United
States – Conditional Tax Incentives
for Large Civil Aircraft
Report of the Panel
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction.. 14
1.1 Complaint by the European Union. 14
1.2 Panel establishment and composition. 14
1.3 Panel proceedings. 14
1.3.1 General 14
1.3.2 Changes to the timetable. 15
1.3.3 Additional Working Procedures for the
Protection of Business Confidential Information (BCI) and Highly Sensitive
Business Information (HSBI) 16
1.3.4 Additional Working Procedures for the
Partial Opening to the Public of the Meetings of the Panel 16
2 Factual aspects. 16
3 Parties' requests for
findings and recommendations. 17
4 Arguments of the
parties. 17
5 Arguments of the third
parties. 17
6 Interim review... 17
7 Findings. 22
7.1 Introduction. 22
7.2 Function of the Panel, Burden of Proof,
and Treaty Interpretation. 22
7.2.1 Function of the Panel 22
7.2.2 Burden of proof 23
7.2.3 Treaty interpretation. 24
7.3 Description and background of the
measures at issue. 25
7.3.1 Aerospace tax measures. 25
7.3.1.1 Measures related to the B&O tax. 26
7.3.1.2 Exemptions from sales and use taxes. 27
7.3.1.3 Exemptions from taxes imposed on
certain leaseholds. 28
7.3.2 Siting provisions. 28
7.3.2.1 First Siting Provision. 28
7.3.2.2 Second Siting Provision. 29
7.3.3 Legislative background and scope of the
measures at issue. 30
7.4 Existence of a subsidy under Article 1 of
the SCM Agreement 32
7.4.1 Arguments of the parties. 32
7.4.2 Third-party views. 33
7.4.3 Whether there is a financial
contribution as "government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or
not collected". 33
7.4.3.1 B&O aerospace tax rate. 35
7.4.3.2 B&O tax credit for aerospace
product development 42
7.4.3.3 B&O tax credit for property and
leasehold excise taxes. 45
7.4.3.4 Computer sales and use tax exemptions. 48
7.4.3.5 Construction sales and use tax
exemptions. 51
7.4.3.6 Leasehold excise tax exemption. 52
7.4.3.7 Leaseholder property tax exemption. 55
7.4.3.8 Conclusion on financial contribution. 56
7.4.4 Whether a benefit is thereby conferred. 58
7.4.5 Conclusion under Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement 59
7.5 Whether the challenged measures are
prohibited subsidies under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement 59
7.5.1 Arguments of the parties. 60
7.5.1.1 European Union. 60
7.5.1.2 United States. 62
7.5.2 Third-party views. 63
7.5.3 Order of analysis. 66
7.5.4 Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement 67
7.5.4.1 Prohibited subsidies. 67
7.5.4.2 Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994. 68
7.5.4.3 Contingency. 68
7.5.4.4 Other interpretive issues. 71
7.5.5 Relevant facts for the assessment of
the alleged contingency. 74
7.5.5.1 The siting provisions of ESSB 5952. 74
7.5.5.2 Products at issue. 77
7.5.5.3 Other relevant facts on record. 82
7.5.6 Whether the subsidies are de jure contingent upon the use of domestic over imported
goods 83
7.5.6.1 The First Siting Provision,
considered separately. 85
7.5.6.2 The Second Siting Provision,
considered separately. 89
7.5.6.3 The First Siting Provision and the
Second Siting Provision, considered jointly. 91
7.5.7 Whether the subsidies are de facto contingent upon the use of domestic over imported
goods 92
7.5.7.1 Legal standard. 93
7.5.7.2 The Panel's approach to address the
European Union's claim.. 93
7.5.7.3 The First and Second Siting
Provisions. 96
8 Conclusions and Recommendation.. 105
8.1 Conclusions. 105
8.2 Recommendation. 106
List of Annexes
ANNEX A
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL
|
Contents
|
Page
|
|
Annex A-1
|
Working
Procedures of the Panel
|
A-2
|
|
Annex A-2
|
Additional Procedures on BCI and HSBI
|
A-7
|
|
Annex A-3
|
Additional Working Procedures for the partial opening
to the public of the meeting of the Panel
|
A-19
|
|
Annex A-4
|
Additional Working Procedures for the partial opening
to the public of the second meeting of the Panel
|
A-21
|
ANNEX B
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
|
Contents
|
Page
|
|
Annex B-1
|
First
integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union
|
B-2
|
|
Annex B-2
|
Second
integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union
|
B-10
|
|
Annex B-3
|
First
integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States
|
B-20
|
|
Annex B-4
|
Second
integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States
|
B-28
|
ANNEX C
ARGUMENTS OF The THIRD PARTIES
|
Contents
|
Page
|
|
Annex C-1
|
Integrated
executive summary of the arguments of Australia
|
C-2
|
|
Annex C-2
|
Integrated
executive summary of the arguments of Brazil
|
C-4
|
|
Annex C-3
|
Integrated
executive summary of the arguments of Canada
|
C-8
|
|
Annex C-4
|
Integrated
executive summary of the arguments of China
|
C-11
|
|
Annex C-5
|
Integrated
executive summary of the arguments of Japan
|
C-13
|
ANNEX d
PRocedural
RULINGS
|
Contents
|
Page
|
|
Annex D-1
|
Letter from the Panel, 15 January 2016
|
D-2
|
|
Annex D-2
|
Letter from the Panel, 4 May 2016
|
D-3
|
WTO CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
|
Short title
|
Full case title and citation
|
|
Australia – Automotive Leather II
|
Panel Report, Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of
Automotive Leather, WT/DS126/R,
adopted 16 June 1999, DSR 1999:III, p. 951
|
|
Brazil – Aircraft
|
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III,
p. 1161
|
|
Brazil – Aircraft
|
Panel
Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/R, adopted 20 August 1999, as modified
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS46/AB/R, DSR 1999:III, p. 1221
|
|
Canada – Aircraft
|
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III,
p. 1377
|
|
Canada – Aircraft
|
Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
WT/DS70/R, adopted 20 August 1999, upheld by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS70/AB/R, DSR 1999:IV, p. 1443
|
|
Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil)
|
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft –
Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, DSR 2000:IX,
p. 4299
|
|
Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees
|
Panel Report, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft,
WT/DS222/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 February 2002,
DSR 2002:III, p. 849
|
|
Canada – Autos
|
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VI, p.
2985
|
|
Canada – Periodicals
|
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 July 1997, DSR 1997:I, p.
449
|
|
Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program
|
Appellate
Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the
Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the
Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, DSR
2013:I, p. 7
|
|
China – Auto Parts
|
Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2009, DSR
2009:I, p. 3
|
|
Colombia – Ports of Entry
|
Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry,
WT/DS366/R and Corr.1, adopted 20 May 2009, DSR
2009:VI, p. 2535
|
|
EC – Hormones
|
Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I,
p. 135
|
|
EC and
certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft
|
Appellate
Body Report, European Communities and
Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p. 7
|
|
EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft
|
Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R, adopted 1 June 2011, as modified by Appellate Body
Report, WT/DS316/AB/R, DSR 2011:II, p. 685
|
|
India – Patents (US)
|
Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 9
|
|
Indonesia – Autos
|
Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, Corr.1 and Corr.2, adopted 23 July
1998, and Corr.3 and Corr.4, DSR 1998:VI, p. 2201
|
|
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II
|
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 97
|
|
Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
|
Panel Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from
Korea, WT/DS336/R,
adopted 17 December 2007, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS336/AB/R,
DSR 2007:VII, p. 2805
|
|
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages
|
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999, DSR 1999:I,
p. 3
|
|
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages
|
Panel Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/R, WT/DS84/R, adopted 17 February 1999, as modified by Appellate Body
Report WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, DSR 1999:I, p. 44
|
|
US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods
|
Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods
(OCTG) from Mexico, WT/DS282/AB/R, adopted 28 November 2005, DSR 2005:XX, p. 10127
|
|
US – Carbon Steel
|
Appellate
Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002,
DSR 2002:IX, p. 3779
|
|
US – Carbon Steel (India)
|
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon
Steel Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 19 December 2014, DSR 2014:V, p. 1727
|
|
US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Sunset Review
|
Appellate
Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of
Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from
Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3
|
|
US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures (China)
|
Appellate
Body Report, United States – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 22 July 2014, DSR
2014:VIII, p. 3027
|
|
US – FSC
|
Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations", WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, DSR 2000:III,
p. 1619
|
|
US – FSC
|
Panel
Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/R, adopted 20 March 2000, as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS108/AB/R, DSR 2000:IV, p. 1675
|
|
US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)
|
Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations" – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European
Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 January 2002, DSR 2002:I,
p. 55
|
|
US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)
|
Panel
Report, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations" – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
European Communities, WT/DS108/RW, adopted 29 January 2002, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS108/AB/RW, DSR 2002:I, p. 119
|
|
US – Gambling
|
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663
(and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
|
|
US – Hot-Rolled Steel
|
Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
|
|
US – Hot-Rolled Steel
|
Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan, WT/DS184/R,
adopted 23 August 2001 modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS184/AB/R, DSR
2001:X, p. 4769
|
|
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint)
|
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
(Second Complaint), WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012, DSR 2012:I, p. 7
|
|
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint)
|
Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
(Second Complaint), WT/DS353/R,
adopted 23 March 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS353/AB/R,
DSR 2012:II, p. 649
|
|
US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)
|
Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 January 2003,
DSR 2003:I, p. 375
|
|
US – Poultry (China)
|
Panel Report, United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from
China, WT/DS392/R, adopted 25 October 2010, DSR
2010:V, p. 1909
|
|
US – Shrimp
|
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755
|
|
US – Softwood Lumber IV
|
Appellate
Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR
2004:II, p. 571
|
|
US – Upland Cotton
|
Panel
Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/R, Add.1 to Add.3 and Corr.1, adopted 21
March 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS267/AB/R, DSR 2005:II,
p. 299
|
|
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses
|
Appellate
Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports
of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, and Corr.1, DSR
1997:I, p. 323
|
GATT CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT
|
Short Title
|
Full Case Title and Citation
|
|
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I
|
GATT Panel Report, Japan –
Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic
Beverages, L/6216, adopted 10 November 1987,
BISD 34S/83
|
|
US – Section 337 Tariff Act
|
GATT Panel Report, United
States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, adopted
7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345
|
|
US – Superfund
|
GATT Panel Report, United
States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
L/6175, adopted 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136
|
EXHIBITS
REFERRED TO IN THIS REPORT
|
Panel
Exhibit
|
Title
|
Short
Title
|
|
EU-3
|
Engrossed Substitute
Senate Bill 5952, Chapter 2, Laws of 2013 3rd Special Session,
2014 Wash. Sess. Laws 2
|
ESSB 5952
|
|
EU-4
|
Final Bill Report ESSB
5952
|
ESSB 5952 Final Bill
Report
|
|
EU-5
|
Department of Revenue
Fiscal Note (5952 SB)
|
ESSB 5952 Fiscal Note
|
|
EU-21
|
House Bill 2294, 2003
Wash. Sess. Laws 2767
|
HB 2294
|
|
EU-22
|
RCW
82.04.260: Tax on manufacturers and processors of various
foods and by-products – Research and development organizations – Travel
agents – Certain international activities – Stevedoring and associated
activities – Low-level waste disposers – Insurance producers, surplus line
brokers, and title insurance agents – Hospitals – Commercial airplane
activities – Timber product activities – Canned salmon processors. (Effective
until July 1, 2015.)
|
RCW
Section 82.04.260
|
|
EU-23
|
RCW
82.04.4461: Credit – Preproduction development
expenditures. (Expires July 1, 2040.)
|
RCW
Section 82.04.4461
|
|
EU-24
|
RCW
82.04.4463: Credit – Property and leasehold taxes paid on property used for
manufacture of commercial airplanes. (Expires July 1, 2040.)
|
RCW
Section 82.04.4463
|
|
EU-25
|
RCW 82.08.975: Exemptions – Computer parts and
software related to the manufacture of commercial airplanes. (Expires July 1,
2040.)
|
RCW
Section 82.08.975
|
|
EU-26
|
RCW 82.12.975: Computer parts and software
related to the manufacture of commercial airplanes. (Expires July 1, 2040.)
|
RCW
Section 82.12.975
|
|
EU-27
|
RCW 82.08.980: Exemptions – Labor, services, and
personal property related to the manufacture of commercial airplanes.
(Expires July 1, 2040.)
|
RCW
Section 82.08.980
|
|
EU-28
|
RCW 82.12.980: Exemptions – Labor, services, and
personal property related to the manufacture of commercial airplanes.
(Expires July 1, 2040.)
|
RCW
Section 82.12.980
|
|
EU-29
|
RCW 82.29A.137: Exemptions – Certain leasehold
interests related to the manufacture of superefficient airplanes. (Expires
July 1, 2040.)
|
RCW
Section 82.29A.137
|
|
EU-30
|
RCW 84.36.655: Property related to the
manufacture of superefficient airplanes. (Expires July 1, 2040.)
|
RCW Section 84.36.655
|
|
EU-32
|
RCW 82.04.220: Business and occupation tax
imposed.
|
RCW Section 82.04.220
|
|
EU-33
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Business & occupation tax
|
B&O Tax Explanation,
Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
EU-35
|
House Bill 2466, 2006
Wash. Sess. Laws 787
|
HB
2466
|
|
EU-36
|
RCW 82.04.240: Tax on manufacturers. (Contingent
expiration date.)
|
RCW Section 82.04.240
|
|
EU-37
|
RCW 82.04.450: Value of products, how determined.
|
RCW Section 82.04.450
|
|
EU-38
|
RCW 82.04.250: Tax on retailers.
|
RCW Section 82.04.250
|
|
EU-39
|
RCW 82.04.270: Tax on wholesalers.
|
RCW Section 82.04.270
|
|
EU-40
|
RCW 82.04.070: "Gross proceeds of
sales".
|
RCW Section 82.04.070
|
|
EU-41
|
WAC 458-20-19301: Multiple activities tax
credits.
|
WAC Section 458-20-19301
|
|
EU-42
|
Substitute Senate Bill
6828, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 365
|
SSB 6828
|
|
EU-44
|
Snohomish County Council, Executive/Council
Approval Form, 25 July 2012
|
Snohomish County Council, Lease Approval
|
|
EU-45
|
Paine Field Community Council, Meeting Minutes,
November 12, 2013
|
Paine Field Community Council, Minutes of Meeting of
12 November 2013
|
|
EU-48
|
The Seattle Times,
"State gave Boeing a free pass on $19.5M in sales tax", by Jim
Brunner, originally published November 29, 2015 / Updated November 30, 2015
|
The Seattle Times,
"State gave Boeing a free pass on $19.5M in sales tax", 30 November
2015
|
|
EU-49
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Leasehold excise tax
|
Leasehold Excise Tax,
Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
EU-50
|
WAC 458-29A-100: Leasehold
excise tax – Overview and definitions.
|
WAC Section 458-29A-100
|
|
EU-51
|
Washington State
Department of Revenue, Personal Property Tax, December 2012
|
Personal Property Tax,
Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
EU-58
|
RCW 82.32.850: Significant commercial airplane
manufacturing – Tax preference – Contingent effective date.
|
RCW
Section 82.32.850
|
|
EU-59
|
Office of Washington Governor – Jay Inslee,
"Legislature approves key elements of 777X incentive package", 10
November 2013
|
Office of Washington Governor, "Legislature
approves key elements of 777X incentive package", 10 November 2013
|
|
EU-61
|
Notification Letter from
Carol K. Nelson, Director, Washington State Department of Revenue, to Kyle
Thiessen, Washington State Code Reviser, 10 July 2014
|
Letter from the Director
of the Washington State Department of Revenue to the Code Reviser, 10 July
2014
|
|
EU-62
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Tax Classifications for Common Business Activities
|
Tax Classifications for Common
Business Activities, Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
EU-65
|
Reuters, "Boeing seen
in advanced talks to make 777X near Seattle", by Tim Hepher and Alwyn
Scott, 4 November 2013
|
Reuters, "Boeing seen
in advanced talks to make 777X near Seattle", 4 November 2013
|
|
EU-78
|
Boeing Presentation,
"Introducing the 787", by Tom Dodt, September 2011
|
Boeing Presentation,
"Introducing the 787", September 2011
|
|
EU-79
|
Boeing, "Randy's
Journal: Arrivals", posted on 22 May 2007
|
Boeingblogs, "Randy's
Journal: Arrivals", 22 May 2007
|
|
EU-82
|
RCW 82.32.550:
"Commercial airplane," "component," and
"superefficient airplane" – Definitions.
|
RCW Section 82.32.550(3)
|
|
EU-83
|
Reuters, "Boeing hopeful of 777X deal, may build
wings in Japan if rejected", 11 November 2013
|
Reuters, "Boeing hopeful of 777X deal, may build
wings in Japan if rejected", 11 November 2013
|
|
EU-84
|
Airbus, "How is an
aircraft built? Production"
|
Airbus, "How is an
aircraft built? Production"
|
|
EU-86
|
Airbus, "How is an
aircraft built? Final assembly and tests"
|
Airbus, "How is an
aircraft built? Final assembly and tests"
|
|
EU-87
|
Airbus Video, "The A350
XWB Final Assembly Line: efficiency in motion", 23 October 2012
|
Airbus Video, "The A350
XWB Final Assembly Line: efficiency in motion", 23 October 2012
|
|
EU-88
|
Airbus Video, "A350 XWB
final assembly: a step-by-step overview", 23 October 2012
|
Airbus Video, "A350 XWB
final assembly: a step-by-step overview", 23 October 2012
|
|
EU-91
|
BBC Documentary, "How to
Build A Super Jumbo Wing", 24 August 2013
|
BBC Documentary, "How to
Build A Super Jumbo Wing", 24 August 2013
|
|
EU-92
|
RCW 82.08.020: Tax imposed – Retail sales –
Retail car rental. (Contingent expiration date.)
|
RCW Section 82.08.020
|
|
EU-95
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, 2016 Tax Exemption Study: A Study of Tax Exemptions,
Exclusions or Deductions From the Base of a Tax; a Credit Against a Tax; a
Deferral of a Tax; or a Preferential Tax Rate: As Authorized by RCW 43.06.400
|
2016 Tax Exemption Study,
Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
EU-97
|
Boeing Video,
"Boeing 747 Dreamlifter", 17 January 2009
|
Boeing Video, "Boeing
747 Dreamlifter", 17 January 2009
|
|
EU-104
|
Airbus Video,
"A380 from dream to reality: Final assembly", 18 October 2007
|
Airbus Video, "A380 from
dream to reality: Final assembly", 18 October 2007
|
|
EU-110
|
Washington State House Finance Committee,
Video, "Testimony of Governor Inslee before House Finance
Committee", 7 November 2013
|
Washington State House Finance Committee, Video,
"Testimony of Governor Inslee before House Finance Committee", 7
November 2013
|
|
EU-121
|
The Seattle Times,
"Boeing must disclose tax-break savings, state Department of Revenue
rules", by Jim Brunner, originally published January 7, 2016 / Updated
January 8, 2016
|
The Seattle Times,
"Boeing must disclose tax-break savings, state Department of Revenue
rules", 8 January 2016
|
|
EU-122
|
Boeing Frontiers,
"Supersize! The 747-700 will be transformed into an even larger
freighter to save significant time and costs in transporting 787
assemblies", by Tom Koehler, June 2005
|
Boeing Frontiers,
"The 747-700 will be transformed into an even larger freighter",
June 2005
|
|
USA-1
|
[[BCI]]
|
Boeing
expert statement (BCI)
|
|
USA-2
|
[[BCI]]
|
Boeing, Make/Buy Model
777-300ER, July 2007 (BCI)
|
|
USA-6
|
Boeing Backgrounder, "The Boeing 777 Family:
Preferred by Passengers and Airlines around the World", April 2015
|
Boeing 777 Backgrounder
|
|
USA-8
|
[[BCI]]
|
Boeing, 777X Make/Buy, All
Commodities, Status as of 17 December 2014 (BCI)
|
|
USA-11
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Question: What are the major B&O tax classifications?
|
Question: What are the
major B&O tax classifications?, Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
USA-12
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Retail Sales Tax
|
Retail Sales Tax
Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
USA-13
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Services subject to sales tax
|
Services Subject to Sales
Tax, Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
USA-14
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Digital Products including Digital Goods
|
Digital Products including
Digital Goods, Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
USA-15
|
Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary on Historical Principles, 5th
edition, Volume 2, p. 2044
|
Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 5th edition, Volume 2, p. 2044
|
|
USA-16
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Local Sales, Use Tax Rates and Changes (Effective January 1
– March 31, 2016)
|
Local Sales, Use Tax Rates
and Changes, Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
USA-17
|
RCW 82.12.020: Use tax imposed. (Effective until January 1, 2016.)
|
RCW Section 82.12.020
|
|
USA-18
|
RCW 82.12.035: Credit for retail sales or use
taxes paid to other jurisdictions with respect to property used. (Effective until January 1, 2016.)
|
RCW Section 82.12.035
|
|
USA-19
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Use Tax
|
Use Tax Explanation,
Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
USA-20
|
RCW 84.36.005: Property subject to taxation
|
RCW Section 84.36.005
|
|
USA-21
|
RCW 84.36.010: Public, certain public-private and
tribal property exempt. (Effective
until January 1, 2022.)
|
RCW Section 84.36.010
|
|
USA-22
|
RCW 84.36.020: Cemeteries, churches, parsonages,
convents, and grounds. (Effective
until December 31, 2020.)
|
RCW Section 84.36.020
|
|
USA-23
|
RCW 84.36.477: Business inventories.
|
RCW Section 84.36.477
|
|
USA-25
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, Leasehold excise tax
|
Leasehold Excise Tax
Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue
|
|
USA-26
|
RCW 82.29A.030: Tax imposed—Credit—Additional tax
imposed. (Effective until January 1, 2019.)
|
RCW Section 82.29A.030
|
|
USA-28
|
Le Nouveau Petit Robert, 2009, pp. 2034-2035
|
Le Nouveau Petit Robert, 2009, pp. 2034-2035
|
|
USA-29
|
Diccionario de la Lengua Española, 2001, pp. 1839-1840
|
Diccionario de la Lengua Española, 2001, pp. 1839-1840
|
|
USA-30
|
Boeing, 777X Content Sources,
Major Structures & Propulsion, Status as of 27 October 2015
|
Boeing, 777X Content Sources,
Major Structures & Propulsion, Status as of 27 October 2015 (BCI)
|
|
USA-31
|
RCW 82.04.440: Credit – Persons taxable on
multiple activities.
|
RCW
Section 82.04.440
|
|
USA-32
|
[[BCI]]
|
Boeing letter to the
Director of the Washington State Department of Revenue (BCI), 9 July
2014
|
|
USA-33
|
Collective Bargaining Agreement between Boeing and
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
of 2 November 2008, including Contract Extension and Modification Agreements
of 7 December 2011 and 3 January 2014
|
Collective Bargaining Agreement between Boeing and
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 2 November
2008, including Contract Extension and Modification Agreements, 7 December
2011 and 3 January 2014
|
|
USA-34
|
[[BCI]]
|
Addendum No. 14 to the 1991 Boeing Everett Mitigation
Decision Document SEPA #14-009, 27 March 2014 (BCI)
|
|
USA-35
|
[[BCI]]
|
Addendum No. 15 to the 1991 Boeing Everett Mitigation
Decision Document SEPA #14-011 – Composite Wing Manufacturing Facility, 30 May 2014
(BCI)
|
|
USA-37
|
RCW 82.04.120: "To manufacture".
|
RCW Section 82.04.120
|
|
USA-38
|
Supreme Court of Washington, Citizens Alliance
for Property Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County et al. (2015)
|
Supreme Court of Washington, Citizens Alliance
for Property Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County et al. (2015)
|
|
USA-42
|
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Boeing 787
|
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Boeing 787
|
|
|
|
|
|
USA-51
|
Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 6th edition, pp. 2044-2045
|
Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 6th edition, pp. 2044-2045
|
|
USA-52
|
Spirit AeroSystems,
"Spirit celebrates completion of first Boeing 737 MAX fuselage
|
Spirit AeroSystems,
"Spirit celebrates completion of first Boeing 737 MAX fuselage
|
|
USA-63
|
Chapter 1.04 RCW
|
Chapter 1.04 RCW
|
|
USA-64
|
Chapter 82.08 RCW: Retail Sales Tax
|
RCW Chapter 82.08
|
|
USA-65
|
Department of Revenue,
Washington State, 2016 Tax Exemption Study,
Introduction and Summary of Findings
|
2016 Tax Exemption Study,
Introduction and Summary of Findings, Washington State
Department of Revenue
|
|
USA-67
|
[[BCI]]
|
Boeing 787 customs invoice and
related shipment documentation (BCI)
|
|
USA-68
|
Boeing Frontiers,
"Wings around the world", by Adam Morgan, March 2006
|
Boeing Frontiers,
"Wings around the world", March 2006
|
|
USA-73
|
[[BCI]]
|
Email from Erik Zahn, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 15
April 2016 (BCI)
|
|
USA-84
|
Washington Court of Appeals, Nationscapital Mortgage
Corporation et al. v. Department of Financial Institutions, 133 Wn. App. 723,
737-738 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006), June 2006
|
Washington Court of Appeals, Nationscapital Mortgage
Corporation et al. v. Department of Financial Institutions, June 2006
|
ABBREVIATIONS
USED IN THis REPORT
|
Abbreviation
|
Description
|
|
B&O tax
|
Business and occupation tax
|
|
BCI
|
Business Confidential
Information
|
|
DSB
|
Dispute Settlement Body
|
|
DSU
|
Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
|
|
ESSB 5952
|
Washington State Legislature Engrossed
Substitute Senate Bill 5952
|
|
GATT 1994
|
General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994
|
|
HB 2294
|
Washington State Legislature House Bill 2294
|
|
HB 2466
|
Washington State Legislature House Bill 2466
|
|
HSBI
|
Highly Sensitive Business
Information
|
|
RCW
|
Revised Code of Washington
(Washington State)
|
|
SCM Agreement
|
Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures
|
|
SSB 6828
|
Washington State Substitute Senate Bill 6828
|
|
Vienna
Convention
|
Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 International
Legal Materials 679
|
|
WAC
|
Washington
Administrative Code (Washington State)
|
|
WTO
|
World
Trade Organization
|
1.1. On 19 December 2014, the European Union requested consultations with
the United States pursuant to Articles 4.1 and 30 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement);
Article XXIII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994),
to the extent incorporated by Article 30 of the SCM Agreement; and Article 4 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU), with respect to the measures and claims set out below.[1]
1.2. Consultations were held on 2 February 2015. These consultations did
not lead to a mutually satisfactory solution.[2]
1.3. On 12 February 2015, the European Union requested the establishment
of a panel pursuant to Articles 4.4 and 30 of the SCM Agreement, Article
XXIII:2 of the GATT 1994 (to the extent incorporated by Article 30 of the SCM
Agreement), and Article 6 of the DSU (as modified by Article 4.4 of the
SCM Agreement, and in light of Article 1.2 and Appendix 2 to the DSU), with
standard terms of reference.[3]
At its meeting on 23 February 2015, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established
a panel pursuant
to the request of the European Union, in accordance with the provisions of Article
4.4 of the SCM Agreement and Article 6
of the DSU, with standard terms of reference.[4]
1.4. The Panel's terms of reference are the following:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered
agreements cited by the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB
by the European Union in document WT/DS487/2 and to make such findings as will
assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided
for in those agreements.[5]
1.5. On 13 April 2015, the
European Union requested the
Director-General to determine the composition of the panel, pursuant to Article
8.7 of the DSU. On 22 April 2015, the Director-General accordingly
composed the Panel as follows:
Chairperson: Mr Daniel Moulis
Members: Mr
Terry Collins-Williams
Mr
Wilhelm Meier
1.6. Australia; Brazil; Canada; China; India; Japan; the Republic of Korea
(Korea); and the Russian Federation (Russia) notified their interest in
participating in the Panel proceedings as third parties.
1.7. The commencement of the Panel's work was delayed as a result of a
lack of available resources in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat.[6]
The parties were notified of this circumstance. The Panel held its
organizational meeting with the parties on 4 December 2015. After
consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures on
7 December 2015[7],
its timetable on 16 December 2015, and a revised timetable on 19 April 2016.
1.8. The European Union filed its first written submission on 9 December
2015. The United States filed its first written submission on 19 January 2016.
Third-party submissions were received on 26 January 2016 from Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, and Japan.
1.9. The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties on 24
and 25 February 2016. A session with the third parties took place on 25
February 2016, in which oral statements were made by Australia, Brazil, China,
and Japan. Written responses to questions posed by the Panel were received on 9
March 2016 from the European Union, the United States, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, and Japan.
1.10. The parties filed their second written submissions on 18 March 2016.
1.11. The Panel held a second substantive meeting with the parties on 5
April 2016. Written responses to questions posed by the Panel were received on
18 April 2016. Comments by the parties on each other's responses to questions
were received on 25 April 2016.
1.12. On 9 May 2016, the Panel issued the descriptive sections of its
draft report to the parties. Parties provided comments to the descriptive
sections of the Panel report on 17 May 2016.
1.13. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 6 July 2016. On
15 July 2016, the European Union and the United States each submitted written
requests for review of precise aspects of the interim report. Neither party
requested an interim review meeting. On 20 July 2016, each of the parties
submitted comments on the other's requests for review. The Panel issued its
Final Report to the parties on 29 July 2016.
1.14. On 5 January 2016, the United States requested an adjustment to the
timetable so that the deadline for the second written submission was set no
earlier than 25 March 2016 (one week later than originally scheduled). The
European Union commented on the United States' request on 7 January 2016.
On 15 January 2016, the Panel informed the parties that it had declined the
United States' request for an extension of the deadline for the second written
submissions.[8]
1.15. In the course of the second meeting with the parties on 5 April
2016, the Panel informed the parties that in order to have sufficient time to
assess the legal and factual issues in the dispute, the timetable would have to
be adjusted so that the interim report was issued to parties on 15 June
2016 and all subsequent dates were similarly adjusted. The parties had no
comments to this proposal. On 19 April 2016, the Panel issued the revised
timetable.
1.16. On 28 April 2016, the United States requested an opportunity to
comment on certain factual evidence and arguments that were submitted by the
European Union with its comments on the United States' responses to Panel
questions. The European Union commented on the United States' request on 2
May 2016. On 4 May 2016, the Panel informed the parties that it had declined
the United States' request.[9]
1.17. On 13 June 2016, the Panel informed the parties that it intended to
issue the interim report to parties on 6 July 2016 and to adjust all subsequent
dates similarly. The European Union submitted comments to this notice on 14
June. On 15 June 2016, the Panel issued a revised timetable.
1.18. On 12 July 2016, the United States requested a two-day extension for
parties to request the review of precise aspects of the interim report. On the same
date, the European Union communicated its agreement to the United States'
request, under the understanding that subsequent dates on the schedule would
not change. On 13 July 2016, the Panel informed the parties that it had extended
by two days the deadline for parties to request the review of precise aspects
of the interim report, and that subsequent deadlines had not been revised. The
Panel issued a revised timetable to the parties.
1.19. At the request of the United States, and having considered comments
from the European Union, the Panel adopted Additional Working Procedures
for the Protection of Business Confidential Information and Highly Sensitive
Business Information (BCI/HSBI Procedures) on 13 January 2016.[10]
1.20. On 22 February 2016 and 23 March 2016, at the request of the
United States, and noting the European Union's agreement, the Panel adopted
additional working procedures for the partial opening to the public of the
meetings of the Panel. These procedures provided for public viewing of a
video-recording of non-confidential portions of each meeting by means of
delayed broadcast. Closed sessions were foreseen for the parties to address BCI
or HSBI and for those third parties that had requested not to make their
statements in the video-recorded session for public viewing.[11]
The public screening of the video-recording of the non-confidential portions of
the Panel meetings took place on 17 and 18 May 2016.
2.1. The claims brought by the European Union concern tax-related provisions
for civil aircraft provided by the state of Washington in the United States, as
amended by Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5952 (ESSB 5952), Chapter 2, Laws of 2013 3rd Special Session, 2014 Wash. Sess.
Laws 2. Specifically, this dispute concerns the following tax-related
provisions contained in the Revised Code of Washington (RCW):
a.
a 0.2904% business
and occupation tax rate with respect to the manufacture or sale of commercial
airplanes, contained in RCW Section 82.04.260(11);
b.
tax credits for property
taxes and leasehold excise taxes on commercial airplane manufacturing
facilities, contained in RCW Section 82.04.4463;
c.
tax credits for
aerospace product development, contained in RCW Section 82.04.4461;
d.
sales tax
exemption for computer hardware, software, and peripherals, contained in RCW Section
82.08.975;
e.
sales tax
exemption for construction services and materials, contained in RCW Section 82.08.980;
f.
use tax exemption
for computer hardware, software, and peripherals, contained in RCW Section 82.12.975;
g.
use tax exemption
for construction services and materials, contained in RCW Section 82.12.980;
h.
leasehold excise
tax exemption, contained in RCW Section 82.29A.137; and
i.
leaseholder property
tax exemption, contained in RCW Section 84.36.655.
2.2. The European Union claims that the availability of the above tax
incentives is subject to the conditions in Sections 2, 5, and 6 of ESSB 5952
(as codified at RCW Sections 82.32.850 and 82.04.260(11)(e)(ii)). These
conditions relate to a decision on the initial siting of a "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" (as defined in the relevant
legislation[12])
in the state of Washington, as well as to the future siting outside the state
of Washington of "any final assembly or wing assembly of any version or variant
of a commercial airplane that is the basis of a siting of a significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program".[13]
3.1. The European Union requests that the Panel find that each of the challenged
Washington State tax incentives, as amended and extended by ESSB 5952, constitutes
a subsidy that is prohibited pursuant to Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM
Agreement due to being contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods.
The European Union further requests, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM
Agreement, that the Panel recommend that the United States withdraw the
subsidies without delay.
3.2. The United States requests that the Panel reject the European
Union's claims in this dispute and find that the challenged measures are not
inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of
the SCM Agreement.
4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflected in their executive
summaries, provided to the Panel in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Working
Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes B-1, B-2, B-3, and B-4).
5.1. The arguments of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, and Japan are
reflected in their executive summaries, provided in accordance with paragraph 21
of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4,
and C-5). India, Korea, and Russia did not submit written or oral arguments to
the Panel.
6.1. On 6 July 2016, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties.
On 15 July 2016, the European Union and the United States each submitted
written requests for review of precise aspects of the Interim Report. Neither
party requested an interim review meeting. On 20 July 2016, each of
the parties submitted comments on the other's requests for review.
6.2. In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this section sets out the
Panel's response to the parties' requests for review of precise aspects of the
Report made at the interim review stage. The parties' requests for substantive
modifications are discussed below, generally in sequence according to the
paragraphs to which the requests pertain.
6.3. The numbering of some of the paragraphs and footnotes in the Final
Report has changed from the numbering in the Interim Report. The discussion
below refers to the numbering in the Interim Report and, where it differs,
includes the corresponding numbering in the Final Report.
6.4. The United States notes that paragraph 7.4
summarizes the requests of the United States "but omits an issue raised by
the United States for the Panel's consideration regarding the Panel's terms of
reference". In particular, the United States requests inclusion of a
reference to its opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, in which
the United States noted that, prior to the establishment of this Panel, the
European Union had maintained that the measures at issue in this dispute were
properly within the terms of reference of the compliance panel in the
proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU in US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint).[14]
The United States identifies paragraph 7.41 of
the Interim Report (paragraph 7.39 of this Report) as "a logical place for
the Panel to address the terms of reference issue identified by the United States".[15]
The European Union considers that this is an inappropriate request for review
of an interim report and that it should be rejected by the Panel. The
European Union requests that, to the extent that the Panel elects to
include a discussion on the United States' statements related to terms of
reference, the Panel reflect "the United States' repeated statements that
it did not consider any of the measures to be outside the [Panel's] terms of
reference".[16]
The Panel declines the United States' request for inclusion of a reference to
this issue in the Panel's findings. In its statement to the Panel, the United
States explicitly clarified that "the United States does not itself consider
that any of the measures at issue are outside the Panel's terms of reference".[17]
Although the Panel recognizes that the vesting of jurisdiction is a fundamental
issue that may need to be considered even in the absence of any objection by a
party, the Panel does not find any reason to question the vesting of its
jurisdiction in the present case. Moreover, apart from any potential relevance
of statements by a party made in another dispute, it is an uncontested fact
that the measures at issue in this dispute are not presently being considered
in any other dispute. The Panel addresses the legislative background and scope
of the measures within its terms of reference in Section 7.3.3, and does
not consider any additional discussion of the issue raised by the United States
to be necessary.
6.5. The United States proposes an addition at the end of the second
sentence of paragraph 7.7 to "elaborate
the function of the Panel" in examining municipal law, which according to
the United States is "to determine the proper factual predicate
against which WTO-consistency will be judged".[18]
The European Union considers that the addition proposed by the United States is
not necessary, as the current formulation is an accurate description of the
existing jurisprudence on the matter.[19]
The United States also requests a revision to paragraph 7.8
to "avoid implying that an analysis of the meaning of a Member's municipal
law could disregard the interpretive rules of a Member's domestic legal
system".[20]
The European Union considers that the modification proposed by the United
States is not necessary, as the current formulation is an accurate and succinct
description of the existing jurisprudence relating to the identification of the
meaning and content of domestic law.[21]
The Panel considers that paragraphs 7.7 and 7.8 adequately refer to Appellate Body
reports and consequently does not consider the elaboration of the issue requested
by the United States to be necessary.
6.6. The European Union proposes to consolidate the discussions in paragraphs 7.7-7.8 and 7.15-7.16 on a panel's role in
examining the meaning of municipal law.[22]
The United States recalls its comments on paragraphs 7.7-7.8 and requests that
the Panel take those comments into account in making any modifications in
response to the European Union's request.[23]
The Panel has consolidated this discussion to avoid duplication by deleting
paragraphs 7.15 and 7.16 of the Interim Report.
6.7. The European Union requests changes to paragraphs
7.17, 7.40, 7.81-7.84, and 7.245 of the Interim Report (paragraphs
7.15, 7.38, 7.79-7.82, and 7.243 of this Report), to "reflect the uncontested
fact that the challenged aerospace tax incentives existed in
Washington State prior to ESSB 5952, which amended the terms of those
incentives".[24]
The United States has no objection to the revisions requested by the
European Union.[25]
The Panel has revised the paragraphs identified by the European Union to refer
to the measures "as amended and extended by" ESSB 5952.
6.8. The United States requests revisions to paragraph
7.36 of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.34 of this Report) to
reflect its view of the legislative history of the measures at issue in this
dispute and the measures at issue in US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint).[26]
The European Union requests that the Panel reject the United States' request
for modification, which in its view "is predicated on a series of
erroneous factual premises".[27]
In the light of the parties' comments, the Panel has made minor adjustments to
the paragraph.
6.9. Both the European Union and the United States suggest changes to paragraphs 7.39 and 7.42 of the
Interim Report (paragraphs 7.37 and 7.40 of this Report) to provide a more
accurate characterization of legislation in Washington State.[28]
The Panel has made consequential revisions to paragraphs 7.39 and 7.42 of the
Interim Report in the light of the parties' comments.
6.10. The United States requests the elimination of a sentence in paragraph 7.55 of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.53 of this
Report), which states that an entitlement granted by virtue of the relevant
legislation "could only be re-established through further legislation
revoking or amending the previous legislation". The United States notes
that "revoking or amending the particular legislation at issue are not the
only alternatives" and revenue may no longer be foregone, for example, if
the measure providing for the benchmark tax were changed.[29]
The European Union considers that the sentence, as currently worded, is
correct.[30]
In the light of the parties' comments, the Panel has removed the word
"only" from the sentence identified by the United States.
6.11. The European Union requests in paragraphs 7.89, 7.104,
7.117, 7.113, 7.139, and 7.148 of the Interim Report (paragraphs
7.87, 7.102, 7.115, 7.131, 7.137, and 7.146 of this Report) the addition of a
reference to the objectives of HB 2294 (along with the existing reference to
ESSB 5952) in discussing the "objective reasons" for the relevant tax
treatment of each aerospace tax measure.[31]
The United States does not agree with the European Union's request, and
considers that it is unclear what relevance the European Union ascribes to the
objectives of HB 2294 in the context of the relevant paragraphs. As part
of its comments on the European Union's request, the United States
requests a modification of paragraph 7.65 of
the Interim Report (paragraph 7.63 of this Report), as legislation such as ESSB
5952 does not amend or extend previous legislation but rather amends or extends
tax treatment provided for in the Revised Code of Washington, which itself
reflects earlier legislation.[32]
The Panel does not consider the additional references requested by the
European Union to be necessary. The paragraphs identified by the European
Union clarify the "objective reasons" for each of the aerospace tax
measures with supporting cross-references to the more extensive discussion in
the context of the B&O aerospace tax rate, including reference to the
objectives of prior legislation. The Panel has made the change requested by the
United States in paragraph 7.63 of this Report.
6.12. The United States requests a revision of the first sentence of paragraph 7.142 of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.140 of
this Report) to reflect that, as noted in the remainder of the paragraph, the
leasehold excise tax is an excise tax, and not a property tax.[33]
The European Union requests that the Panel reject the United States' proposed
modification and retain the current language. In the European Union's view, the
leasehold excise tax is functionally a property tax. To the extent that
the United States wishes to clarify that the leasehold excise tax is not
formally a "property tax" within the specific meaning of the Revised
Code of Washington, the European Union considers that the Panel could replace
the phrase "property tax" in the sentence at issue with the phrase "tax
on property", when referring to the leasehold excise tax.[34]
The Panel has partially modified the first sentence of
paragraph 7.142 of the Interim Report to accommodate the United States'
request. However, the Panel has used the word "supplements" instead
of "complements" (which was the word suggested by the United States)
to describe the relationship of the "leasehold excise tax" to the
"property taxes".
6.13. The European Union requests in footnote 263 to paragraph
7.143 of the Interim Report (footnote 300 to paragraph 7.141 of this
Report), in relation to the reference to the parties' arguments on the
quantitative coverage of property tax exemptions, clarification of the
cross-reference to the discussion of the parties' arguments concerning sales
and use tax exemptions.[35]
The United States has no comment on the European Union's request.[36]
The Panel has made the requested clarification to footnote 263 of the Interim
Report. The Panel has also provided a supplemental reference to the parties'
arguments in a footnote to the last sentence of paragraph 7.121 of this
Report.
6.14. The European Union requests a revision of paragraph
7.176 of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.174 of this Report) to
refer to "wing assembly", rather than "final assembly of a
wing", in the description of its argument as to the potential triggering
of the Second Siting Provision.[37]
The United States has no objection to the European Union's request.[38]
The Panel has made the requested correction to paragraph 7.176 of the Interim
Report.
6.15. The United States requests a revision of paragraph 7.187
of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.185 of this Report) to better capture the
substance of the United States' argument in rejecting the European Union's
interpretation of the word "use" in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.[39]
The European Union makes no comment on the United States' request. The
Panel has made the requested change.
6.16. The European Union requests rephrasing paragraph
7.231 of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.229 of this Report), specifically
by removing the word "challenged" before "aerospace tax
measures", so as not to inaccurately convey that the measures challenged
by the European Union are the aerospace tax incentives as they stood before the
amendments and extensions effected by ESSB 5952.[40]
The United States agrees with the European Union's explanation and considers
further that the first sentence in paragraph 7.231 of the Interim Report should
be revised as explained in the United States' comments on paragraph 7.36 of the
Interim Report discussed above.[41]
The Panel has made the modification requested by the European Union. The Panel
has added a footnote to the first sentence of paragraph 7.229 of this Report referring
to the earlier discussion of the legislative background of ESSB 5952, but
declines to make the additional changes to the sentence requested by the United
States.
6.17. The European Union requests a change in paragraph
7.231 of the Interim Report of the phrase "the entry into force
of the amended and extended aerospace tax measures was contingent" to
instead state "the entry into force of the amendment and extension of the
aerospace tax measures was contingent". According to the European Union,
this change would clarify that it was only the amendment and extension of the
tax measures that were conditional upon fulfilment of the First Siting
Provision, rather than the entirety of the aerospace tax measures. The European
Union requests similar changes to paragraphs 7.289 and
7.315(a) of the Interim Report to refer to the entry into force of
the amendment and extension by ESSB 5952 of the aerospace tax measures.[42]
The United States has no objection to the European Union's requests.[43]
The Panel has made the requested modifications to paragraphs 7.231, 7.289, and
7.315(a) of the Interim Report (paragraphs 7.229, 7.287, and 7.313(a) of this
Report).
6.18. The European Union requests an additional citation in footnote 450 to paragraph 7.243 of the Interim Report
(footnote 488 to paragraph 7.241 of this Report) to its submissions on the
point that the measures at issue do not place any conditions on the use of
elements or components of commercial airplanes, other than wings and fuselages.[44]
The United States has no objection to the European Union's request.[45]
The Panel has made the requested addition to the footnote.
6.19. The European Union requests a modification of paragraph
7.289 of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.287 of this Report) to
reflect that only wings or fuselages,
not both, are required to be made of carbon fibre as noted elsewhere by the
Panel.[46]
The United States has no objection to the European Union's request.[47]
The Panel has made the requested modification.
6.20. The European Union requests inclusion in paragraph
7.352 of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.350 of this Report) of
references to its submissions and exhibits that, in addition to evidence
related to the 777X aircraft programme, "would support the more general
proposition in relation to the aerospace industry" regarding the variety
of aircraft manufacturing processes, as well as continuing innovation within
the aerospace industry.[48]
The United States does not consider that adding the requested citations would
provide additional clarity to the report, as they are not "illustrative
for the purposes of the Panel's sentence".[49]
The Panel does consider them to be illustrative of the statements made in the
paragraph and therefore has included the references identified by the European
Union.
6.21. The United States requests a revision of paragraph 7.358
of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.356 of this Report) as, in its view, the
word "coincident" used in the paragraph "does not accurately
capture the sequence of events" of Boeing's decision to site the 777X
aircraft programme in Washington State. The United States also considers the
same sentence "problematic in its reference to 'certain wing structures
that the same manufacturer had previously imported for other commercial
airplane manufacturing programmes'."[50]
The European Union requests that the Panel reject the United States' request
for modification. In the European Union's view, the statement at issue is a
"factual finding … based on an objective assessment of the evidence that
the Parties placed before the Panel, and should not be rewritten based on the
United States' own view of the evidence".[51]
In the light of the parties' comments, the Panel has made modifications and
clarifications to the sentence in question.
6.22. The European Union requests in paragraph 7.368
of the Interim Report (paragraph 7.366 of this Report) an adjustment of the
left parenthesis in the phrase "(outside Washington State, including
overseas)" as the current formulation "could potentially be
misunderstood to indicate that the reference to Washington State is not an
essential aspect of the explanation".[52]
The United States has no comment on the European Union's request.[53]
The Panel has made the requested modification.
6.23. In addition to the requests discussed above, the Panel has made corrections
for typographical and other non-substantive errors in the Interim Report,
including those identified by the parties.
7.1. In this dispute, the European Union claims that the United States is
acting inconsistently with the SCM
Agreement by providing prohibited subsidies to the aerospace industry in the
state of Washington. The European Union argues that these subsidies are
provided by the state of Washington in the United States.
7.2. More specifically, the European Union challenges seven aerospace tax
measures[54],
namely: (i) a reduced business and occupation (B&O) tax rate for the
manufacture and sale of commercial airplanes; (ii) a credit for the B&O tax
for pre-production development of commercial airplanes and components; (iii) a
credit for the B&O tax for property taxes on commercial airplane
manufacturing facilities; (iv) an exemption from sales and use taxes for
certain computer hardware, software, and peripherals; (v) an exemption from
sales and use taxes for certain construction services and materials; (vi) an
exemption from leasehold excise taxes on port district facilities used to
manufacture superefficient airplanes; and (vii) an exemption from property
taxes for the personal property of port district lessees used to manufacture
superefficient airplanes.
7.3. The European Union claims that the alleged subsidies are prohibited
under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM
Agreement as subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic over imported
goods. According to the European Union this contingency results from two siting
provisions – a First Siting Provision and a Second Siting Provision – contained
in Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5952 (ESSB 5952). The European Union
requests that the Panel recommend that the United States withdraw the subsidies
without delay, on the basis that they are prohibited subsidies, as required by
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.
7.4. The United States requests the Panel to find that the United States
has acted consistently with its obligations under the SCM
Agreement and to deny the relief requested by the European Union.
7.5. This Report is organized as follows. Section 7.2 sets
out the relevant principles regarding the Panel's function, the burden of
proof, and treaty interpretation. Section 7.3 provides
a description and background of the measures at issue. In section 7.4, the
Panel examines whether the measures challenged by the European Union constitute
subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement. In section 7.5 the
Panel turns to an examination of whether the challenged measures are prohibited
under Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement. The Panel sets forth its conclusions and recommendation in
section 8.
7.6. According to Article 11 of the DSU:
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its
responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements.
Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before
it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make
such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in
giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
7.7. The Panel has been required to examine municipal law in the course
of exercising its functions under Article 11 of the DSU in this dispute. In
this regard, the Appellate Body has explained that, "[a]lthough it is
not the role of panels or the Appellate Body to interpret a Member's domestic
legislation as such, it is permissible, indeed essential, to conduct a detailed
examination of that legislation in assessing its consistency with WTO
law".[55]
The Appellate Body has added that:
As part of their duties under Article 11 of the DSU, panels have the
obligation to examine the meaning and content of the municipal law at issue in
order to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and
conformity with the covered agreements. This obligation under Article 11 means
that panels must conduct their own objective and independent assessment of the
meaning of municipal law, instead of deferring to a party's characterization of
such law.[56]
7.8. In respect of the types and threshold of evidence that may be
required to prove the WTO-inconsistency of municipal law, the Appellate Body
has explained that "[i]f the meaning and content of the measure are clear
on its face, then the consistency of the measure as such can be assessed on
that basis alone. If, however, the meaning … is not evident on its face,
further examination is required."[57]
The nature and the extent of the evidence required to satisfy the burden of
proof will vary from case to case.[58]
In some cases, the text of the relevant legislation may be sufficient to
clarify the content and the meaning of the relevant legal instruments. In other
cases, the parties will also need to support their understanding of the content
and meaning of such legal instruments with evidence beyond the text of the
instrument, such as evidence of consistent application of such
laws, pronouncements of domestic courts on the meaning of such laws, the
opinions of legal experts, and the writings of recognized scholars.[59]
The task of a panel may be facilitated by agreement between the parties about
the meaning of the law and its interpretation, being an interpretation that it
is open for the panel to itself adopt. The Appellate Body has added that,
"in ascertaining the meaning of municipal law, a panel should undertake a
holistic assessment of all relevant elements, starting with the text of the law
and including, but not limited to, relevant practices of administering
agencies" as well as "legal interpretation[s] given by a domestic
court or by a domestic administering agency as to the meaning of municipal law
with respect to the measure being reviewed for consistency with the covered
agreements".[60]
7.9. The general rule in WTO dispute settlement is that the burden of
proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the
affirmative of a particular claim or defence.[61]
Following this principle, the Appellate Body has explained that the complaining
party in any given dispute should establish a prima facie case
of inconsistency of a measure with a provision of the WTO covered agreements,
before the burden of showing consistency with that provision or defending it
under an exception must be assumed by the defending party.[62]
In other words, "a party claiming a violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement by another Member must
assert and prove its claim."[63]
7.10. A prima facie case is "one
which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires
a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party
presenting the prima facie case."[64]
To establish a prima facie case, the party
asserting a particular claim must adduce evidence sufficient to raise a
presumption that what is claimed is true. If the complaining party
"adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed
is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it
adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption."[65]
In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that:
[P]recisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be
required to establish such … [presumptions] will necessarily vary from measure
to measure, provision to provision, and case to case.[66]
7.11. The Appellate Body has also stated that "[a] complaining party
may not simply submit evidence and expect the panel to divine from it a claim
of WTO-inconsistency. Nor may a complaining party simply allege facts without
relating them to its legal arguments".[67]
7.12. In this dispute, the European Union bears the burden of establishing
a prima facie case that the disputed
measures are prohibited subsidies inconsistent with Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. In addition, if the Panel finds that
the European Union has made out its prima facie
case, it is for the United States to provide rebuttal arguments and evidence that
is needed to support that rebuttal.
7.13. Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that Members recognise that the
dispute settlement system serves to clarify the provisions of the covered
agreements "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law". It is well established that the principles codified in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the
"Vienna Convention")[68]
are such customary rules of interpretation of public international law.[69]
They provide as follows:
ARTICLE 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose
of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with
the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument
which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty.
3. There shall be taken into
account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be
given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
ARTICLE 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
7.14. There is a considerable body of WTO case law dealing with the
application of these provisions. It is clear that interpretation must be based
above all on the text of the treaty[70],
but that the context of the treaty also plays a role. It is also
well-established that these principles of interpretation "neither require
nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there or the
importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended."[71]
Furthermore, panels "must be guided by the rules of treaty interpretation
set out in the Vienna Convention, and must not add to or diminish rights and
obligations provided in the WTO Agreement."[72]
7.15. The European Union challenges
seven separate tax measures for civil aircraft provided by the state of
Washington (aerospace tax measures) as amended and extended by ESSB 5952[73]:
(a) reduced
business and occupation (B&O) tax rate for the manufacture and sale of
commercial airplanes (B&O aerospace tax rate)[74];
(b) B&O tax credit for pre-production
development for commercial airplanes and components (B&O
tax credit for aerospace product development)[75];
(c) B&O tax credit for property taxes on
commercial airplane manufacturing facilities (B&O tax credit for
property and leasehold excise taxes)[76];
(d) exemption from sales and use taxes for
certain computer hardware, software, and peripherals (computer sales and use
tax exemptions)[77];
(e) exemption from sales and use taxes for
certain construction services and materials (construction sales and use tax
exemptions)[78];
(f) exemption from leasehold excise taxes on
port district facilities used to manufacture superefficient airplanes (leasehold
excise tax exemption)[79];
and
(g) exemption from property taxes for the
personal property of port district lessees used to manufacture superefficient
airplanes (leaseholder property tax exemption)[80].
7.16. A person claiming the B&O tax credit for property and
leasehold excise taxes, listed above as (c), is not eligible for either the leasehold
excise tax exemption or the leaseholder property tax exemption, listed above as
(f) and (g), respectively.
7.17. The first three aerospace tax
measures listed above pertain to the business and occupation (B&O) tax,
which is the state of Washington's "major business tax"[81], in that the state of Washington
"relies primarily on a B&O tax – rather than a corporate tax or an
income tax – for purposes of business taxation".[82] The B&O tax is imposed
"for the act or privilege of engaging in business activities" and
"is measured by the application of rates against the value of products,
gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of the business, as the case may
be".[83] The B&O tax applies to
distinct business activities (such as retailing, manufacturing, wholesaling,
extracting, and services). A business may have more than one B&O tax rate,
depending on the types of activities conducted.[84]
7.18. The first tax measure above (B&O
aerospace tax rate) provides for a B&O tax rate of 0.2904% for
specified business activities.[85] The other two B&O
tax-related measures (B&O tax credits for aerospace product development and
for property and leasehold excise taxes) provide credits against B&O tax
liability based on specified expenditures or other tax payments made by the
taxpayer concerned.[86] The rules regarding the
calculation of B&O tax liability for different types of activities as well
as the amount of B&O tax credits are discussed below in connection with
whether there is a financial contribution in the sense of Article 1 of the
SCM Agreement.
7.19. The next two aerospace tax measures in the above list are exemptions
from the state of Washington's retail sales and use taxes. The retail sales tax
is Washington State's principal source of tax revenue (including business and
non-business tax revenue)[87],
and is collected from customers by businesses making retail sales in Washington
State. The retail sales tax is generally imposed on the sale of tangible
personal property[88]
and digital products[89],
as well as certain services[90],
to the final consumer or end user of such property, digital product, or
service.[91]
The use tax is a tax on the use of goods or certain services in the state of
Washington when sales tax has not been paid.[92]
Goods used in Washington State are subject to either sales or use tax, but not
to both; thus, the use tax compensates when the sales tax has not been paid.[93]
7.20. The computer sales and use tax exemptions relate to sales or use "of computer hardware,
computer peripherals, or software … used primarily in the development, design,
and engineering of aerospace products or in providing aerospace services".[94] These exemptions also relate to
sales or use of "labor and services rendered in respect to installing the
computer hardware, computer peripherals, or software".[95]
7.21. The construction sales and use
tax exemptions concern labour, services, and personal property used to
construct new buildings for the manufacture of commercial airplanes or the
fuselages and wings of commercial airplanes. More specifically, the sales tax
exemption applies to retail sales taxes on "[c]harges, for labor and
services rendered in respect to the constructing of new buildings, made to a
manufacturer engaged in the manufacturing of commercial airplanes or the
fuselages or wings of commercial airplanes".[96] Sales and use tax exemptions apply
to the sales and use of "tangible personal property that will be
incorporated as an ingredient or component"[97] in constructing such buildings. These
construction sales and use tax exemptions also apply to charges for
construction labour and services made to, and tangible personal property used
in constructing new buildings for, "a port district, political
subdivision, or municipal corporation, to be leased to a manufacturer engaged
in the manufacturing of commercial airplanes or the fuselages or wings of commercial
airplanes".[98]
7.22. The applicable tax rates and
coverage of retail sales and use taxes in Washington State are considered in
greater detail below in connection with whether these exemptions constitute a
financial contribution in the sense of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.
7.23. The final two aerospace tax measures concern property taxes imposed
on certain leaseholds in Washington State. Real and personal property in
Washington State is generally subject to property taxes based on its value,
unless a specific exemption is provided by law.[99] For example, all property
owned by federal, state, and local governments is exempt from the Washington
State property tax.[100]
7.24. The leasehold excise tax
exemption relates to the Washington State leasehold excise tax, which is
imposed in lieu of a property tax on the use of public property by a private
party.[101] More specifically, Washington State imposes "a leasehold excise
tax on the act or privilege of occupying or using publicly owned real or
personal property … through a leasehold interest".[102] The leasehold excise tax exemption applies to "[a]ll leasehold
interests in port district facilities exempt from tax under [the construction
sales and use tax exemptions] and used by a manufacturer engaged in the
manufacturing of superefficient airplanes".[103]
7.25. Under the leaseholder property tax exemption, Washington State also exempts from property taxation
"all buildings, machinery, equipment, and other personal property of a
lessee of a port district eligible [for the construction sales and use tax
exemptions], used exclusively in manufacturing superefficient airplanes".[104]
7.26. Neither the leasehold excise tax
exemption nor the leaseholder property tax exemption is available to a person
claiming the B&O tax credit for property and leasehold excise taxes.[105]
7.27. The European Union identifies two
"siting" provisions that govern the availability of the above
aerospace tax measures, namely a First Siting Provision[106] relating to all of the aerospace
tax measures, and a Second Siting Provision[107] relating only to the B&O
aerospace tax rate.[108]
7.28. Each of the above aerospace tax
measures is extended, and certain others are also amended, by ESSB 5952, which,
according to the First Siting Provision in Section 2 of ESSB 5952, "takes
effect contingent upon the siting of a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program in the state of Washington". Alternatively,
"[i]f a significant commercial airplane manufacturing program is not sited
in the state of Washington by June 30, 2017, … [this act] does not take
effect".[109]
7.29. The First Siting Provision
defines "siting" to mean "a final decision, made on or after
November 1, 2013, by a manufacturer to locate a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program in Washington State". In turn, "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" is defined as:
[A]n airplane program in which the following products, including final
assembly, will commence manufacture at a new or existing location within
Washington state on or after the effective date of this section:
(i) The new model, or any version or variant of an
existing model, of a commercial airplane; and
(ii) Fuselages and wings of a new model, or any version
or variant of an existing model, of a commercial airplane.[110]
7.30. The First Siting Provision additionally defines "new model, or
any version or variant of an existing model, of a commercial airplane" to
mean "a commercial airplane manufactured with a carbon fiber composite
fuselage or carbon fiber composite wings or both".[111]
7.31. Both parties agree that the First Siting Provision has been
fulfilled and, as a result, the measures set out in ESSB 5952 are in effect.[112]
7.32. ESSB 5952 also contains a Second Siting Provision, relating only to
the B&O aerospace tax rate[113],
which provides as follows:
With respect to the manufacturing of commercial airplanes or making
sales, at retail or wholesale, of commercial airplanes, this subsection (11)
[i.e. the B&O aerospace tax rate] does not apply on and after July 1st of
the year in which the department [i.e. the Department of Revenue] makes a
determination that any final assembly or wing assembly of any version or
variant of a commercial airplane that is the basis of a siting of a significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program in the state under section 2 of this
act [i.e. the First Siting Provision] has been sited outside the state of
Washington. This subsection (11)(e)(ii) [i.e. the Second Siting Provision] only
applies to the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes that are the basis
of a siting of a significant commercial airplane manufacturing program in the
state under section 2 of this act.
7.33. The Second Siting Provision thus concerns the continued availability
of the B&O aerospace tax rate for the version or variant of the commercial
airplane that is the basis of the First Siting Provision. The Second Siting
Provision specifically pertains to the siting of "any final assembly or wing
assembly" of that commercial airplane. As agreed by the parties, and as
explained more fully below, the Boeing 777X is the relevant version or variant
of commercial airplane that served as the basis for fulfilment of the First Siting
Provision.[114]
7.34. ESSB 5952 amends and extends certain tax measures established in
2003 under Washington State Legislature House Bill 2294 (HB 2294)[115], which were measures at
issue in the dispute US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint).[116]
7.35. The parties have raised different views as to the temporal scope of
the measures at issue and the applicability of the contingencies introduced by
ESSB 5952. For example, with reference to pre-existing tax measures in
Washington State, the United States submits that "[a]bsent ESSB 5952,
aerospace activity through 2024 subject to the B&O tax, the sales and use tax, the property excise tax, and the
leasehold excise tax would have qualified under HB 2294
and for the [aerospace tax measures] identified by the European Union",
and thus contends that "the treatment prior to 2024 under any of these
measures, even if the measure were determined to be a subsidy, is a priori not contingent on any conditions introduced by ESSB
5952".[117] By contrast, the European
Union asserts that its challenge is not limited to the extended
tax treatment from 2024 to 2040 effected by ESSB 5952, but rather that
"the European Union is challenging the subsidies at issue from the point
in time that they became contingent on satisfaction of the [First Siting
Provision] conditions in SSB 5952, i.e., November 2013. The European Union
challenges the existence of a financial contribution for the whole period from
November 2013 through June 2040."[118]
7.36. In light of these differing assertions, the Panel first reviews the
legislative background and scope of the measures at issue before turning to the
claims raised in this dispute. The tax measures adopted by the Washington State Legislature in 2003 under HB 2294
included a reduction in the B&O tax rate[119]; a B&O tax credit for pre-production development expenditures[120]; a B&O tax credit for computer software and hardware[121]; and a B&O tax credit for property taxes paid on property used in
the manufacture of commercial airplanes and airplane components.[122] Also included were sales and use tax exemptions for computer equipment
and software, and their installation, as well as construction services and
equipment, used primarily in the development of commercial airplanes and
components.[123] A leasehold excise tax exemption and property tax exemption for port
district facilities was also available to manufacturers of superefficient
airplanes that were not using the B&O tax credit for property taxes.[124] These measures were scheduled to end in 2024.[125]
7.37. ESSB 5952 extended the availability of these tax measures to 2040
upon fulfilment of the First Siting Provision through the siting of the Boeing
777X programme. ESSB 5952 also provided that the B&O aerospace tax
rate would no longer apply to that programme if the conditions foreseen in the
Second Siting Provision occurred. At the same time, the aerospace tax measures
reflect substantive amendments made by ESSB 5952 as well as other legislative changes made to the tax measures in the intervening period between
HB 2294 and ESSB 5952. For example, with regard to the B&O aerospace tax rate, in 2006, Washington State Legislature House
Bill 2466 (HB 2466) also extended the reduced B&O tax rate to certain
certified repair stations[126], and consolidated the B&O aerospace tax rates for the
manufacture of commercial airplanes and components, and for the sales of
commercial airplanes and components, into a single provision covering both
manufacture and sales.[127] In addition, Substitute Senate Bill 6828 (SSB 6828) of 2008
extended the reduced B&O tax rate to the manufacture and retailing of
tooling used in the manufacture of commercial airplanes and components of
airplanes.[128] The B&O tax credit for aerospace product development reflects an
extension of the credit to non-manufacturing firms under HB 2466 of 2006.[129] It further reflects the extension under SSB 6828 of the credit for
preproduction development to "aerospace product development", which
was subsequently carried over in the provisions extended by ESSB 5952.[130] The B&O tax credit for property and leasehold excise taxes
amended by ESSB 5952 reflects the prior 2006 amendment under HB 2466 to include
leasehold excise taxes in addition to property taxes as part of this B&O
tax credit.[131] The computer sales and use tax exemptions amended by ESSB 5952 reflect
prior changes made under HB 2466 of 2006 and under SSB 6828 of 2008.[132] Further, ESSB 5952 amends the construction sales and use tax
exemptions originally
established in HB 2294 by changing their application to "the
manufacturing of commercial airplanes or the fuselages and wings of commercial
airplanes" rather than to "manufacturing of superefficient
airplanes".[133]
7.38. ESSB 5952 was enacted in November 2013 by the Washington State
legislature. Pursuant to the First Siting Provision, the aerospace tax measures,
as amended and extended by ESSB 5952, were to take effect upon the
determination by the Department of Revenue of Washington State that the First
Siting Provision had been satisfied, based on the "siting" of a
"significant commercial airplane manufacturing program" as defined in
that provision. On 9 July 2014, Boeing submitted a letter to the Department of
Revenue of Washington State providing formal notification that Boeing had made
a final decision to manufacture the 777X in Washington State, and describing
how the 777X satisfied the requirements of the First Siting Provision.[134] The Department of Revenue of Washington State provided written
notice on 10 July 2014 of its determination that the First Siting
Provision had been fulfilled and that ESSB 5952 had taken effect on 9 July
2014.[135] The Boeing 777X was the model of commercial airplane that
served as the basis for determining that the First Siting Provision had been
fulfilled.[136]
7.39. For the purposes of this dispute, the measures that are within the
Panel's terms of reference are those identified by the European Union in its
request for the establishment of a panel.[137] These measures are the aerospace tax measures, as presently
codified in the RCW provisions cited in the European Union's panel request.[138] The aerospace tax measures as codified[139] reflect the substantive amendments made under ESSB 5952 as
well as other legislative amendments subsequent to the enactment of
HB 2294 in 2003, and are presently in effect until 2040. The aerospace tax
measures are further subject to the First and Second Siting Provisions, which
were introduced by ESSB 5952.
7.40. Recalling the parties' different views as to the temporal scope of
the measures at issue and the applicability of the contingencies introduced by
ESSB 5952, the Panel considers that the measures at issue are not limited to
tax treatment for the period of extension from 2024 to 2040. Rather, given the
Panel's terms of reference as well as the various substantive amendments
effected by ESSB 5952 and prior to its passage, the aerospace tax measures and
Siting Provisions at issue are those that are in effect pursuant to codified
provisions of Washington State law following the enactment and entry into force
of ESSB 5952.
7.41. The European Union contends that the aerospace tax measures are
subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.[140]
According to the European Union, each of the aerospace tax measures at issue
constitutes a financial contribution under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM
Agreement because "government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or
not collected". In support of its contention, the European Union proposes
various benchmarks for comparison for the aerospace tax measures and contends
that, in relation to these benchmarks, government revenue that would otherwise
be due is foregone. The European Union also draws upon findings in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) and
contends that similar considerations apply in respect of measures that are analogous
to those that were found to constitute financial contributions in that dispute.
At the same time, the European Union distinguishes its claim from that made in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) as it
argues in the present case "that a financial contribution exists in the
abstract" rather than being entity-specific.[141]
The European Union contends that government revenue does not need to have
been actually foregone for there to be a
financial contribution, but rather that it is the foregoing of the government's
entitlement to collect revenue that is
determinative of a financial contribution.[142]
Further, the European Union argues that the conferral of a benefit is a natural
consequence of the foregoing of government revenue in comparison to "market"
conditions.[143]
7.42. The United States asserts that the European Union fails to make a prima facie case that any of the challenged measures
constitutes a financial contribution. The United States also disputes the
European Union's reliance on findings made in respect of contested measures in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) to
demonstrate a financial contribution in this dispute.[144]
While acknowledging the European Union's clarification as to a financial
contribution existing "in the abstract", the United States contends
that the present tense drafting of Article 1.1(a)(ii) means that "this
provision covers revenue foregone or not collected in the
present".[145]
In addition, the United States disagrees with various legal
interpretations advanced by the European Union, including that the term
"maintain" in Article 3.2 refers to the continuation of a subsidy
that has been "granted"[146],
as well as the European Union's distinction between the terms "not
collected" and "foregone", arguing that both are in the present
passive tense, and that "the two verbs describe different ways that the
government may obtain tax income".[147]
With respect to the
benefit allegedly conferred, the United States agrees with the European Union
that "the concept of financial contribution in the form of revenue
foregone that is otherwise due often overlaps with the concept of
benefit", but contends that "[t]he European Union has not identified
with sufficient clarity what the benefit is that it is alleging, much less
provided evidence that the two concepts fully overlap in the present
case."[148]
The United States further contends that the European Union erroneously argues
that a finding of benefit proceeds automatically from a finding that revenue is
foregone.[149]
7.43. Australia submits "that by the very nature of the type of
transaction relating to the foregoing or non-collection of government revenue,
the actual use or exercise of the fiscal incentive by a beneficiary/recipient
may not necessarily be determinative in establishing the existence of a
financial contribution".[150]
Accordingly, Australia frames the question as "whether, but for the tax
incentive, the beneficiary of the tax measure would owe revenue payable as a
debt, but expect it to be forgone or not collected".[151]
With regard to the benefit conferred, Australia refers to the standard of a
measure making a recipient "better off" in comparison to the
marketplace, and that, "[i]n this instance, the marketplace would be made
up of other companies facing the usual tax rates set by Washington State,
without provision of the discounts offered to companies that qualified for the
tax exemption/discount".[152]
7.44. Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement provides in relevant
part:
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to
exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government … , i.e. where:
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise
due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
(footnote omitted)
7.45. With regard to the legal standard
under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body has set
out the following considerations:
In our view, the "foregoing"
of revenue "otherwise due" implies that
less revenue has been raised by the government than would have been raised in a
different situation, or, that is, "otherwise". Moreover, the word
"foregone" suggests that the government has given up an entitlement
to raise revenue that it could "otherwise" have raised. This cannot,
however, be an entitlement in the abstract, because governments, in theory,
could tax all revenues. There must, therefore, be
some defined, normative benchmark against which a comparison can be made
between the revenue actually raised and the revenue that would have been raised
"otherwise".[153]
(emphasis original)
7.46. The Appellate Body therefore
considered that "the term 'otherwise due' implies some kind of comparison
between the revenues due under the contested measure
and revenues that would be due in some other situation", and that
"the basis of comparison must be the tax rules applied by the Member in
question".[154]
The Appellate Body further stated
that, "[i]n identifying the appropriate benchmark for comparison, panels
must obviously ensure that they identify and examine fiscal situations which it
is legitimate to compare. In other words, there must be a rational basis for
comparing the fiscal treatment of the income subject to the contested measure
and the fiscal treatment of certain other income."[155]
7.47. The Appellate Body considered
that there may be situations where the measures at issue might be described as
an "exception" to a general rule of taxation, and that in such
situations it may be possible to apply a "but for" test to examine
the fiscal treatment of income absent the contested measure. At the same time,
given the variety and complexity of domestic tax systems, the Appellate Body
did not consider that "Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) always requires panels to identify, with respect
to any particular income, the 'general' rule of taxation prevailing in a
Member".[156]
Instead, the Appellate Body explained "that panels should seek to compare
the fiscal treatment of legitimately comparable income to determine whether the
contested measure involves the foregoing of revenue which is 'otherwise due',
in relation to the income in question".[157]
7.48. In US – Large
Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), the Appellate Body
reiterated the principle that it is necessary to identify "legitimately
comparable" situations of taxation in order to determine whether
government revenue is foregone.[158] The Appellate Body further
articulated three analytical steps for a panel examining a claim under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
7.49. First, a panel should
"identify the tax treatment that applies to the income of the alleged
recipients", which "will entail consideration of the objective
reasons behind that treatment and, where it involves a change in a Member's tax
rules, an assessment of the reasons underlying that change".[159]
7.50. Second, "the panel should
identify a benchmark for comparison – that is, the tax treatment of comparable
income of comparably situated taxpayers", which "involves an
examination of the structure of the domestic tax regime and its organizing
principles".[160] The Appellate Body noted the
potential difficulty of this exercise given that such principles may "be
unique to the particular domestic regime" or "that disparate tax
measures, implemented over time, do not easily offer up coherent principles
serving as a benchmark".[161] Nevertheless, "the task of
the panel is to develop an understanding of the tax structure and principles
that best explains that Member's tax regime, and to provide a reasoned basis
for identifying what constitutes comparable income of comparably situated
taxpayers".[162]
7.51. Third, "the panel should
compare the reasons for the challenged tax treatment with the benchmark tax
treatment it has identified after scrutinizing a Member's tax regime".[163] According to the Appellate Body,
this "comparison will enable a panel to determine whether, in the light of
the treatment of the comparable income of comparably situated taxpayers, the
government is foregoing revenue that is otherwise due in relation to the income
of the alleged recipients."[164]
7.52. Before proceeding to the analysis of each aerospace tax measure
under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement, the Panel will address the
United States' argument that aerospace activity until 1 July 2024 would have
qualified for certain tax treatment under legislation pre-dating ESSB 5952,
and that the extent of any financial contribution in this dispute would be
limited to revenue foregone at some point in the future.[165]
The Panel recalls that the European Union has argued that, unlike in a past
dispute under another provision of the SCM Agreement, in this case the European
Union is advancing its claim in the abstract, on the basis of the pertinent
legislation as such, and that it considers that Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)
covers not only the foregoing of actual revenue in the present, but also the
foregoing of an entitlement to future revenue.[166]
7.53. In respect of the measures at issue, the Panel agrees with the
European Union that Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement encompasses
the foregoing of revenue in the future.[167]
In the particular context of tax-based measures, the underlying legislation may
be effective over a period defined in the legislation itself, or indefinitely.
Where such legislation gives rise to a financial contribution in the form of
revenue foregone, the fact of a government having forgone such revenue is true
for the entire period during which the legislation is in force. Even if the
effective start date of a period defined in the legislation is subsequent to the
date on which the legislation enters into force, as of the date of entry into
force the government would have, by virtue of the legislation, already given up
its entitlement to the future tax revenue during the defined future period.[168]
That entitlement could be re-established through further legislation revoking
or amending the previous legislation. This principle is implicit in past cases
involving financial contributions from tax-based measures. Where the rulings in
those cases have been based on the underlying legislation as such, they have
not only concerned particular revenue streams foregone in particular periods,
but instead have concerned all of the implicit future revenue streams that
would be foregone pursuant to the underlying legislation.[169]
7.54. In this connection, the present tense of the verb "is" in
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) relates to a government presently foregoing an entitlement
to collect revenue either now or in the future.[170] It
is this government action taken with respect to otherwise applicable tax
liabilities that is the focus of the analysis under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii),
particularly where the measures are challenged as such rather than "against
the application … during any given point in time or in any specific
instance".[171]
In this dispute, the Panel has determined that the aerospace tax measures at
issue are those that are presently in effect pursuant to codified provisions of
Washington State law following the enactment and entry into force of ESSB 5952.[172]
A finding that the aerospace tax measures result in government revenue being foregone,
or that they cause government revenue to be foregone, be it currently or in the
future, applies to the measures themselves. This foregoing of revenue would
apply to taxpayers at any time during the entire period in which the measures
are in force. The foregoing of revenue is constituted by the government's
promise to do so, and not only by particular instances of it being done.
7.55. Having addressed the threshold issue of revenue foregone in the
future, the Panel now examines each of the challenged aerospace tax measures,
as such, on the basis of the analytical framework outlined above, to assess
whether any of them involves a financial contribution in the form of government
revenue foregone within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the
SCM Agreement.
7.56. The legislation for the B&O aerospace tax rate provides in
relevant part:
(11)(a) Beginning October 1, 2005, upon every person engaging within
this state in the business of manufacturing commercial airplanes, or components
of such airplanes, or making sales, at retail or wholesale, of commercial
airplanes or components of such airplanes, manufactured by the seller, as to
such persons the amount of tax with respect to such business is, in the case of
manufacturers, equal to the value of the product manufactured and the gross
proceeds of sales of the product manufactured, or in the case of processors for
hire, equal to the gross income of the business, multiplied by the rate of:
(i) 0.4235 percent from October 1, 2005, through June
30, 2007; and
(ii) 0.2904 percent beginning July 1, 2007.
(b) Beginning July 1, 2008, upon every person who is not eligible to
report under the provisions of (a) of this subsection (11) and is engaging
within this state in the business of manufacturing tooling specifically
designed for use in manufacturing commercial airplanes or components of such
airplanes, or making sales, at retail or wholesale, of such tooling
manufactured by the seller, as to such persons the amount of tax with respect
to such business is, in the case of manufacturers, equal to the value of the
product manufactured and the gross proceeds of sales of the product
manufactured, or in the case of processors for hire, be equal to the gross
income of the business, multiplied by the rate of 0.2904 percent.[173]
7.57. Based on the available evidence,
the Panel will first identify the applicable tax treatment under the B&O
aerospace tax rate, including consideration of the objective reasons behind that
treatment. As provided for in the relevant legislation, the B&O aerospace
tax rate applies to "every person engaging within [the state of
Washington] in the business of manufacturing commercial airplanes, or
components of such airplanes, or making sales, at retail or wholesale, of
commercial airplanes or components of such airplanes, manufactured by the
seller".[174]
The B&O aerospace tax rate also applies to those persons "engaging
within [the state of Washington] in the business of manufacturing tooling specifically
designed for use in manufacturing commercial airplanes or components of such
airplanes, or making sales, at retail or wholesale, of such tooling
manufactured by the seller".[175]
7.58. Thus, the B&O aerospace tax
rate applies to the following activities within the state of Washington: (i) the
manufacture of commercial airplanes (and
components thereof); (ii) sales of
commercial airplanes (and components thereof) by such manufacturers; and (iii)
the manufacture and sales of tooling for use
in manufacturing commercial airplanes or components of such airplanes.
7.59. The B&O aerospace tax rate is
a specific rate of taxation applicable to these activities. For the manufacture
and sales of commercial airplanes and components thereof, this specific rate
was implemented in two stages: first, a rate of 0.4235% from 1 October
2005 through 30 June 2007; and second, a rate of 0.2904% beginning 1 July 2007.[176]
For the manufacture and sales of tooling for use in manufacturing commercial
airplanes or components of such airplanes, the applicable rate as of 1 July
2008 is 0.2904%. As a result of the enactment of ESSB 5952, the B&O
aerospace tax rate expires on 1 July 2040.[177]
7.60. Thus, the relevant tax treatment
at present and until the expiration of the B&O aerospace tax rate in 2040 is
the tax rate of 0.2904%. This rate is multiplied by, "in the case of
manufacturers … the value of the product manufactured and the gross proceeds of
sales of the product manufactured, or in the case of processors for hire … the
gross income of the business".[178]
7.61. With regard to the
"objective reasons" behind this tax treatment[179], the Panel notes that the
underlying legislation itself repeatedly refers to tax "incentives"
and "preferences" to encourage the aerospace industry (as such) to
remain in Washington State and to expand its presence there. For instance, ESSB
5952 is entitled "Aerospace Industry – Tax
Preferences –
Tax Exemption".[180] The published Session Laws of
Washington State containing ESSB 5952 characterize the act as "[r]elating
to incentivizing a long term commitment to
maintain and grow jobs in the aerospace industry in Washington state by
extending the expiration date of aerospace tax
preferences".[181]
7.62. In the text of the legislation
itself, the Washington State legislature explicitly set out the reasons for
enacting the aerospace tax measures in ESSB 5952:
The legislature finds that the people of Washington have benefited
enormously from the presence of the aerospace industry in Washington state. The
legislature further finds that the industry continues to provide good wages and
benefits for the thousands of engineers, mechanics, and support staff working
directly in the industry throughout the state. The legislature further finds
that suppliers and vendors that support the aerospace industry in turn provide
a range of well-paying jobs. In 2003, and again in 2006, and 2007, the
legislature determined it was in the public interest to encourage the continued
presence of the aerospace industry through the provision of tax incentives. To
this end, and in recognition of the continuing extreme importance of the
aerospace industry in Washington, it is the legislature's intent to reaffirm
and build upon prior aerospace tax incentive legislation in a fiscally prudent
manner.
…
It is the legislature's specific public policy objective to maintain and
grow Washington's aerospace industry workforce. To help achieve this public
policy objective, it is the legislature's intent to conditionally extend
aerospace industry tax preferences until July 1, 2040, in recognition of intent
by the state's aerospace industry sector to maintain and grow its workforce
within the state.[182]
7.63. These references make clear that
the purpose of the legislation is to provide favourable tax treatment for the
aerospace industry, in order to encourage the industry to remain in
Washington State and to grow its workforce. As stated in the Final Bill
Report of ESSB 5952, "[t]he explicitly described public policy objective
of the act is to maintain and grow Washington [State]'s aerospace industry
workforce."[183] This language is similar to that of the prior legislation in HB 2294.
In HB 2294 the Washington State legislature "declare[d] that it is in the
public interest to encourage the continued presence of [the aerospace] industry
through the provision of tax incentives. The comprehensive
tax incentives in this act address the cost of
doing business in Washington state compared to locations in other states."[184] The mechanism for achieving the objective of encouraging the aerospace
industry is, in the words of both pieces of legislation, the provision of tax
"preferences", "exemptions", and "incentives".
7.64. Having identified the relevant
tax treatment and its objective reasons, the next step of this analysis is the
identification of an appropriate "benchmark for comparison" within the
Washington State tax regime to determine whether this tax treatment
constitutes revenue foregone by the Washington State government that would
otherwise be due. This benchmark must be ascertained with regard for "the
structure of the domestic tax regime and its organizing principles".[185]
7.65. The European Union submits that
the benchmarks for comparison are the "general B&O tax rate for
manufacturing and wholesaling activities" of 0.484%
and that of 0.471% otherwise applicable to retailing.[186] The United States generally
contends that the European Union has not met its burden to identify the
benchmark for each aerospace tax measure. With specific respect to the B&O
aerospace tax rate, the United States submits that Washington State's unique
B&O tax system results in a pyramiding effect and thus "the industry
in which a taxpayer sits may impact whether it is comparably situated to a
taxpayer in the aerospace industry".[187]
The United States also submits that "there is no question that Boeing's 777X program would have qualified
for the 0.2904 percent B&O tax rate established under HB 2294 through 2024
if Washington had not enacted ESSB 5952", and contends on this basis that
"[Boeing's] eligibility for that rate during the 2014-2024 does not
represent revenue foregone".[188]
7.66. As a threshold matter, the Panel
notes that the parties' arguments on the benchmark for examining the B&O
aerospace tax rate relate specifically to the B&O tax regime, as
distinguished from other types of taxation that exist in Washington State.
Given that the B&O tax is the primary business tax in Washington State, and
noting the parties' argumentation based on particular features of that regime,
the Panel frames its assessment of "legitimately comparable" tax
situations in the light of the specific structure and organizing principles of
the B&O tax regime.
7.67. The Washington State B&O tax
is imposed "for the act or privilege of engaging in business
activities" and "is measured by the application of rates against the
value of products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income of the business, as
the case may be".[189]
In general, the B&O tax rate varies by activity, according to the following
"major B&O tax classifications": (i) manufacturing; (ii)
wholesaling; (iii) retailing; and (iv) services and other activities.[190]
7.68. Because the B&O aerospace tax
rate applies to manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing activities for
commercial airplanes (as well as their components and tooling), these are the
B&O tax classifications that are pertinent to the benchmark for comparison.
The provisions of Washington State law governing these three categories of
B&O tax are set out below:
Manufacturing: Upon every person engaging within this state in business as
a manufacturer, except persons taxable as
manufacturers under other provisions of this chapter; as to such persons the
amount of the tax with respect to such business shall be equal to the value of
the products, including byproducts, manufactured, multiplied by the rate of
0.484 percent.[191] (emphasis added)
Wholesale: Upon every person engaging within this state in the business
of making sales at wholesale, except persons
taxable as wholesalers under other provisions of this chapter; as to such
persons the amount of tax with respect to such business shall be equal to the
gross proceeds of sales of such business multiplied by the rate of 0.484
percent.[192] (emphasis added)
Retail: Upon every person engaging within this state in the business
of making sales at retail, except persons
taxable as retailers under other provisions of this chapter, as to such
persons, the amount of tax with respect to such business is equal to the gross
proceeds of sales of the business, multiplied by the rate of 0.471 percent.[193] (emphasis added)
7.69. The Panel considers that these
general rates, as set out in these provisions and identified by the European
Union, properly serve as the "normative benchmark"[194]
for comparison within the Washington State B&O tax system. The express
wording of the relevant statutes contemplates a general rate of B&O taxation
applicable to "every person" engaging in the relevant activity,
"except" where such persons are taxable "under other
provisions" of the same chapter.
7.70. Moreover, other documents
produced by Washington State addressing the B&O aerospace tax rate support
the understanding that, in the absence of an explicit provision for a different
tax treatment, B&O taxation would generally operate according to these
major activity classifications and the corresponding rates of taxation. The
Final Bill Report to ESSB 5952 describes the B&O tax and explains that
"[m]ajor tax rates are 0.471 per cent for retailing;
0.484 per cent for manufacturing, wholesaling, and extracting; and 1.5 per cent for services,
and activities not classified elsewhere".[195] The Department of Revenue Fiscal
Note in relation to ESSB 5952 provides a "narrative explanation"
of the measures having a fiscal impact, which refers to "[r]educed
business and occupation (B&O) tax rates of 0.2904% for manufacturers of
commercial airplanes (instead of the general manufacturing rate
of 0.484%)".[196] Further, the Washington State
Administrative Code refers to the RCW Section containing the B&O aerospace
tax rate as "provid[ing] several special B&O tax
rates/classifications for manufacturers engaging in certain
manufacturing activities".[197] Finally, a 2016 Tax Exemption
Study by the Washington State Department of Revenue characterizes the B&O
aerospace tax rate as a "preferential rate".[198]
7.71. The Panel notes the United
States' description of the B&O tax as a "pyramiding tax".
According to the United States:
[G]oods and services are taxed multiple times as they move through the
production chain, with a successively greater effective tax rate for each
business in the chain. As a result, industries with multiple steps, such as the
aerospace industry, have higher effective tax rates. In part to address this
"pyramiding", Washington has introduced a number of industry-specific
B&O tax rates.[199]
7.72. The Panel also observes that the United States further suggests that
because "Washington's unique B&O tax system results in a pyramiding
effect", "the industry in which a taxpayer sits may impact whether it
is comparably situated to a taxpayer in the aerospace industry".[200]
7.73. Arguments related to the
"pyramiding" effect of the B&O tax were examined previously by the panel and the Appellate Body in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) in
relation to similar (though subsequently amended and extended) measures under
HB 2294. Reviewing arguments on average effective tax rates based on the panel
record in that dispute, the Appellate Body saw "no indication … that
adjusting tax rates to approximate the average effective tax rate reflects a
principle under the Washington State B&O tax regime. Rather, it appears to
be more in the nature of an ex post
explanation regarding the relationship of these rates to one another."[201] The Appellate Body further
considered that the panel record in that dispute did "not support the contention
that Washington State implemented House Bill 2294 alone, or as part of a
broader regulatory scheme, to counteract the effects of pyramiding".[202]
7.74. In the present dispute, the
evidence before the Panel demonstrates that the B&O tax system is organized
based on major activity classifications with statutorily prescribed rates of
taxation corresponding to each activity. Within the framework of those major
activity classifications, the B&O tax system contemplates different rates
of taxation for certain businesses.[203] The B&O aerospace tax rate
itself is one such case, as it is explicitly framed according to these major
activity classifications (i.e. manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing), and for
such aerospace activities it establishes a specific B&O tax rate due to
policy reasons tied to the maintenance and growth of Washington State's
aerospace industry workforce.[204]
7.75. In this context, the
counteraction of higher effective tax rates from "pyramiding" due to
multiple business activities does not appear to amount to an "organizing
principle" of the domestic tax regime in question. Other features of the
B&O tax system may reflect a concern for preventing double B&O taxation,
namely the provision for a Multiple Activities Tax Credit for persons taxable under the B&O tax on
making retail and wholesale sales of the items they manufacture, such that taxes
paid on manufacturing of products sold in Washington State can be credited
against retailing or wholesaling B&O tax liability on the items
manufactured.[205] However, this feature of the B&O tax system reinforces an understanding
of the B&O tax structure built on core activity classifications of
manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing for the purposes of identifying
comparably situated taxpayers in Washington State.[206] It is these activity classifications, rather than the effective tax
rates of specific industries or sectors, that appear to form the
"organizing principle" underlying the B&O tax system.
7.76. Finally, the Panel is not
persuaded that any possible qualification for pre-existing tax incentives, in
particular those established under HB 2294, is relevant to establishing the
benchmark in this case. The fact that the applicable tax treatment may have
been available previously by virtue of earlier measures does not automatically
render that tax treatment its own normative benchmark, particularly as the
earlier application of the tax treatment in question may itself be a departure
from the organizing principles of the domestic tax regime. The United States
has not articulated why a B&O aerospace tax rate of 0.2904% should be understood
as a "defined, normative benchmark" reflective of "organizing
principles" of the B&O tax regime. The assertion that "[Boeing's] eligibility
for that rate during the [period] 2014-2024 does not represent revenue foregone"[207]
would seem to apply a strict "but for" test, without accounting for
the organizing principles of the B&O tax regime described above. Such an
approach could amount to "identifying a benchmark
solely by reference to historical rates"[208],
contrary to the reservations expressed by the Appellate Body[209]
as to the identification of a benchmark without proper regard for the complexities of a Member's domestic rules of taxation.[210]
In this case, the benchmark for comparison is not determined simply by
historical tax treatment, but rather is based on the government revenue that
would be otherwise due from comparably situated taxpayers in light of the
structure and organizing principles of the Washington State B&O tax regime.
7.77. On the basis of the evidence and
arguments on the record, the Panel considers that taxpayers in Washington State
engaged in the major business activities of manufacturing, wholesaling, and
retailing are comparably situated to their counterparts in the aerospace
industry engaged in such activities, as "every" taxpayer in the state
engaged in those activities is subject to the B&O tax. Accordingly, the
appropriate normative benchmarks with regard to the B&O aerospace tax rate
are the general B&O tax rates of 0.484% for manufacturing and wholesaling
activities, and 0.471% for retailing activities.
7.78. Having established the relevant
tax treatment provided to alleged beneficiaries of the B&O aerospace tax
rate, as well as the reasons for that treatment, the Panel turns to the
comparison of the B&O aerospace tax rate with the identified benchmarks.
7.79. For taxpayers engaged in the
business of manufacturing commercial airplanes, or manufacturing components of
such airplanes, the B&O aerospace tax rate provides for a B&O tax rate
of 0.2904%. This is to be compared with the taxation of comparably situated
taxpayers, namely the B&O tax rate of 0.484% generally applicable to other
entities engaged in manufacturing activities in Washington State. Pursuant to the
Washington State tax code, as amended by ESSB 5952, the rate applicable to
manufacturing commercial airplanes (or components of such airplanes) is lower
than that generally applied to other manufacturing activities. There is no
evidence that this difference is reflective of any organizing principle of the
B&O tax system. Rather, the difference is for the express reason of
incentivizing the maintenance and growth of Washington State's aerospace
industry. For these reasons, the Panel finds that the Washington State
government is foregoing revenue that is otherwise due in relation to
manufacturing beneficiaries of the B&O aerospace tax rate.
7.80. For taxpayers engaged in the
business of making sales at wholesale of commercial airplanes, or making sales
at wholesale of components of such airplanes, the B&O aerospace tax rate provides
for a B&O tax rate of 0.2904%. This is to be compared with the taxation of
comparably situated taxpayers, namely the B&O tax rate of 0.484% generally
applicable to other entities engaged in wholesaling activities in Washington
State. Pursuant to the Washington State tax code, as amended by ESSB 5952, the
rate applicable to wholesale sales of commercial airplanes (or components of
such airplanes) is lower than that generally applied to wholesaling activities.
There is no evidence that this difference is reflective of any organizing
principle of the B&O tax system. Rather, the difference is for the express
reason of incentivizing the maintenance and growth of Washington State's
aerospace industry. For these reasons, the Panel finds that the
Washington State government is foregoing revenue that is otherwise due in
relation to wholesaling beneficiaries of the B&O aerospace tax rate.
7.81. For taxpayers engaged in the
business of making sales at retail of commercial airplanes, or making sales at retail
of components of such airplanes, the B&O aerospace tax rate provides for a
B&O tax rate of 0.2904%. This is to be compared with the taxation of
comparably situated taxpayers, namely the B&O tax rate of 0.471% generally
applicable to other entities engaged in retailing activities in Washington
State. Pursuant to the Washington State tax code, as amended by ESSB 5952, the
rate applicable to retail sales of commercial airplanes (or components of such
airplanes) is lower than that generally applied to retailing activities. There
is no evidence that this difference is reflective of any organizing principle
of the B&O tax system. Rather, the difference is for the express reason of
incentivizing the maintenance and growth of Washington State's aerospace
industry. For these reasons, the Panel finds that the Washington State
government is foregoing revenue that is otherwise due in relation to retailing
beneficiaries of the B&O aerospace tax rate.
7.82. Finally, for taxpayers engaged in
the manufacture and sales, at both wholesale and retail levels, of tooling for use in manufacturing commercial airplanes or
components of such airplanes, the B&O aerospace tax rate provides for a
B&O tax rate of 0.2904%. This is to be compared with the taxation of comparably
situated taxpayers, namely the B&O tax rate of 0.484% generally applicable
to other entities engaged in manufacturing and wholesaling activities in
Washington State, and the B&O tax rate of 0.471% generally applicable
to other entities engaged in retailing activities in Washington State. Pursuant
to the Washington State tax code, as amended by ESSB 5952, the rate applicable
to manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing of tooling for use in
manufacturing commercial airplanes (or components of such airplanes) is lower
than that generally applied to such activities. There is no evidence that this
difference is reflective of any organizing principle of the B&O tax system.
Rather, the difference is for the express reason of incentivizing the
maintenance and growth of Washington State's aerospace industry. For these
reasons, the Panel finds that the Washington State government is foregoing
revenue that is otherwise due in relation to tooling beneficiaries (manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers) of the B&O aerospace tax rate.
7.83. Accordingly, the Panel finds that
the B&O aerospace tax rate, in respect of all of the types of activities
that it covers, constitutes a financial contribution within the meaning of
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
7.84. The legislation for the B&O tax credit for aerospace product
development provides in relevant part:
(1)(a)(i) In computing the tax imposed under this chapter [the B&O
tax], a credit is allowed for each person for qualified aerospace product
development. For a person who is a manufacturer or processor for hire of
commercial airplanes or components of such airplanes, credit may be earned for
expenditures occurring after December 1, 2003. For all other persons, credit
may be earned only for expenditures occurring after June 30, 2008.
…
(2) The credit is equal to the amount of qualified aerospace product
development expenditures of a person, multiplied by the rate of 1.5 percent.
…
(5) The definitions in this subsection apply throughout this section.
…
(b) "Aerospace product development" means research, design,
and engineering activities performed in relation to the development of an
aerospace product or of a product line, model, or model derivative of an
aerospace product, including prototype development, testing, and certification.
…
(c) "Qualified aerospace product development" means aerospace
product development performed within this state.
(d) "Qualified aerospace product development expenditures"
means operating expenses, including wages, compensation of a proprietor or a
partner in a partnership as determined by the department, benefits, supplies,
and computer expenses, directly incurred in qualified aerospace product
development by a person claiming the credit provided in this section. … [211]
7.85. Based on the available evidence,
the Panel will first identify the applicable tax treatment under the B&O
tax credit for aerospace product development, including consideration of the
objective reasons behind that treatment. As provided for in the relevant
legislation, Washington State provides a credit against B&O tax
liability "equal to the amount of qualified aerospace product development
expenditures of a person, multiplied by the rate of 1.5 per cent".[212] The term "aerospace product
development" is defined to include "research, design, and engineering
activities performed in relation to the development of an aerospace product or
of a product line, model, or model derivative of an
aerospace product, including prototype development, testing, and
certification".[213] In turn, the term "aerospace product" is
defined under Washington State law as: "(i) Commercial airplanes and
their components; (ii) Machinery and equipment that is designed and used primarily
for the maintenance, repair, overhaul, or refurbishing of commercial airplanes
or their components".[214] Such "aerospace product development" is only "qualified"
– i.e. it only counts towards the tax credit – if it occurs in Washington State[215], and
the relevant expenditures for such development against which the credit is
calculated include a variety of "operating expenses" specified in the
relevant statute that are "directly incurred in qualified aerospace
product development by a person claiming the credit provided in this section".[216]
7.86. Thus,
the tax treatment at issue is a credit applied against a taxpayer's B&O tax
liability, calculated as 1.5% of expenditures on the development of commercial
airplanes and their components, as well as machinery and equipment used in
relation to commercial airplanes and their components. As a result of the enactment of ESSB 5952,
the B&O tax credit for aerospace product development expires on 1 July
2040.[217] Thus, the relevant tax treatment
for the covered activities, at present and until the 2040 expiry date, is as
set forth above.
7.87. This tax treatment forms part of
the legislation in ESSB 5952 targeted towards the aerospace industry in
Washington State. Its "objective reasons" are the same as
discussed in respect of the B&O aerospace tax rate – that is, to provide
favourable tax treatment for the aerospace industry in order to encourage the
industry to remain in Washington State and to grow its workforce.[218]
7.88. Having identified the relevant tax treatment and its objective
reasons, the next step of the analysis is the identification of an appropriate
"benchmark for comparison" within the Washington State tax
regime to determine whether this tax treatment constitutes revenue foregone by
the Washington State government that would otherwise be due. This benchmark
must be ascertained with regard for "the structure of the domestic tax
regime and its organizing principles".[219]
7.89. With regard to the "benchmark for comparison", the
European Union submits that the B&O tax credit for aerospace product
development reduces the amount of B&O tax liability by the value of the
credit, and that "the standard tax treatment of manufacturers, unabated by
such tax credits, serves as the normative benchmark".[220]
The United States, in addition to its general argument that the European Union
has not met its burden to identify the benchmark for each aerospace tax measure,
also submits, in respect of tax credits, that the comparable taxable
"event" is not an event involving the same taxpayers absent the
credit, as this would be the "type of historical comparison for a taxpayer
[that] was criticized by the Appellate Body".[221]
7.90. The Panel considers that, as with the B&O aerospace tax rate,
the B&O tax regime (rather than other types of taxation that exist in
Washington State) constitutes the part of the Washington State tax regime that
is relevant to the appropriate benchmark for the B&O tax credit for
aerospace product development. Unlike the B&O aerospace tax rate, the B&O
tax credit for aerospace product development does not alter the rate of
taxation applicable to a given taxpayer, but rather provides for an amount to
be credited or offset against that taxpayer's B&O tax liability. As
discussed above, the organizing principles of the B&O tax regime involve
the establishment of generally applicable rates of taxation according to major
activity classifications, across a range of different industries and sectors.[222]
7.91. Based on the evidence on record, the Panel does not consider it to
be an "organizing principle" of the B&O tax regime to provide
industry-specific credits for designated activities to offset a portion of the
tax liability arising from the pertinent B&O tax rates. A taxpayer is
normally subject to generally applicable B&O tax rates based on the type of
business activity conducted (e.g. manufacturing, wholesaling, or retailing). The
taxpayer's B&O tax liability would be calculated by multiplying the
applicable tax rate by the taxable amount generated by the business activity.[223]
The "gross" B&O tax liability thus calculated would be the
benchmark against which to compare the taxpayer's B&O tax liability net of
the amount of the credit. The fact that in every case of such comparison the
taxpayer in question is the same does not change this conclusion, because the
organizing principle is not that credits are made available, but rather that
taxpayers, by virtue of the generally applicable rates of taxation according to
major activity classifications, would otherwise expect to have to pay the tax
that is being credited. Indeed, given that the form of the measure is a credit,
or offset, against a taxpayer's gross B&O tax liability, the Panel considers
this approach to identifying the benchmark for a measure of this nature as most
reasonable.
7.92. The Panel therefore agrees with the European Union that the relevant
normative benchmark is the B&O tax liability that would apply to a given
taxpayer in the absence of the credit.
7.93. Having established the relevant tax treatment provided to alleged
beneficiaries of the B&O tax credit for aerospace product development, as
well as the reasons for that treatment, the Panel turns to the comparison of the
B&O tax credit for aerospace product development with the identified benchmark.
7.94. As described above, taxpayers engaged in activities subject to
B&O taxation in Washington State are subject to B&O tax rates
corresponding to the major activity classifications. It is by virtue of the
additional provision for a B&O tax credit tied to aerospace product
development that this tax liability can be reduced for eligible taxpayers by
the amount of the credit. As noted above, this credit is provided within the
framework of legislation enacted for the express reason of incentivizing the
maintenance and growth of employment in Washington State's aerospace industry.
7.95. In this regard, the Panel is mindful of the Appellate Body's
reservation that "an approach that focuses too narrowly on the change
effected by a tax measure could result in a finding that government revenue
otherwise due is foregone anytime the tax rate applicable to a recipient is
lowered."[224]
The Appellate Body underscored "the risk in identifying a benchmark solely
by reference to historical rates, the very departure from which may reflect
evidence of shifting norms within that regime".[225]
This is the issue raised by the United States referred to above.[226]
7.96. Taking into account the Appellate Body's guidance, the Panel's
analysis does not concern "what previously applied
to commercial aircraft manufacturing activities", but rather "what
would currently apply to these activities if
the conditions for" the tax credit were not met.[227]
The Panel has taken into account the structure of the B&O tax system and
the reasons for the specific tax treatment at issue. Moreover, the Panel does
not consider, nor did the United States provide evidence or argumentation to
suggest, that the provision of this tax credit reflects "evidence of
shifting norms within" the B&O tax regime.[228] The
Panel notes that the measure in question is a tax credit, and thus does not
change the applicable tax rates, but rather offsets B&O tax liability that
would otherwise be due in the absence of the credit.
7.97. Based on these considerations, the Panel finds that the B&O tax
credit for aerospace product development results in the foregoing of government
revenue by Washington State with respect to the B&O tax liability that
would otherwise be presently incurred by the taxpayers eligible for the credit.
In this regard, the Panel considers the illustrative reference in Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)
to "fiscal incentives such as tax credits" to be apposite to the
circumstances of the B&O tax credit for aerospace product development as
presented to the Panel.
7.98. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the B&O tax credit for
aerospace product development constitutes a financial contribution within the
meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
7.99. The legislation for the B&O
tax credit for property and leasehold excise taxes provides in relevant part:
(1) In computing the tax imposed under this chapter [the B&O tax], a
credit is allowed for property taxes and leasehold excise taxes paid during the
calendar year.
(2) The credit is equal to:
(a)(i)(A) Property taxes paid on buildings, and land upon which the
buildings are located, constructed after December 1, 2003, and used exclusively
in manufacturing commercial airplanes or components of such airplanes; and
(B) Leasehold excise taxes paid with respect to buildings constructed
after January 1, 2006, the land upon which the buildings are located, or both,
if the buildings are used exclusively in manufacturing commercial airplanes or
components of such airplanes; and
(C) Property taxes or leasehold excise taxes paid on, or with respect
to, buildings constructed after June 30, 2008, the land upon which the
buildings are located, or both, and used exclusively for aerospace product
development, manufacturing tooling specifically designed for use in
manufacturing commercial airplanes or their components, or in providing
aerospace services … ; or
(ii) Property taxes attributable to an increase in assessed value due to
the renovation or expansion, after: (A) December 1, 2003, of a building used
exclusively in manufacturing commercial airplanes or components of such
airplanes; and (B) June 30, 2008, of buildings used exclusively for
aerospace product development, manufacturing tooling specifically designed for
use in manufacturing commercial airplanes or their components, or in providing
aerospace services, … [229]
7.100. Based on the available evidence,
the Panel will first identify the applicable tax treatment under the B&O
tax credit for property and leasehold excise taxes, including consideration of
the objective reasons behind that treatment. As provided for in the relevant
legislation, Washington State provides a credit against B&O tax
liability "for property taxes and leasehold excise taxes paid during the
calendar year".[230] The tax credit applies to
property and leasehold excise taxes related to buildings, and/or land upon
which the buildings are located, that are: "used exclusively in
manufacturing commercial airplanes or components of such airplanes"[231]; and "used exclusively for
aerospace product development, manufacturing tooling specifically designed for
use in manufacturing commercial airplanes or their components, or in providing
aerospace services".[232] In addition, this B&O tax
credit applies to property taxes "attributable to an increase in assessed
value due to renovation or expansion" of such buildings.[233] As a result of the enactment of
ESSB 5952, the B&O tax credit for property and leasehold excise taxes expires
on 1 July 2040.[234] Thus, the relevant tax treatment,
at present and until the 2040 expiry date, is as set forth above.
7.101. The United States explains that the
B&O tax credit for property and leasehold excise taxes enables a taxpayer
to claim a credit that is measured according to property taxes and leasehold
excise taxes[235] "due on certain types of
property with certain types of uses related to commercial airplane, airplane
components, aerospace services, and aerospace product development".[236] The tax credit provided for
under this aerospace tax measure "offsets the B&O tax that is due in a
given year".[237]
7.102. This tax treatment forms part of
the legislation in ESSB 5952 targeted towards the aerospace industry in
Washington State. As such, its "objective reasons" are the same as
discussed in respect of the B&O aerospace tax rate – that is, to provide
favourable tax treatment for the aerospace industry in order to encourage the
industry to remain in Washington State and to grow its workforce.[238]
7.103. Having identified the relevant tax treatment and its objective
reasons, the next step of the analysis is the identification of an appropriate
"benchmark for comparison" within the Washington State tax
regime to determine whether this tax treatment constitutes revenue foregone by
the Washington State government that would otherwise be due. This benchmark
must be ascertained with regard for "the structure of the domestic tax
regime and its organizing principles".[239]
7.104. With regard to the "benchmark for comparison", the
European Union submits that the B&O tax credit for property and leasehold
excise taxes reduces the amount of B&O tax liability by the value of the
credit, and that "the standard tax treatment of manufacturers, unabated by
such tax credits, serves as the normative benchmark".[240] The
United States, in addition to its general argument that the European Union has
not met its burden to identify the benchmark for each aerospace tax measure,
also submits, in respect of tax credits, that the comparable taxable
"event" is not an event involving the same taxpayers absent the
credit, as this would be the "type of historical comparison for a taxpayer
[that] was criticized by the Appellate Body".[241]
7.105. The Panel considers that, as with the other B&O-related tax
measures, the B&O tax regime constitutes the part of the Washington State
tax regime that is relevant to the appropriate benchmark for the B&O tax
credit for property and leasehold excise taxes. Like the B&O tax credit for
aerospace product development, the B&O tax credit for property and
leasehold excise taxes does not alter the rate of taxation but rather provides
for an amount to be credited against a taxpayer's B&O tax liability. As
discussed above, the organizing principles of the B&O tax regime involve
the establishment of generally applicable rates of taxation according to major
activity classifications, across a range of different industries and sectors.[242]
7.106. As also discussed above, and based
on the evidence on record, the Panel does not consider it to be an
"organizing principle" of the B&O tax regime to provide
industry-specific credits for designated activities to offset a portion of the
tax liability arising from the pertinent B&O tax rates. The Panel follows the same approach for the B&O tax credit for
property and leasehold excise taxes, for the same reasons, as that taken in
respect of the B&O tax credit for aerospace product development. The Panel
therefore agrees with the European Union that the relevant normative benchmark
is the B&O tax liability that would apply in the absence of the credit.
7.107. The comparison for the B&O tax credit for property and leasehold
excise taxes follows the same reasoning as that set out above for the B&O
tax credit for aerospace product development. Thus, taxpayers engaged in
activities subject to B&O taxation in Washington State are subject to B&O
tax rates corresponding to the major activity classifications. It is by virtue
of the additional provision for a B&O tax credit for property and leasehold
excise taxes paid in respect of the designated aerospace related activities and
properties that this tax liability can be reduced, for eligible taxpayers, by
the amount of the credit. As noted above, this credit is provided within the
framework of legislation enacted for the express reason of incentivizing the
maintenance and growth of employment in Washington State's aerospace industry.
7.108. As with the B&O tax credit for aerospace product development,
the Panel is mindful of the Appellate Body's reservation that "an approach
that focuses too narrowly on the change effected by a tax measure could result
in a finding that government revenue otherwise due is foregone anytime the tax
rate applicable to a recipient is lowered."[243]
The Appellate Body underscored "the risk in identifying a benchmark solely
by reference to historical rates, the very departure from which may reflect
evidence of shifting norms within that regime".[244]
7.109. Taking into account the Appellate Body's guidance, the Panel's
analysis does not concern "what previously
applied to commercial aircraft manufacturing activities", but rather
"what would currently apply to these
activities if the conditions for" the tax credit were not met.[245]
The Panel has taken into account the structure of the B&O tax system and
the reasons for the specific tax treatment at issue. Moreover, the Panel does
not consider, nor did the United States provide evidence or argumentation to
suggest, that the provision of this tax credit reflects "evidence of
shifting norms within" the B&O tax regime.[246] The
Panel notes that the measure in question is a tax credit, and thus does not
change the applicable tax rates, but rather offsets B&O tax liability that
would otherwise be due in the absence of the credit.
7.110. Based on these considerations, the Panel finds that the B&O tax
credit for property and leasehold excise taxes results in the foregoing of
government revenue by Washington State with respect to the B&O tax
liability that would otherwise be presently incurred by taxpayers eligible for
the credit. In this regard, and as with the B&O tax credit for aerospace
product development, the Panel considers the illustrative reference to
"fiscal incentives such as tax credits" in Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)
to be apposite to the circumstances of the B&O tax credit for property and
leasehold excise taxes as presented to the Panel.
7.111. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the B&O tax credit for
property and leasehold excise taxes constitutes a financial contribution within
the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
7.112. The legislation for the computer
sales tax exemption provides in relevant part:
(1) The tax levied by RCW 82.08.020 [the sales tax] does not apply to
sales of computer hardware, computer peripherals, or software … used primarily
in the development, design, and engineering of aerospace products or in
providing aerospace services, or to sales of or charges made for labor and
services rendered in respect to installing the computer hardware, computer
peripherals, or software.[247]
7.113. The computer use tax exemption provides in relevant part:
(1) The provisions of this chapter [the use tax] do not apply in respect
to the use of computer hardware, computer peripherals … used primarily in the
development, design, and engineering of aerospace products or in providing
aerospace services, or to the use of labor and services rendered in respect to
installing the computer hardware, computer peripherals, or software.[248]
7.114. Based on the available evidence,
the Panel will first identify the applicable tax treatment under the computer
sales and use tax exemptions, including consideration of the objective reasons
behind that treatment. As provided for in the relevant legislation, Washington
State provides an exemption from the retail sales tax[249] for "sales of computer
hardware, computer peripherals, or software … used primarily in the
development, design, and engineering of aerospace products or in providing
aerospace services, or to sales of or charges made for labor and services
rendered in respect to installing the computer hardware, computer peripherals,
or software".[250] Additionally, the use of these
items is exempt from the Washington State's "use tax"[251], which is a tax on the use of
goods or certain services in the state of Washington when sales tax has not
been paid.[252] As a result of ESSB 5952, the
computer sales and use tax exemptions expire on 1 July 2040.[253] Thus, the relevant tax treatment
for the covered activities and products, at present and until the 2040 expiry
date, is as set forth above.
7.115. This tax treatment forms part of
the legislation in ESSB 5952 targeted towards the aerospace industry in
Washington State. As such, its "objective reasons" are the same as
discussed in respect of the B&O aerospace tax rate – that is, to provide
favourable tax treatment for the aerospace industry in order to encourage the
industry to remain in Washington State and to grow its workforce.[254]
7.116. Having identified the relevant
tax treatment and its objective reasons, the next step of the analysis is the
identification of an appropriate "benchmark for comparison" within
the Washington State tax regime to determine whether this tax treatment
constitutes revenue foregone by the Washington State government that would
otherwise be due. This benchmark must be ascertained with regard for "the
structure of the domestic tax regime and its organizing principles".[255]
7.117. With regard to the
"benchmark for comparison", the European Union submits that the computer
sales and use tax exemptions "exempt[] the purchase of otherwise taxable
goods and services from the retail sales and use taxes", and that "the normative
benchmark is the sales and use taxes that would otherwise apply absent these
exemptions".[256]
The United States, in addition to its general argument that the European Union
has not met its burden to identify the benchmark for each aerospace tax
measure, also submits, in respect of tax exemptions, that the comparable
taxable "event" is not an event involving the same taxpayers absent
the exemption, as this would be the "type of historical comparison for a
taxpayer [that] was criticized by the Appellate Body".[257]
The United States further submits that "quantitative coverage of various
tax regimes could be relevant to determining a financial contribution compared
to a normative benchmark"[258] and that "Washington
provides a large number of exemptions … suggesting that the sales and use tax
rates that are notionally (but not actually) applicable to all purchases by consumers
located in Washington are not the appropriate benchmark".[259]
7.118. As a threshold matter, it is the
sales and use tax regime, as distinguished from other types of taxation that
exist in Washington State, in which the aerospace tax measure at issue applies
and according to which the parties have advanced their arguments on the
appropriate benchmark for comparison. Therefore, in order to identify the
appropriate benchmark for comparison, the Panel will examine the structure of
the sales and use tax regime in Washington State, particularly in respect of
its organizing principles and legitimately comparable tax situations.
7.119. Washington State has a retail
sales tax, which is its principal source of tax revenue.[260] Generally, a retail sale is the
sale of tangible personal property, as well as the sale of certain services
(including construction services) and sales of digital products to consumers.[261] The
Washington State retail sales tax rate has two components: the state component,
which is equal to 6.5%, and the local component, which varies by jurisdiction.[262]
Local governments within Washington State have the authority to set their own retail
sales tax rates within their jurisdictions, but the State administers both
components.[263]
7.120. The Washington State use tax is complementary to the retail sales
tax, in that it is due on the use of goods or services to the extent that the
user has not paid the Washington State retail sales tax or "a legally
imposed retail sales or use tax … to any other state, possession, territory, or
commonwealth of the United States, any political subdivision thereof, the
District of Columbia, and any foreign country or political subdivision
thereof".[264]
Thus, goods in Washington State are subject to either sales or use tax, but not
both, and the use tax compensates when the sales tax has not been paid.[265]
Use tax is determined on the value of the goods (generally the purchase price)
when first used in Washington State.[266]
The use tax rate is the same as the retail sales tax rate.[267]
7.121. Both parties have noted that
there are a number of exemptions from retail sales and use taxes for purchases
of specific goods or services. Some of these exemptions are limited to a
particular industry or sector, while other exemptions are available for any
purchaser or user of the specified good or service.[268] The parties also have advanced arguments based on the quantitative
coverage of the exemptions.[269]
7.122. The parties' arguments on the
coverage and exemption of sales and use taxes are primarily based on a 2016 Tax
Exemption Study by the Washington State Department of Revenue. The portions of
the study submitted to the Panel include an Introduction and Summary of
Findings[270] as well as an Appendix containing a detailed list of "tax
exemptions" examined in the study. The study uses the term "tax
exemption" to cover "a variety of preferences that reduce tax
liability for taxpayers", including exclusions, deductions, credits,
preferential tax rates, and exemptions under a range of different tax regimes,
not limited to the retail sales and use taxes.[271] On the basis of data in this study, both parties have submitted figures
on the quantitative coverage of certain exemptions in relation to the
underlying tax. The United States refers to the large number of exemptions as
"suggesting that the sales and use tax rates that are notionally (but not
actually) applicable to all purchases by consumers located in Washington are
not the appropriate benchmark".[272]
7.123. Having examined the tax study, the
Panel finds that it evidences a tax regime structure in which there are
specific exemptions targeted at defined beneficiaries.[273] To the extent that the study is submitted as evidence of the factual
assertion that exemptions from the tax rules in question (sales and use taxes)
are of greater value than government revenue collected under those rules, the
parties' arguments based on this study do not clearly establish that this is
the case. For example, the parties derive fractions using different figures for
the numerator[274], and the figures used by both parties fail to
adjust for the exemptions in question that are available to the aerospace
industry, which could be necessary to assess government revenue that would be
"otherwise due" and to guard against the normative benchmark being
distorted by alleged subsidies at issue.[275]
7.124. The Panel considers that the quantitative
scope of what may be considered an "exception" could undermine the
notion of a "general rule" for a given tax situation. An organizing
principle that a government professes in respect of a tax, or that appears to
be the principle that is being applied "on the surface", may not
represent the "true" organizing principle. The terms and principles
employed by the sovereign tax authority in question will be important but in
all cases the Panel's decision must be informed by the evidence and by the
Panel's interpretation of it. In this respect, the Panel finds relevant the
Appellate Body's statement that the benchmark for comparison is normative in
nature, and that "the task of the panel is to develop an understanding of
the tax structure and principles that best explains that Member's tax regime,
and to provide a reasoned basis for identifying what constitutes comparable
income of comparably situated taxpayers".[276]
7.125. In this case, the Washington
State sales and use taxes are drawn as broadly applicable taxes in a
non-exhaustive fashion, and are designed to complement one another through
mutually exclusive coverage. This breadth of the sales and use taxes is
foundational to the structure of the sales and use tax regime, which set out
exemptions in a specific manner. Although the exemptions involve a diversity of
goods, services, and sectors, the evidence advanced by the United States is not
sufficient to rebut the prima facie
conclusion that can be drawn from what the European Union has placed before the
Panel. The structure of the tax is that of a generally applicable tax that
applies by default. As a matter of fact the Panel does not find that structure
to have been inverted by the relative coverage of exemptions in quantitative terms.
In other words, exempting taxpayers from sales and use taxes does not amount to
an "organizing principle" of the Washington State sales and use tax
regime (or the Washington State tax regime more generally).
7.126. It is with regard for this basic
structure, and on the basis of the rules established by Washington State, that
the Panel finds that the generally applicable sales and use taxes serve as the
appropriate normative benchmark in respect of the computer sales and use tax
exemptions.
7.127. In view of the benchmark
established above, it follows that the specific exemption from sales and use
taxes, which otherwise would apply to the aerospace activities in question,
amounts to the foregoing of government revenue by Washington State that would
otherwise be due. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the computer sales and use
tax exemption constitutes a financial contribution within the meaning of
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
7.128. The legislation for the construction
sales tax exemption provides in relevant part:
(1) The tax levied by RCW 82.08.020 does not apply to:
(a) Charges, for labor and services rendered in respect to the
constructing of new buildings, made to (i) a manufacturer engaged in the
manufacturing of commercial airplanes or the fuselages or wings of commercial
airplanes or (ii) a port district, political subdivision, or municipal
corporation, to be leased to a manufacturer engaged in the manufacturing of
commercial airplanes or the fuselages or wings of commercial airplanes;
(b) Sales of tangible personal property that will be incorporated as an
ingredient or component of such buildings during the course of the
constructing; or
(c) Charges made for labor and services rendered in respect to
installing, during the course of constructing such buildings, building fixtures
… [277]
7.129. The construction use tax
exemption provides in relevant part:
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not apply with respect to the use
of:
(a) Tangible personal property that will be incorporated as an ingredient
or component in constructing new buildings for (i) a manufacturer engaged in
the manufacturing of commercial airplanes or the fuselages or wings of
commercial airplanes or (ii) a port district, political subdivision, or
municipal corporation, to be leased to a manufacturer engaged in the
manufacturing of commercial airplanes or the fuselages or wings of commercial
airplanes; or
(b) Labor and services rendered in respect to installing, during the
course of constructing such buildings, building fixtures … [278]
7.130. Based on the available evidence,
the Panel will first identify the applicable tax treatment under the construction
sales and use tax exemptions, including consideration of the objective reasons
behind that treatment. As provided for in the relevant legislation, Washington State
provides exemptions from retail sales taxes[279]
on "[c]harges, for labor and services rendered in respect to the
constructing of new buildings, made to a manufacturer engaged in the manufacturing
of commercial airplanes or the fuselages or wings of commercial
airplanes", as well as taxes on "[s]ales of tangible personal
property that will be incorporated as an ingredient or component of such
buildings during the course of the constructing".[280] Similarly, there is an exemption
from use taxes "with respect to the use of [t]angible personal property
that will be incorporated as an ingredient or component in constructing new
buildings for a manufacturer engaged in the manufacturing of commercial airplanes
or the fuselages or wings of commercial airplanes".[281] As a result of ESSB 5952, the
construction sales and use tax exemptions expire on 1 July 2040.[282] Thus, the relevant tax treatment
for the covered activities and products, at present and until the 2040 expiry
date, is as set forth above.
7.131. This tax treatment forms part of
the legislation in ESSB 5952 targeted towards the aerospace industry in
Washington State. As such, its "objective reasons" are the same as
discussed in respect of the B&O aerospace tax rate – that is, to provide
favourable tax treatment for the aerospace industry in order to encourage the
industry to remain in Washington State and to grow its workforce.[283]
7.132. The parties have not
differentiated between the computer sales and use tax exemptions, on the one
hand, and the construction sales and use tax exemptions, on the other, in their
arguments regarding the benchmark for comparison.
7.133. The construction sales and use
tax exemptions pertain to the same underlying tax obligations as those
considered above, namely the Washington State retail sales and use taxes. In
the Panel's view, the same considerations apply in determining the appropriate
normative benchmark for comparison in relation to the construction sales and
use tax exemptions. These exemptions form a targeted tax treatment within a
structure organized according to the principle that either sales or use taxes,
but not both, are generally due on the sales and use of tangible goods and
services. In light of this basic organizing principle, it is the generally
applicable sales and use taxes that serve as the appropriate normative
benchmark in this case.
7.134. In view of the benchmark
established above, it follows that the specific exemption from sales and use
taxes, which would otherwise apply to the aerospace activities in question,
amounts to the foregoing of government revenue by Washington State that would
otherwise be due. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the construction sales and
use tax exemption constitutes a financial contribution within the meaning of
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
7.135. The legislation for the leasehold
excise tax exemption provides in relevant part:
(1) All leasehold interests in port district facilities exempt from tax
under [the construction sales and use tax exemptions] and used by a
manufacturer engaged in the manufacturing of superefficient airplanes … are
exempt from tax under this chapter. A person claiming the credit under [the B&O
tax credit for property and leasehold excise taxes] is not eligible for the
exemption under this section.[284]
7.136. Based on the available evidence,
the Panel will first identify the applicable tax treatment under the leasehold
excise tax exemption, including consideration of the objective reasons behind
that treatment. As provided for in the relevant legislation, Washington State imposes
a leasehold excise tax in lieu of a property tax on the use of public property
by a private party.[285] The relevant regulations explain
that "[t]he intent of the law is to ensure that lessees of property owned
by public entities bear their fair share of the cost of governmental services
when the property is rented to someone who would be subject to property taxes
if the lessee were the owner of the property".[286] Washington State exempts from
this tax leasehold interests in certain facilities "used
by a manufacturer engaged in the manufacturing of superefficient
airplanes".[287] The leasehold excise tax
exemption is not available to a person claiming the B&O tax credit for
property and leasehold excise taxes.[288] ESSB 5952 extended the
application of this exemption to 1 July 2040.[289] Thus, the relevant tax treatment
for the covered activities, at present and until the 2040 expiry date, is as
set forth above.
7.137. This tax treatment forms part of
the legislation in ESSB 5952 targeted towards the aerospace industry in
Washington State. As such, its "objective reasons" are the same as
discussed in respect of the B&O aerospace tax rate – that is, to provide
favourable tax treatment for the aerospace industry in order to encourage the
industry to remain in Washington State and to grow its workforce.[290]
7.138. Having identified the relevant
tax treatment and its objective reasons, the next step of the analysis is the
identification of an appropriate "benchmark for comparison" within
the Washington State tax regime to determine whether this tax treatment
constitutes revenue foregone by the Washington State government that would
otherwise be due. This benchmark must be ascertained with regard for "the
structure of the domestic tax regime and its organizing principles".[291]
7.139. The European Union submits that
the appropriate benchmark for comparison for the leasehold excise tax exemption
"is the payment of the 12.84 percent leasehold excise tax that would
normally apply".[292] The United States, in addition to
its general argument that the European Union has not met its burden to
identify the benchmark for each aerospace tax measure, also submits that, for
tax exemptions, the comparable taxable "event" is not an event
involving the same taxpayer absent the exemptions, as this would be the "type
of historical comparison for a taxpayer [that] was criticized by the Appellate
Body".[293]
The United States further submits that "quantitative coverage of various
tax regimes could be relevant to determining a financial contribution compared
to a normative benchmark"[294]
and that "tax exemptions far outweighed tax revenues" for state
property taxes.[295]
7.140. The Panel notes that the leasehold
excise tax is an excise tax that supplements the Washington State property tax
regime. Specifically, the leasehold excise tax applies in lieu of real property
tax where a private party uses public property under lease, rather than owning
real property. This tax is complementary to real and personal property taxes,
which are levied in accordance with the statutory rule of the property tax
regime in Washington State that "[a]ll property now existing, or that is
hereafter created or brought into this state, shall be subject to assessment
and taxation for state, county, and other taxing district purposes".[296] Thus, real and personal property
is generally subject to taxation, although a number of exemptions to this
general rule apply.[297] For example, property valued at
less than USD 500, churches and cemeteries, business inventory, and property
owned by federal, state, and local governments are all exempt from property
taxation.[298] Although government-owned
property as such is not subject to property tax, such property becomes subject
to the leasehold excise tax when it is used by a private party. Personal
property such as household goods and personal effects are not subject to
property tax unless these items are used in a business, and personal property
is subject to the same levy rate as real property.[299]
7.141. Based on the foregoing, the Panel
considers that it is the Washington State property tax regime, as distinguished
from other types of taxation that exist in Washington State, that is relevant
to identifying the appropriate benchmark for the leasehold excise tax
exemption. As noted, under this tax regime, real and personal property is
subject to taxation unless a specific exemption applies. In this respect, while
the Panel takes note of the parties' arguments on the quantitative coverage of
property tax exemptions[300], the relevant rules established
by Washington State authorities suggest that the organizing principle of
the tax regime is to create a default rule of property taxation with provision
for specific exemptions and the quantitative information does not displace that
principle. Exempting taxpayers from property tax liability does not appear to
be an "organizing principle" of the Washington State property tax
regime. Nor does the structure of the tax regime in question suggest an
alternative benchmark apart from the generally defined norm of being subject to
property taxation. The particular features of the leasehold excise tax, which
is a tax on the use of public property by a private party in lieu of the
property tax, reinforces the notion of generally applicable property taxation
as the appropriate benchmark for comparison.[301] In light of this, the applicable
leasehold excise tax rate of 12.84% of the rent paid by the lessee for the
property represents the taxable situation that is legitimately comparable to
that covered by the leasehold excise tax exemption.
7.142. Accordingly, the Panel considers
that the benchmark for comparison for the leasehold excise tax exemption is the
leasehold excise tax that would ordinarily be imposed on private parties using
public property.
7.143. Given the benchmark of otherwise
applicable leasehold excise taxation within the general regime of property
taxation, the specific exemption from leasehold excise taxes, which would
otherwise apply to the aerospace activities in question, amounts to the
foregoing of government revenue by Washington State that would otherwise be
due. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the leasehold excise tax exemption
constitutes a financial contribution within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)
of the SCM Agreement.
7.144. The legislation for the leaseholder property tax exemption provides
in relevant part:
(1) Effective January 1, 2005, all buildings, machinery, equipment, and
other personal property of a lessee of a port district eligible under [the construction
sales and use tax exemptions], used exclusively in manufacturing superefficient
airplanes, are exempt from property taxation. A person taking the credit under
[the B&O tax credit for property and leasehold excise taxes] is not
eligible for the exemption under this section. … [302]
7.145. Based on the available evidence,
the Panel will first identify the applicable tax treatment under the
leaseholder property tax exemption, including consideration of the objective
reasons behind that treatment. As provided for in the relevant legislation,
Washington State exempts from property taxation "all buildings, machinery,
equipment, and other personal property of a lessee of a port district eligible [for
construction sales and use tax exemptions], used exclusively in manufacturing
superefficient airplanes".[303] The leaseholder property tax exemption
is not available to a person claiming the B&O tax credit for property and
leasehold excise taxes.[304] ESSB 5952 extended the
application of this exemption to 1 July 2040.[305] Thus, the relevant tax
treatment, at present and until the 2040 expiry date, is as set forth above.
7.146. This tax treatment forms part of the legislation in ESSB 5952
targeted towards the aerospace industry in Washington State. As such,
its "objective reasons" are the same as discussed in respect of the
B&O aerospace tax rate – that is, to provide favourable tax treatment for
the aerospace industry in order to encourage the industry to remain in
Washington State and to grow its workforce.[306]
7.147. Having identified the relevant
tax treatment and its objective reasons, the next step of the analysis is the
identification of an appropriate "benchmark for comparison" within
the Washington State tax regime to determine whether this tax treatment
constitutes revenue foregone by the Washington State government that would
otherwise be due. This benchmark must be ascertained with regard for "the
structure of the domestic tax regime and its organizing principles".[307]
7.148. The European Union submits that
the leaseholder property tax exemption "exempts certain otherwise taxable
business property from the property taxes that would normally apply", and
"that otherwise applicable property tax treatment therefore provides the
normative benchmark".[308] The United States, in addition to
its general argument that the European Union has not met its burden to identify
the benchmark for each aerospace tax measure, also submits that, for tax
exemptions, the comparable taxable "event" is not an event involving
the same taxpayer absent the exemptions, as this would be the "type of
historical comparison for a taxpayer [that] was criticized by the Appellate
Body".[309]
The United States further submits that "quantitative coverage of various
tax regimes could be relevant to determining a financial contribution compared
to a normative benchmark"[310]
and that "tax exemptions far outweighed tax revenues" for state
property taxes.[311]
7.149. As discussed above, under the relevant statutory rule of the Washington State
property tax regime[312], real and personal property in
Washington State is generally subject to taxation, although a number of
exemptions from this general rule apply.[313] In this respect, the Panel has
noted that the relevant rules established by Washington State authorities suggest
that the organizing principle of the tax regime is to create a default rule of
property taxation with provision for specific exemptions and the quantitative
information does not displace that principle. Exempting taxpayers from property
tax liability does not appear to be an "organizing principle" of the
Washington State property tax regime. Nor does the structure of the tax regime
in question suggest an alternative benchmark apart from the generally defined
norm of being subject to property taxation. Thus, the generally applicable
property tax within the state of Washington corresponds to the taxable
situation (namely ownership of personal property by an eligible lessee) that is
legitimately comparable to that covered by the leaseholder property tax exemption.
7.150. Accordingly, the Panel considers
that the benchmark for comparison is the property tax that would ordinarily be
imposed on personal property of lessees of port districts.
7.151. Given the benchmark of otherwise
applicable property taxation, the specific exemption from property taxes, which
would otherwise apply to the aerospace activities in question, amounts to the
foregoing of government revenue by Washington State that would otherwise be due.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the leaseholder property tax exemption
constitutes a financial contribution within the meaning of Article
1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
7.152. In concluding, the Panel notes various additional arguments raised
by the parties in relation to whether the aerospace tax measures constitute a
financial contribution.
7.153. The United States has submitted that aerospace activity until 1 July
2024 would have qualified for certain tax treatment under legislation
pre-dating ESSB 5952, and that the extent of any financial contribution in this
dispute would be limited to revenue foregone at some point in the future.[314]
In this regard, the Panel recalls its determination that the aerospace tax
incentives at issue are those as currently codified and in effect until 2040
by virtue of ESSB 5952.[315]
Thus, the preceding analysis of a financial contribution under each of the
aerospace tax measures does not refer to a future window of time during which
pre-existing tax treatment was extended. Rather, the analysis of government
revenue foregone has been conducted in regard to the currently codified tax
provisions, which reflect and incorporate a series of earlier legislative acts,
in addition to incorporating new substantive provisions created by ESSB 5952.
7.154. The Panel further notes the European Union's clarification that its
claim is directed at the aerospace tax measures "as such", and thus
is "not directed against the application of these measures during any
given point in time or in any specific instance".[316]
The Panel considers this an important distinction from the claim made in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), in
which arguments were presented and assessed in relation to Boeing-specific
subsidies and their alleged causation of adverse effects under Part III of the
SCM Agreement. Thus, although evidence of actual use of certain fiscal
incentives may support or confirm a finding that government revenue is foregone
that is otherwise due[317],
the Panel does not consider this to be required for the purposes of
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement, particularly where a claim is
made that the challenged measures "as such" make a financial
contribution.[318]
7.155. In the same vein, the Panel notes the issue raised by the United
States of whether it is possible to establish a financial contribution (and
benefit) for tax incentives that legally are mutually exclusive according to
their own explicit terms, as is the case for the B&O tax credit for
property and leasehold excise taxes on the one hand, and the tax exemptions
related to leasehold excise taxes and leaseholder property taxes on the other
hand.[319]
The Panel does not consider that any such mutual exclusivity should prevent
simultaneous challenge, or a finding that each tax incentive, on its own and
"as such", represents the foregoing of revenue otherwise due. The
fact that a taxpayer can in the future choose between tax incentives does not
render the one that ultimately is not chosen to be less of a foregoing of
revenue. Furthermore,
for measures such as those at issue where there may be multiple potential
recipients of the financial contribution, certain taxpayers may be eligible
for, and may use, one incentive, while others may be eligible for, and may use,
the other at any given moment during the period of availability of the tax
measures (in this case, until the expiration of the aerospace tax measures in
2040).[320]
7.156. Finally, the Panel notes the United States' reiteration that the
European Union has failed to meet its burden of proof in respect of any
financial contribution made by the aerospace tax measures, and that this burden
cannot be met by substituting the findings made in the context of US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint)
regarding different claims and measures. The Panel agrees that its terms of
reference are confined to the aerospace tax measures identified in the
European Union's panel request in the present case, which are formally and
substantively distinct from those considered in US – Large
Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint). The Panel's assessment is
based upon arguments and evidence on the record of this dispute, with careful
regard for the principle that it is the complaining party's burden to establish
a prima facie case which, in the absence
of adequate refutation, requires the Panel to rule in favour of the complaining
party. A significant amount of evidence was placed before the Panel by the
European Union, and its submissions led the Panel to various relevant aspects
of that evidence. Brevity in the European Union's submissions did not prejudice
its satisfaction of the burden of proving facts to establish that the measures
involved a foregoing of revenue otherwise due within the terms of Article
1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement. The case put in rebuttal by the United
States did not reverse the European Union's satisfaction of its burden.
7.157. In conclusion, none of these arguments disturbs the Panel's above analysis
of the aerospace tax measures. Accordingly, the Panel finds that each aerospace
tax measure constitutes a financial contribution within the meaning of Article
1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement because "government revenue that is
otherwise due is foregone or not collected".
7.158. With respect to whether a benefit
is conferred under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body
emphasized that "a 'financial contribution' and a 'benefit' [are] two
separate legal elements in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, which together
determine whether a subsidy exists".[321]
7.159. The ordinary meaning of the term
"benefit" has been understood as "clearly encompass[ing] some
form of advantage".[322] The Appellate Body further
explained that "the word 'benefit', as used in Article 1.1(b), implies
some kind of comparison" to determine whether "the 'financial
contribution' makes the recipient 'better off' than it would otherwise have
been, absent that contribution".[323] In the Appellate Body's view,
"the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison in
determining whether a 'benefit' has been 'conferred', because the
trade-distorting potential of a 'financial contribution' can be identified by
determining whether the recipient has received a 'financial contribution' on
terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the market."[324]
7.160. In the case of tax-based
financial contributions, while the foregoing of revenue by a government may not
be conceptually equivalent to the enjoyment of an advantage by the recipient,
as a practical matter the two will often coincide. That is, where the
government is found to have foregone revenue, this is because it has departed
from the normative benchmark in respect of some particular category or class of
taxpayers or activities. By virtue of foregoing revenue, that departure from
the norm means that the taxpayers that are subject to the government's
normative departure owe less tax than they otherwise would under the
"normal" taxation rules.
7.161. It is in this light that the
Panel understands the observation of the panel in US – Large
Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) that, "[i]n those
cases where a financial contribution has been found to exist in the form of the
foregoing of revenue otherwise due, the conclusion that a benefit exists has
been made with little difficulty".[325]
Having reviewed cases in which the existence of a benefit readily followed from
a determination of foregone revenue that was otherwise due[326], the panel concluded that
"the relevant tax break is essentially a gift from the government, or a
waiver of obligations due, and it is clear that the market does not give such
gifts".[327]
Although the parties disagree as to the extent to which revenue foregone is
automatically determinative of a benefit, they
have not directly called into question the soundness of the approach adopted by
the panel in US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd
complaint) or its reliance on previous panels.
7.162. For tax-based financial
contributions such as the aerospace tax measures, the relief from taxation
otherwise due is not generally available to market participants, nor does it
exist as a general condition in the marketplace. It is in this sense that the
Panel understands the "marketplace" observations made by the
Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft as they would
apply in the context of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii).[328] Indeed, the "market
conditions" that are relevant as the benchmark in this context are the
competitive conditions that exist in the absence of the challenged financial
contribution. Judging the conferral of a benefit by reference to such market
conditions, it is clear that the financial contributions of foregone government
revenue otherwise due from certain Washington State taxpayers – through a
reduced tax rate, credits against business taxation, or exemptions from
otherwise applicable tax liability – makes the recipients "better
off" than they otherwise would have been, in the marketplace, absent those
contributions.[329]
7.163. While bearing in mind the
guidance of the Appellate Body as to the independence of the concepts of
financial contribution and benefit[330], the Panel does not consider
itself precluded from using the same factual elements from its conclusions as
to revenue foregone in its analysis of whether each measure also confers a
benefit. By way of reference, financial contributions in the form of
"grants" under Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement
have been found to confer benefits, "as they place the recipient in a
better position than the recipient otherwise would have been in the
marketplace", given that no entity acting pursuant to commercial
considerations would make such unremunerated payments.[331] Similarly, a financial
contribution in the form of foregone government revenue that is otherwise due
is naturally apt to provide the taxpayers concerned with an
"advantage" in comparison to market conditions where such advantages
do not otherwise exist.
7.164. Accordingly, the Panel finds that each of the aerospace tax measures
at issue confers a benefit within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement.
7.165. Having concluded that there is a financial contribution by the
Washington State government under each of the aerospace tax measures at issue,
and that a benefit is thereby conferred, the Panel finds that each of the
aerospace tax measures at issue constitutes a subsidy within the meaning of
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.
7.166. The Panel has found that the challenged measures are subsidies
within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. It will now proceed to consider whether, as
alleged by the European Union, the measures are also "contingent … upon the use of domestic over imported goods" and
therefore prohibited subsidies under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.
7.167. In this regard, the Panel recalls that, for a subsidy within the
meaning of Article 1.1 to be subject to the provisions of Parts II, III, and V
of the SCM Agreement (disciplines on prohibited subsidies, actionable
subsidies, and countervailing measures, respectively), it must be
"specific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2" of that
Agreement.[332]
The Panel further recalls that, pursuant to Article 2.3 of the SCM Agreement,
prohibited subsidies are deemed to be specific. The European Union's claim is
that the measures at issue are prohibited subsidies in that they are contingent
on the use of domestic over imported goods. Accordingly, no matter what the
Panel decides in relation to the alleged contingency, the Panel is not required
to conduct a specificity analysis under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.
7.168. The European Union alleges that the aerospace tax measures at issue
are de jure and de facto
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods and therefore
inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Article 3.1(b) of the
SCM Agreement.[333]
In the European Union's view, the challenged aerospace tax measures have been
contingent in this manner from the time that ESSB 5952 was enacted.[334]
7.169. According to the European Union, its first and principal claim is
that the challenged aerospace tax measures are de jure
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods inasmuch as the text of
ESSB 5952 clearly sets out the prohibited contingency.[335]
The European Union also makes a secondary claim that the aerospace tax measures
are de facto contingent upon the use of
domestic over imported goods.[336]
7.170. In the European Union's view, Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement
sets out a single standard irrespective of whether the claim is that the
measure is de jure or de facto
contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods. The difference would be
the evidence necessary to establish each claim. A de jure
claim would be made on the basis of the express terms of the text of the
measure or by necessary implication therefrom, whereas in a de facto claim the contingency would have to be inferred
"from the total configuration of facts constituting and surrounding the
subsidy grant, including the design, structure and modalities of operation set
out in the measure".[337]
7.171. With respect to its de jure claim,
the European Union submits that, as clearly set out in the text of ESSB 5952,
and as a result of the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision,
whether considered individually or together, the challenged aerospace tax measures
constitute subsidies that are contingent in law on the use of domestic over
imported goods.[338]
The prohibited contingency in respect of the use of fuselages as
domestic goods would result solely from the First
Siting Provision, while the
prohibited contingency in respect of the use of wings as domestic goods would
result from both the First Siting Provision and the
Second Siting Provision.[339]
7.172. The European Union argues that, pursuant to the First Siting
Provision in Section 2 of ESSB 5952, the challenged aerospace tax measures
were contingent on the establishment of a new commercial aircraft manufacturing
programme that uses goods (i.e., fuselages and wings) produced in the state of
Washington. Under this provision, with respect to all aerospace companies in
the state of Washington, if Boeing had decided to use
imported wings and fuselages in the assembly of the 777X (or any other new
aircraft programme that it might have decided to site in Washington State), the
challenged tax measures would not have been granted.[340]
7.173. The European Union also argues that, pursuant to the Second Siting
Provision, the B&O aerospace tax rate for the 777X (or any other aircraft
that Boeing might have sited to satisfy the First Siting Provision) is contingent
on Boeing's use of wings produced exclusively in the state of Washington. The
European Union contends in particular that, if Boeing were to source even some
wings for the sited aircraft programme outside of the United States, it would
lose access to the B&O aerospace tax rate in respect of the manufacturing
and sale of 777X airplanes.[341]
7.174. The European Union further asserts that the United States' proposed
reading of the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision would
render meaningless all references contained therein to "wings" and to
"fuselages".[342]
The European Union also argues that the text of ESSB 5952 does not require
that the same manufacturer produce both the commercial airplane and the
fuselages and wings; to the contrary, nothing in ESSB 5952 would preclude
an airplane manufacturer from procuring wings or fuselages from another
producer, as long as this other producer is located in the state of Washington.[343]
The European Union further contends that the Second Siting Provision in ESSB 5952
would be triggered even by a single instance of final assembly outside the
state of Washington of an airplane which was the basis of the original siting
decision, or by a single instance of wing assembly for that airplane outside
the state of Washington, either by Boeing or by any other entity, and that this
would result in precluding the continued availability of the B&O aerospace tax
rate.[344]
7.175. The European Union argues further that any evidence provided by the
United States and related to the manner in which Boeing purportedly will
produce 777X aircraft is irrelevant to the Panel's consideration of the
European Union's de jure claim, although some of
those facts could be relevant to the European Union's de facto
claim.[345]
7.176. With respect to its de facto claim,
the European Union submits that the First Siting Provision and the Second
Siting Provision in ESSB 5952 are each capable of strongly influencing
Boeing's choice between imported wings and fuselages, and domestic (United
States-produced) wings and fuselages, for the 777X airplanes.[346]
According to the European Union, ESSB 5952 creates specific penalties for
the use of imported wings or fuselages and rewards for the use of domestic
wings or fuselages. The First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision
acting together would maximize trade distortions in favour of domestic goods to
the detriment of imported goods, which suggests that the
challenged measures
are geared to induce the use of domestic over imported goods.[347] In the European Union's view, the subsidies at issue exceed the
total development cost of the 777X airplanes, and would thereby overshadow any
other factors that may favour a decision by Boeing to import wings and
fuselages for 777X airplanes.[348]
7.177. In the United States' view, the main issue before the Panel is
whether a subsidy granted for the manufacture of a finished good, including its
major structural elements, and which allows the producer to import all the parts that are used in the production process, can
nonetheless be considered to be a subsidy contingent upon the use of domestic
over imported goods.[349]
The United States argues in this regard that a contingency is only inconsistent
with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement if it requires the use of domestic
over imported goods[350],
and that this determination must take into account all sources that elucidate
the meaning of the words used in the measure at issue, including relevant
factual information on the application of the measure.[351]
According to the United States, in the analysis of both the de jure and the de facto
claims, the Panel should consider evidence that pertains to the actual
operation of the measure, beyond the text of the legal instrument in question.[352]
7.178. As a factual matter, the United States asserts that Boeing does not use wings or fuselages, either domestic or imported, to
produce 777X airplanes.[353]
According to the United States, fuselages and wings are not manufactured as
separate products that are subsequently used in the manufacture of a finished
777X airplane.[354]
7.179. The United States asserts that the European Union has failed to
establish that the aerospace tax measures at issue are de jure
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. According to the
United States, if a taxpayer can meet a condition without resorting to the use
of domestic over imported goods this would be sufficient to demonstrate that
the underlying measure is not an import-substitution subsidy prohibited by
Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.[355]
The United States argues that "the First Siting Provision has been
fulfilled, and the Second Siting Provision has been avoided, without any use of
domestic over imported goods".[356]
7.180. The United States argues that:
The [First] Siting Provision and the [Second] Siting Provision in ESSB
5952 make no mention of goods. They
make no mention of the use of goods.
They make no mention of the domestic nature
of goods. They make no mention of imported goods.
They contain no text that requires the
use of domestic over imported goods, nor even encourages
it. They therefore do not result in any discrimination
against imported goods.[357]
(emphasis added)
7.181. According to the United States, the references to the manufacturing
and the assembly of fuselages and wings in the First Siting Provision and the
Second Siting Provision merely define the scope of the production
activity required to enjoy the tax treatment covered by ESSB 5952.[358]
The United States argues that there are several means of satisfying the First
Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision, including one that would not
involve the use of fuselages and wings as inputs into the airplane production
process, namely the 777X manufacturing programme.[359]
7.182. The United States argues further that the European Union has failed
to demonstrate the existence of a domestic good on which the subsidies are
allegedly contingent. According to the United States, ESSB 5952 does not
require the use of any domestic parts in the
assembly of the fuselages and the wings; Boeing would be free to import 100% of
the parts as long as the assembly takes place in the state of Washington.[360]
7.183. The United States further asserts that the European Union has failed
to establish that the aerospace tax measures at issue are de facto
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods, because it has not
demonstrated that the use of domestic goods is required as a condition for
eligibility for the subsidy.[361]
According to the United States, none of the factual evidence referred to by the
European Union supports its claim that the measures are de facto
contingent.[362]
7.184. The United States also argues that Boeing has complied with the
First Siting Provision and has avoided triggering the Second Siting Provision
even though it does not use domestic wings and fuselages and instead completes
the assembly of wings and fuselages as part of the final assembly of the
finished airplane.[363]
The United States adds that the measures in ESSB 5952 had no effect on Boeing's
make/buy decisions nor on its decision on where to site the assembly of fuselages
and wings.[364]
The United States contends that the European Union has failed to establish that
the challenged measures are geared to induce the use of domestic over imported goods.[365]
The United States submits that, provided it conducts the requisite
assembly activity in the state of Washington, Boeing would satisfy the First
Siting Provision and avoid triggering the Second Siting Provision even if it
imported every part of the 777X airplane; Boeing therefore would be receiving
no rewards for increasing the use of domestic inputs on the 777X airplane, nor
would it be penalized for increasing the use of imported inputs.[366]
7.185. The United States rejects the interpretation advanced by the
European Union on the meaning of the word "use" in Article 3.1(b) of
the SCM Agreement, saying that a broad characterization of the meaning of the
word "use", such as that advocated by the European Union, would be
subjective in that it is not based on the text of the SCM Agreement.[367]
According to the United States, the term "use" in Article 3.1(b)
refers to the employment of a domestic good as an input or instrumentality in a
productive process, or to the enjoyment of a good for its intended purpose by
an end user.[368]
Accordingly, Article 3.1(b) would cover subsidies granted contingent on the
employment of a good as an input or instrumentality in a productive process,
but not subsidies contingent on the creation of the output of such a productive
process.[369]
In the United States' view, Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement does not
prohibit "production subsidies"; in this respect, the United States
argues that Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994 provides relevant context for the
interpretation of Article 3.1(b).[370]
7.186. Australia submits that it is important that a distinction is
retained between the permitted payment of a subsidy to domestic producers,
including to encourage manufacturing activities, and a prohibited subsidy which
is contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods.[371]
Australia notes that it interprets the references to wings and fuselages in the
legislation at issue merely as efforts to define the scope of the eligibility
to the subsidy. According to Australia, "defining the scope of a subsidy in this
manner does not imply that a subsidy is being provided contingent on the use of
domestic over imported goods. Rather, it is a practical way of targeting an
industry which the Washington State Government has chosen to support."[372] In Australia's view, the Panel needs to assess whether the
challenged measure can be characterized as providing the scope for the
beneficiaries of the subsidy, or whether it can be characterized instead as a
requirement to use domestic over imported goods as a condition for the subsidy.[373]
Australia argues that it is unclear how the European Union reaches the
conclusion that the First and the Second Siting Provisions are expressly
conditioned on the use of domestic over imported goods.[374]
According to Australia, it is doubtful whether the European Union has
successfully made a case for a de jure breach
of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement; the Panel's determination in the
present case may ultimately depend on the finding of facts.[375]
Australia encourages the Panel to consider whether the references to wings and
fuselages in the First and the Second Siting Provisions can be regarded as
merely defining the beneficiary of the subsidies, instead of being a
requirement to use domestically produced goods.[376]
In response to a question from the Panel, Australia submits that the Appellate
Body's rulings in US – Softwood Lumber IV cannot be
interpreted as stating that "goods" in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement must be tradeable or capable of being traded. In Australia's view,
such an interpretation would not be practical and would undermine the object
and purpose of the SCM Agreement.[377]
7.187. Brazil argues that Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement does not
cover production requirements, as long as these requirements do not constitute
requirements to use domestic goods to the detriment of imported goods.[378]
According to Brazil,
the SCM Agreement does not prohibit WTO Members from providing subsidies to
producers contingent on the performance of production steps of a certain good
in their territories. Such a production requirement could fall upon the
production of either a final or an intermediate good.[379] In Brazil's view, the expression "use" in
Article 3.1(b) means that the goods in question must be
"products" that can be "used" in a commercial context.[380]
Brazil adds that "contingency" under Article 3.1(b) requires concrete
evidence of the actual requirement to use domestic products to the detriment of
imported products and cannot be based simply on a measure's incidental or
indirect impact on domestic production, such as the fact that domestic products
may become more attractive to the producer and lead to a larger share of
domestic products as inputs.[381]
According to Brazil, a subsidy can be prohibited under Article 3.1(b)
because the terms of the subsidy expressly condition its granting on the use of
domestic inputs or otherwise the necessary implication of the specific
conditions is such that, absent the use of domestic goods, the conditions
cannot be met.[382]
Brazil maintains that, in the latter case, a panel would have to
examine the specific requirements imposed as a condition for the granting of
the subsidy, based on the text of the subsidy programme and on its necessary
implications, and determine whether the conditions can be met without using
domestic goods.[383]
Brazil
asserts that a subsidy on the production of a certain good, with requirements
on the performance of production steps along the production chain, would not be
considered de jure contingent on the use of
domestic over imported goods under the purview of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.[384] Conversely, a subsidy could be found de facto
to be prohibited under Article 3.1(b) when a
condition does not necessarily require the use of domestic goods either
directly or by necessary implication, but based on the total configuration of
the facts it becomes clear that, in fact, the subsidy recipient is required to
use domestic over imported goods in order to receive the subsidy.[385]
Brazil submits that, in the present case, the Panel will have to assess whether
the conditions contained in the challenged measure simply require a domestic
production activity by the producer (which would likely not amount to a
prohibited conditionality) or if instead: (i) the condition requires de jure and by necessary implication the use of domestic
over imported goods; or (ii) the condition, in combination with other factual
evidence on the record, requires de facto the
use of domestic over imported inputs.[386]
7.188. According
to Canada, the European Union appears to be arguing
that a subsidy is contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods where
the producer of a final good is required to produce certain components of that
good in order to receive the subsidy.[387]
In Canada's view, this interpretation of Article 3.1(b) would improperly
extend the provision to cover situations where subsidy recipients are required
to produce goods.[388]
According to Canada, under the challenged measure, the beneficiary company is required
to manufacture and/or assemble those fuselages and wings itself in order to
receive the tax subsidy.[389]
There is no requirement to purchase in the United States wings, fuselages, or
other parts used in the assembly of the final aircraft.[390]
Canada adds that the European Union did not provide any evidence suggesting
that Boeing would de facto have to "use"
domestic components other than those that the company manufactures itself.[391]
Canada argues that WTO Members are not prohibited from providing subsidies to
domestic producers, including where the subsidy to the producer of a final good
is contingent on the recipient producing goods in its territory or producing
certain intermediate goods by itself.[392]
Similarly, in Canada's view, neither the GATT 1994 nor the SCM Agreement limits
a Member's ability to define the level of production required for subsidy
eligibility purposes.[393]
Otherwise, production requirements would have to be limited to simple assembly
operations, and the right of WTO Members to require subsidy recipients to
produce goods, as defined by the granting Member, in order to receive a subsidy
would be nullified.[394]
7.189. China contends that the Panel must examine whether, under the First
Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision, the subsidy is conditional or
dependent on the use of domestic over imported goods.[395]
China disagrees with the United States' assertion that fuselages and wings are
not "goods".[396]
In China's view, custom-tailored goods can also be considered as
"goods" within the meaning of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.
China also disagrees with the notion that Article 3.1(b) requires that the
relevant good is traded in practice, as long as the good has "the value of
trading".[397]
According to China, the "use" of intermediate goods in the course of
production may meet the condition for being considered a "use" of
domestic over imported goods.[398]
The Panel should consider in this regard whether the conditions imposed by the
challenged measure result in a de facto
situation in which the 777X aircraft programme prefers domestic components or
other intermediate goods over imported goods.[399]
China also argues that Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994 is not relevant
to the present dispute as a legal basis to exclude the challenged measure from
examination under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.[400]
In China's view, there seems to be insufficient evidence that the First Siting
Provision would result de jure in a
prohibited subsidy under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.[401]
China argues however that the Panel should examine whether de facto
the First Siting Provision has created an incentive for the use of domestic
components over imported components, taking into account that this provision may
make it more favourable to purchase, in the state of Washington, the components
for the fuselages and wings to be used in the assembly of 777X aircraft.[402]
Likewise, China suggests that the Panel should assess whether the Second Siting
Provision should be considered de jure as a
prohibited subsidy under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement or otherwise
whether de facto it may result in an incentive
to use more domestic than imported components due to cost savings and
efficiencies.[403]
7.190. Japan argues that the same legal standard should be followed by
panels when examining prohibited subsidies under Article 3.1(a) and under
Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, as well as when examining de jure and de facto
contingency.[404]
With respect to the evidentiary standard for the establishment of contingency, Japan
states that a de jure analysis should be based
on the words actually used in the measure at issue and their necessary
implications, while a de facto
analysis should be based on the total configuration of the facts constituting
and surrounding the granting of the subsidy in light of the available evidence,
rather than on subjective motivations expressed by governmental agencies,
officials or legislators.[405]
In Japan's view, a subsidy contingent on the use of domestic goods that is
prohibited by Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement cannot be justified by
Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994.[406]
According to Japan, it appears that the European Union has argued that the
challenged subsidy is de jure
contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods, but has based its
analysis on "factual scenarios which may or may not have materialized, factual circumstances
that may or may not have existed, and choices that private actors may
or may not have made", instead of focusing on the
actual text of the measure.[407]
With respect to the First Siting Provision, Japan asserts that a law stating that a subsidy is contingent upon the domestic siting of a certain programme is different from a law
stating that a subsidy is contingent upon the use of
a domestic product.[408]
With respect to the Second Siting
Provision, Japan asserts that the words used in the legislation are not completely clear as to whether, by virtue of the location requirement
for the
final assembly or wing assembly, the revenue from the 777X will not benefit from the reduced B&O tax rate if these assembling
activities take place outside
Washington State.[409]
In Japan's view, the European Union's analysis with respect to both the First
Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision may fall short of the standard
required to establish "contingency" under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement.[410]
7.191. As noted above, the European Union has argued that its "first
and principal claim in this dispute" is that the challenged aerospace tax measures
are de jure contingent upon the use of
domestic over imported goods.[411]
7.192. The Panel will start by considering the European Union's de jure claim. As explained below, the Panel will assess whether
the European Union has made a prima facie case
that the contingency of the challenged aerospace tax measures upon the use of
domestic over imported goods can be demonstrated on the basis of the words of
the relevant legislation. This could be either because the conditionality is
set out expressly in the legislation or because such conditionality can clearly
be derived, by necessary implication, from the words used in the legislation.[412]
7.193. The European Union has also advanced a secondary claim, i.e. that
the tax measures at issue are inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement by being de facto
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. If the Panel were to
conclude that the European Union has successfully established that the
aerospace tax measures are de jure
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods, and therefore
inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, it would not need also
to establish that the same measures are de facto
contingent. Nonetheless, in that circumstance the Panel will try to ensure that
there is a complete factual record on which the Appellate Body may base
its rulings in the event of an appeal.
7.194. Conversely, if the Panel finds that the European Union has not established
its de jure claim, it will subsequently
consider the European Union's de facto
claim, which the European Union makes on a secondary and alternative basis. In
analysing the de facto claim, the Panel would
consider the total configuration of the facts constituting and surrounding the
granting of the subsidy. As explained below[413],
this would include considering (i) the design and structure of the measures
granting the subsidies; (ii) the modalities of operation set out in such
measures; and (iii) the relevant factual circumstances surrounding the granting
of the subsidies that provide the context for understanding the measures'
design, structure, and modalities of operation.
7.195. Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement
reads as follows:
Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following
subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact4,
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance,
including those illustrated in Annex I5;
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of
several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.
____________________________
(footnotes original) 4 This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that
the granting of a subsidy, without having been made legally contingent upon
export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or
export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which
export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an export subsidy
within the meaning of this provision.
5 Measures referred to in
Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under
this or any other provision of this Agreement.
7.196. Only those subsidies that meet the definition in Article 1 of the
SCM Agreement and fall within the description of either Article 3.1(a) or
3.1(b), commonly referred to as "export subsidies" and "import
substitution subsidies", respectively, are prohibited by the SCM
Agreement. As noted by the Appellate Body:
Only those subsidies that are conditioned on export performance or on
import substitution are prohibited per se under
Article 3 of Part II of the SCM Agreement. In contrast, all other subsidies are
allowed under the SCM Agreement, albeit a Member granting such subsidies
should not cause, through the use of the subsidies, adverse effects within the
meaning of Article 5 of Part III,
in which case it must remove the adverse effects or must withdraw the subsidies
themselves.[414]
(original italics)
7.197. Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the SCM Agreement, "[a] Member shall neither grant nor maintain
[prohibited subsidies]".
7.198. Prohibited subsidies are a special category of subsidies, which Members
have deemed to create such trade distortions that they are proscribed without the
need for a complaining Member to show any adverse effects.[415]
As noted by the panel in Brazil – Aircraft,
these subsidies "are specifically designed to affect trade".[416]
7.199. The United States has argued that Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994
provides context for the interpretation of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.[417]
Article III:8(b) is part of Article III of the GATT 1994, the provision dealing
with the obligation of national treatment on internal taxation and regulation.
As noted by the Appellate Body:
The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid
protectionism in the application of internal tax and regulatory measures. More
specifically, the purpose of Article III "is to ensure that internal
measures 'not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production'".[418]
Toward this end, Article III obliges Members of the WTO to provide
equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation to
domestic products.[419],
[420]
7.200. Notwithstanding the above, according to Article III:8(b):
The provisions of this Article [Article III of the GATT 1994] shall not
prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including
payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or
charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies
effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.
7.201. By its terms, Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994 applies to the
national treatment disciplines under Article III of the GATT 1994, which are
not at issue in this dispute, and clarifies that the provision of subsidies
exclusively to domestic producers is not in itself a breach of the national
treatment obligation. To the extent that Article III:8(b) provides interpretive
guidance in the present case, it is consistent with the principle under the SCM
Agreement that subsidization in itself is not prohibited, but only becomes so
in two particular situations – one of which is a contingency on the use of
domestic over imported goods.[421]
7.202. Returning to the specific text of Article 3.1(b), the expression
"contingent … upon" is common to Articles 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) of the
SCM Agreement. Article 3.1(a) prohibits subsidies that are contingent upon
export performance, while Article 3.1(b) prohibits those subsidies that are contingent
upon the use of domestic over imported goods.
7.203. The expression "contingent … upon" is used in both Article
3.1(a) and Article 3.1(b). This expression has been found to have the same
meaning in both provisions.[422]
The expression "contingent … upon" has been explored in greatest
detail in disputes concerning allegations of export subsidies under Article
3.1(a). In this context, the Appellate Body has noted:
In our view, the key word in Article 3.1(a) is
"contingent". As the Panel observed, the ordinary connotation of
"contingent" is "conditional" or "dependent for its
existence on something else". This common understanding of the word
"contingent" is borne out by the text of Article 3.1(a), which
makes an explicit link between "contingency" and
"conditionality" in stating that export contingency can be the sole
or "one of several other conditions".[423]
(emphasis original)
7.204. Regarding the interpretation of the term "contingent" in
the context of an export subsidy, the Panel in Australia –
Automotive Leather II referred to a "close connection"
between the grant or maintenance of a subsidy and export performance. It added
that for a subsidy to be export contingent, it must be "conditioned"
upon export performance, stating:
An inquiry into the meaning of the term "contingent…" in
Article 3.1(a) must, therefore, begin with an examination of the ordinary
meaning of the word "contingent". The ordinary meaning of "contingent"
is "dependent for its existence on something else", "conditional;
dependent on, upon".[424]
7.205. In Canada – Autos, the Appellate
Body referred back to this earlier statement and held that "this legal
standard applies not only to 'contingency' under Article 3.1(a), but also
to 'contingency' under Article 3.1(b)".[425]
7.206. The Appellate Body has also clarified that Article 3.1(b) covers not
only de jure contingency, but also de facto contingency. In Canada – Autos,
the Appellate Body reversed a panel ruling that had limited "contingency"
under Article 3.1(b) to de jure
contingency:
[W]e believe that the Panel erred in finding that Article 3.1(b)
does not extend to subsidies contingent "in fact" upon the use of
domestic over imported goods. We, therefore, reverse the Panel's broad conclusion
that "Article 3.1(b) extends only to contingency in law."[426]
7.207. In the context of Article 3.1(a), the Appellate Body has noted that
contingency "in law" (de jure) is
demonstrated "on the basis of the words of the relevant legislation,
regulation or other legal instrument".[427] The Appellate Body has
added that "such conditionality can [also] be derived by necessary
implication from the words actually used in the measure".[428]
7.208. Given that "contingent … upon" has the same meaning in
Article 3.1(b) as it does in Article 3.1(a), a conclusion that a subsidy
is de jure contingent upon the use of
domestic over imported goods is to be based on the words of the relevant
legislation, as well as their necessary implication. This would require a
finding that:
[T]he existence of that condition can be demonstrated on the basis of
the very words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal
instrument constituting the measure. The simplest, and hence, perhaps, the
uncommon, case is one in which the condition … is set out expressly, in so many
words, on the face of the law, regulation or other legal instrument. We
believe, however, that a subsidy is also properly held to be de jure … contingent where the condition … is clearly,
though implicitly, in the instrument comprising the measure. Thus, for a
subsidy to be de jure … contingent, the
underlying legal instrument does not always have to provide expressis verbis that the subsidy is available only
upon fulfillment of the condition … Such conditionality can also be derived by necessary implication from the words actually used in the
measure.[429]
(emphasis added)
7.209. With respect to de facto
contingency, in the context of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, the
Appellate Body has stated that "the evidence needed to establish de facto … contingency goes beyond a legal instrument and
includes a variety of factual elements concerning the granting of the subsidy
in a specific case"[430]:
Proving de facto … contingency is a
much more difficult task. There is no single legal document which will
demonstrate, on its face, that a subsidy is "contingent … in fact…".
Instead, the existence of this relationship of contingency, between the subsidy
and … performance, must be inferred from
the total configuration of the facts constituting and surrounding the granting
of the subsidy, none of which on its own is likely to be decisive in any given
case.[431]
(emphasis original)
7.210. Still referring to contingency upon export performance under Article
3.1(a), the Appellate Body has stated that "the standard for de facto … contingency … would be met when the subsidy is
granted so as to provide an incentive to the recipient to export in a way that
is not simply reflective of the conditions of supply and demand in the domestic
and export markets undistorted by the granting of the subsidy."[432] The Appellate Body has
further noted that:
The existence of de facto export
contingency, as set out above, "must be inferred
from the total configuration of the facts constituting and surrounding the
granting of the subsidy"[433],
which may include the following factors: (i) the design and structure of the
measure granting the subsidy; (ii) the modalities of operation set out in such
a measure; and (iii) the relevant factual circumstances surrounding the
granting of the subsidy that provide the context for understanding the
measure's design, structure, and modalities of operation.[434]
(emphasis original)
7.211. Moreover, the Appellate Body has ruled as follows:
[T]he conditional relationship between the granting of the subsidy and
export performance must be objectively observable on the basis of such evidence
in order for the subsidy to be geared to induce the promotion of future export
performance by the recipient. The standard for de facto
… contingency is therefore not satisfied by the subjective motivation of the
granting government … In this respect, we note that the Appellate Body and
panels have, on several occasions, cautioned against undue reliance on the
intent of a government behind a measure to determine the WTO‑consistency of
that measure.[435]
The Appellate Body has found that "the intent, stated or otherwise, of the
legislators is not conclusive" as to whether a
measure is consistent with the covered agreement.[436]
In our view, the same understanding applies in the context of a determination
on … contingency, where the requisite conditionality … must be established on
the basis of objective evidence, rather than subjective intent. We note,
however, that while the standard for de facto …
contingency cannot be satisfied by the subjective motivation of the granting
government, objectively reviewable expressions of a government's policy
objectives for granting a subsidy may, however, constitute relevant evidence in
an inquiry into whether a subsidy is geared to induce
the promotion of future export performance by the recipient.[437]
(emphasis added)
7.212. In sum, the Panel takes note of the Appellate Body's findings in
prior disputes that "contingency" has the same meaning in Article
3.1(a) and Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, and that the contingency in Article
3.1(b) can be established on a de jure as well
as on a de facto basis. The Panel shall be
guided by these findings in its analysis.
7.213. The parties have advanced contrasting arguments regarding the
interpretation of certain terms in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.
7.214. Both the European Union and the United States note that the word
"over" used in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, in the
expression "subsidies contingent … upon the use of domestic over imported goods", is defined in the dictionary as
"in preference to", "in excess of", or "more
than".[438]
7.215. The United States notes that the expressions equivalent to the word
"over" that are used in the French and the Spanish texts of Article
3.1(b) are "de préférence à" and "con preferencia a", which would be equivalent to the
English expression "in preference to" or "instead of".[439]
Thus, according to the United States:
[A] subsidy that is inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) requires the use of
domestic goods "in preference to," i.e.,
instead of, imported goods. For this reason, Article 3.1(b) is often referred
to as relating to "import substitution subsidies."[440]
It does not cover measures simply because they involve some sort of domestic
activity, but rather it is focused specifically on subsidies that depend on the
substitution of domestic over imported goods.[441]
7.216. The European Union argues that, based on its ordinary meaning, the
word "over" in Article 3.1(b) should be interpreted as "in
excess of".[442]
The European Union recalled that the expression "in excess of" is
used in other provisions of the WTO Agreements (such as Articles II:1(b)
and III:2 of the GATT 1994) and has been interpreted by previous panels and the
Appellate Body as excluding a de minimis
standard.[443]
Based on its proposed meaning of the word "over", the European Union argues
that there is no de minimis standard for
discrimination in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. According to the
European Union, "[a]s soon as a subsidy is contingent upon the use of
domestic over imported goods, competitive opportunities between domestic and
imported goods are distorted, even if no such goods are currently
imported".[444]
7.217. As clarified subsequently, the parties have no real discrepancy with
respect to the meaning of the word "over" in Article 3.1(b) for
the purpose of this dispute. The European Union has noted that it "does
not disagree with the United States' legal interpretation of 'over'."[445]
The United States has noted in turn that none of the parties has argued
that there is a de minimis exception in
Article 3.1(b), so that there is no need for the Panel to address the
question of whether such an exception exists.[446]
7.218. In any event, the Panel notes the
ordinary meaning of the word over, namely "[a]bove
in degree, quality, or action; in preference to; more than".[447]
In Article 3.1(b), the term "over" appears in the context of
a prohibition on subsidies that are conditional upon the use of domestic over imported products. As noted above, the purpose of this
provision is to prohibit certain subsidies that have been considered
particularly trade-distorting by Members. In this context, the word
"over" in Article 3.1(b) can be read in the sense of "in
preference to" (or "instead of" or "rather than")[448],
so that this provision prohibits any subsidy that is conditional on the use of domestic
goods in preference to (or "instead of" or "rather than") imported
goods.
7.219. Article 3.1(b) refers to subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. According to the United
States, "[t]he term 'use' [in Article 3.1(b)] refers to either the act of
using an input to produce a downstream good, or the use of a finished good by
the end-user".[449]
The United States refers to footnote 61 of the SCM Agreement in Annex II
("Guidelines on Consumption of Inputs in the Production Process") as
"mak[ing] clear that 'use' means the consumption of goods … as inputs into
a production process".[450]
This is related to the United States' argument that separate wings and
fuselages are elements of the finished aircraft and will not be "used"
in the production of 777X airplanes.[451]
7.220. Conversely, the European Union argues that the term "use"
in Article 3.1(b) is broad enough to "encompass situations where the input
is 'used' in such a way that it has not been consumed and where it remains a
discrete, identifiable part of the whole."[452]
In the European Union's view, the term "use" is not limited to
situations where an input is consumed in the production process, or merely
attached to a final product.[453]
7.221. The Appellate Body has examined the
ordinary meaning of the term "use" in the context of a different provision
of the SCM Agreement, namely Article 2.1(c) ("use of a subsidy programme
by a limited number of certain enterprises"). In this respect, the Appellate
Body noted that "[t]he word 'use' refers to the action of using or
employing something" and cited the following dictionary definition of the
term: "the action of using something; the fact or state of being used;
application or conversion to some purpose".[454] The Appellate Body also noted
that, in the context of Article 2.1(c), "what is used or employed is
'a subsidy programme'".[455] The Panel observes that term
"use", referring to products, appears in several other provisions in
the SCM Agreement and in other covered agreements.[456]
7.222. In Article
3.1(b), the term "use" appears in the context of a prohibition on
subsidies that are conditional upon the use of domestic
over imported goods. The purpose of this provision is to prohibit certain
subsidies that have been considered particularly trade-distorting by Members.
The Panel finds that the ordinary meaning of the word, namely the action of
using or employing something, is apt in the context of Article 3.1(b). Neither
the text of Article 3.1(b) nor any relevant context indicates that the term
"use" is confined to a particular manner of using or employing a
given good, or that the good "used" in this context must possess
certain characteristics in order to be capable of being "used" within
the meaning of Article 3.1(b). Accordingly, a subsidy conditional on the
consumption of domestic goods, rather than or in preference to imported goods, as
inputs into a production process would be covered by Article 3.1(b), but
so too would a subsidy that is conditional in any other way on the use or
employment of domestic goods, rather than or in preference to imported goods.
7.223. The United States submits that the word "goods" in Article
3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, in the expression "subsidies contingent
… upon the use of domestic over imported goods",
refers to something that is saleable or tradeable.[457]
The United States points to the dictionary definition of "goods" as
"saleable commodities, merchandise, wares"[458]
The United States also notes that the words used in the French and the Spanish
texts of Article 3.1(b) are "produits"
and "productos", respectively, both of
which connote saleable commodities, merchandise, or wares.[459]
The United States further notes that in Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement the word "goods" is qualified by the word
"imported" (as well as by the word "domestic") and an
imported good would be one that by definition is traded.[460]
The United States concludes that "goods", within the meaning of
Article 3.1(b), must be understood as being products that are traded; if they
are not, they cannot be imported, which would be inconsistent with the specific
reference to "imported goods" in Article 3.1(b).[461]
7.224. The European Union agrees with the United States that the French and
the Spanish texts confirm the interpretation that the word "goods" in
Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement is synonymous with the word
"products".[462]
The European Union, however, does not agree that the definition of
"goods" should be limited to those products which are actually
traded.[463]
In the European Union's view, the approach advocated by the United States would
run against a fundamental principle of the disciplines on trade in goods: that
these disciplines protect competitive opportunities (and not just actual trade
volumes), including the potential to compete, even absent actual trade in the
goods concerned.[464]
According to the European Union, the interpretation advocated by the United
States would open up an
easy path for circumventing the subsidy disciplines under Article 3.1(b) of the
SCM Agreement[465] and would defeat the purpose of Article 3.1(b) by affording
impunity to the most distortive subsidies: those that successfully eliminate
competing foreign products from the market.[466]
The European Union submits that a challenge under Article 3.1(b) should be
evaluated in view of the market situation at the point in time prior to
adoption of the challenged measure.[467]
7.225. The Panel agrees with the parties
that the term "goods" in Article 3.1(b) can be read as synonymous
with "products". This is also the reading that
best reconciles the language used in the three authentic versions of the SCM
Agreement. In Article 3.1(b), the term "goods" appears in the context of
a prohibition on subsidies that are conditional upon the use of domestic over
imported goods. As noted above, the purpose of
this provision is to prohibit certain subsidies that have been considered
particularly trade-distorting by Members. Since a main objective of the
agreement is to address trade distortions caused by subsidies – in the
provision at issue, a subsidized preference for domestic over imported goods –,
it follows that the goods in question must be at least potentially tradable.
Indeed, the SCM Agreement is part of a set of covered agreements called
"Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods". There is no requirement
under the provision, however, that the goods in question must be actually
traded. Following the Appellate Body's guidance with respect to provisions in
other covered agreements, it can be said that Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement protects competitive opportunities of imported products, rather than
existing trade flows of such products.[468]
In this regard, the fact that a given product may, or may not, be actually
traded at present is not dispositive of whether competitive opportunities exist
with respect to that product. The Panel therefore considers that there is no
need to demonstrate present trade in a specific product as it exists at a given
moment in time to establish a prohibited contingency under Article 3.1(b).
7.226. The European Union's primary claim is that, as a result of the First
Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision, considered individually or
together, the challenged aerospace tax measures constitute subsidies that are de jure contingent on the use of domestic over imported
goods.[469]
7.227. The European Union also argues that the First Siting Provision and
the Second Siting Provision each make the tax measures at issue subsidies that
are de facto contingent on the use of domestic
over imported goods.[470]
7.228. Before assessing the European Union's claims, the Panel will review
the texts of the relevant provisions of the measures at issue, as well as the
additional factual evidence available.
7.229. ESSB 5952 amended and extended the
aerospace tax measures, which were originally established in 2003 by HB 2294.[471] The amendment and extension,
however, did not take effect immediately upon enactment of ESSB 5952. Instead,
the entry into force of the amendment and extension of the aerospace tax measures
was contingent upon satisfaction of the First Siting Provision in Section 2 of
ESSB 5952, namely "upon the siting of a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program in the state of Washington".[472] The legislation also provides
that, "[i]f a significant commercial airplane manufacturing program is not
sited in the state of Washington by June 30, 2017, … [this act] does not take
effect".[473]
7.230. The First Siting Provision reads:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 2. A new section is added to chapter 82.32 RCW to read as follows:
(1) Chapter ..., Laws of 2013 3rd sp. sess. (this
act) takes effect contingent upon the siting of a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program in the state of Washington. If a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program is not sited in the state of Washington by June 30, 2017,
chapter ..., Laws of 2013 3rd sp. sess. (this act) does not take effect.
(2) The definitions in this subsection apply
throughout this section unless the context clearly requires otherwise.
(a) "Commercial
airplane" has the same meaning provided in RCW 82.32.550.
(b) "New model, or any
version or variant of an existing model, of a commercial airplane" means a
commercial airplane manufactured with a carbon fiber composite fuselage or
carbon fiber composite wings or both.
(c) "Significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" means an airplane program in
which the following products, including final assembly, will commence
manufacture at a new or existing location within Washington state on or after
the effective date of this section:
(i) The new model, or any
version or variant of an existing model, of a commercial airplane; and
(ii) Fuselages and wings of a
new model, or any version or variant of an existing model, of a commercial
airplane.
(d) "Siting" means a
final decision, made on or after November 1, 2013, by a manufacturer to locate
a significant commercial airplane manufacturing program in Washington state.
(3) The department must make a determination
regarding whether the contingency in subsection (1) of this section occurs and
must provide written notice of the date on which such contingency occurs and
chapter ..., Laws of 2013 3rd sp. sess. (this act) takes effect. If the
department determines that the contingency in subsection (1) of this section
has not occurred by June 30, 2017, the department must provide written notice
stating that chapter ..., Laws of 2013 3rd sp. sess. (this act) does not take
effect. Written notice under this subsection (3) must be provided to affected
parties, the chief clerk of the house of representatives, the secretary of the
senate, the office of the code reviser, and others as deemed appropriate by the
department.[474]
7.231. Under the terms of the
legislation, the First Siting Provision concerns a one-time event. That is, the
amendment and extension of the challenged aerospace tax measures would come
into effect, for all beneficiaries, upon the siting of a significant commercial
airplane manufacturing programme in Washington State. Moreover, if no such
siting occurred by the specified date (30 June 2017), the possibility for the amendment and extension of the
measures to take effect would lapse.
7.232. The First Siting Provision
defines "siting" to mean "a final decision, made on or after
November 1, 2013, by a manufacturer to locate a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program in Washington State". In turn, "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" is defined as:
[A]n airplane program in which the following products, including final
assembly, will commence manufacture at a new or existing location within
Washington state on or after the effective date of this section:
(i) The new model, or any version or variant of an
existing model, of a commercial airplane; and
(ii) Fuselages and wings of a new model, or any version
or variant of an existing model, of a commercial airplane.[475]
7.233. The First
Siting Provision additionally defines "new model,
or any version or variant of an existing model, of a commercial airplane"
to mean "a commercial airplane manufactured with a carbon fiber composite
fuselage or carbon fiber composite wings or both".[476]
7.234. As to the procedures to verify the satisfaction of the conditions in
the First Siting
Provision, Section 2 of ESSB 5952 provides that:
The department [of
Revenue of the state of Washington] must make a determination regarding whether
the contingency in subsection (1) of this section [the siting] occurs and must
provide written notice of the date on which such contingency occurs and [this
act] takes effect. If the department determines that the contingency in
subsection (1) of this section has not occurred by June 30, 2017, the
department must provide written notice stating that [this act] does not take
effect. Written notice under this subsection (3) must be provided to affected
parties, the chief clerk of the house of representatives, the secretary of the
senate, the office of the code reviser, and others as deemed appropriate by the
department.[477]
7.235. The Second Siting Provision within ESSB 5952 relates to the business
and occupation (B&O) aerospace tax rate[478],
and provides as follows:
With respect to the manufacturing of commercial airplanes or making
sales, at retail or wholesale, of commercial airplanes, this subsection (11)
does not apply on and after July 1st of the year in which the department makes
a determination that any final assembly or wing assembly of any version or
variant of a commercial airplane that is the basis of a siting of a significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program in the state under section 2 of this
act has been sited outside the state of Washington. This subsection (11)(e)(ii)
only applies to the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes that are the
basis of a siting of a significant commercial airplane manufacturing program in
the state under section 2 of this act.[479]
7.236. The Second Siting Provision concerns the continued availability of
the 0.2904% B&O aerospace tax rate for the version or variant of a
commercial airplane that is the basis of the First Siting Provision. The Second
Siting Provision specifically pertains to the siting of any "final
assembly or wing assembly" of such commercial airplane.
7.237. By its own terms, the Second Siting Provision refers to the same
significant commercial airplane manufacturing programme (that is, the programme
that satisfied the First Siting Provision) in which certain "products,
including final assembly, will commence manufacture at a … location within Washington state"
(emphasis added). The Second Siting Provision "only applies to the manufacturing
or sale of commercial airplanes that are the basis of a siting [under the First
Siting Provision]".[480]
The relevant "commercial airplanes" in this regard are Boeing 777X
aircraft.
7.238. ESSB 5952 does not define the term "manufacture".[481]
However, Section 82.04.120 of the Revised Code of Washington contains the
following definition of "manufacture":
"To manufacture" embraces all activities of a commercial or
industrial nature wherein labor or skill is applied, by hand or machinery, to
materials so that as a result thereof a new, different or useful substance or
article of tangible personal property is produced for sale or industrial use…[482]
7.239. This definition is part of Chapter 82.04 of the Revised Code of
Washington, which governs the application of the B&O tax.[483]
As stated by the United States, the Department of Revenue of the state of
Washington considers that the definition "would apply in the
interpretation of ESSB 5952".[484]
7.240. There is no relevant statutory definition of the term
"assembly". As noted by the United States, if called to interpret
undefined terms, Washington State authorities would consider the common law or
ordinary meaning of the word in the context of the statute in which the word
appears.[485]
Based on the dictionary meaning of the word, and its consideration of the
statute as a whole, the United States notes that "assembly is a subset of
manufacturing".[486]
7.241. The European Union's claim in this
dispute relates to an alleged prohibited contingency based on the use of
domestic over imported wings and fuselages.[487]
It is not in dispute whether the measures at issue place any conditions on the
use of any other elements or components of
commercial airplanes, including sub-components of wings and fuselages.[488]
Accordingly, the products at issue for the Panel's analysis under Article
3.1(b) of the SCM are wings and fuselages of commercial airplanes.
7.242. The parties have presented extensive
factual evidence regarding the production of commercial airplanes, particularly
with regard to the production of wings and fuselages in the context of
commercial airplane assembly. In this section, the Panel will review this
evidence, including undisputed aspects of the production and assembly of
Boeing's 777X aircraft, as well as other evidence relating to the production and
transport of wings and fuselages of other types of commercial airplanes.
7.243. As noted above, the aerospace tax measures, as amended and extended
by ESSB 5952, took effect upon fulfilment of the First Siting Provision, based
on Boeing's decision to site its programme for the production of 777X
aircraft in the state of Washington.[489]
The United States has provided background explanations as to various aspects of
the 777X programme and the production process of 777X aircraft, including
information provided in a statement by corporate officers of Boeing (Boeing
Expert Statement).[490]
7.244. The 777X is a new aircraft programme developed by Boeing, based on
its earlier 777 programme. According to the explanations provided by the United
States, many of the 777X production and supplier choices made by Boeing mirror
those of the current 777-300ER, which is a twin-aisle aircraft, typically
configured for approximately 350-375 passengers (depending on class
configuration) with a range of 7,825 nautical miles. The 777‑300ER's fuselages
and wings, however, are composed primarily of aluminium; by contrast, the
777X's wings will be made primarily of carbon fibre-reinforced plastic.[491]
7.245. The United States submits a statement by experts affiliated with
Boeing regarding Boeing's production operations and background information on
the products at issue. As explained by the Boeing experts:
An aircraft gets its essential structure, its aerodynamic and
load-bearing qualities, from its airframe. The
main airframe structures are the fuselage, wing, and tail.[492]
(emphasis original)
7.246. In the following sections, the Panel will review evidence and
information related to the manufacturing and assembly of the Boeing 777X. The
Panel notes that this evidence, including the statement by the Boeing experts,
concerns future manufacturing operations that
have not yet commenced, and that, based on current projections, the first
variant of the 777X will enter into service in the year 2020.[493]
7.247. As explained by the Boeing experts with respect to the fuselage of
the aircraft:
The fuselage is the long tube that forms the
longitudinal axis of the aircraft, running from nose to tail. It forms the
exterior structure that houses the aircraft's interior accommodations and
payload – e.g., passengers, crew,
flight deck, cargo.[494]
(emphasis original)
7.248. The fuselage's primary elements
consist of:
a.
Skins: the panels that form the exterior of the fuselage, with cutouts
for windows and doors;
b.
Frames: stronger, hoop-shaped structures positioned perpendicular to the
skins at intervals along the length of the fuselage; and
c.
Stringers: long, thin structures running parallel to, and reinforcing,
the skins.[495]
7.249. The fuselage also includes floor
frames and panels that support passengers, crew, cargo, and interior accommodations.[496]
7.250. The 777X's fuselage comprises eight separate fuselage sections,
called Sections 41 to 48. Section 41 is the nose of the plane and Section 48 is
the empennage (a tapered end at the tail of the plane).[497]
Like all other Boeing commercial aircraft (with the exception of the 787), the
777X's primary fuselage structures are made from aluminium.[498]
According to the Boeing experts, [[BCI]].[499]
7.251. In its initial fuselage
manufacturing operations, Boeing receives fuselage structures from its
suppliers at the Everett fuselage building, which when completed will be a new
facility next to the main factory building where the 777X will undergo final
assembly.[500]
For the various fuselage Sections, [[BCI]], these
primary fuselage structures [[BCI]].[501]
The separate fuselage Sections are then joined into three larger parts of the
fuselage, namely the forward (Sections 41 and 43), center (Sections 44
and 11/45), and aft (Sections 46-48). More specifically:
a.
The forward part of the fuselage incorporates Section 41, which is the foremost
fuselage section that will eventually house the flight deck, which is joined to
Section 43.[502]
b.
The center part of the fuselage consists of Section 44, which unlike
other fuselage sections does not have a keel panel; rather, Section 11/45 forms
the bottom of the center part of the fuselage, and is itself constructed from
various structures: [[BCI]].[503]
c.
The aft part of the fuselage is formed by joining three separate
fuselage sections (Sections 46-48).[504]
7.252. As explained by the Boeing experts with respect to the wings of the
aircraft:
The wings join the aircraft at roughly the mid-point
along the length of the fuselage. In addition to providing lift and flight
control surfaces, the wings carry the engine installations and fuel.[505]
(emphasis original)
7.253. The wings have elements that are
fixed in flight, and flight control surfaces
that move in flight. The 777X's main fixed wing elements consist of:
a.
The main wing box, which forms most of the wing's visible surface area;
b.
The wing tip, which is static in flight but folds at airport gates to
meet certain wingspan constraints;
c.
The fixed leading
and trailing edges that run most of the span of the visible wing; and
d.
The center wing box,
which sits under the fuselage and is not visible on a finished aircraft.[506]
7.254. The visible wing box structures are
composed of: (i) the skins, which form the wing exterior; (ii) the ribs, which
run perpendicular to the wing span and support the skins; (iii) the spars, which
run the length of the wing span and support the ribs; and (iv) the stringers,
which are attached to the skins and also run the length of the wing. As for the
movable elements of the wings, the primary parts are: (i) the slats on the wing's
leading edge; and (ii) the droop panels, spoilers, ailerons and flaps on the
trailing edge.[507]
7.255. Some of the main structures of the
777X's wings will be made mostly from carbon
fibre-reinforced plastic.[508] By
contrast, both the fuselage and the wing of the 777-300ER
are primarily composed of aluminium.[509]
According to the Boeing experts, [[BCI]].[510]
7.256. The initial wing manufacturing
operations for the 777X will take place in the Composite Wing Center that is
being built close to the main factory building. As explained by the Boeing
experts, that center is responsible for fabricating [[BCI]]
777X wing structures, [[BCI]].[511]
Further fabrication takes place in a spar sub-assembly building where [[BCI]].[512]
7.257. The resulting "Section 12"
wing structure consists of the main wing box (including spars, ribs, and
panels) and the fixed leading and trailing edges, but does not include movable
edges or the wingtip.[513]
7.258. The United States provided detailed
descriptions of the various steps in the assembly of the 777X aircraft.
The United States "acknowledges that wing fabrication, wing assembly, and
fuselage assembly are all production activities conducted in the manufacture of
an airplane"[514],
but argues that fuselages and wings are "features or elements of the
finished aircraft, which are generated only through the final assembly process
of the airplane itself – not inputs into the production process".[515]
In other words, and as stated by the Boeing experts, "neither a complete
fuselage nor complete wings enter the final assembly process".[516]
7.259. The production carried out in the
fuselage building, described above, results in three separate sections of the
fuselage (forward, center, and aft), which at the time they leave the fuselage
building still [[BCI]].[517]
The three fuselage sections are then [[BCI]].[518], [519]
7.260. The Section 12 wing structure, which
results from initial wing manufacturing operations described above, undergoes
additional operations in the main factory building, namely: [[BCI]].[520]
These operations result in two "outboard wing structures".[521]
7.261. Having undergone separate
fabrication and installation operations[522],
the center fuselage structure (including the center wing box) and outboard wing
structures are at this point brought together in the "wing-body join
stage" of the moving assembly line. As explained by the Boeing experts,
"[t]his is the first point at which the main wing structures – the two
outboard wings and the center wing box – are joined together".[523]
At this stage, the outboard wing structures still lack [[BCI]].[524]
7.262. The final assembly process then
moves into "final body join", and the subsequent final assembly
position, where, as explained by the Boeing experts, certain operations
complete the airframe and install the major remaining systems:
[[BCI]][525]
7.263. In addition to the Boeing 777X, the
parties have presented evidence on the production of other models of aircraft,
particularly in respect of the production of wings and fuselages.
7.264. The parties have referred to another
model of aircraft manufactured by Boeing, the 787, in respect of whether Boeing
imports 787 wings from a foreign supplier.[526] The United States submits that the "787's wings, like those of all
Boeing large civil aircraft, consist of numerous individual parts, including
those that make up fixed wing structures (e.g., the spars, ribs, and panels
that comprise the main wing box; the fixed leading and trailing edges; and the
center wing box) and the movable wing elements that enable controlled flight
operations (e.g., moveable leading and trailing
edges)".[527] According to the United States, "Boeing imports multiple wing-related
structures from Japan" that require further wing assembly activity in the
United States.[528] More specifically, Boeing imports a "right-hand and left-hand
partial wing structure" that include the constituent parts of the main
wing box and the fixed and leading trailing edges[529], without [[BCI]].[530] The United States clarifies that the imported wing structure for the
787 is referred to as Section 12, discussed above in relation to the 777X, which
consists of the main wing box and the fixed leading and trailing edges.[531] These wing structures are then shipped to a Boeing 787 assembly
facility in the United States in Boeing's Dreamlifter aircraft where they
undergo assembly operations, including additional elements of the wing itself.[532] The European Union has also provided evidence, including
descriptions from Boeing, of the production and shipping of the relevant 787
wing structures.[533]
7.265. In respect of the fuselages of the
Boeing 737, it is not disputed that Boeing sources complete fuselages for the
737NG and 737MAX single-aisle aircraft from a supplier in the state of Kansas,
which are then transported by rail to Boeing's 737 manufacturing facility in
the state of Washington for final assembly of the aircraft.[534]
7.266. The parties have also presented
evidence of the production and assembly of certain models of Airbus aircraft.
The European Union describes the production and transport of Airbus A350
XWB wings, which are structurally assembled at a facility in the United
Kingdom, and from there transported by the Airbus Beluga carrier aircraft to a
facility in Bremen, Germany where they are "fully equipped with the
relevant systems", and then transported on the Airbus Beluga to the
final assembly site in Toulouse, France.[535] In this regard, the United States contends that "these structures
have neither all the fixed nor all the movable parts that the fully assembled
A350 XWB wings have, and they must therefore undergo further
assembly"[536], such that "what leaves the United Kingdom is a [[BCI]]".[537] The European Union further describes the transport of Airbus A380 wings
"across long distances", with wings first produced in the United
Kingdom and "then moved by road for a mile, placed on a specially built
barge on the river, and finally transported by road to Toulouse".[538] The United States submits that, for the A380, what
is shipped to Toulouse are [[BCI]].[539] In this connection, the United States considers that "[t]here
are at least some complete finished wings for single-aisle aircraft that fit on
the transport aircraft [such as an Airbus Beluga or a Boeing Dreamlifter], [[BCI]]."[540] However, the United States contends that the same is not true for
completely assembled wings of larger aircraft, including [[BCI]].[541]
7.267. In addition, the European Union
submits that "[m]anufacturing fuselages as intermediate goods before the
final assembly of the aircraft is also the standard practice for Airbus",
referring specifically to the production of the A320, the A350 XWB, and the
A380.[542]
7.268. In accordance with the First Siting Provision in ESSB 5952, the availability of the aerospace
tax measures at issue was conditional on a determination by the Department of Revenue of the state of Washington that a
manufacturer had made a final decision, after 1 November 2013 but before 30 June 2017, to site a
significant commercial airplane manufacturing programme in the state of Washington.
7.269. The "significant commercial
airplane manufacturing program" necessary for the Department
of Revenue's
determination is one in which the following products, including final assembly,
will commence manufacture: (i) a new model of a
commercial airplane, or any version or variant of an existing model; and (ii)
fuselages and wings of a new model of a commercial airplane, or of any version
or variant of an existing model. The "new model" or "any version
or variant of an existing model" of a commercial airplane is defined as "a
commercial airplane manufactured with a carbon fiber composite fuselage or
carbon fiber composite wings or both".
7.270. Boeing's 777X programme is the "significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program", and the 777X is the new
model of a commercial airplane, that satisfied the First Siting Provision. On 9 July 2014, Boeing notified the Department of Revenue of
the state of Washington in writing that Boeing had made a final decision to
manufacture the 777X airplane in the state of Washington. In its letter Boeing
stated that this decision satisfied the requirement in ESSB 5952 that a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing programme be sited in the state of Washington.[543] Three attachments accompanied
Boeing's letter, as examples of "actions Boeing has taken consistent with
its decision to manufacture the 777X in Washington".[544] The first attachment was a copy
of a Collective Bargaining Agreement between Boeing and the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, containing a Letter
of Understanding in which "Boeing 'agrees to locate the 777X wing
fabrication and assembly, final assembly, and major components' in Puget Sound"
(Washington State).[545], [546] [[BCI]].[547], [548], [549]
7.271. The Washington
State Department of Revenue accepted Boeing's statement as fulfilling the contingency requirements of the First Siting Provision in ESSB 5952.
Subsequent to Boeing's letter, on 10 July 2014, the Department of Revenue
issued a formal notification that a manufacturer had made a final decision to site a significant commercial airplane manufacturing programme in the state of Washington; that the contingency requirements in ESSB 5952 had been
satisfied; and that the relevant legislation had taken effect on 9 July 2014.[550] As a result of this
determination, the expiration date for the aerospace tax measures at issue was
extended until 1 July 2040 for all eligible taxpayers, and the other
amendments to those measures took effect.[551] As discussed above,
pursuant to ESSB 5952 the Department of Revenue's determination is a one-time decision
and there is no legal mechanism under Washington State law that would allow the
Department of Revenue to revoke its determination.[552]
7.272. The Panel turns to the European Union's principal claim, which is
its de jure claim. In this regard, the Panel
must determine whether the European Union has made a prima facie
case that the challenged aerospace tax measures are de jure
contingent upon the use of domestic instead of imported goods, and therefore
inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Article 3.1(b) of the
SCM Agreement. To prevail on its de jure claim,
the European Union has the burden of demonstrating that such contingency or
conditionality is either set out expressly on
the face of the legislation or can clearly be derived, by necessary
implication, from the words actually used in the legislation.[553]
7.273. In this regard, the Panel understands that a contingency that is not
set out expressly in the relevant legislation may nevertheless be derived by
necessary implication if such contingency results inevitably from the words
actually used in the legislation, or if any other interpretation would be
unreasonable.[554] In other words, the terms
used in the legislation must either expressly or by necessary implication
demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy is contingent upon the use of
domestic instead of imported goods.[555] For the purpose of the de jure determination, including by necessary implication,
the relevant facts are therefore the text of the legislation at issue and any
additional facts that can assist the Panel in understanding the meaning of the
terms as used in that legislation.[556]
7.274. As noted above, the ordinary connotation of the term
"contingent" is "conditional" or "dependent for its
existence on something else". Therefore, the question before the Panel is
whether, on the basis of the words of the relevant legislation, the challenged aerospace
tax measures are conditional upon the use of domestic over imported goods.
Contingency upon the use of domestic over imported goods need not be the only
condition; it can be one of several other conditions for benefitting from the
tax measures at issue. In order to find contingency in the sense of
Article 3.1(b), such contingency must be a necessary condition so that the
recipient would not benefit from the subsidy unless domestic goods are used instead
of, or in preference to, imported goods.
7.275. The European Union asserts that the prohibited contingency is clearly
set out in the text of ESSB 5952 as a result of the First Siting Provision and
of the Second Siting Provision, whether considered individually or together.[557]
In the European Union's view, each of these two provisions:[558]
[I]ndependently
results in a de jure violation of Article
3.1(b).[559]
At the same time, these conditions act together to
maximize trade distortions in favour of domestic goods, and to the detriment of
competitive opportunities for imported goods. While the [First Siting Provision]
focuses on component sourcing decisions made at the beginning of a new aircraft
programme, the [Second Siting Provision] focuses on later stages.[560]
(emphasis original)
7.276. The European Union adds that a prohibited contingency in respect of wings results from both the First
Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision, while a prohibited
contingency in respect of fuselages would
result solely from the First Siting Provision.[561]
7.277. With respect to the First Siting
Provision, according to the European Union:
[U]nder the [First Siting Provision] established in Section 2 [of ESSB
5952], the aerospace tax incentive extensions and expansion provided for in
[ESSB 5952] were made contingent upon Boeing's decision to locate in
Washington State both (i) production of the wings and fuselage for the
777X and (ii) final assembly of the 777X.[562],
[563]
7.278. The European Union concludes:
Stated differently, for the extension and expansion of the existing
aerospace tax incentives to occur, Boeing was required to commit to use wings
and fuselages produced or assembled in Washington State in the final assembly
of 777X LCA in Washington State.[564]
7.279. With respect to the Second Siting Provision, the European Union
asserts that:
Pursuant to the exclusive-production condition established by [ESSB
5952] … the reduced [business and occupation] tax rate would not apply to
revenue from the 777X in the event
Boeing were to perform any final assembly, or any wing assembly,
for the 777X outside of Washington State.[565]
In other words, in order for Boeing to benefit from the [business and
occupation] tax rate reduction with respect to the 777X (whether prior to or
after 2024), Boeing must not conduct any final assembly, or any wing assembly,
of that aircraft outside of Washington State …
Accordingly, under this exclusive-production condition, 777X aircraft
benefit from the preferential [business and occupation] tax rate only if Boeing
assembles the wings and assembles the aircraft exclusively in Washington State.[566]
(emphasis original)
7.280. The United States has submitted particular facts relating to the production
process of the 777X programme as evidence of the meaning of the requirements in
the First and Second
Siting Provisions.[567]
The factual evidence referred to by the United States does not specifically
relate to the meaning of the terms used in the legislation, nor does it concern
the necessary implication of those terms. Rather, the evidence concerns the
particular manner in which Boeing will produce 777X aircraft in Washington
State.[568]
In this regard, the Panel is not persuaded by the United States' argument that
those facts relating to the siting of the 777X programme in Washington State
are relevant to the de jure analysis.
To the extent that this evidence sheds light on "the total configuration
of the facts constituting and surrounding the granting of the subsidy"[569],
the Panel will consider its relevance in the context of the European Union's de facto claim.
7.281. The Panel must decide the European Union's de jure
claim against the aerospace tax measures on the basis of the text of ESSB 5952.
The Panel will start its consideration of this claim by looking separately at
the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision to assess whether
the European Union has successfully demonstrated the existence of the
prohibited contingency in either of the provisions. Subsequently, if necessary,
the Panel will consider the two siting provisions acting jointly.
7.5.6.1 The First Siting Provision, considered separately
7.282. The Panel recalls that, according to the First Siting Provision in Section 2 of ESSB 5952, the aerospace
tax measures as amended and extended by ESSB 5952 "[take] effect
contingent upon the siting of a significant commercial airplane manufacturing
program in the state of Washington".[570] The legislation also provides
that, "[i]f a significant commercial airplane manufacturing program is not
sited in the state of Washington by June 30, 2017, … [this act] does not take
effect".[571]
7.283. The Panel further recalls that
the First Siting Provision defines "siting" to mean "a final
decision, made on or after November 1, 2013, by a manufacturer to locate a
significant commercial airplane manufacturing program in Washington
State".[572] In turn, "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" is defined as:
[A]n airplane program in which the following products, including final
assembly, will commence manufacture at a new or existing location within
Washington state on or after the effective date of this section:
(i) The new model, or any version or variant of an
existing model, of a commercial airplane; and
(ii) Fuselages and wings of a new model, or any version
or variant of an existing model, of a commercial airplane.[573]
7.284. The First
Siting Provision additionally defines "new model,
or any version or variant of an existing model, of a commercial airplane"
to mean "a commercial airplane manufactured with a carbon fiber composite
fuselage or carbon fiber composite wings or both".[574]
7.285. As to the procedures involved, according to Section 2 of ESSB 5952:
The department [of
Revenue of the state of Washington] must make a determination regarding whether
the contingency in subsection (1) of this section occurs and must provide
written notice of the date on which such contingency occurs and [this act]
takes effect. If the department determines that the contingency in subsection
(1) of this section has not occurred by June 30, 2017, the department must
provide written notice stating that [this act] does not take effect. Written
notice under this subsection (3) must be provided to affected parties, the
chief clerk of the house of representatives, the secretary of the senate, the office
of the code reviser, and others as deemed appropriate by the department.[575]
7.286. Based on the terms used in the legislation, the Panel understands
that, for the aerospace
tax measures to take effect, the First Siting Provision requires a
determination by the Department
of Revenue of the state of Washington that a final decision has been
made, on or after 1 November 2013 and by 30 June 2017, to site a "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" within the state of Washington.
The legislation also defines the characteristics that the "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" would have to fulfil to qualify
for the Department of Revenue's positive determination. Those characteristics are, in essence, that the following products will "commence manufacture", "including
final assembly", at a new or existing location within Washington State on
or after the effective date of the legislation: (i) a new model of a commercial
airplane or a version or variant of an existing model; and (ii) fuselages and
wings for the new model of a commercial airplane or for the version or variant
of an existing model.
7.287. In other words, the amendment and
extension by ESSB 5952 of the aerospace tax measures are subject, for their
entry into force, to a condition precedent or suspensive condition[576] – a contingency – contained in
the same legislation. That contingency is a positive determination by the Department of
Revenue of the state of Washington, that a "significant commercial
airplane manufacturing program" had been sited, between 1 November 2013 and 30 June
2017, in the state of Washington. Such a determination in turn requires that a producer commit to manufacture
within the state of Washington the two following
categories of products: (i) a commercial airplane with a carbon fibre
composite fuselage, or carbon fibre composite wings, or both; and (ii) fuselages
and wings for such commercial airplanes.[577]
7.288. The European Union interprets the terms of the First Siting
Provision as requiring Boeing "to commit to use wings and fuselages
produced or assembled in Washington State in the final assembly of 777X [large
civil aircraft] in Washington State".[578]
According to the European Union, "[i]f Boeing had not committed to using
US-made wings and fuselages [it would have] thereby failed to satisfy the [First Siting
Provision]".[579]
7.289. The Panel's reading of the text of the First Siting Provision is different. On its
face, the First Siting
Provision imposes a condition for certain tax benefits to take effect for a range of beneficiaries;
namely, that the competent authority (the Washington State Department of
Revenue) makes a one-time determination that a manufacturer has made a final
decision to site a significant commercial
airplane manufacturing programme in the state of Washington.
7.290. Nowhere in the words used in the First Siting Provision does the Panel find a requirement that makes the
entry into force of the challenged measures contingent
upon a determination that domestic goods will be used instead of imported
products. Nor do the terms of the First Siting
Provision impose any such requirement in respect of the "significant commercial airplane manufacturing program" that
would be the basis for the Department of Revenue's determination.
To the contrary, the First Siting
Provision is silent as to the use of imported or domestic goods and does not
make the receipt of subsidies dependent on refraining from using imported
goods.
7.291. Nor can a prohibited import-substitution contingency be derived by
necessary implication from the language of the First Siting
Provision, in the sense that it would result inevitably from the words actually
used in the legislation, or that any other interpretation would be
unreasonable. The Panel sees nothing in the language of the siting contingency
contained in the First
Siting Provision that would per se
and necessarily exclude the possibility for the airplane manufacturer to use
wings or fuselages from outside the state of Washington[580]
(if, for example, it continued manufacturing some
fuselages and wings in the state of Washington, with the additional use of fuselages
and wings that were manufactured separately elsewhere). Moreover, as a
condition involving a one-time decision, the First Siting
Provision in itself would not prevent the manufacturer over time, and
subsequent to the Department of Revenue's determination, terminating all
production of wings or fuselages and only using wings and fuselages
manufactured outside the state of Washington.
7.292. The Panel is mindful of the strict limitation of a de jure analysis to the terms actually used in the measure
at issue (and any relevant facts illuminating the meaning of those words), as
well as of the specific focus of the contingency that is prohibited under
Article 3.1(b), namely the requirement to use domestic goods instead of
imported goods. In assessing the meaning of municipal law a panel may be
assisted by "evidence of the consistent application of such laws, the
pronouncements of domestic courts on the meaning of such laws, the opinions of
legal experts and the writings of recognized scholars"[581], as well as the
"relevant practices of administering agencies".[582] In this case, no such
evidence has been presented that would alter the Panel's assessment of the First Siting Provision for the purposes of the
European Union's de jure claim.
7.293. The contingency set out in the terms of the First Siting
Provision is not that products manufactured in the state of Washington (wings
or fuselages) must be used in the
manufacturing of commercial airplanes as a condition for receiving the
subsidies, but rather that the manufacturing (including by final assembly) of
all of these products be sited within
the state of Washington. The terms actually used in the provision do not
preclude a scenario in which separately produced wings and fuselages were
"used" in the manner alleged by the European Union, i.e. that
wings and fuselages manufactured in the state of Washington were
"used" in the final assembly of 777X commercial airplanes in the
state of Washington. That such a scenario may be possible on the basis of terms
used in the First Siting Provision, however, is not the same as concluding that it is
a requirement or condition for the subsidies that necessarily derives from
those terms.
7.294. One other possible and equally reasonable reading of the terms of
the First Siting Provision would allow the manufacturer to benefit from the
subsidies if it used wings and fuselages manufactured outside the state of
Washington in the final assembly of 777X commercial airplanes in the state of
Washington, so long as it manufactured at least some wings and fuselages in the
state of Washington. Another possible and also reasonable reading of the terms
of the First Siting Provision, as mentioned above, would allow the manufacturer
to benefit from the subsidies even if it stopped manufacturing fuselages, wings,
and even commercial airplanes in the state of Washington, as the First Siting
Provision involves a one-time decision on the initial establishment, but not
the continuation, of certain manufacturing activities.
7.295. Furthermore, and related to the above argument by the European
Union, the Panel notes that there is a discrepancy between the parties whether
the First Siting Provision requires the same entity to manufacture both the commercial
airplane and the fuselages and wings. In particular, the European Union has
argued that "the [First Siting Provision] could have been
satisfied if Boeing had planned to purchase wings and fuselages produced by
another entity in Washington State.[583]
Conversely, the United States has submitted that "the text of ESSB 5952
clearly contemplates a single manufacturer, and Washington officials have
confirmed to the United States that this was the only scenario they
contemplated".[584]
The Panel notes that the terms of the First Siting Provision refer to "a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program" in which a commercial airplane, as well as fuselages and wings, are manufactured. The First Siting Provision
also refers to "a
manufacturer" that would have to decide to locate the significant
commercial airplane manufacturing programme in the state of Washington.[585] Because the "manufacturing
program" is the one and same programme, this strongly suggests that the
manufacturer involved, namely the "manufacturer" referenced in the First
Siting Provision, is the same manufacturer that would decide to site the programme
in the state of Washington. In any event, regardless of the number of
manufacturers that could satisfy the First Siting
Provision, the terms of the provision in no case condition, either explicitly
or by necessary implication, the availability of subsidies on the use of
domestic over imported goods by the manufacturer or manufacturers involved.
Thus, even if the First Siting Provision could have been satisfied by two different
entities siting two different operations in the state of Washington, this
situation would neither expressly require nor necessarily imply that domestic
goods instead of imported goods would have to be used by either entity.
7.296. Accordingly, the Panel finds that a contingency upon the use of domestic over
imported products is neither set out expressly in the First Siting
Provision, nor can it be derived by necessary implication, in the sense that it
results inevitably, from the terms used in this provision.[586]
The contingency on siting certain production activities within the state of
Washington does not entail any explicit, or any necessarily implied,
requirement to use domestic goods.
7.297. For the reasons explained above, the Panel concludes that the
European Union has not demonstrated that, on its own, and based on its express
terms, the First Siting Provision makes the challenged aerospace tax measures de jure contingent upon the use of domestic over imported
goods.
7.5.6.2 The Second Siting Provision, considered separately
7.298. The Panel recalls that the Second Siting Provision in Sections 5 and
6 of ESSB 5952 relates only to the B&O aerospace tax rate and provides as
follows:
With respect to the manufacturing of commercial airplanes or making
sales, at retail or wholesale, of commercial airplanes, this subsection (11)
does not apply on and after July 1st of the year in which the department [of Revenue
of the state of Washington] makes a determination that any final assembly
or wing assembly of any version or variant of a commercial airplane that is the
basis of a siting of a significant commercial airplane manufacturing program in
the state under section 2 of this act has been sited outside the state of
Washington. This subsection (11)(e)(ii) only applies to the manufacturing or
sale of commercial airplanes that are the basis of a siting of a significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program in the state under section 2 of this
act.[587]
7.299. In other words, the 0.2904% B&O aerospace tax rate as amended and extended by ESSB 5952 is subject to a condition
subsequent or resolutory condition[588], i.e. this tax rate would
cease to apply under certain defined circumstances. In particular, this condition would be activated,
and the B&O aerospace tax rate terminated in respect of the
manufacturing or sale of airplanes that had satisfied the First Siting
Provision, if any final
assembly (of an airplane) or wing assembly that was the object of a positive
siting determination by the Department of Revenue of the state of Washington under the First Siting
Provision, is subsequently sited outside the state of Washington.
7.300. According to the European Union, "under this [Second Siting
Provision], 777X aircraft benefit from the preferential B&O tax rate only
if Boeing assembles the wings and assembles the aircraft exclusively in
Washington State".[589]
The European Union adds that, pursuant to this provision, "if Boeing opts,
for example, to purchase any 777X wings from outside Washington State, it
will be penalized through loss of the B&O tax rate reduction for all
revenue related to sales of the 777X".[590]
7.301. As noted in the text of the Second Siting
Provision, this provision "only applies to the manufacturing or sale of
commercial airplanes that are the basis of a siting of a significant commercial
airplane manufacturing program in the state under section 2 of this act",
that is, under the First
Siting Provision. Furthermore, by its terms, the Second Siting
Provision applies only to the challenged B&O aerospace tax rate, which in
turn is one of the seven aerospace tax measures that would take effect upon
satisfaction of the First
Siting Provision. Because the First Siting Provision
defines what is referred to in the Second Siting Provision, the terms used in the Second Siting
Provision necessarily draw their meaning from the terms of the First Siting
Provision, including the events contemplated therein.
7.302. The Panel notes some variation in the usage of the verb
"site" in the First and Second Siting Provisions, as well as
potential discrepancies in the "assembly" activities that are the
subject of siting in each provision. The term "siting" is defined in
the First Siting Provision as "a final decision, made on or after November
1, 2013, by a manufacturer to locate a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program in Washington State". Section 2 of ESSB 5952 notes
that the "definitions in this subsection apply throughout [the] section
unless the context clearly requires otherwise". In this connection, the
context of the First Siting Provision is different to that of the Second Siting
Provision as it refers to "the siting of a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program", which in turn is "an airplane program in
which" an airplane model, fuselages, and wings are "products [that],
including final assembly, will commence manufacture" in Washington State.
By contrast, the Second Siting Provision does not use the term "final
assembly" in conjunction with the "manufacture" of the products
listed in the First Siting Provision, but rather as a discrete activity along
with "wing assembly" that the Department of Revenue may determine
"has been sited" outside Washington State. In the context of the
Second Siting Provision, the term "final assembly" thus seems to
pertain to final aircraft assembly, as
distinguished from wing assembly, whereas "final assembly" in the
First Siting Provision appears to refer to a stage or aspect of the
manufacturing process of all "products" listed therein. In any event,
and apart from these contextual differences of the term "final
assembly", the Panel considers that the expression "has been
sited" (used in the Second Siting Provision in the passive tense) is
consonant with the definition of "siting" in the First Siting
Provision. In particular, the reference in the Second Siting Provision to a
programme having been "sited" is related to a manufacturer's decision
to locate the relevant manufacturing and assembly activities in or outside
Washington State.
7.303. As indicated above, the Second Siting Provision explicitly provides that
the B&O aerospace tax rate will cease to apply if an assembly operation that had been sited in the
state of Washington is subsequently "sited outside
the state of Washington". Under the
terms of the relevant legislation, to "site" is related to a
manufacturer's decision to locate a manufacturing programme in a particular
location.
7.304. The European Union asserts that, under the Second Siting
Provision, the B&O aerospace tax rate would only continue in force "if
Boeing assembles the wings and assembles the aircraft exclusively in Washington
State".[591]
The European Union adds that, pursuant to this provision, if Boeing purchases
any 777X wings from outside the state of Washington, it would lose the B&O aerospace
tax rate for all revenue related to sales of the 777X aircraft.[592]
7.305. Such conclusions, however, do not result explicitly
from the terms of the Second Siting Provision. On its face, the Second Siting
Provision is silent as to the use of imported or domestic goods and does not
make the receipt or continued enjoyment of subsidies dependent on refraining
from using imported products. The Panel finds no express indication in the
terms of the provision that the subsidy provided by the B&O aerospace tax
rate would be lost by importing wings, as alleged by the European Union. In
particular, the contingency contemplated in the Second Siting Provision relates
to a determination that "any final assembly or wing assembly of any
version or variant of a commercial airplane that is the basis of a siting of a
significant commercial airplane manufacturing program in the state under [the First Siting
Provision] has been sited outside the state of Washington". Based purely
on the wording of this statutory contingency, the terms "any final
assembly or wing assembly" are explicitly tied, and arguably limited, to
the specific assembly operations that were "the basis of a siting" under
the First Siting Provision. Thus, the terms of the Second Siting
Provision could rather be understood to address the situation in which
production activities that had been previously sited in the state of Washington, and had been the
basis of the determination by the Department of Revenue
pursuant to the First
Siting Provision, were subsequently sited outside the state of Washington. Seen in this light, the words of
the Second Siting Provision do not expressly condition the receipt of a subsidy
on the use of domestic over imported goods. On its face, the Second Siting
Provision, as long as production activities of the defined type continue to
take place in the state of Washington, does not require that the goods for that
production (whether they be wings or anything else) need to be sourced only from within the state of Washington.
7.306. Nor can an import-substitution contingency be derived by necessary
implication from the words of the Second Siting
Provision, in the sense that such a contingency would result inevitably from
the words actually used in the legislation, or that any other interpretation
would be unreasonable. That is, the siting contingency contained in the Second Siting Provision would not per se and necessarily exclude the possibility for the
airplane manufacturer to use wings from outside the state of Washington
(assuming arguendo that the manufacturer could use
wings manufactured separately), as long as it did not relocate the previously
sited manufacturing of wings outside the state of Washington.
7.307. The Panel recalls the strict limitation of a de jure
analysis to the terms actually used in the measure at issue and any relevant
facts that illuminate the meaning of those terms in their particular context. The
Panel also recalls the specific focus of the contingency that is prohibited under
Article 3.1(b), namely a requirement to "use" domestic instead of
imported goods. As noted above[593],
in assessing the meaning of municipal law a panel may also be assisted by
evidence of the consistent application of such laws, the pronouncements of
domestic courts on the meaning of such laws, the opinions of legal experts, the
writings of recognized scholars, as well as the relevant practices of
administering agencies. In this case, no such evidence has been presented that
would alter the Panel's assessment of the Second Siting
Provision for the purposes of the European Union's de jure
claim.
7.308. The contingency set out in the Second Siting
Provision is not that products manufactured in the state of Washington (wings)
must be "used" in the manufacturing of commercial airplanes as a
condition for the subsidy, but rather that the manufacturing (including by
final assembly) of all these products not be sited outside the state of
Washington.
7.309. If the Second Siting
Provision is construed as relating to the relocation of a manufacturing programme
previously sited under the First Siting Provision, it would not inevitably
result from the terms of the Second Siting
Provision that domestic goods must be used over imports. Another reading of the
terms of the Second Siting
Provision would allow the manufacturer in question to continue to benefit from
the subsidy if it used wings manufactured outside the state of Washington in
the final assembly of the commercial airplanes in question in the state of
Washington, so long as it maintained final and wing assembly previously sited
in the state of Washington.
7.310. In sum, and contrary to what the European Union asserts, the Second Siting Provision does not indicate on its face that the B&O aerospace tax rate would cease to apply if the
aircraft manufacturer in question "uses" imported products instead of
domestic products. Moreover, it does not inevitably
result from the terms of the Second Siting Provision that the importation of
wings would amount to the "siting" of production activities outside
the state of Washington, even if such an outcome is not excluded by the text of
the Second Siting Provision. No express or obvious contingency results from the
terms used in the provision, nor can one be derived inevitably from its terms.
7.311. For the reasons explained above, the Panel concludes that the
European Union has not demonstrated that the Second Siting Provision, on its own, and based on its express terms, makes
the challenged B&O aerospace tax rate de
jure contingent
upon the use of domestic instead of imported goods.
7.5.6.3 The First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision, considered jointly
7.312. The European Union asserts that, taken together, the First Siting
Provision and the Second
Siting Provision expressly condition all of the challenged
aerospace tax measures "on the use of domestic over imported goods in the
final assembly of the aircraft, in violation of Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the
SCM Agreement".[594]
The European Union adds that these siting provisions "act together to maximize trade distortions in favour of domestic
goods and to the detriment of competitive opportunities for imported goods.
While the [First Siting Provision] focuses on component sourcing decisions made at
the beginning of a new aircraft programme, the [Second Siting Provision]
focuses on later stages".[595]
7.313. As noted above, the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision, respectively, set out a condition for the activation of
certain tax measures contained in the legislation, and a condition under which one of
those tax measures (i.e. the B&O
aerospace tax rate) would
cease to apply. More specifically, in accordance with
these provisions:
a.
the entry into
force of the amendments
and extensions to the aerospace tax measures requires a determination by the Department of
Revenue of the state of Washington that a final decision has been made to site within that state a "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program", which would include the manufacture, including the final assembly of: (i) a new model of a commercial
airplane or a version or variant of an existing model; and (ii) fuselages
and wings for a new model of a commercial airplane or for a version or variant
of an existing model;
and
b.
one of the challenged aerospace tax measures
(namely the 0.2904% B&O aerospace tax rate) would cease to apply if the Department of
Revenue of the state of Washington makes a determination that any final assembly of airplanes or wing
assembly that had
been sited in the state of Washington, in accordance with the First Siting Provision, has subsequently been "sited outside the state
of Washington".
7.314. On their face, the two siting provisions, and the respective
conditions contained therein, provide for the "siting" of certain
manufacturing activities within the state of Washington as a condition for the
enjoyment of a number of tax benefits and seek to prevent certain manufacturing
activities that had been sited within the state of Washington being
subsequently sited outside the state of Washington. Under the terms of the First Siting Provision, the term "siting" refers to a manufacturer's decision to
locate a manufacturing programme (the "significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program") in a particular location (in the state of
Washington).
7.315. As the Panel has found above, the First Siting Provision and the Second
Siting Provision are silent as to the use of imported
or domestic goods. On their face, these provisions do not make the receipt or
continued enjoyment of subsidies dependent on refraining from using imported
products. Such conditionality does not result explicitly from the
terms of the provisions, nor can it be derived by necessary implication, in the
sense that it results inevitably, from such terms. On a de jure
basis these provisions do not speak of "component sourcing decisions"[596], but of the location of
certain manufacturing activities.
7.316. Furthermore, while the Second Siting Provision pertains explicitly to
the "sited" programme that would have satisfied the First Siting
Provision, this textual link between the two siting provisions adds nothing to
the de jure analysis of each of the
provisions separately that the Panel has already conducted. Considering them
jointly does not produce any elements that might have been obscured by
considering them separately. Therefore, the Panel finds that the terms of the First Siting
Provision and the Second
Siting Provision, taken together, do not condition the
challenged aerospace tax measures on the use of domestic over imported goods.
Whether in practice, as also argued by the European
Union, these two siting provisions act together to create a contingency on the
use of domestic goods over imported goods, is something that the Panel will
turn to as part of its consideration of the European Union's de facto claim against the measures at issue.
7.317. Accordingly, the Panel concludes that the European Union has not
demonstrated that, acting together, the First Siting
Provision and the Second
Siting Provision make the challenged aerospace tax measures
de jure contingent upon the use of domestic
over imported goods.
7.318. The Panel has found that the European Union has failed to establish
that the challenged aerospace tax measures are de jure
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. The Panel will now
consider the European Union's secondary claim, i.e. that the aerospace tax
measures at issue are inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement by
being de facto contingent upon the use of
domestic over imported goods. In its assessment of this claim, the Panel will
determine whether the contingency or conditionality of the aerospace tax
measures on the use of domestic goods instead of imported goods, even if not
set out expressly in the legislation, including
by necessary implication, is demonstrated by the facts of the case.
7.319. There are no specific precedents on the criteria that would guide
the Panel's determination of a de facto import
substitution contingency under Article 3.1(b). However, as discussed above, the
Appellate Body has referred to elements that would be considered for a de facto determination of export contingency under Article
3.1(a). For the reasons explained above, these elements are also relevant for a
contingency determination under Article 3.1(b).[597]
7.320. In summary, the legal standard expressed by the word
"contingent" is the same for both de jure or de facto contingency.[598]
However, there is a difference in the type of evidence that may be employed to establish
de jure or de facto
contingency. De jure contingency is
demonstrated on the basis of the words of the relevant legislation, regulation
or other legal instrument. The evidence needed to establish de facto contingency goes beyond the relevant legal
instruments and includes a variety of factual elements concerning the granting
of the subsidy in a specific case.[599]
De facto contingency must be established
from the total configuration of the facts constituting and surrounding the
granting of the subsidy, including the design, structure, and modalities of
operation of the measure granting the subsidy, none of which on its own is
likely to be decisive in any given case.[600]
That configuration of the facts may include the following factors: (i) the
design and structure of the measure granting the subsidy; (ii) the modalities
of operation set out in such a measure; and (iii) the relevant factual
circumstances surrounding the granting of the subsidy that provide the context
for understanding the measure's design, structure, and modalities of operation.[601]
Moreover, the determination of contingency must be based on an assessment of the subsidy itself, in the light of the relevant factual
circumstances, rather than by reference to the granting authority's subjective
motivation for the measure. Reviewable expressions of a government's policy
objectives for granting a subsidy may, however, constitute relevant evidence in
the inquiry.[602]
7.321. For the Panel to find a violation of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement, the European Union will need to make a prima facie
case that the aerospace tax measures are granted subject to the condition that
domestic products must be used instead of, or in preference to, imported
products. It would not
be sufficient to demonstrate, for example, that a
subsidy is being granted to a firm that uses domestic instead of imported goods
or even that the subsidy would negatively affect the competitive opportunities
of foreign producers. Such facts would not in themselves support a
determination that the challenged measures are subject to a prohibited
contingency (although they might be relevant in the context of actions pursuant
to Parts III and V of the SCM Agreement). Rather, the European Union
will need to demonstrate that there is something about the design and structure
of the challenged measures and their operation, in the circumstances in which
the measures have been introduced and exist, that establishes the contingency,
and does so with the requisite standard of certainty. The Panel recalls, in this regard, the Appellate Body's warning against
blurring "the line drawn by the [SCM] Agreement between prohibited … subsidies and actionable … subsidies", in a manner
"contrary to the overall design and structure of the Agreement".[603]
7.322. The European Union asserts that the text of ESSB 5952, and in
particular the language of the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting
Provision, is the most important fact on record and the best evidence of the
design, structure, and modalities of operation of the challenged subsidies and
the associated contingencies.[604]
7.323. In addition to the text of ESSB 5952, the European Union cited the
following four factors in support of its de facto
claim: first, statements and testimony by the Governor of the state of
Washington, referring to the "contingency language" included in the
legislation[605];
second, that Boeing imports wings from Japan for its 787 aircraft[606];
third, that, prior to the enactment of ESSB 5952, Boeing would have
considered the possibility of importing wings from Japan for its 777X
aircraft and decided against that option once ESSB 5952 was enacted[607];
and fourth, that ESSB 5952 "creates specific multi-billion dollar penalties for use of imported wings or fuselages, and
multi-billion dollar rewards for use
of domestic wings or fuselages".[608]
7.324. The European Union submits that the First Siting Provision and the
Second Siting Provision in ESSB 5952 are each capable of strongly
influencing Boeing's choice between imported wings and fuselages, and domestic
(United States-produced) wings and fuselages for the 777X airplanes.[609]
The European Union asserts that the amount of the subsidies at issue exceeds
the total development cost of the 777X airplanes, and would therefore
overshadow any other factors that may favour a decision by Boeing to import
wings and fuselages for 777X airplanes.[610]
The European Union maintains that the First Siting Provision and the Second
Siting Provision acting together would maximize trade distortions in favour of
domestic goods and to the detriment of imported goods, which suggests that the challenged measures are geared to induce the use of domestic over imported goods.[611]
7.325. In response, the United States asserts that the European Union has
failed to establish that the aerospace tax measures at issue are de facto contingent upon the use of domestic over imported
goods, because the European Union has not demonstrated that the use of domestic
goods is required as a condition for eligibility for the subsidies.[612]
According to the United States, none of the factual evidence referred to by the
European Union (the text of ESSB 5952; the statement of the Governor of the
state of Washington; Boeing's alleged importation of wings from Japan for its
787 airplanes; Boeing's alleged consideration of importing wings from Japan for
its 777X airplanes; and the alleged system of rewards and penalties in
ESSB 5952) supports its claim that the measures are de facto
contingent.[613]
7.326. The United States argues that Boeing has fulfilled the First Siting Provision
and has avoided triggering the Second Siting Provision without the use of
domestic over imported goods.[614]
According to the United States, Boeing does not "use" domestic wings
and fuselages and instead completes the assembly of wings and fuselages as part
of the final assembly of the finished airplane.[615]
The United States adds that the measures in ESSB 5952 have had no effect on
Boeing's make/buy decisions nor on its decision on where to site the assembly
of fuselages and wings.[616]
The United States contends that the European Union has failed to establish that
the challenged measures are geared to induce the use of domestic over imported
goods.[617]
The United States submits that, provided it conducts the requisite
assembly activity in the state of Washington, Boeing would satisfy the First
Siting Provision and avoid triggering the Second Siting Provision even if it
imported every part of the 777X airplane; Boeing therefore would be receiving
no rewards for increasing the use of domestic inputs on the 777X airplane, nor
would it be penalized for increasing the use of imported inputs.[618]
Finally, the United States argues that, if the challenged measures are not
found to be de jure contingent upon import
substitution, to show that they are de facto contingent
upon import substitution would typically involve at a minimum showing that the
measures are having an import substitution effect.[619]
7.327. In its assessment of the European Union's de facto
claim against the challenged aerospace tax measures, the Panel will consider whether
the text of the relevant legislation, the factors cited by the European Union,
and other evidence on the record, support the European Union's assertion that
the aerospace tax measures are contingent upon the use of domestic over
imported goods. The Panel's de facto
analysis must go beyond the text of the legislation and will be based on a
holistic examination of all the available evidence. The Panel will consider in
this regard the total configuration of the facts constituting and surrounding
the granting of the subsidies, such as: (i) the design and structure of the
measures; (ii) the modalities of operation set out in such measures; and (iii)
the relevant factual circumstances surrounding the granting of the subsidies
that provide the context for understanding the measures' design, structure, and
modalities of operation.
7.328. The Panel recalls that, with respect to the European Union's de jure claim, the Panel started by analysing the First
Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision, each considered separately, and
subsequently considered the two siting provisions acting jointly.[620]
Because the consideration of the European Union's de jure
claim focused on the terms of the legislation, the Panel considered it
appropriate to look at the siting provisions separately and to look subsequently
at both provisions jointly. This approach was consistent with the manner in
which the European Union directed its de jure claim
at the provisions "whether considered individually or together".[621]
The European Union further clarified its argument as follows:
To be clear, the European Union understands that each condition [First
Siting Provision and Second Siting Provision] independently
results in a de jure violation of Article
3.1(b). At the same time, these conditions act together to
maximize trade distortions in favour of domestic goods, and to the detriment of
competitive opportunities for imported goods.[622]
(emphasis original; footnote omitted)
7.329. With respect to its de facto claim,
the European Union has asserted that the First Siting Provision and the Second
Siting Provision in ESSB 5952 "are each capable of strongly
influencing Boeing's choice between imported wings and fuselages, and US-produced
wings and fuselages, for the 777X [airplanes]".[623]
In contrast, in articulating its arguments in support of its de facto claim, the European Union has consistently referred
to the joint operation of the two siting provisions.[624]
7.330. For purposes of determining the practical operation of the
challenged measures, the Panel considers that it would be artificial to look at
the siting provisions separately. Not only are both provisions part of the same
legal instrument (ESSB 5952), in practice both operate together in regulating
the conditions for obtaining and then maintaining access to the subsidies at
issue in this dispute. Recalling the textual linkage in the legislation of the
two siting provisions (the reference in the Second Siting Provision to the significant
commercial airplane programme that had satisfied the First Siting Provision), the
First Siting Provision having been satisfied by Boeing's 777X siting decision,
the joint operation in practice of the two siting provisions can be examined
and, as a practical matter, their operation cannot at this point be
dissociated.
7.331. The Panel will therefore consider the manner in which the measures
at issue are structured, designed, and operate, under the terms of ESSB 5952,
and as a result of the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision.
As noted, this approach is consistent with the manner in which the European
Union has articulated its de facto claim,
namely by reference to the joint operation of the two siting provisions.
7.5.7.3 The First and Second Siting Provisions
7.332. The Panel recalls that, based on the terms used in the legislation,
for the aerospace
tax measures to take effect, the First Siting Provision requires a
determination by Washington State's Department of Revenue that a final decision has been
made, on or after 1 November 2013 and no later than 30 June 2017, to site a "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" within the state of Washington.
The legislation also defines the characteristics that the "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" would have to fulfil to qualify
for the Department of Revenue's positive determination. Those characteristics are, in essence, that the following products will "commence manufacture", "including
final assembly", at a new or existing location within Washington State on
or after the effective date of the legislation: (i) a new model of a commercial
airplane or a version or variant of an existing model; and (ii) fuselages and
wings for a new model of a commercial airplane or for a version or variant of
an existing model.
7.333. In turn, based on the terms used in the legislation, the B&O
aerospace tax rate will
cease to apply in respect of "the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes"
that had satisfied the First Siting Provision if Washington State's Department of Revenue makes a determination that any final airplane
assembly or wing assembly (that had been the
object of a positive siting determination by the Department of Revenue under
the First Siting Provision) has subsequently been sited outside the state
of Washington.
7.334. The European Union interprets the terms of the First Siting
Provision as requiring Boeing "to commit to use wings and fuselages
produced or assembled in Washington State in the final assembly of 777X [large
civil aircraft] in Washington State".[625]
According to the European Union, "[i]f Boeing had not committed to using
US-made wings and fuselages [it would have] thereby failed to satisfy the [First Siting
Provision]".[626]
7.335. According to the European Union, under the Second Siting
Provision, "777X aircraft benefit from the preferential B&O tax rate
only if Boeing assembles the wings and assembles the aircraft exclusively in
Washington State".[627]
The European Union adds that, pursuant to this provision, "if Boeing opts,
for example, to purchase any 777X wings from outside Washington State, it will
be penalized through loss of the B&O tax rate reduction for all revenue
related to sales of the 777X".[628]
7.336. The European Union adds that the siting provisions in ESSB 5952
"are geared to induce the use of domestic over imported goods".[629]
According to the European Union:
[T]hese conditions [the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting
Provision] act together to maximize trade
distortions in favour of domestic goods, and to the detriment of competitive
opportunities for imported goods.[630]
While the [First Siting Provision] focuses on component sourcing decisions made
at the beginning of a new aircraft programme, the [Second Siting Provision] focuses
on later stages.[631]
(emphasis original)
7.337. The European Union adds that the siting provisions in ESSB 5952
influence the choice by an individual producer on how to produce an aircraft
and source its wings and fuselages, as follows:
In the absence of the contingencies, Boeing would have arrived at a
decision as a reasonable commercial actor, which may or may not have been to
use wings and fuselages produced outside the United States. [ESSB 5952]
distorts these choices. First, it takes away the competitive
opportunity for foreign producers of wings and fuselages, pursuant
to the [First Siting Provision]. If Boeing had not committed to using US-made
wings and fuselages, and thereby failed to satisfy the [First Siting Provision],
that would have led to severe penalties for Boeing, as the entirety of [ESSB
5952] would not have gone into effect. Second, it further takes away the competitive opportunity for foreign wing producers, pursuant
to the [Second Siting Provision]. If Boeing uses any foreign-made wings for the
777X, and thereby fails to satisfy the [Second Siting Provision], then the
777X-related portion of the B&O tax rate reduction will be eliminated.[632]
7.338. The United States asserts that the relevant conditions in ESSB 5952
(namely, the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision) have
"nothing whatsoever to do with the use of goods" and instead
"address aerospace-related production activities".[633]
The United States also argues that "the references to manufacturing or
assembly of fuselages and wings in the Siting Provisions … merely define the
scope of production activity required to use the tax treatment covered by
ESSB 5952".[634]
7.339. The Panel has already concluded that, on its face, the First Siting
Provision imposes a condition for certain tax benefits to take effect for a range of beneficiaries, namely, that the competent authority (the Washington State Department
of Revenue) make a one-time determination that a manufacturer has made a final
decision to site a
significant commercial airplane manufacturing programme in the state of Washington.
The Panel also has concluded that the First Siting
Provision does not, either by its express terms or by necessary implication
thereof, make the entry into force of the subsidies at issue contingent upon a
determination that domestic goods will be used instead of imported goods.[635]
7.340. The Panel has concluded further that, on its face, the Second Siting
Provision is silent as to the use of imported or domestic goods and does not expressly
or by necessary implication make the receipt or continued enjoyment of
subsidies dependent on refraining from using imported goods. The Panel also
found no indication in the terms of the provision that the subsidy provided by
the B&O aerospace tax rate would be lost by importing wings, as alleged by
the European Union. The Panel concluded that the Second Siting
Provision does not, either by its express terms or by necessary implication,
condition the receipt of the B&O aerospace tax rate on the use of domestic
over imported goods.[636]
7.341. The Panel recalls the European
Union's argument that the siting provisions focus on "component sourcing
decisions".[637] The Panel has found that the
First and Second Siting Provisions de jure do not
speak of component sourcing decisions, but of the location of certain
manufacturing activities.[638] However, this does not resolve
whether on a de facto basis these provisions
operate in a manner that conditions the availability of subsidies based on
whether certain components are sourced from a foreign or domestic origin. It is
in respect of this question of "component sourcing decisions" that
the Panel will examine the European Union's claim of de facto contingency
on the use of domestic over imported goods.
7.342. Turning to the actual operation of the challenged measures, the
evidence before the Panel confirms that the First Siting
Provision in itself did not and does not make the aerospace tax measures contingent upon
the use of domestic goods instead of, or in preference to, imported goods. As
noted above[639], the First Siting Provision was activated by the Washington State Department of
Revenue on 10 July 2014. This activation was a result of a determination by the Department of Revenue that a manufacturer (namely, Boeing) had made
a final decision to site
a significant commercial airplane manufacturing programme (namely, the 777X
programme) in the state of Washington and that the
contingency requirements in ESSB 5952 had therefore been satisfied. As a
result of this determination, ESSB 5952 was deemed to have taken effect on
9 July 2014.[640]
The Department of Revenue's determination in turn was based on Boeing's
notification of 9 July 2014 that it had made a final decision to manufacture
the 777X airplane, including its fuselages and wings, in the state of
Washington.[641]
Boeing's
notification was accompanied by three attachments, as examples of "actions
Boeing has taken consistent with its decision to manufacture the 777X in Washington".[642] As a result of the Department of Revenue's determination and the
entry into effect of ESSB 5952, the expiration date for the aerospace tax measures
at issue was extended until 1 July 2040 for all eligible taxpayers,
including but not limited to Boeing.[643]
7.343. Under the terms of the legislation, and as confirmed by the
additional evidence available, the Department of Revenue's determination was
based exclusively on Boeing's decision to locate a significant commercial airplane
manufacturing programme (as defined by the legislation) in the state of Washington.[644] There is no indication that the
activation of the First Siting Provision was the result of any other
factor, such as a commitment by the manufacturer to use domestic over imported
goods.
7.344. In particular, the European Union has submitted no evidence, and there is nothing in
either Boeing's letter to the Department of Revenue or the Department of
Revenue's determination, that indicates that the use of domestic over imported
goods – by Boeing or anyone else - was a condition for the Department of
Revenue's positive determination in respect of the First Siting Provision. In
fact, undisputed evidence submitted by the United States shows that Boeing will
source a significant number of the components for the 777X, including wing and
fuselage components and subassemblies, outside the United States.[645]
In any event, there is no evidence to indicate that a particular use of goods
of specific origins formed part of the Department of Revenue's determination
that the First Siting Provision had been fulfilled. The Panel thus sees no
factual evidence in the Department of Revenue's determination or in how Boeing
will organize the sourcing for the production of the 777X indicating a de facto requirement to use any domestic goods, including
wings or fuselages as referred to specifically in the European Union's claim of
de facto contingency.
7.345. With respect to the First Siting
Provision, the Panel additionally notes that the Department of Revenue's
determination, pursuant to this provision, is a one-time decision and there is
no legal mechanism under Washington State law that would allow the Department
of Revenue to revoke that determination.[646] Thus, the First Siting
Provision is not a measure whose operation will occur in repeated instances
over some (definite or indefinite) period. Pursuant to ESSB 5952, there will be
no other instance of this particular legislative provision being activated
(again) in respect of another commercial airplane programme. The First Siting
Provision established the possibility for a one-time creation of certain tax
benefits subject to a certain condition being fulfilled. That condition was in
fact fulfilled, such that the tax benefits in fact did take effect, and these
events exhausted the operational life of the First Siting Provision. Thus, the
evidence regarding the satisfaction, in July 2014, of the First Siting
Provision by the Boeing 777X programme constitutes the entire universe of
relevant evidence regarding that provision's operation.
7.346. While the operation of the First Siting Provision as such was a
one-time event creating extended availability of a package of tax benefits, and
while the Panel finds no factual evidence of any requirement to use domestic
goods in respect of the triggering of that availability, the Panel recalls that
the First Siting Provision does not exist in isolation. To the contrary, the
role of the Second Siting Provision is to establish conditions for the airplane
manufacturing programme that had activated the First Siting Provision (and thus
effected the extended availability of the tax benefits) to maintain that
programme's access to one of those tax benefits, namely the B&O aerospace
tax rate. To put this more precisely, given that the conditionality in the
Second Siting Provision is phrased in the negative, the Panel understands the
Second Siting Provision to set forth the factual circumstances that would, if
they arose, cause the airplane manufacturing programme that had satisfied the
First Siting Provision (namely, the 777X programme) to lose access to the
B&O aerospace tax rate. These, then, are the conditions or circumstances
that Boeing must avoid in respect of the 777X programme in order not to
lose access to that tax rate in respect of that programme.
7.347. The Panel thus will now consider the manner of operation of this
second set of conditions attached to the subsidy. In particular, the Panel will
examine in detail the facts concerning the manner in which the Second Siting
Provision operates in practice in respect of the 777X programme which, having
satisfied the First Siting Provision, is the sole and exclusive object of the
Second Siting Provision. As its analytical framework, the Panel will consider
the design, structure, and operation of the measures granting the subsidies, the
modalities of operation as set forth in the measures, and the relevant factual
circumstances surrounding the granting of the subsidies at issue, that provide
context for understanding the measures' design, structure and operation. In
that regard, the additional evidence surrounding the Department of Revenue's
determination to activate the First Siting Provision can also serve to inform
the factual circumstances in which the Second Siting Provision now operates. The
Panel notes in particular the following facts in this regard.
7.348. First, the relevant legislation grants discretion to the Department of Revenue to
determine both: (i) that a manufacturer made a final decision to site a significant commercial
airplane manufacturing programme in the state of Washington; and (ii) that any
final airplane assembly or wing assembly previously sited in the state of Washington, and which
was the subject of the Department of Revenue's
determination as described in (i) above, has subsequently been sited outside the state of Washington. To recall, the Department of
Revenue's determination of the original siting decision, under the First Siting Provision, was designed to be, and in fact operated, as a
one-time determination, and there is no legal mechanism under Washington State law
that would allow the Department of Revenue to revoke that determination once
made.[647]
That said, under the Second Siting Provision, the Department of Revenue could
exercise its discretion to make a determination as described in (ii) above at
any point in the period during which the B&O aerospace tax rate is in effect
under ESSB 5952. Such a determination would lead to the termination of this
subsidy for the previously sited airplane programme as of 1 July of the
year in which that second determination was made. A determination as described
in (ii) above would only affect the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing
or sale of commercial airplanes under the airplane manufacturing
programme in
question. It would not affect any of the other subsidies to the manufacturer in
question, nor would it affect any of the subsidies (including the B&O aerospace
tax rate) for any of the other beneficiaries in respect of other activities.
7.349. Second, the condition contained
in the First Siting Provision is to site the manufacture
of certain "products" in Washington State, namely: (i) a new model, or a version or variant of an existing model, of a commercial
airplane manufactured with a carbon fibre composite fuselage or carbon fibre composite
wings or both; and (ii) fuselages and wings for a new model of a commercial
airplane, or a version or variant of an existing model. In contrast, the condition contained in the Second
Siting Provision is to refrain from siting outside of
Washington State any final assembly or wing assembly of a manufacturing programme
that had previously been sited under the First Siting Provision. The Panel
notes that it is the Second Siting Provision's reference to wing assembly,
rather than final assembly, that is relevant to the European Union's claim of de facto contingency to use domestic over imported wings.[648] This condition of the
Second Siting Provision with respect to the siting of any wing assembly is in
force for the entirety of the period during which the B&O aerospace tax rate is in effect under ESSB 5952.[649] Accordingly, the Panel understands that, under
the Second Siting
Provision, if the manufacturer were to relocate outside Washington State the wing assembly of
the "significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program" that had been previously sited in Washington State in accordance with the First Siting Provision (namely, the 777X
programme), the legal consequence would be the termination of the availability
of the B&O aerospace tax rate for the
manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under that programme.
7.350. Third, the parties have discussed extensively the process of
producing wings for large civil aircraft and, specifically, the incorporation
of wings into the final production or final assembly of large civil aircraft. The evidence before the Panel
reflects a variety of aircraft manufacturing processes, as well as continuing
innovation within the aerospace industry, including for the development of the
777X itself.[650]
The Panel notes in this regard the United States' observation that there is
great variation in the process of producing large commercial airplanes.[651]
Accordingly, the available evidence suggests that
manufacturers can decide on specific processes for producing wings, including
by assembly, and for incorporating wings into the final production or final
assembly of large civil aircraft based on a number of factors, including
economic, business, logistical, and technological considerations.
7.351. Fourth, as part of their discussion on the process of producing
wings for large civil aircraft, the parties advanced different definitions of
what can be considered as a "wing" for a large civil aircraft.
Different large civil aircraft models have wings with different designs, sizes,
and technical characteristics. As is clear
from the available evidence, some large aircraft models have been produced
using wing components or wing structures in different stages of completion that
were produced separately from the rest of the airplane and, in some cases,
transported to the site of the final airplane assembly.[652] In any event, an examination of the available evidence suggests
that manufacturers of large civil aircraft can incorporate wing structures into
the process of final assembly at different levels of completion based on a
number of factors, including economic, business, logistical, and technological
considerations.
7.352. More generally, regarding the diversity of ways in which
manufacturers may assemble large civil aircraft, the United States noted that "[i]n fact, the evidence shows that what these [aircraft manufacturing]
programs really have in common is that they all end up with fuselages and wings
on the finished airplanes, which is not surprising because they are the main
structural elements of the airframe."[653]
Thus, whatever manufacturing and assembly process is chosen by a particular
manufacturer, the result of that process will be a finished aircraft and the
result of wing assembly, however performed, will be a finished wing. Notably,
the Second Siting Provision refers to the location of "wing assembly"
as the subject of a possible determination by the Department of Revenue, and the text of ESSB 5952 uses the word
"products" when referring to commercial airplanes, fuselages, and
wings that would have to be manufactured within
Washington State as part of the "significant commercial airplane manufacturing program" under
the First Siting Provision.[654]
7.353. Fifth, the Panel notes the United
States' argument that Boeing does not use fuselages or wings, and has no plans
to use fuselages or wings, since the wings for 777X aircraft "are only
completed as part of the output of the process of producing the aircraft
itself".[655]
The Panel understands from this argument that Boeing is expected to assemble
the wings of the 777X itself, rather than sourcing wings from another entity,
domestic or foreign. In this connection, the United States clarified that
"its argument is not that, as a general matter, it is impossible to
assemble any aircraft wings separate from the final assembly of any
aircraft".[656]
[[BCI]].[657]
7.354. In any event, the particular production process selected by Boeing for the 777X
airplane is not in itself dispositive of whether the legislation creates de facto a prohibited contingency on Boeing to use domestic
goods. The fact that a manufacturer has chosen a particular production process
in the past or operates that process in the present, including because of economic,
business, logistical, or technological factors, does not mean that alternative
processes may not be available now or in the future. In this respect, it is
relevant that ESSB 5952 extends the subsidies provided pursuant to the
aerospace tax measures until 2040. During the entirety of this period, the
conditions in the Second Siting Provision govern the availability of the
B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme.
7.355. Furthermore, the Panel recognizes
that neither the First Siting Provision nor the Second Siting
Provision, either explicitly or in their operation,
binds Boeing to a specific process for manufacturing 777X aircraft, either at
the time of the 2014 siting determination or in respect of its future
activities through 2040. Thus Boeing is not legally constrained by the measures
at issue from adopting new processes or adapting existing processes in the
future in respect of the 777X. The Panel notes in this regard the United
States' argument that "ESSB 5952 does not require any production process
in particular".[658]
The focus of the Panel's analysis, for the purpose of the current dispute, is
not on the production processes for the 777X, in general or at any point in
time, but rather on whether the measures at issue, in their design, structure,
and modalities of operation, would limit access to existing subsidies if
imported goods were to be used in any such processes.
7.356. Sixth, the significant
commercial airplane manufacturing programme announced by the manufacturer, which is the basis of the First Siting Provision, in fact entails the
production by Boeing and in Washington State of wing structures that, for other
aircraft models, had been previously produced outside of Washington State and
in some cases imported from outside the United States.[659]
Notwithstanding the fact that "ESSB 5952 does not require any production
process in particular"[660],
the fact remains that following the passage of ESSB 5952 the manufacturer made
a final decision, for the 777X manufacturing programme, to produce domestically
certain wing structures (i.e. "Section 12" wing structures[661])
that the same manufacturer had previously imported for another commercial
airplane manufacturing programme.[662]
7.357. Considering all these facts, in the light of the European Union's de facto contingency claim, the Panel notes first that the
provision of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, without more, is not
in itself a breach of the obligations under the covered agreements. In the
context of the GATT 1994, this principle is reflected in Article III:8(b) of
the GATT 1994, which clarifies that the provision of subsidies exclusively to
domestic producers is not in itself a breach of the national treatment
obligation under that agreement. By contrast, subsidies of a particular
character can be in breach of the SCM Agreement. The focus of the Panel's
assessment is not whether the measures at issue have had an import substitution
effect or a detrimental impact on imports, as this would require the Panel to
trespass into an adverse effects analysis of the type that is not contemplated
by Article 3.1. Rather, the precise question before the Panel is whether the
subsidies at issue have been granted to domestic producers (i.e. Boeing)
contingent, in fact, upon the use of domestic goods.
7.358. The specific nature and operating mechanism of the Second Siting
Provision becomes relevant to this question. We recall, in particular, that the
Second Siting Provision provides that the "siting" of "wing
assembly" of the airplane model in question (the 777X) outside
Washington State would result in the loss of the B&O aerospace tax
rate for the manufacturing
or sale of that airplane.[663]
It thus is clear that so long as this "siting" does not happen, the
Second Siting Provision remains dormant, operating passively as a deterrent to
safeguard the status quo (or at least
particular aspects thereof) that satisfied the First Siting Provision. This
particular passive, deterrent nature of the measure in turn raises the question
as to what sorts of factual evidence could inform the analysis of whether
ongoing access to the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of
commercial airplanes under the 777X programme is
contingent de facto on the use of domestic over
imported 777X wings. In particular, at the time of the Panel's assessment of
this claim, the Second Siting Provision has not been triggered, and therefore
no evidence exists as to the actual operation (the triggering) of the Second
Siting Provision.
7.359. The Panel thus is confronted by the counterfactual question of what
would trigger the Second Siting Provision, that is, what action by Boeing would
result in the Department of Revenue determining that 777X wing assembly "has
been sited" outside Washington State. We note in this regard the argument
of the European Union that if Boeing were to use even a single imported 777X
wing, the Second Siting Provision would be triggered and Boeing would lose the
B&O aerospace tax rate in respect of the 777X.[664]
The evidence cited by the European Union consists of the word "any"
in the Second Siting Provision, which it argues means that that provision would
be triggered by the use of any quantity, no matter how small, of imported 777X
wings.[665]
The United States for its part argued that the purpose of the Second Siting
Provision is to prevent Boeing from relocating, or duplicating, 777X production
outside Washington State.[666]
7.360. With regard to the question of what would trigger the Second Siting
Provision, the Panel finds particularly relevant the discretion granted by ESSB
5952, and specifically by the Second Siting Provision, to the Department of
Revenue to terminate the availability of the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing
or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme
if it determines that Boeing has "sited" assembly of wings for that
model outside of Washington State. In particular, the exercise of the Department
of Revenue's discretion would be inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement if, in practice, it resulted in the termination of the B&O
aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme on the basis of a determination that Boeing, by virtue
of using imported 777X wings, had "sited" 777X wing assembly outside
Washington State.
7.361. To elucidate the issue of what would trigger the Second Siting
Provision, and more specifically, whether a use by Boeing of imported 777X wings
would do so, the Panel posed a series of questions to the United States in
respect of certain counterfactual scenarios, other than the existing status quo that satisfied the First Siting Provision (and
that thus by definition does not trigger the Second Siting Provision). That
existing status quo is that Boeing will itself
assemble the wings and fuselages, and conduct the final assembly of the 777X,
in Washington State. The Panel questions specifically went to whether the
Second Siting Provision would be triggered if:
a.
Boeing continued
manufacturing, inter alia, wings itself in
Washington State and in addition purchased wings (assuming arguendo
that it were possible to do so) from another manufacturer in Washington State[667];
b.
Boeing continued
manufacturing, inter alia, wings itself in
Washington State and also, (assuming arguendo that
it were possible to do so), imported some wings from a different producer
(i.e., other than Boeing itself).[668]
7.362. The essence of the Panel's questions thus was what would happen pursuant
to the Second Siting Provision if Boeing in the future sourced some 777X wings
from other entities, including foreign producers, rather than assembling all of
them itself.[669]
The specific focus of these questions was the geographic location of other hypothetical
suppliers. In response to the first question above, the United States indicated
(assuming arguendo that it were possible for 777X
wings to be completed and transported as separate articles), that the
Department of Revenue likely would not determine that any wing assembly had
been sited outside Washington State, and thus the Second Siting Provision would
not be triggered.[670]
In response to the Panel's other question, however, the United States indicated
that if completed wings were produced outside of the United States and then imported,
the Department of Revenue likely would determine that some wing assembly had
been sited outside Washington State, meaning that the Second Siting Provision
would be triggered.[671]
7.363. Thus, as explained in the United States' responses in this regard,
if the manufacturer were to use wings produced outside of Washington State
(including in particular wings imported from other countries) in the production
of 777X aircraft[672],
the Department of
Revenue would likely consider this to mean that some wing assembly had been
sited outside of Washington State and this would activate the Second Siting
Provision.[673]
This would be the case even if the manufacturer imported some wings, while
continuing to produce wings in Washington State, effectively duplicating wing
manufacturing or assembly.[674]
In such cases, as indicated by the United States, the Department of Revenue
would likely determine that at least some wing assembly had been sited outside
of Washington, which would activate the Second Siting
Provision. As a consequence, the use of imported wings would lead to the loss
of the B&O
aerospace tax rate. In contrast, if the manufacturer
were to use wings made in Washington State by another producer, this would not
activate the Second Siting Provision.[675]
7.364. The United States' responses clarify that the Second Siting
Provision is not only aimed at ensuring that a manufacturer (namely Boeing)
itself assemble the 777X wings or conduct the final assembly of the 777X. This
is notwithstanding the United States' arguments that the measures at issue (to
the extent they are subsidies) would be production subsidies (to Boeing),
rather than subsidies contingent on the use of any particular goods, and that
the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting Provision contemplated a
single entity performing all of the operations referred to in those provisions.
In particular, the United States' responses indicate that the Second Siting
Provision would not be triggered simply by a decision by
Boeing to source 777X wings from another entity rather than assembling them
itself. Rather, in such a scenario, whether or not the Second Siting Provision
would be triggered would be determined exclusively by where the wings in
question were assembled. In particular, the only decision
by Boeing to source wings which it would then "use" in producing the
777X that would not trigger the Second Siting
Provision would be to source such wings within Washington State, which by
definition would be domestic wings.
7.365. The Panel considers that these descriptions are significant in
understanding the modalities of operation of the conditions of the Second
Siting Provision, which as noted are subject to administrative discretion vested
in the Department of Revenue. As explained by the United States, within the
Washington State domestic legal system, courts would accord "substantial
weight to the agency's interpretation of the governing statutes and legislative
intent" and "substantial deference to agency views when it bases its
determination on factual matters".[676]
The United States' clarifications as to how the Department of Revenue would
likely exercise discretion shed light on the requirements imposed by the Second
Siting Provision, which applies prospectively to the 777X manufacturing
operations that are still being commenced and that may evolve over time. Under
such circumstances, the likely actions of the relevant administrative agency in
response to possible factual scenarios are indicative of whether, in practice,
a subsidy would remain available so long as a manufacturer used domestic goods,
while that same subsidy would be terminated if a manufacturer used those same
goods from a foreign source.
7.366. In light of the foregoing, the Panel is not persuaded that the
Second Siting Provision is only aimed at preventing Boeing from relocating the
777X entirely outside Washington State or from establishing a parallel 777X
production program outside Washington State. The Second Siting Provision does
not only concern the production of airplanes. It also concerns the
"use" of certain goods, and specifically the origin of those goods
that enter into the production process for the 777X as a condition for the
continued availability of a subsidy. The Panel notes in particular the use of
the word "or" in the Second Siting Provision. That is, that provision
would be triggered if wing assembly "or" final assembly of the 777X
were "sited" outside Washington State.[677]
The United States' responses as to how the Department of Revenue would likely
exercise its discretion, in interpreting the Second Siting Provision, demonstrate
that the expression "or" in that Provision contemplates, and seeks to
prevent inter alia, any wings (of the airplane
model that satisfied the First Siting Provision) from being produced as
separate products outside Washington State (including overseas), that would
then be shipped to Washington State for incorporation in the final assembly
process. Statements made by the Governor of Washington about the goal of
keeping 777X wing production in Washington, seen in the light of the United
States' responses, are consistent with this conclusion and are considered by
the Panel to be relevant evidence in this de facto
analysis.[678]
7.367. The loss of the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial
airplanes under the 777X programme if Boeing used 777X wings produced outside of Washington State, even if it maintained production
of such wings in Washington State, makes the B&O aerospace tax rate for that
programme contingent upon the use of wings made in Washington State.
This is confirmed by the 777X programme retaining access to the B&O aerospace tax rate if
Boeing used 777X wings made in Washington State by
another producer. Accordingly, pursuant to ESSB 5952, and as a result of the Second Siting
Provision, the B&O
aerospace tax rate subsidy for the manufacturing or sale of commercial
airplanes under the 777X programme is contingent de facto not only on the production of that aircraft and its
wings in Washington State, but additionally on not using 777X wings other than
those made in Washington State. Since wings made in Washington State are
domestic goods and any imported wings would by definition be made outside of
Washington State, it follows that the Second Siting Provision makes the B&O
aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme contingent upon the use of domestic wings over
imported wings.
7.368. Lastly, and for completeness, the Panel returns to the contention by
the United States that wings are not used in the production of the 777X, in the
sense that separate, identifiable and complete "wings" never come
into existence in the production process of the 777X. In this regard we observe
that Article 3.1(b) does not require the identification of a specific good in
order that it can be applied to a particular situation. In the case before us,
it is the output or outputs of a wing assembly process that the evidence
establishes must not be sourced by Boeing from overseas, because of the
implications of doing so. Regardless of precisely what these outputs are, and
regardless of the reference to "wing" and to "wing assembly"
in the siting provisions, there can be no doubt that goods, which together make
up a wing to the factual satisfaction of the Department of Revenue, cannot be
sourced by Boeing from outside the state of Washington without the consequence
of activating the Second Siting Provision. The Panel's references to wings
should be understood in this context.
7.369. For the reasons explained above, the Panel concludes that the siting
provisions in ESSB 5952, and in particular the prospective modalities of operation
of the Department of Revenue's discretion under the Second Siting
Provision, make the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial
airplanes under the 777X programme de facto
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods within the meaning of
Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.
8.1. In light of the findings in the foregoing sections of the Report,
and with respect to the aerospace tax measures at issue, as amended and
extended through Washington State's Engrossed
Substitute Senate Bill (ESSB 5952), the Panel concludes
that:
a. Each of the seven aerospace tax measures at issue in the present
case constitutes a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement;
b. Regarding the European Union's claim that the aerospace tax measures
at issue are subsidies de jure
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods within the meaning of
Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement:
i. The European Union has not demonstrated that the aerospace tax
measures are de jure contingent upon the use
of domestic over imported goods with respect to the First Siting Provision in
ESSB 5952 considered separately;
ii. The European Union has not demonstrated that the reduced business and occupation (B&O) tax rate for the manufacture
and sale of commercial airplanes (B&O aerospace tax rate) is de jure contingent upon the use
of domestic over imported goods with respect to the Second Siting Provision in
ESSB 5952 considered separately;
iii. The European Union has not demonstrated that the aerospace tax
measures are de jure contingent upon the use
of domestic over imported goods with respect to the First Siting Provision and
the Second Siting Provision considered jointly;
c. With respect to the First Siting Provision and the Second Siting
Provision in ESSB 5952, considered jointly, the B&O aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial
airplanes under the 777X programme is a subsidy de
facto contingent upon the use of domestic over
imported goods within the meaning of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.
8.2. Having found that the B&O aerospace tax rate for the
manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the 777X programme is
inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the
Panel also finds that the United States has acted inconsistently with Article
3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
8.3. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an
infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action
is considered prima facie to constitute a case
of nullification or impairment. We conclude that, to the extent that the United
States has acted inconsistently with the SCM Agreement,
it has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the European Union under that
Agreement.
8.4. Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement provides that, having found a measure in dispute to be a prohibited subsidy:
[T]he panel shall recommend that the subsidizing
Member withdraw the subsidy without delay. In this regard, the panel shall
specify in its recommendation the time period within which the measure must be
withdrawn.
8.5. The Panel has found that the European Union has demonstrated that
the B&O
aerospace tax rate for the manufacturing or sale of commercial airplanes under the
777X programme, pursuant to ESSB 5952, is a subsidy
contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods, prohibited under
Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM
Agreement.
8.6. Accordingly, taking into account the
nature of the prohibited subsidy found in this dispute, the Panel recommends
that the United States withdraw it without delay and within 90 days.
8.7. Finally, the Panel notes that the
rules contained in Part II of the SCM Agreement
do not require a panel to specify how the implementation of recommendations
under Article 4.7 should be effected by the subsidizing Member. In this
context, the second sentence of Article 19.1 of
the DSU provides that a panel may suggest
ways in which a recommendation could be implemented. Assuming that this
provision also applies to recommendations under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel notes that, pursuant
to Article 21.3 of the DSU, the means of implementation is in the first
instance for the Member concerned.[679]
Further, the Appellate
Body has made clear that the second sentence of
Article 19.1 "does not oblige panels to make ... a suggestion".[680]
In this case, in the absence of any request from the parties, the Panel refrains from making any
suggestions concerning steps that might be taken to implement its
recommendation.
__________
[1] See Request for Consultations by the European Union, WT/DS487/1, 23
December 2014.
[2] See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union,
WT/DS487/2, 13 February 2015.
[4] See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre
William Rappard on 23 February 2015, WT/DSB/M/357, 17 April 2015, pp.
14-15.
[5] Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the
European Union – Note by the Secretariat, WT/DS487/3, 23 April 2015.
[6] Communication from the Panel to the DSB, WT/DS487/4, 30 September
2015.
[7] See the Panel's Working Procedures in Annex A-1.
[8] See letter from the Panel in Annex D-1.
[10] See the Additional Working Procedures for the Protection of
BCI/HSBI in Annex A-2.
[11] See the Additional Working Procedures for the partial opening to
the public of the meetings of the Panel in Annexes A-3 and A-4.
[12] In turn, "significant commercial airplane manufacturing
program" is defined as: "[A]n airplane program in which the following
products, including final assembly, will commence manufacture at a new or
existing location within Washington state on or after the effective date of
this section: (i) The new model, or any version or variant of an existing
model, of a commercial airplane; and (ii) Fuselages and wings of a new
model, or any version or variant of an existing model, of a commercial
airplane." ESSB
5952 Sections 2(2)(c) and (d), codified at RCW Sections 82.32.850(2)(c)
and (d) (Exhibits EU-3 and EU-58).
[13] ESSB 5952
Sections 5(11)(e)(ii) and 6(11)(e)(ii), codified at RCW Section 82.04.260(11)(e)(ii)
(Exhibits EU-3 and EU‑22).
[14] United States' request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
paras. 2-3.
[16] European Union's comments on United States' request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 1.
[17] United States' opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 34.
[18] United States' request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
paras. 4-5.
[19] European Union's comments on United States' request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 2.
[20] United States' request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 6.
[21] European Union's comments on United States' request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 3.
[22] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 5.
[23] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 6.
[24] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 6.
[25] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 7.
[26] United States' request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 8.
[27] European Union's comments on United States' request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 4.
[28] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
paras. 8-10; United States' request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
paras. 10-11 and 13.
[29] United States' request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 14.
[30] European Union's comments on United States' request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 6.
[31] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 11.
[32] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, paras. 11-12.
[33] United States' request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 15.
[34] European Union's comments on United States' request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 7.
[35] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 13.
[36] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 14.
[37] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 14.
[38] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 14.
[39] United States' request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 16.
[40] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 16.
[41] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 17.
[42] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 17.
[43] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 18.
[44] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 19.
[45] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 20.
[46] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 21.
[47] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 22.
[48] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 22.
[49] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 23.
[50] United States' request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
paras. 18-20.
[51] European Union's comments on United States' request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 8.
[52] European Union's request for review of the Panel's Interim Report,
para. 23.
[53] United States' comments on European Union's request for review
of the Panel's Interim Report, para. 24.
[54] These seven aerospace tax measures correspond to the nine
tax-related provisions cited in para. 2.1 above.
In the articulation of its claims, the European Union groups the sales and use tax
exemptions for computer hardware, software, and peripherals in subparagraphs
2.1(d) and (f); and the sales tax exemptions for construction services and
materials in subparagraphs 2.1(e) and (g).
[55] Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel,
para. 200. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India),
p. 4.445.
[56] Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India),
p. 4.445 (citing Appellate Body Report, India – Patents (US),
para. 66).
[57] Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review, para. 168.
[58] Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel,
para. 157. See also Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India),
p. 4.446.
[59] Appellate Body Reports, US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.100; US – Carbon
Steel, para. 157; US – Carbon Steel (India),
para. 4.446.
[60] Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Duties (China), para. 4.101. See also Appellate
Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para.
4.446.
[61] Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and
Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, p. 323 at p. 335.
[62] Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones,
para. 104.
[63] Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and
Blouses, p. 16, DSR 1997:I, p. 323 at p. 337.
[64] Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones,
para. 104.
[65] Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and
Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, p. 323 at p. 335. (footnote omitted)
[67] Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling,
para. 140.
[68] Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 United Nations Treaty
Series 331 (1980); 8 International Legal
Materials 679 (1969).
[69] See, e.g. Appellate Body Report, US - Shrimp,
para. 114.
[70] Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II, p. 11, DSR 1996:I, 97, at p. 105.
[71] Appellate Body Report, India – Patents (US),
para. 45.
[73] Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5952, Chapter 2, Laws of 2013 3rd
Special Session, 2014 Wash. Sess. Laws 2, (ESSB 5952) (Exhibit EU-3).
See European Union's first written submission, para. 15. Throughout these
proceedings, the European Union has consistently referred to this legislation
as "SSB 5952", rather than "ESSB 5952", explaining that it
"omitted the 'Engrossed' and the 'E', in an effort to abbreviate the
name". European Union's response to Panel question No. 52, para. 4. The
United States has noted that the bill enacting the relevant legislation and
conditions was Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill
5952, rather than Substitute Senate Bill 5952. United States' first written
submission, fn 1. The United States has also clarified the legislative process
beginning with Senate Bill 5952 as well as the series of amendments that led to
the "Substitute" bill and subsequently the "Engrossed" bill
that was passed by the Washington State legislature and approved by the
Governor. United States' response to Panel question No. 52, paras. 1-5. The
United States also confirmed that the citation in the European Union's panel
request corresponds to ESSB 5952, and that the United States does not take
the position that ESSB 5952 is outside the Panel's terms of reference. United States'
response to Panel question No. 52, paras. 6-8. In light of this clarification
and confirmation by the United States, the Panel refers to the legislation
cited in the European Union's panel request as Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill
5952 (ESSB 5952) throughout this Report.
[74] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections
5-6, codified at RCW Section 82.04.260 (Exhibit EU-22).
[75] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
9, codified at RCW Section 82.04.4461 (Exhibit EU-23).
[76] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
10, codified at RCW Section 82.04.4463 (Exhibit EU-24).
[77] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections
11-12, codified at RCW Section 82.08.975 (Exhibit EU-25) and RCW Section
82.12.975 (Exhibit EU-26).
[78] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections
3-4, codified at RCW Section 82.08.980 (Exhibit EU-27) and RCW Section
82.12.980 (Exhibit EU-28).
[79] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
13, codified at RCW Section 82.29A.137 (Exhibit EU-29).
[80] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
14, codified at RCW Section 84.36.655 (Exhibit EU-30).
[81] See Final Bill Report, Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5952, (ESSB
5952 Final Bill Report) (Exhibit EU-4), p. 1.
[82] United States' first written submission, para. 39.
[83] RCW Section 82.04.220(1) (Exhibit EU-32). See also United States'
first written submission, paras. 39‑41.
[84] See ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report (Exhibit EU-4), p. 1. See para. 7.77 below
regarding B&O taxation of multiple business activities.
[85] See ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections 5-6; RCW Section
82.04.260(11) (Exhibit EU-22); ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report (Exhibit EU-4),
p. 3.
[86] See RCW Section 82.04.4461(2) (Exhibit EU-23).
[87] United States' first written submission, para. 42; Retail
Sales Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-12).
[88] Retail Sales Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of
Revenue (Exhibit USA-12).
[89] Digital Products including Digital Goods, Washington State
Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA‑14).
[90] Services Subject to Sales Tax, Washington State Department of
Revenue (Exhibit USA-13).
[91] See ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report (Exhibit EU-4), p.1.
[92] Use Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue
(Exhibit USA-19). See also ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report (Exhibit EU-4),
p.1; United States' first written submission, para. 44. For example, the use
tax is owed if goods are purchased in another state that does not have a sales
tax or a state with a sales tax lower than that of the state of Washington, and
then used in the state of Washington. The use tax would also be owed if goods
are purchased from someone who is not authorized to collect sales tax (e.g.
purchases of furniture from an individual through a newspaper classified ad or
a purchase of artwork from an individual collector), or if personal property is
acquired with the purchase of real property.
[93] Use Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue
(Exhibit USA-19).
[94] RCW Section 82.08.975 (Exhibit
EU-25); RCW Section 82.12.975 (Exhibit EU-26); ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3),
Sections 11-12.
[95] RCW Section 82.08.975 (Exhibit
EU-25); RCW Section 82.12.975 (Exhibit EU-26); ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3),
Sections 11-12.
[96] RCW Section 82.08.980 (Exhibit
EU-27); ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section 3.
[97] RCW Section 82.08.980 (Exhibit
EU-27); RCW Section 82.12.980 (Exhibit EU-28); ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3),
Sections 3-4. The United States explains that the
"use tax is not due on construction services", which "accounts
for why the language of the statute on its face appears to have a more limited
scope when compared with the language for the exemption for the retail sales
tax". United States' first written submission, fn 118.
[98] RCW Section 82.08.980(1)(a)(ii)
(Exhibit EU‑27); RCW Section 82.12.980(1)(a)(ii) (Exhibit EU-28).
[99] See ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report (Exhibit EU-4), p. 1; RCW
Section 84.36.005 (Exhibit USA-20); United States' first written submission,
para. 46.
[100] RCW Section 84.36.010 (Exhibit USA-21). See also ESSB 5952
Final Bill Report (Exhibit EU-4), pp. 1‑2; United States' first written
submission, para. 46.
[101] Leasehold Excise Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of
Revenue (Exhibit USA-25).
[102] RCW Section 82.29A.030 (Exhibit USA-26).
[103] RCW Section 82.29A.137 (Exhibit
EU-29). Under Washington State law,
"superefficient airplane" is defined as "a twin aisle airplane
that carries between two hundred and three hundred fifty passengers, with a
range of more than seven thousand two hundred nautical miles, a cruising speed
of approximately mach .85, and that uses fifteen to twenty percent less fuel
than other similar airplanes on the market". RCW Section 82.32.550(3) (Exhibit
EU-82).
[104] RCW Section 84.36.655 (Exhibit
EU-30).
[105] RCW 82.29A.137(1) (Exhibit EU-29);
RCW 84.36.655(1) (Exhibit EU-30). These refer to
measures (f), (g), and (c), respectively, in the list in para. 7.15 above.
[106] The European Union refers to this as the "Programme-Siting
Condition". See European Union's first written submission, paras. 42-45. The
United States refers to this as the "Initial Siting Provision". United States' first written submission, paras. 74-78.
[107] The European Union refers to this as the "Exclusive-Production
Condition". European Union's first written submission, paras. 46-52. The
United States refers to this as the "Future Siting Provision". See
United States' first written submission, paras. 55-56, 79-80.
[108] See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union,
WT/DS487/2, 13 February 2015, p. 2.
[109] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section 2, codified at RCW Section
82.32.850 (Exhibit EU-58).
[110] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section 2(2)(c) and (d), codified at RCW
82.32.850(2)(c) and (d) (Exhibit EU-58).
[111] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section 2(2)(b), codified at RCW
82.32.850(2)(b) (Exhibit EU-58).
[112] Notification Letter from Carol K. Nelson, Director, Washington
State Department of Revenue, to Kyle Thiessen, Washington State Code Reviser,
10 July 2014 (Exhibit EU-61). United States' first written submission, para.
78. See para. 7.273 below
regarding the details of fulfilment of the First Siting Provision.
[113] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections
5-6(11)(e)(ii), codified at RCW 82.04.260(e)(ii) (Exhibit EU‑22).
[114] See European Union's first written submission, para. 46; United
States' first written submission, para. 56.
[115] House Bill 2294, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2767, (HB 2294) (Exhibit
EU-21).
[116] See Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 7.39.
[117] United States' response to Panel question No. 2, para. 3. See also
United States' response to Panel question Nos. 53, 54, and 58.
[118] European Union's second written submission, para. 18. See also
European Union's response to Panel question No. 6, para. 8.
[119] HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21), Sections 3-4; Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint),
paras. 7.47-7.49.
[120] HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21), Section 7; Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint),
paras. 7.51-7.52.
[121] HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21), Section 8; Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint),
paras. 7.53-7.54.
[122] HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21), Section 15; Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint),
paras. 7.55-7.56.
[123] HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21), Sections 9-12; Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint),
paras. 7.59-7.62.
[124] HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21), Sections 13-14; Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint),
paras. 7.64-7.68.
[125] HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21); ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report (Exhibit
EU-4), p. 2.
[126] House Bill 2466, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 787, (HB 2466) (Exhibit EU-35),
Section 5.
[127] HB 2466 (Exhibit EU-35), Section 4.
[128] Substitute Senate Bill 6828, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 365, (SSB 6828)
(Exhibit EU-42), Section 4.
[129] HB 2466 (Exhibit EU-35), Section 3; ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report
(Exhibit EU-4), p. 2; United States' first written submission, para. 62.
[130] SSB 6828 (Exhibit EU-42), Section 7; United States' first written
submission, para. 62 (noting that this "broadened the B&O tax credit
for aerospace product development to include expenditures in developing
aerospace products, such as machinery for maintaining and repairing commercial
airplanes and tooling equipment").
[131] See HB 2466 (Exhibit EU-35), Section 10.
[132] Thus, the currently codified provisions of these exemptions omit
the limitation to manufacturers or processors for hire of commercial airplanes
or components of such airplanes that originally existed under HB 2294. See HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21),
Sections 9-10; ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections 11-12.
[133] See HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21),
Sections 11-12; ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections 3-4.
[134] Letter from Boeing to Carol K. Nelson, Director, Washington State
Department of Revenue, regarding decision to site 777X programme, 9 July 2014 (Exhibit
USA-32) (BCI).
[135] Letter from the Director of the Washington State Department of
Revenue to the Code Reviser, 10 July 2014 (Exhibit EU-61).
[136] United States' first written submission, para. 56.
[137] See Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the
European Union – Note by the Secretariat, WT/DS487/3, 23 April 2015.
[138] The Panel notes that the United States has focused upon the enacted
results of ESSB 5952, rather than the legislative bill itself, stating that
"ESSB 5952 is not itself a measure challenged by the EU." United
States' first written submission, fn 99. As further explained by the United
States, "provisions of legislation like HB 2294 or ESSB 5952 operate as
law to the extent they are codified in the RCW, and any provision so codified
will continue to do so until it is amended, rescinded, or expires." United
States' comments the European Union's response to Panel question No. 54, para.
10.
[139] In this connection, RCW Section 1.04.020 states that "[a]ny
section of the Revised Code of Washington … expressly amended by the
legislature, including the entire context set out, shall, as so amended,
constitute the law and the ultimate declaration of legislative intent." RCW Section 1.04.020 in
Chapter 1.04 RCW (Exhibit USA-63).
[140] European Union's first written submission, para. 53; second written
submission, para. 9; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.
15; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 12.
[141] European Union's response to Panel question No. 23, para. 45
(quoting Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 7.151). See also European Union's
second written submission, para. 34.
[142] See European Union's second written submission, para. 21; opening
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 15-16.
[143] European Union's first written submission, paras. 67-68; second
written submission, paras. 36-37; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 35; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 23.
[144] United States' first written submission, para. 94-99.
[145] United States' second written submission, para. 86. (emphasis
original) The United States further submits that the European Union's legal
arguments do not overcome "the implication of the present tense drafting
of Article 1.1(a)(ii)". United States' second written submission, para. 87.
[146] United States' second written submission, para. 88.
[147] United States' second written submission, para. 89.
[148] United States' response to Panel question No. 22, para. 53.
[149] United States' second written submission, para. 93.
[150] Australia's response to Panel question No. 1.
[152] Australia's response to Panel question No. 2.
[153] Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para.
90.
[154] Ibid. The Appellate Body further noted that a "WTO Member, in
principle, has the sovereign authority to tax any particular categories of
revenue it wishes" and that "[w]hat is 'otherwise due', therefore,
depends on the rules of taxation that each Member, by its own choice,
establishes for itself."
[155] Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 –
EC), para. 90.
[156] Ibid. para. 91. (emphasis original)
[158] See Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), paras. 810-812.
[165] United
States' response to Panel question Nos. 2 and 21; second written submission, paras.
85-92.
[166] European Union's response to Panel question Nos. 6 and 21.
[167] The Panel notes that the United States does not categorically
reject the possibility that a financial contribution may occur in the future.
[168] This is consistent with the Appellate Body's characterization of a
government having "given up an entitlement to raise revenue that it could
'otherwise' have raised". Appellate Body Report, US – FSC,
para. 90.
[169] See, e.g. Panel Report, US – FSC,
paras. 7.98-7.101. In that dispute, the panel examined the "FSC
scheme" as a whole, and noted inter
alia that for any given fiscal year, a corporation was free to elect
whether or not to have the status of a FSC. Thus, it was the existence and
operation of the scheme itself, which was of indefinite duration under the US
tax laws, that gave rise to the finding of revenue foregone, rather than
individual instances of application of the scheme by particular corporations,
or instances of application of the scheme during any particular
period. This aspect of the panel report was not appealed.
[170] See United States' second written submission, para. 86 ("By
virtue of the present tense verb 'is', this provision covers revenue foregone
or not collected in the present. Thus, Article
1.1(a)(1)(ii) deals with tax liabilities that exist in the present, and
government actions with respect to those liabilities."). (emphasis added)
[171] European Union's response to Panel question No. 6, para. 7.
[172] See para. 7.41
above.
[173] RCW Section 82.04.260(11) (Exhibit
EU-22).
[174] RCW Section 82.04.260(11)(a)
(Exhibit EU-22). Under
Washington State law, the term "commercial airplane" "has its
ordinary meaning, which is an airplane certified by the federal aviation
administration for transporting persons or property, and any military
derivative of such an airplane". RCW Section 82.32.550(1) (Exhibit EU-82).
Further, the term "component" "means a part or system certified
by the federal aviation administration for installation or assembly into a
commercial airplane". RCW Section 82.32.550(2) (Exhibit EU‑82).
[175] RCW Section 82.04.260(11)(b)
(Exhibit EU-22).
[176] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections
5-6; RCW 82.04.260(11)(a) (Exhibit EU-22).
[177] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections
5-6.
[178] RCW Section 82.04.260(11) (Exhibit
EU-22).
[179] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 812.
[180] ESSB 5952
(Exhibit EU-3), p. 2. (emphasis added)
[181] Ibid. (emphasis added)
[182] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
1(1) and (3).
[183] ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report (Exhibit EU-4), p. 3.
[184] HB 2294 (Exhibit EU-21), Section 1. (emphasis added) See also SSB
6828 (Exhibit EU-42), Section 1.
[185] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 813.
[186] See European Union's response to Panel question No. 24, para. 48; first
written submission, paras. 17-21, 59.
[187] United States' response to Panel question No. 56, para. 20.
[188] United States' second written submission, para. 92.
[189] RCW Section 82.04.220(1) (Exhibit EU-32). See also United States' first
written submission, paras. 39-41. As further explained by the Washington State Department of Revenue,
"Washington, unlike many other states, does not have an income tax.
Washington's B&O tax is calculated on the gross income from activities.
This means there are no deductions from the B&O tax for labor, materials,
taxes, or other costs of doing business." Business & Occupation Tax
Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit EU-33). See
also ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report (Exhibit EU-4), p. 1.
[190] Question: What are the major B&O tax classifications?,
Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-11); United States' first
written submission, para. 41.
[191] RCW Section 82.04.240 (Exhibit EU-36). Further, the "value of
products, including by-products, extracted or manufactured shall be determined
by the gross proceeds derived from the sale thereof whether such sale is at
wholesale or at retail". RCW Section 82.04.450(1) (Exhibit EU-37).
[192] RCW Section 82.04.270 (Exhibit EU-39). Further, the "'[g]ross proceeds of
sales' means the value proceeding or accruing from the sale of tangible
personal property, digital goods, digital codes, digital automated services,
and/or for other services rendered, without any deduction on account of the
cost of property sold, the cost of materials used, labor costs, interest,
discount paid, delivery costs, taxes, or any other expense whatsoever paid or
accrued and without any deduction on account of losses." RCW Section 82.04.070
(Exhibit EU-40).
[193] RCW Section 82.04.250 (Exhibit
EU-38).
[194] See Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para.
90.
[195] ESSB 5952 Final Bill Report
(Exhibit EU-4), p. 1. (emphasis added)
[196] ESSB 5952 Fiscal Note (Exhibit
EU-5), p. 2. (emphasis added)
[197] WAC Section 458-20-136(5) (Exhibit USA-41).
[198] 2016 Tax
Exemption Study, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit EU-95), Appendix
B, p. B-1.
[199] United States' first written submission, para. 41 (citing Panel
Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint),
para. 7.98).
[200] United States' Response to Panel question No. 56, para. 20.
[201] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 829.
[203] For example, the RCW provisions codifying the B&O aerospace tax
rate include special B&O tax rates for other businesses, including inter alia the manufacturing of seafood and dairy products,
as well as the manufacturing and wholesaling of "fruits or vegetables by
canning, preserving, freezing, processing, or dehydrating fresh fruits or
vegetables". See RCW Section 82.04.260(1) (Exhibit EU-22).
[204] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section 1(3).
[205] RCW Section 82.04.440(4) (Exhibit USA-31). See also WAC Section
458-20-19301(3) (Exhibit EU‑41) (explaining that "[t]his integrated
tax credits system is intended to assure that gross receipts from sales or the
value of products determined by such gross receipts are taxed only one time,
whether the activities occur entirely within this state or both within and
outside this state").
[206] See Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 813.
[207] United States' second written submission, para. 92.
[208] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815.
[209] Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para. 91.
[210] Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), fn 66.
[211] RCW Section 82.04.4461 (Exhibit
EU-23).
[212] RCW Section 82.04.4461(2) (Exhibit
EU-23).
[213] RCW Section 82.04.4461(5)(b)
(Exhibit EU-23).
[214] RCW Section 82.08.975(3)(a)
(Exhibit EU-25). Under
Washington State law, the term "commercial airplane" "has its
ordinary meaning, which is an airplane certified by the federal aviation
administration for transporting persons or property, and any military
derivative of such an airplane". RCW Section 82.32.550(1) (Exhibit EU-82).
Further, the term "component" "means a part or system certified
by the federal aviation administration for installation or assembly into a
commercial airplane". RCW Section 82.32.550(2) (Exhibit EU‑82).
[215] RCW Section 82.04.4461(5)(b)
(Exhibit EU-23). United States' first written
submission, para. 60.
[216] RCW Section 82.04.4461(5)(d)
(Exhibit EU-23).
[217] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
9.
[218] See para. 7.65 above.
[219] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 813.
[220] See European Union's response to Panel question No. 24, para. 48; first
written submission, paras. 22-24, 62-63.
[221] The United States' response to Panel question No. 57, para. 23
(citing Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815).
[222] See also Tax Classifications for Common Business Activities,
Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit EU-62).
[223] More specifically, the B&O tax liability "is measured by
the application of rates against the value of products, gross proceeds of
sales, or gross income of the business, as the case may be". RCW Section 82.04.220(1)
(Exhibit EU-32).
[224] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815.
[226] See United States' response to Panel question No. 57.
[227] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 823. (emphasis original) See also
European Union's comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 57,
para. 15.
[228] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815. See also United States'
response to Panel question No. 57.
[229] RCW Section
82.04.4463 (Exhibit EU-24). The B&O tax credit for
property and leasehold excise taxes contains further provisions on the calculation
of the credit for property taxes paid on certain machinery and equipment, as
well as certain computer hardware, computer peripherals, and software. See RCW Section 82.04.4463(2)(b) (Exhibit EU-24).
[230] RCW Section
82.04.4463(1) (Exhibit EU-24).
[231] RCW Section
82.04.4463(2)(a)(i)(A) and (B) (Exhibit EU-24). Under Washington State law, the term
"commercial airplane" "has its ordinary meaning, which is an
airplane certified by the federal aviation administration for transporting
persons or property, and any military derivative of such an airplane". RCW
Section 82.32.550(1) (Exhibit EU-82). Further, the term "component"
"means a part or system certified by the federal aviation administration
for installation or assembly into a commercial airplane". RCW Section 82.32.550(2)
(Exhibit EU‑82).
[232] RCW Section 82.04.4463(2)(a)(i)(C)
(Exhibit EU-24).
[233] RCW Section 82.04.4463(2)(a)(ii)
(Exhibit EU-24).
[234] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section 10.
[235] See description of these taxes in paras. 7.25-7.26 above.
[236] United States' response to Panel question No. 9, para. 18.
[238] See para. 7.65 above.
[239] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 813.
[240] See European Union's response to Panel question No. 24, para. 48; first
written submission, paras. 22-24, 62-63.
[241] The United States' response to Panel question No. 57, para. 23
(citing Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815).
[242] See also Tax Classifications for Common Business Activities,
Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit EU-62).
[243] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815.
[244] Ibid. See also United States' response to Panel question No. 57.
[245] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 823. (emphasis original) See also
European Union's comments on the United States' response to Panel question No. 57,
para. 15.
[246] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815. See also United States'
response to Panel question No. 57.
[247] RCW Section 82.08.975 (Exhibit
EU-25).
[248] RCW Section 82.12.975 (Exhibit
EU-26).
[249] RCW Section 82.08.020 (Exhibit
EU-92).
[250] RCW Section 82.08.975 (Exhibit
EU-25).
[251] RCW Section 82.12.975 (Exhibit
EU-26).
[252] Use Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue
(Exhibit USA-19). For example, the use tax is owed if goods are purchased in
another state that does not have a sales tax or a state with a sales tax lower
than that of the state of Washington. The use tax would also be owed if good
are purchased from someone who is not authorized to collect sales tax (e.g.
purchases of furniture from an individual through a newspaper classified ad or
a purchase of artwork from an individual collector), or if personal property is
acquired with the purchase of real property.
[253] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections
11-12.
[254] See para. 7.65 above.
[255] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 813.
[256] See European Union's comments on the United States' response to
Panel question No. 24, para. 50; first written submission, paras. 22-24, 62-63.
[257] The United States' response to Panel question No. 57, para. 23
(citing Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815).
[258] United States' response to Panel question No. 60, para. 31.
[259] United States' response to Panel question No. 56, para. 21.
[260] United States' first written submission, para. 42; Retail
Sales Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-12).
[261] RCW Section 82.08.020 (Exhibit
EU-92); United States' first written submission, para. 42; Retail
Sales Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-12); Services Subject to Sales
Tax, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-13); Digital Products
including Digital Goods, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-14).
[263] United States' first written submission, para. 43.
[264] RCW Section 82.12.020 (Exhibit
USA-17); RCW Section 82.12.035 (Exhibit USA-18).
[265] Use Tax
Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-19).
[268] See Table of Contents for RCW Chapter 82.08 (Exhibit USA-64); Retail
Sales Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-12)
(listing "common exemptions" that include food, prescription drugs,
sales to nonresidents, federal government sales, interstate and foreign sales,
manufacturers' machinery and equipment, sales to Indians or Indian tribes, and
newspapers); 2016 Tax
Exemption Study, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit EU-95), Appendix
B; United States' response to Panel question
No. 25, para. 55 (providing as examples motor vehicles and brokered natural
gas).
[269] See parties' responses and comments on each other's responses to
Panel question No. 60.
[270] 2016 Tax
Exemption Study, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-65), Introduction
and Summary of Findings.
[272] United
States' response to Panel question No. 56, para. 21.
[273] 2016 Tax Exemption Study, Washington State Department of Revenue
(Exhibit EU-95), Appendix B.
[274] Specifically, the United States uses a fraction based on
"taxpayer savings from exemptions", whereas the European Union uses a
fraction based on "state potential revenue gains" – these figures
form the numerator of the fraction to represent the value of the exemption, and
both parties add "forecasted tax revenues" of the particular tax to
the chosen exemption value to form the denominator. The difference between
taxpayer savings, on the one hand, and potential revenue gains from a full
repeal, on the other hand, is that repeal of a given exemption does not
automatically mean the tax can be collected due to other reasons within the
Washington State tax system. See 2016 Tax Exemption Study, Washington State Department of Revenue
(Exhibit USA-65), Introduction and Summary of Findings, p. 1-3.
[275] See Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 824.
[276] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 813.
[277] RCW Section 82.08.980 (Exhibit EU-27).
[278] RCW Section 82.12.980 (Exhibit
EU-28).
[279] RCW Section 82.08.020 (Exhibit EU-92).
[280] RCW Section 82.08.980 (Exhibit
EU-27). A similar
exemption is applied for charges, for labor and services for constructing new
buildings, made to "a port district, political
subdivision, or municipal corporation, to be leased to a manufacturer engaged
in the manufacturing of commercial airplanes or the fuselages or wings of
commercial airplanes".
[281] RCW Section
82.12.980 (Exhibit EU-28). A similar exemption is
applied to tangible property used in constructing new buildings for "a
port district, political subdivision, or municipal corporation, to be leased to
a manufacturer engaged in the manufacturing of commercial airplanes or the
fuselages or wings of commercial airplanes".
[282] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Sections
3-4.
[283] See para. 7.65 above.
[284] RCW Section 82.29A.137 (Exhibit
EU-29).
[285] Leasehold Excise Tax, Washington State Department of Revenue
(Exhibit EU-49).
[286] WAC Section 458-29A-100 (Exhibit
EU-50).
[287] Under
Washington State law, "superefficient airplane" is defined as "a
twin aisle airplane that carries between two hundred and three hundred fifty
passengers, with a range of more than seven thousand two hundred nautical
miles, a cruising speed of approximately mach .85, and that uses fifteen to
twenty percent less fuel than other similar airplanes on the market". RCW Section 82.32.550(3)
(Exhibit EU-82).
[288] RCW Section 82.29A.137 (Exhibit
EU-29).
[289] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section 13; RCW Section
82.29A.137 (Exhibit EU-29).
[290] See para. 7.65 above.
[291] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 813.
[292] European Union's response to Panel question No. 24, para. 51.
[293] United States' response to Panel question No. 57, para. 23 (citing
Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815).
[294] United States' response to Panel question No. 60, para. 31.
[296] RCW Section 84.36.005 (Exhibit USA-20).
[297] United States' first written submission, para. 46.
[298] RCW Section 84.36.010 (Exhibit
USA-21); RCW Section 84.36.020 (Exhibit USA-22); RCW Section 84.36.477
(Exhibit USA-23).
[299] Real and personal property are chiefly
distinguished by the characteristic of mobility, with the former including
"land, structures, improvements to land, and certain equipment affixed to land
or structures", and the latter including "machinery, equipment, furniture,
and supplies of businesses and farmers". Personal
Property Tax, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit EU-51).
[300] See parties' responses and comments on each other's responses to
Panel question No. 60. See also paras. 7.123-7.125 above.
The Panel notes that the parties relied upon the same tax exemption study in
respect of exemptions from property taxation as that cited in respect of
exemptions from retail sales and use taxes.
[301] Leasehold
Excise Tax Explanation, Washington State Department of Revenue (Exhibit USA-25); WAC Section 458-29A-100
(Exhibit EU-50).
[302] RCW Section 84.36.655 (Exhibit
EU-30).
[303] Ibid. Under Washington
State law, "superefficient airplane" is defined as "a twin aisle
airplane that carries between two hundred and three hundred fifty passengers,
with a range of more than seven thousand two hundred nautical miles, a cruising
speed of approximately mach .85, and that uses fifteen to twenty percent less
fuel than other similar airplanes on the market". RCW Section 82.32.550(3) (Exhibit
EU-82).
[304] RCW Section 84.36.655 (Exhibit
EU-30).
[305] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
14.
[306] See para. 7.65 above.
[307] Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 813.
[308] European Union's response to Panel question No. 24, para. 51.
[309] United States' response to Panel question No. 57, para. 23 (citing
Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 815).
[310] United States' response to Panel question No. 60, para. 31.
[312] RCW Section 84.36.005 (Exhibit
USA-20).
[313] United
States' first written submission, para. 46; RCW Section 84.36.010 (Exhibit USA-21); RCW
Section 84.36.020 (Exhibit USA-22); RCW Section 84.36.020 (Exhibit USA-23).
[314] United
States' response to Panel question No. 2.
[315] See para. 7.42 above.
[316] European Union's response to Panel question No. 6, para. 7.
[317] See ESSB 5952 Fiscal Note (Exhibit
EU-5); Snohomish County Council Lease Approval (Exhibit EU‑44); Paine Field Community Council, Minutes of Meeting of 12 November
2013 (Exhibit EU-45); The
Seattle Times, "State gave Boeing a free pass on
$19.5M in sales tax", 30 November 2015 (Exhibit EU‑48); The Seattle
Times, "Boeing
must disclose tax-break savings, state Department of Revenue rules", 8
January 2016 (Exhibit EU-121).
[318] In the view of the United States, "where a Member challenges the alleged grant of
a subsidy to a particular recipient of an alleged subsidy, that Member normally
must establish actual receipt of that subsidy. That may not be the case where a
Member asserts 'that a financial contribution exists in the abstract', which
the EU has now clarified is its argument in this proceeding." United States' second written submission, para. 85.
[319] See, e.g. United States' response to Panel question No. 2, para. 4.
[320] In this connection, the Panel's conclusions are not impacted by the
fact that the alleged contingency of using domestic over imported goods does
not apply to all potential beneficiaries of the subsidies at issue. The
provision of subsidies to a range of beneficiaries based on a contingency applicable
to only one or some of those beneficiaries may still be found inconsistent with
the disciplines of the SCM Agreement, provided that: (i) a subsidy exists
within the meaning of Article 1; and (ii) the availability of any such subsidy,
to whichever recipient or beneficiary, is contingent in the manner set out in
Article 3. These provisions do not require any strict identity of subsidy
recipients and entities subject to the contingency in question. The Panel is
therefore unpersuaded by the United States' contention that the applicability
of ESSB 5952's contingencies to only one potential recipient of subsidies
"disproves the EU's claims that the alleged subsidies are 'as such'
contingent on the use of domestic over imported fuselages and wings". See
United States' response to Panel question No. 59, para. 25. Accordingly, the
Panel assesses in this section the criteria for determining the existence of a
subsidy, and separately will consider whether, as a condition for access to any
such subsidy, there is a requirement to use domestic over imported goods.
[321] Appellate Body Report, Brazil –
Aircraft, para. 157. (emphasis omitted)
[322] Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 153 (citing Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 9.112).
[323] Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 157.
[325] Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 7.169.
[326] See Panel Reports, US – FSC, para.
7.103; US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 8.46; Canada – Autos, para. 10.165.
[327] Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), para. 7.170. Accordingly, the panel found that "for those tax measures that
it has found to constitute a financial contribution, a benefit is
conferred". Ibid. para. 7.171.
[329] See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 154.
[330] The Appellate Body has stated that "the second element in
Article 1.1. is concerned with the 'benefit … conferred' on the recipient by [the] governmental action" of making a
financial contribution, and that a "'benefit' does not exist in the
abstract, but must be received and enjoyed by a beneficiary or a
recipient". The Appellate Body further considered that "[l]ogically, a
'benefit' can be said to arise only if a person, natural or legal, or a group
of persons, has in fact received something". Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, paras. 154 and 156. (emphasis
original)
The Panel notes
that these statements were made in the context of rejecting a specific argument
"that 'cost to government' is one way of conceiving of 'benefit'". Ibid.
para. 154. The Appellate Body considered this approach to be "at odds with
the ordinary meaning of Article 1.1(b), which focuses on the recipient and not on the government
providing the 'financial contribution'". Ibid. (emphasis original) The Appellate Body was not addressing the particular factual
circumstance of the actual use of a financial contribution (such as a tax
incentive) by particular entities, nor did it address the potential relevance
in this regard of alleged subsidies being challenged "as such".
Rather, in response to particular arguments before it, the Appellate Body was emphasising
the focus on beneficiaries, as distinct from
the provider, of a given financial
contribution in the conceptually distinct analysis of whether a benefit is
conferred by that financial contribution.
[331] Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton,
paras. 7.1116 and 7.1118. See also Panel Reports, EC and
certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 7.1501 (finding
that "to the extent that Airbus received a funding grant in the form of an
actual 'direct transfer of funds' from the various entities involved, it was
automatically placed in a better position than it would otherwise have been in
without the grant", and that such funding grants therefore conferred a
"benefit"); US – Large Civil Aircraft
(2nd complaint), paras. 7.1228-7.1229 (in relation to
payments that were not disputed to "constitute a financial contribution in
the form of a direct transfer of funds", finding that such payments confer
a "benefit" under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement as such
payments would not be made by any "private entity acting pursuant to
commercial considerations") and 7.1362-7.1363.
[332] SCM Agreement, Article 1.2.
[333] European Union's second written submission, para. 40.
[334] European Union's response to Panel question No. 6, para. 11.
[335] European Union's second written submission, paras. 1, 2, 41 and 90;
closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 1; opening statement
at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 2; response to Panel question
Nos. 29 and 46, paras. 67 and 125. See also Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the European Union, WT/DS487/2, 13 February 2015,
p. 2.
[336] European Union's second written submission, paras. 1 and 90;
opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 2. See also Request
for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union, WT/DS487/2, 13 February
2015, p. 2.
[337] European Union's first written submission, para. 72; second written
submission, para. 44; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 47; response to Panel question Nos. 18 and 30, paras. 23‑26 and
68-69.
[338] European Union's first written submission, paras. 70 and 73; second
written submission, paras. 1, 41 and 60; opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, para. 6; response to Panel question No. 41, para. 98.
[339] European Union's response to Panel question No. 43, para. 101.
[340] European Union's first written submission, paras. 44 and 74; second
written submission, para. 61; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 53-54; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.
3.
[341] European Union's first written submission, paras. 47, 51-52 and 75;
second written submission, para. 61; opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, paras. 55-56; response to Panel question No. 7, para. 12.
[342] European Union's second written submission, paras. 65-75.
[343] European Union's second written submission, paras. 65 and 76-81;
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 60-61; response to
Panel question No. 45, para. 119.
[344] European Union's second written submission, paras. 65 and 82-84;
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 61; response to
Panel question No. 7, para. 12.
[345] European Union's second written submission, para. 41.
[346] European Union's first written submission, para. 77; second written
submission, para. 90. See also European Union's second written submission,
para. 91; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 72-73;
response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 66-67; Reuters, "Boeing seen in advanced talks
to make 777X near Seattle", 4 November 2013 (Exhibit
EU-65).
[347] European Union's first written submission, para. 77; opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 6 and 70-74; response to
Panel question Nos. 31 and 41, paras. 70-71 and 98.
[348] European Union's second written submission, para. 90. See also
ibid, para. 91; European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 73; response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 66‑67; Reuters, "Boeing seen in
advanced talks to make 777X near Seattle", 4 November 2013 (Exhibit EU-65).
[349] United States' second written submission, paras. 1-3.
[350] United States' first written submission, para. 104; second written
submission, paras. 10-14.
[351] United States' second written submission, paras. 11, 17 and 34.
[352] United States' second written submission, paras. 29-34 and 36;
response to Panel question No. 18, paras. 37-43.
[353] United States' first written submission, paras. 37 and 105; second
written submission, paras. 35 and 54-56; response to Panel question No.
44, para. 104.
[354] United States' first written submission, para. 105; response to
Panel question Nos. 34, 35 and 42, paras. 79, 81-82, 102 and 110-115.
[355] United States' second written submission, paras. 10-11, 15-16, 37
and 51.
[356] United States' second written submission, para. 58. See also ibid.
paras. 60-62; United States' response to Panel question No. 33, para. 74.
[357] United States' first written submission, para. 3. See also ibid.
paras. 73, 101, 105-107 and 109.
[358] United States' first written submission, paras. 73 and 101; second
written submission, paras. 38-47 and 57.
[359] United States' second written submission, para. 51; response to
Panel question No. 18, para. 43.
[360] United States' second written submission, paras. 24, 48-50, 57, 64,
68 and 84.
[362] Ibid. paras. 78-83.
[363] Ibid. paras. 59-63.
[364] Ibid. paras. 64-71 and 84.
[365] United States' first written submission, paras. 105 and 132-140;
second written submission, paras. 72-74; response to Panel question No.
30, paras. 65-67.
[366] United States' second written submission, paras. 75-77.
[368] United States' second written submission, para. 52; response to Panel
question No. 44, paras. 104‑108.
[369] United States' second written submission, para. 52.
[370] United States' first written submission, paras. 116-124; second
written submission, para. 20.
[371] Australia's third-party submission, paras. 10 and 21; third-party statement,
paras. 10-12; response to Panel question No. 5.
[372] Australia's response to Panel question No. 5.
[373] Australia's third-party submission, paras. 11-13.
[374] Australia's third-party statement, para. 6.
[377] Australia's response to Panel question No. 4.
[378] Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 7-8. See also Brazil's response
to Panel question No. 5.
[379] Brazil's response to Panel question No. 5.
[380] Brazil's third-party submission, para. 9; third-party statement,
para. 7.
[381] Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 10-14; third-party
statement, paras. 6 and 9.
[382] Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 16; third-party statement,
para. 10.
[383] Brazil's third-party submission, para. 17.
[384] Brazil's response to Panel question No. 12. See also Brazil's response
to Panel question No. 14.
[385] Brazil's third-party submission, paras. 18; third-party statement,
para. 11.
[386] Brazil's third-party submission, para. 19.
[387] Canada's third-party submission, para. 3.
[394] Ibid. paras. 8 and 11.
[395] China's third-party submission, para. 18.
[396] China's third-party statement, para. 3.
[397] China's third-party submission, para. 21; third-party statement,
para. 3; response to Panel question No. 4.
[398] China's third-party statement, para. 4.
[399] China's third-party submission, para. 23.
[400] China's third-party submission, para. 25; third-party statement,
para. 5. See also China's response to Panel question Nos. 5 and 15.
[401] China's third-party submission, para. 28; third-party statement,
para. 7; response to Panel question No. 5.
[402] China's third-party submission, paras. 29-30; third-party
statement, para. 8; response to Panel question No. 5.
[403] China's third-party submission, paras. 32-33.
[404] Japan's third-party submission, paras. 2-8; third-party statement,
paras. 3-5.
[405] Japan's third-party submission, paras. 2 and 11-21; third-party
statement, paras. 6-11.
[406] Japan's response to Panel question No. 5.
[407] Japan's third-party submission, para. 12.
[408] Japan's third-party submission, para. 22; third-party statement,
para. 13.
[409] Japan's third-party statement, para. 14.
[410] Japan's third-party submission, paras. 27-28; third-party
statement, para. 12.
[411] European Union's second written submission, para. 2. See also ibid.
paras. 41, 85 and 90; European Union's closing statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, paras. 1 and 11; response to Panel question No. 29,
para. 67.
[412] See para. 7.274
below.
[413] See para. 7.329
below.
[414] Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1054.
[415] The Appellate Body has
explained that "the granting of a subsidy is not, in and of itself,
prohibited under the SCM Agreement.
Nor does granting a 'subsidy', without more, constitute an inconsistency with
that Agreement. The universe of subsidies is vast. Not all subsidies are
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.
The only 'prohibited' subsidies are those identified in Article 3 of the SCM Agreement". Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil), para. 47.
[416] Panel Report, Brazil – Aircraft,
para. 7.26.
[417] See, for example, United States' first written submission, paras. 9 and 116-123; second written submission, paras. 9, 20 and 47; opening statement at the
first meeting of the Panel, para. 19; opening statement at the second meeting
of the Panel, para. 16.
[418] (footnote original) United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, BISD 36S/345, para. 5.10.
[419] (footnote original) United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, BISD 34S/136, para. 5.1.9; Japan – Customs Duties,
Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, BISD
34S/83, para. 5.5(b).
[420] Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II, p. 16, DSR 1996:I, 97, at p. 109.
[421] See Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos,
para. 14.33.
[422] Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos,
para. 123.
[423] Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 166.
[424] Panel Report, Australia – Automotive
Leather II, para. 9.55.
[425] Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos,
para. 123.
[427] Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 167. See
also Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Autos,
para. 123; EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Aircraft, para. 1038.
[428] Appellate
Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 123.
See also ibid. para. 100; and Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para.
1038.
[429] Appellate
Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 100. See also Panel Report, Canada – Aircraft Credits
and Guarantees, para. 7.365 and Panel Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), paras. 8.54-8.56.
[430] Appellate
Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Aircraft, para. 1038.
[431] Appellate
Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para. 167.
See also Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Autos,
para. 123; EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Aircraft, para. 1038.
[432] Appellate
Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Aircraft, para. 1045.
[433] (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Aircraft, para. 167. (original emphasis)
[434] Appellate
Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Aircraft, para. 1046.
[435] (footnote original) For example, in the context of a discrimination
claim under Article III of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body found
that "[i]t is not necessary for a panel to sort through the many reasons
legislators and regulators often have for what they do and weigh the relative
significance of those reasons to establish legislative or regulatory intent."
(Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II, p. 27, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 119) Moreover,
"there may well be a certain degree of speculation in seeking to establish
the intent of a government in the abstract." (Panel Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), para. 7.104)
[436] (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US – Offset
Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 259. (emphasis added) See also Appellate
Body Report, China – Auto Parts, para. 178,
where the Appellate Body found that the intent, stated or otherwise, of the
legislators is not conclusive as to the characterization of a measure.
[437] Appellate
Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil
Aircraft, para. 1050.
[438] European Union's response to Panel question No. 32, para. 72;
United States' second written submission, para. 25; United States' response to
Panel question No. 32, para. 68. See also Japan's third-party submission, fn 5;
Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 5th
edition, Volume 2, p. 2044 (Exhibit USA-15); and Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 6th
edition, pp. 2044-2045 (Exhibit USA-51).
[439] United States' second written submission, para. 25; response to
Panel question No. 32, para. 68. See also European Union's second written
submission, para. 52.
[440] (footnote
original) See, e.g., Canada – Renewable Energy (AB), para. 5.6.
[441] United States' response to Panel question No. 32, para. 68. See
also United States' second written submission, para. 25.
[442] European Union's response to Panel question No. 32, para. 77;
second written submission, para. 51.
[443] European Union's response to Panel question No. 32, paras. 73-76.
[444] European Union's response to Panel question No. 32, para. 77; second
written submission, paras. 50-51.
[445] European Union's second written submission, para. 52.
[446] United States' second written submission, para. 28.
[447] "Over", 11, Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 6th edition (2007), Vol. 2, p. 2048.
[448] This is also the meaning that best reconciles the language used in
the three authentic versions of the SCM Agreement. The French text of Article 3.1(b) reads: "subventions
subordonnées … à l'utilisation de produits nationaux de
préférence à des produits importés". The Spanish
text reads: "las subvenciones supeditadas al empleo de productos
nacionales con preferencia a los importados…" (emphasis
added)
[449] United States' response to Panel question No. 44, para. 104.
[450] Ibid. para. 105. Footnote 61 of the SCM Agreement provides as
follows: "Inputs
consumed in the production process are inputs physically incorporated, energy,
fuels and oil used in the production process
and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their use
to obtain the exported product." (emphasis added)
[451] United States' first written submission, paras. 110-115; second
written submission, paras. 52-55; opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 8-10; United States' response to Panel question No. 44,
para. 108.
[452] European Union's opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, para. 30.
[453] European Union's response to Panel question No. 44, para. 102.
[454] Appellate
Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para.
4.374 and fn 1009. See also European Union's
response to Panel question No. 44, paras. 103-105.
[455] Appellate
Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para.
4.374.
[456] See, for example, fn 29 to Article 8.2 of the SCM Agreement ("the translation of industrial research findings into a plan, blueprint
or design for new, modified or improved products, processes or services whether
intended for sale or use…");
item (d) of Annex I to the SCM Agreement ("[t]he provision by governments or their agencies … of imported
or domestic products or services for use in the
production of exported goods…"); item (h) of Annex I to the
SCM Agreement ("[t]he
exemption, remission or deferral of prior‑stage cumulative indirect taxes on
goods or services used in the production of
exported products…"); para. II.3 of Annex II to the SCM
Agreement ("[i]nvestigating
authorities should treat inputs as physically incorporated if such inputs are used in the production process and are physically present in
the product exported…"); Article III:1 of the GATT 1994 ("internal
taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements
affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use of products, and internal
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions…");
para. 1(a) of the Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
("the purchase or use by an
enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source…");
para. 2 of the Annex to the Agreement on Civil Aircraft ("the products
covered by the descriptions listed below … shall be accorded duty-free or
duty-exempt treatment, if such products are for use
in civil aircraft or ground flying trainers and for incorporation therein, in
the course of their manufacture, repair, maintenance, rebuilding, modification
or conversion…"). (emphasis added)
[457] United States' first written submission, paras. 105 and 125-128;
second written submission, paras. 22-23.
[458] United States' first written submission, para. 126 (citing
Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV,
para. 58 & fn 43, which in turn cites The New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. I,
p. 1116).
[459] United States' first written submission, para. 126 (citing Le Nouveau
Petit Robert, 2009, pp. 2034‑2035 (Exhibit USA-28) and Diccionario de la Lengua Española, 2001, pp. 1839-1840
(Exhibit USA-29)).
[460] United States' first written submission, para. 126 (citing
Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV,
para. 62). See also United States' second written submission, para. 22.
[461] United States' first written submission, para. 128.
[462] European Union's second written submission, para. 46.
[464] Ibid. (citing Panel Reports, Korea — Alcoholic
Beverages, para. 10.81; Colombia — Ports of Entry,
para. 7.356; US — Poultry (China), paras.
7.424–7.427 and 7.429; and Indonesia — Autos,
para. 14.113; and Appellate Body Report, Canada — Periodicals,
pp. 20‑21, DSR 1997:I, 449, 466-467. See also European Union's response to
Panel question No. 33, para. 85.
[465] European Union's second written submission, para. 49 (citing
Japan's response to Panel question No. 4, para. 4).
[466] European Union's second written submission, para. 46; opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 47-48.
[467] European Union's second written submission, para. 46; closing
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 9.
[468] See, for example, Appellate Body Reports, Japan –
Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 16, DSR 1996:I, 97, at
pp. 109-110; Korea – Alcoholic Beverages,
paras. 119-120.
[469] European Union's second written submission, para. 60.
[471] See para. 7.39 above.
[472] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit
EU-3), Section 2, codified at RCW Section 82.32.850 (Exhibit EU-58). See also European Union's comments on United States' response to Panel
question No. 53, para. 7.
[473] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
2, codified at RCW Section 82.32.850 (Exhibit EU-58).
[474] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3).
[475] Ibid. Section
2(2)(c) and (d), codified at RCW Section 82.32.850(2)(c) and (d) (Exhibit
EU-58).
[476] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit
EU-3), Section 2(2)(b), codified at RCW Section 82.32.850(2)(b) (Exhibit EU‑58).
[477] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit
EU-3), Section 2, codified at RCW Section 82.32.850 (Exhibit EU-58).
[478] The Second Siting Provision concerns paragraph 11 of Sections 5 and
6 of ESSB 5952, which refers to the 0.2904% B&O tax rate applicable to persons
"engaging within the [state of Washington] in the
business of manufacturing commercial airplanes, or components of such
airplanes, or making sales, at retail or wholesale, of commercial airplanes or
components of such airplanes, manufactured by the seller". See ESSB 5952
(Exhibit EU-3) , Sections 5 and 6. See also United
States' first written submission, paras. 79-80; response to Panel
question No. 53(b), para. 16.
[479] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit
EU-3), Sections 5 and 6, codified at RCW Section 82.32.850(11)(e)(ii)
(Exhibit EU-22).
[480] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit
EU-3), Sections 5 and 6, codified at RCW Section 82.32.850(11)(e)(ii)
(Exhibit EU-22).
[481] United States' first written submission, para. 78.
[482] See RCW Section 82.04.120 (Exhibit USA-37). The provision additionally lists activities
included in this definition such as inter alia
"[t]he production or fabrication of special made or custom made
articles".
[483] United States' response to Panel question No. 14, para. 28.
[485] See Supreme Court of
Washington, Citizens Alliance for Property Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County
et al. (2015) (Exhibit USA-38). United States' response to Panel question No. 14,
para. 29.
[486] United States' response to Panel question No. 14, paras. 29-32.
[487] See, e.g. European Union's first written submission, paras. 74-75;
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 4; second written
submission, para. 1; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 3, 9, 32-34.
[488] See e.g. European
Union's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 9 and 31‑32; United
States' response to Panel question No. 64, para. 41.
[489] European Union's first written submission, para. 45; United States'
first written submission, paras. 2 and 78. See also Letter from the Director of
the Washington State Department of Revenue to the Code Reviser, 10 July 2014 (Exhibit EU-61).
[490] Boeing
expert statement (Exhibit USA-1) (BCI).
[491] United States' first written submission, paras. 20-24; Boeing expert statement
(Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), para. 16; Boeing 777
Backgrounder (Exhibit USA-6).
[492] See Boeing expert statement
(Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), para. 11.
[493] See ibid. para.
40.
[494] See ibid. para. 12.
[495] See Boeing expert statement
(Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), para. 12.
[497] See ibid. para. 13.
[499] See ibid. para.
42. "Make/buy" refers to the process of determining which aircraft
elements Boeing will make, and which to procure from outside suppliers. Ibid. fn 1.
[500] Boeing expert statement (Exhibit
USA-1) (BCI), para. 52(a).
[505] See Boeing expert statement
(Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), para. 14.
[507] See ibid. para. 15.
[508] United States' first written submission, para. 22; Boeing expert statement (Exhibit
USA-1) (BCI), paras. 16, 39, 43.
[509] United States' first written submission, para. 21; Boeing
777 Backgrounder (Exhibit USA-6).
[510] See Boeing expert statement
(Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), para. 42. See also United
States' first written submission, para. 32.
[511] Boeing
expert statement (Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), para. 52(h).
[512] Ibid. para.
52(i)-(k).
[513] United States' response to Panel question No. 64, para. 40.
[514] United States' response to Panel question No. 66, para. 71.
[515] United States' first written submission, para. 110.
[516] See Boeing
expert statement (Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), para. 53.
[522] See ibid. para.
52(m).
[526] See, e.g. European Union's first written submission, paras. 74-75; Reuters, "Boeing seen in advanced talks
to make 777X near Seattle", 4 November 2013 (Exhibit
EU-65).
[527] United
States' response to
Panel question No. 16, para. 34.
[530] Boeing
expert statement (Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), fn 6.
[531] United States' response to Panel question No. 64, para. 40; response to Panel question No.
73; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Boeing 787 (Exhibit USA-42); Boeing Frontiers, "Wings
Around the World", March 2006 (Exhibit USA-68); Boeing 787 customs invoice and related shipment documentation (Exhibit USA‑67) (BCI).
[532] United
States' response to
Panel question No. 16, para. 35; Boeing expert statement (Exhibit
USA-1) (BCI), para. 43 (explaining that [[BCI]] in comparison to 777X wings).
[533] See European Union's response to
Panel question No. 33, para. 79; Boeing Presentation, "Introducing the
787", September 2011 (Exhibit EU-78); Boeingblogs, "Randy's Journal: Arrivals",
22 May 2007 (Exhibit EU-79); Boeing Video, "Boeing 747
Dreamlifter", 17 January 2009 (Exhibit EU-97); Boeing Frontiers, "The
747-400 will be transformed into an even larger freighter ", June 2005 (Exhibit EU-122).
[534] United States' response to Panel
question No. 35, para. 80; Spirit AeroSystems, "Spirit celebrates completion
of first Boeing 737 MAX fuselage", (Exhibit USA-52); European Union's response
to Panel question No. 33, paras. 80-81.
[535] See European Union's response to
Panel question No. 17, paras. 18-19; Airbus, "How is an aircraft
built? Production" (Exhibit EU-84); Airbus Video, "The A350 XWB Final
Assembly Line: efficiency in motion", 23 October 2012 (Exhibit EU-87).
[536] United States' response to Panel question No. 64, para. 47.
[537] Ibid. (citing Email
from Erik Zahn, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 15 April 2016 (Exhibit USA-73) (BCI).
[538] See European
Union's response to
Panel question No. 17, para. 22; BBC Documentary, "How to Build A Super
Jumbo Wing", 24 August 2013 (Exhibit EU-91).
[539] United
States' response to
Panel question No. 64, para. 48 (citing Email from Erik
Zahn, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 15 April 2016 (Exhibit USA-73) (BCI).
[540] United
States' response to Panel question No. 64, para. 41(citing Email
from Erik Zahn, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 15 April 2016 (Exhibit USA-73) (BCI).
[541] United States' response to Panel
question No. 64, paras. 52-53.
[542] European Union's response to Panel
question No. 33, para. 83; Airbus, "How is an aircraft built? Final
assembly and tests" (Exhibit EU-86); Airbus Video, "The A350
XWB Final Assembly Line: efficiency in motion", 23 October 2012 (Exhibit EU-87);
Airbus Video, "A350 XWB final assembly: a step-by-step overview", 23
October 2012 (Exhibit EU-88); Airbus Video, "A380 from dream to reality: Final
assembly", 18 October 2007 (Exhibit EU-104).
[543] Boeing letter to the Director of the Washington State Department of
Revenue, 9 July
2014 (Exhibit USA‑32) (BCI). See also United
States' response to Panel question No. 10, paras. 20-21.
[544] Boeing letter to the Director of the Washington State Department of
Revenue, 9 July
2014 (Exhibit USA‑32) (BCI).
[546] See Letter of Understanding No. 43, Subject: 777X Work Placement,
dated 3 January 2014, in Collective Bargaining Agreement between Boeing and the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 2 November 2008,
including Contract Extension and Modification Agreements, 7 December 2011 and 3
January 2014 (Exhibit USA-33), p. 190.
[547] Boeing letter to the Director of the Washington State Department of
Revenue, 9 July
2014 (Exhibit USA‑32) (BCI).
[548] Addendum No. 14 to the 1991 Boeing Everett Mitigation Decision
Document SEPA #14-009, 27 March 2014 (Exhibit USA-34) (BCI).
[549] Addendum No. 15 to the 1991 Boeing Everett Mitigation Decision
Document SEPA #14-011 – Composite Wing Manufacturing Facility, 30 May 2014
(Exhibit USA-35) (BCI).
[550] Letter from the Director of the Washington State Department of
Revenue to the Code Reviser, 10 July 2014 (Exhibit EU-61). See
also United States' response to Panel question Nos. 10 and 12, paras. 21
and 26.
[551] United States' first written submission, para. 78 (citing letter
from the Director of the Washington State Department of Revenue to the Code
Reviser, 10 July
2014 (Exhibit EU-61)); response to Panel question No.
12, para. 26.
[552] See United States' response to Panel question No. 12, para. 26.
[553] As noted above (see paragraphs 7.209 and 7.210
above), the Appellate Body has indicated that de jure
contingency can be established explicitly by a legal instrument and "also
be derived by necessary implication from the words actually used in the measure".
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 100. See also ibid. para. 123.
[554] The meaning of the word "necessary", when referring to a
mental concept, a truth, a judgment, etc., can be understood to refer to
something "resulting inevitably from the nature of things or of the mind
itself". Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
6th edition (2007), Vol. 2, p. 1901. A necessary implication is
an implication so strong in its probability that anything to the contrary would
be unreasonable. See Black's Law Dictionary,
8th edition (2004), p. 770.
[555] See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 171. See also European Union's response to Panel question
No. 18, paras. 23-26.
[556] In the context of a de jure
analysis, such facts could include relevant context within the legislation
itself, or other clarifications of legal meaning within the domestic legal
system in question (such as the interpretation of pertinent terms by domestic
courts, or administrative regulations directly implementing the legislation). However,
any such facts would serve to illuminate the meaning of words used in the
legislation, and would not extend to other factual circumstances surrounding
the granting of the subsidy that provide the context for understanding the
measure's design, structure, and modalities of operation.
[557] European Union's first written submission, paras. 70 and 73; second
written submission, paras. 1, 2, 41, 60, and 90; opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, para. 6; closing statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 3; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 2;
response to Panel question Nos. 29, 41, 46, and 68, paras. 67, 98, 125,
and 46.
[558] European Union's response to Panel question No. 68, para. 46.
[559] (footnote original) See, European Union's first written submission,
para. 73 ("As a result of the programme-siting condition and the
exclusive-production condition, whether considered
individually or together, the Washington State tax incentives, as
amended and extended by SSB 5952, constitute subsidies that are contingent on
the use of domestic over imported goods, in violation of Articles 3.1(b) and
3.2 of the SCM Agreement". (emphasis added)).
[560] European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 6. See also European Union's response to Panel question No.
41, para. 98.
[561] European Union's response to Panel question No. 43, para. 101.
[562] (footnote original) See SSB 5952 Bill
Report, Exhibit EU-4, p. 3.
[563] European Union's first written submission, para. 44.
[564] Ibid. See also European Union's second written submission, para. 61;
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 4.
[565] (footnote original) See SSB 5952 §§ 5-6 (adding new subsection
(e)(ii) to RCW 82.04.260(11)), Exhibit EU-3.
[566] European Union's first written submission, paras. 47 and 52. See
also European Union's second written submission, para. 61.
[567] See, for example, United States' response to Panel question Nos. 18,
39, and 46, paras. 37-43, 93-94, and 121-122.
[568] The Panel notes the United States' argument that, "even under
a de jure analysis, a panel must
make sufficient findings as to how the alleged contingency operates, which may
require findings as to how the contingency applies to actual subsidy
recipients." See United States' response to Panel question No. 46,
para. 116. The United States seeks support for this statement in the
Appellate Body's analysis in Canada – Autos. The measures at issue in that case
created "value-added requirements" that de jure were company-specific and capable of variation
across the manufacturer beneficiaries. Thus, according to the explicit terms of
"the legal instruments at issue [in that dispute] and their implications
for individual manufacturers", there was a "multiplicity of
possibilities for compliance" that may have been relevant to an analysis
of de jure contingency. Appellate
Body Report, Canada – Autos,
paras. 130 and 132. This is distinguishable from the measures at issue in
the present case, for which particular production choices by a manufacturer are
not part of the de jure
requirements of the measures, but rather form part of the surrounding factual
circumstances of the alleged contingency.
[569] Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 167.
[570] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit
EU-3), Section 2, codified at RCW Section 82.32.850 (Exhibit EU-58). See also European Union's comments on United States' response to Panel
question No. 53, para. 7.
[571] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
2, codified at RCW Section 82.32.850 (Exhibit EU-58).
[572] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
2(2)(d), codified at RCW Section 82.32.850(2)(d) (Exhibit EU‑58).
[573] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
2(2)(c), codified at RCW Section 82.32.850(2)(c) (Exhibit EU-58).
[574] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
2(2)(b), codified at RCW Section 82.32.850(2)(b) (Exhibit EU‑58).
[575] ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3), Section
2, codified at RCW Section 82.32.850 (Exhibit EU-58).
[576] A condition precedent is an act or event, other than a lapse of
time, that must exist or occur before a duty to perform something promised
arises. See Black's Law Dictionary, 8th
edition (2004), p. 312. A suspensive condition is one that makes a certain
obligation arise only if a specified but uncertain event occurs. See Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.
313.
[577] A possible reading of the First Siting Provision is that the "significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program" could consist of the manufacture
(including final assembly) of a model of commercial airplane and the manufacture
(including final assembly) of fuselages and wings of a different
model of commercial airplane. In other words, under this reading, the fuselages
and wings referred to in subparagraph (ii) of the provision would not need
to correspond to the commercial airplane referred to in subparagraph (i).
Neither party has advanced such a reading. Moreover, such a reading would
assume that the references to a "significant commercial airplane
manufacturing program" and to a "new model, or any version or variant
of an existing model, of a commercial airplane" can include two different commercial
airplane models. Despite this theoretical possibility based on the terms of the
First Siting Provision, such assumptions do not seem persuasive. The
manufacturing activities referred to in the First Siting Provision are part of a
single "manufacturing program" that is sited based on a decision
taken by "a manufacturer", and there is no compelling evidence in the
text of the measure or its context to suggest that this programme could involve
more than one model of commercial airplane. Therefore, the Panel proceeds on
the basis that the reference to fuselages and wings in subparagraph (ii) is to
the same model of commercial airplane contemplated in subparagraph (i).
[578] European Union's first written submission, para. 44. See also European
Union's second written submission, para. 61; opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, paras. 53-54 and 68; opening statement at the second meeting of
the Panel, para. 3.
[579] European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,
para. 68. See also ibid. para. 4; European Union's second written
submission, para. 61.
[580] Assuming arguendo that
the manufacturer could use wings or fuselages manufactured separately.
[581] Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel,
para. 157.
[582] Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.101.
[583] European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 60.
[584] United States' response to Panel question No. 62, para. 35. See
also United States' response to Panel question Nos. 38, 45, and 70, paras.
91, 111, and 83.
[585] See also, for example, United States' response to Panel question
No. 38, paras. 91-92.
[586] Whether this contingency is demonstrated by other evidence is
something that the Panel will discuss in relation to the European Union's de facto claim below.
[587] ESSB 5952 (exhibit
EU-3), Sections 5 and 6, codified at RCW Section 82.04.260(11)(e)(ii) (Exhibit EU-22).
[588] A condition subsequent is one that, if it occurs, will bring
something else to an end; an event the existence of which discharges a duty of
performance that has arisen. See Black's Law Dictionary,
8th edition (2004), p. 312. A resolutory condition is one that upon
fulfilment terminates an already enforceable obligation. See Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.
313.
[589] European Union's first written submission, para. 52. See also European
Union's second written submission, para. 61.
[590] European Union's first written submission, para. 51. See also European
Union's second written submission, para. 61; opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, paras. 61 and 68; opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, para. 3.
[591] European Union's first written submission, para. 52. See also European
Union's second written submission, para. 61.
[592] European Union's first written submission, para. 51. See also European
Union's second written submission, para. 61; opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, paras. 61 and 68; opening statement at the second meeting of the
Panel, para. 3.
[593] See para. 7.294
above.
[594] European Union's first written submission, para. 76. See also ibid.
para. 73.
[595] European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 6. (emphasis original) See also European Union's response to Panel
question Nos. 31 and 41, paras. 71 and 98.
[596] See, for example, European Union's opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, para. 6; response to Panel question Nos. 31 and 41, paras. 71 and
98.
[597] See
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos,
para. 123. See also paras. 7.211 and 7.212 above.
[598] Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 167.
[599] Ibid. and Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1038.
[600] Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Aircraft,
para. 167; EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft,
para. 1051.
[601] Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1046.
[602] Ibid. paras. 1051-1052.
[603] Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member
States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1054. (emphasis original)
[604] European Union's response to Panel question Nos. 29 and 68,
paras. 29 and 45-46. See also European Union's second written submission, paras.
90-91.
[605] European Union's second written submission, para. 91; response
to Panel question Nos. 29 and 68, paras. 67 and 45 and 47. See also Office
of Washington Governor, "Legislature approves
key elements of 777X incentive package", 10 November 2013 (Exhibit EU-59); and Washington State House Finance Committee, Video, "Testimony of
Governor Inslee before House Finance Committee", 7 November 2013 (Exhibit EU-110).
[606] European Union's first written submission, para. 75; second written
submission, paras. 91
and 95‑96; opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, paras. 66-67; response to Panel question Nos. 29 and 68,
paras. 67 and 45 and 48.
[607] European Union's second written submission, para. 91; opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 73; response to Panel
question Nos. 29 and 68, paras. 67 and 45 and 48. See also Reuters, "Boeing hopeful of
777X deal, may build wings in Japan if rejected", 11 November 2013 (Exhibit EU-83).
[608] European Union's second written submission, para. 91; opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 74; response to Panel
question Nos. 29, 31, and 68, paras. 67, 70, and 45. (emphasis
original) See also European Union's second written submission, para. 2; response
to Panel question Nos. 33 and 68, paras. 71, 85, and 46.
[609] European Union's first written submission, para. 77; second written
submission, para. 90. See also European Union's second written submission,
para. 91; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 67-69 and
72-73; response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 66-67; Reuters, "Boeing seen in
advanced talks to make 777X near Seattle", 4 November 2013 (Exhibit EU-65).
[610] European Union's second written submission, para. 90. See also
ibid, para. 91; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 73;
response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 66-67; Reuters, "Boeing seen in advanced talks
to make 777X near Seattle", 4 November 2013 (Exhibit
EU-65).
[611] European Union's first written submission, paras. 77-78; opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 6 and 70-74; response to
Panel question Nos. 30, 31 and 41, paras. 68-71 and 98.
[612] United States' second written submission, para. 58.
[613] United States' second written submission, paras. 78-83.
[615] United States' second written submission, paras. 59-63. See also
response to Panel question No. 64, para. 56.
[616] United States' second written submission, paras. 64-71 and 84.
[617] United States' first written submission, paras. 105 and 132-140; second
written submission, paras. 72-74; response to Panel question No. 30,
paras. 65-67.
[618] United States' second written submission, paras. 75-77.
[619] United States' response to Panel question No. 74, para. 111.
[620] See para. 7.283 above.
[621] European Union's first written submission, para. 73; second written
submission, para. 60; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.
6, fn 8.
[622] European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 6.
[623] European Union's second written submission, para. 90. See also
European Union's first written submission, para. 77; second written submission,
para. 91; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 72-73;
response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 66-67; Reuters, "Boeing seen in advanced talks
to make 777X near Seattle", 4 November 2013 (Exhibit
EU-65).
[624] European Union's second written submission, paras. 91, 98; opening
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.67, 70-74; response to Panel
question Nos. 31, 41, 68, and 76, paras. 70-71, 98, 45, and 55.
[625] European Union's first written submission, para. 44. See also European
Union's second written submission, para. 61; opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, paras. 53-54 and 68; opening statement at the second meeting of
the Panel, para. 3.
[626] European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 68. See also ibid. para. 4; European Union's second
written submission, para. 61.
[627] European Union's first written submission, para. 52. See also European
Union's second written submission, para. 61.
[628] European Union's first written submission, para. 51. See also European
Union's second written submission, para. 61; opening statement at the first meeting
of the Panel, para. 61; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel,
para. 3.
[629] European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 70. See also European Union's response to Panel question No. 30,
paras. 68-69.
[630] (footnote original) European Union's opening oral statement, para.
6.
[631] European Union's response to Panel question No. 31, para. 71.
[632] European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, para. 68.
[633] United States' first written submission, paras. 1-2. See also ibid.
paras. 4, 7, 9, 73, 101, and 106‑109; second written submission, paras. 2 and
38; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 4 and 23.
[634] United States' second written submission, para. 38.
[635] See paras. 7.291 and 7.292 above.
[636] See paras. 7.308 and 7.313 above.
[637] See, for example, European Union's opening statement at the first
meeting of the Panel, para. 6; response to Panel question Nos. 31 and 41,
paras. 71 and 98.
[638] See para. 7.317 above.
[639] See para. 7.40 above.
[640] Letter from the Director of the Washington State Department of
Revenue to the Code Reviser, 10 July 2014 (Exhibit EU-61). See also
United States' response to Panel question Nos. 10 and 12, paras. 21
and 26.
[641] Boeing letter to the Director of the Washington State Department of
Revenue, 9 July
2014 (Exhibit USA‑32) (BCI). See also United
States' response to Panel question No. 10, paras. 20-21.
[642] Boeing letter to the Director of the Washington State Department of
Revenue, 9 July
2014 (Exhibit USA‑32) (BCI).
[643] United States' first written submission, para. 78 (citing letter
from the Director of the Washington State Department of Revenue to the Code
Reviser, 10 July
2014 (Exhibit EU-61)); response to Panel question No.
12, para. 26.
[644] See Letter from the Director of the Washington State Department of
Revenue to the Code Reviser, 10 July 2014 (Exhibit EU-61). See also
para. 7.40
above.
[645] See, for example, Boeing expert statement (Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), paras. 41-42, 50-52, and
59-60; Boeing, Make/Buy Model 777-300ER, July 2007 (Exhibit USA-2) (BCI); Boeing,
777X Make/Buy, All Commodities, Status as of 17 December 2014 (Exhibit USA-8)
(BCI); Boeing, 777X Content Sources, Major Structures & Propulsion, Status
as of 27 October 2015 (Exhibit USA-30) (BCI).
[646] See United States' response to Panel question No. 12, para. 26.
[647] See paras. 7.273 and 7.347
above.
[648] See, for example, European Union's response to Panel question No. 50,
paras. 132-133; comments on United States' response to Panel question Nos. 69
and 77, paras. 63 and 85-89.
[649] In this respect, the Panel notes the United States' argument that
there is no prohibited contingency in this case based on the fact that Boeing's
777X programme has satisfied the First Siting Provision and has not triggered
the Second Siting Provision. See, for example, United States' opening statement
at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 46-47. Although this argument rests
on particular aspects of 777X production in relation to the United States'
interpretation of the terms "use" and "goods" in Article
3.1(b), it also raises an important aspect of the combined operation of the
First and Second Siting Provisions. Necessarily, by the terms of the
legislation, a programme that satisfies the First Siting Provision would not at
that moment trigger the Second Siting Provision. The latter would only be
triggered at a later point in time, if the circumstances underlying the
original siting determination by the Department of Revenue have changed in the
manner specified in the Second Siting Provision.
[650] See, e.g. Boeing expert statement (Exhibit USA-1) (BCI), para. 39
("The 777X is designed to be the largest and most efficient twin-engine
commercial aircraft in aerospace history"). See also United States' response to Panel question No. 64,
para. 57; European Union's response to Panel question
No. 64, paras. 37‑39; Boeing Frontiers, "The 747-700 will be transformed into an even
larger freighter", June 2005 (Exhibit EU-122).
[651] United States' response to Panel question No. 64, para. 57.
[652] See paras. 7.266 and 7.268
above.
[653] United States' response to Panel question No. 64, para. 57, fn 71.
[654] "'Significant
commercial airplane manufacturing program' means an airplane program in which
the following products, including final assembly, will commence manufacture at
a new or existing location within Washington state on or after the effective
date of this section: (i) The new model, or any version or variant of an
existing model, of a commercial airplane; and (ii) Fuselages and wings of a new
model, or any version or variant of an existing model, of a commercial
airplane." ESSB 5952 (Exhibit EU-3).
[655] United States' response to Panel question No. 42, para. 102. Further, in the United
States' view, the fact that "complete finished wings for some smaller
commercial airplanes can be transported in a large transport airplane … simply
means that, for some airplanes, it is theoretically possible to fully assemble
the wings in a location far from where any further assembly of the airplane
will take place". United States' response to Panel question No. 64,
para. 55. See also United States' second written
submission, para. 60.
[656] United States' response to Panel question No. 42, para. 102.
[657] See United States' first written submission, paras. 25 and 130, and
fn 45; opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 11; closing statement
at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 6; response to Panel question Nos. 35 and 64,
paras. 82, 52-54 and 56; Boeing expert statement (Exhibit USA-1) (BCI),
para. 43.
[658] United States' response to Panel question No. 64, para. 57.
[659] See, for example, Office of Washington Governor, "Legislature approves key elements
of 777X incentive package", 10 November 2013 (Exhibit EU-59); Washington State House Finance Committee, Video, "Testimony of
Governor Inslee before House Finance Committee", 7 November 2013 (Exhibit
EU-110); Collective Bargaining Agreement between Boeing and the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 2 November 2008, including
Contract Extension and Modification Agreements, 7 December 2011 and 3 January
2014 (Exhibit USA-33), p. 190; Addendum No. 14 to the 1991 Boeing Everett
Mitigation Decision Document SEPA #14-009, 27 March 2014 (Exhibit USA-34)
(BCI).
[660] United States' response to Panel question No. 64, para. 57.
[661] See paras. 7.259 and 7.266 above.
[662] See, for example, United States' first written submission, paras.
18, 24, 25, 28-29, and 31-32.
[663] The Panel recalls that the expression "has been sited"
(used in the Second Siting Provision in the passive tense) is related to a
manufacturer locating a manufacturing programme in a particular place, which is
consonant with the definition of "siting" in the First Siting
Provision. See para. 7.304
above.
[664] See European Union's opening statement at the first meeting of the
Panel, paras. 5 and 48.
[665] See European Union's response to Panel question No. 7, para. 12; comments
on United States' response to Panel question No. 77, paras. 85-89.
[666] See United States' response to Panel question Nos. 43 and 80, paras. 103 and 118-120.
[667] See Panel question No. 40.
[668] See Panel question No. 80.
[669] The Panel recalls its assessment in the context of the European
Union's de jure claim that, on its face, the
Second Siting Provision did not condition the availability of the subsidy on
use of domestic over imported goods. Based strictly on the terms of the Second
Siting Provision, a possible reading of the conditionality set out therein would
allow the manufacturer in question to continue to benefit from the subsidy if
it used wings manufactured outside the state of Washington in the final
assembly of the commercial airplanes in question in the state of Washington, so
long as it maintained final and wing assembly previously sited in the state of
Washington. See above, para. 7.311. As
noted, in the context of its de facto
analysis the Panel considers not only the text of the measure, but also
additional factual evidence relevant to understanding the design, structure,
and modalities of operation of the contingency in question.
[670] See United States' response to Panel question No. 40, para. 97.
[671] See United States' response to Panel question No. 39, paras. 93-95;
response to Panel question No. 80, paras. 118-120. See also United States'
response to Panel question No. 7, paras. 15-16.
[672] Assuming arguendo that
the manufacturer could use wings or fuselages manufactured separately.
[673] See United States' response to Panel question Nos. 39 and 80, paras.
93-95 and 118-120. See also United States' response to Panel question No. 7,
paras. 15-16.
[674] See United States' response to Panel question No. 80, paras. 118-120.
See also United States' response to Panel question No. 42, para. 103; European
Union's comments on United States' response to Panel question No. 80,
para. 91.
[675] See United States' response to Panel question No. 40, para. 97.
[676] See Washington Court of Appeals, Nationscapital Mortgage
Corporation et al. v. Department of Financial Institutions, June 2006 (Exhibit
USA-84); United States' response to Panel question No. 79, para. 117, fn
146.
[677] See para. 7.304
above.
[678] Upon the passage of ESSB 5952, the Washington State Governor issued
a press release indicating that ESSB 5952 "includes strong contingency
language to ensure that all of the 777X assembly and wing assembly remains in
Washington. Specifically, the bill includes a provision that says the company
will lose its preferential B&O tax rate for the 777X if any of that work is
moved out of state." Office of Washington Governor, "Legislature approves key elements of 777X incentive
package", 10 November 2013 (Exhibit EU-59). The Governor additionally
provided testimony to the Washington State legislature prior to the passage of
ESSB 5952 regarding House Bill 2089, a companion bill to a previous
version of ESSB 5952, which had similar siting provisions referring to wing
assembly and final assembly (in addition to "wing fabrication", which
does not appear in ESSB 5952). In that testimony, the Governor expresses the
aim of maintaining employment in the aerospace industry by retaining production
of the 777X carbon fibre wing in Washington State. See Washington State House Finance Committee,
Video, "Testimony of Governor Inslee before House Finance Committee",
7 November 2013 (Exhibit EU-110).
[679] Panel Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 8.11.
[680] Appellate
Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures
on Oil Country Tubular Goods, para. 189.