about 19 C.F.R. 351.526(b)(4),
which addresses deadlines. As explained in the Final Rule, Commerce generally
agrees it would be appropriate to permit additional time to provide rebuttal
information with respect to a new subsidy allegation raised concerning a change
in ownership, and will consider what alternative deadlines would be appropriate
on a case-by-case basis such that all interested parties have an opportunity to
present relevant evidence and fully defend their interests. See 89 Fed. Reg. at
101753.
__________
[1] _G/ADP/Q1/USA/37 – _G/SCM/Q1/USA/37
[2] _G/ADP/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.38 – _G/SCM/N/1/USA/1/Suppl.39