At this year’s G7 summit, world leaders reconfirmed the de-risking approach with China, rather than just decoupling. The primary purpose of the de-risking policy is to reduce the economic risks with respect of national security due to over-dependency on authoritarian partners such as China and Russia. National security includes the ability to respond to unexpected risks and the risk of trading with partners with different values. In a few core critical sectors such as advanced semiconductors and AI, the preferred strategy for democratic countries to promote supply chain de-risking would be decoupling. This that implies Taiwan and democratic countries are working to create a "China-free" supply chain model.
For non-critical sectors (those with low national security risks, such as home appliances, clothing and food), it is in most cases business as usual. However, topics such as the prevention of forced labor as well as carbon emissions, still produce profound impact on the re-shaping of the global supply network. One example is the proposed EU Forced Labour Regulation that authorizes customs authorities to prohibit products with forced labour from entering the EU.
Another example is that since 2021 the EU and US have been negotiating a steel and aluminum agreement, incorporating carbon intensity reduction obligations to manage the entry of steel from producers that lack relevant environmental standards. China is envisaged as the main target.
These rules aim to ensuring that universal values like environmental and labor justice are not compromised for any reason. Although these regulatory reforms are not directly targeting China, the fact that China is the “world's factory,” with growing disputes of labor and environmental abuse, implies that some supply chains are likely to reduce their presence in China. This is a non-national security economic risk that business communities need to recognize too.
Western consensus
Taiwan is a leader in economic de-risking against China. Manufacturing investment of Taiwan to China started to decline about 10 years before the US and EU, who consider China a strategic competitor. In 2022, Taiwan’s investment to China stands at around $4.5 billion, which is just one-third of the peak value of $14 billion in 2010. Overall, China once accounted for 83.3% of Taiwan's outbound investment in 2010, and this has fallen to 34.7% in 2022. To the contrary, Taiwan's investment to other regions has been growing and outperforming investment to China.