United States – measures concerning the
importation, marketing and sale of tuna and tuna products
recourse to article 21.5 of the dsu by Mexico
AB-2015-6
Report of
the Appellate Body
Table of
Contents
1 Introduction.. 12
2 Arguments of the Participants. 18
3 Arguments of the third participants. 18
4 Issues Raised in This Appeal. 18
5 Preliminary issues. 20
5.1 Business
confidential information. 20
5.2 The
scope of Article 21.5 proceedings. 22
6 Background and Overview of the Measure at Issue. 24
6.1 The
amended tuna measure. 26
6.1.1 The
ETP large purse-seine fishery. 29
6.1.2 The
non-ETP purse-seine fishery. 31
6.1.3 "All
other fisheries". 32
6.2 Principal
modifications under the amended tuna measure. 32
7 Analysis of the Appellate Body. 33
7.1 Mexico's
claim regarding the amended tuna measure as a whole. 33
7.2 Article
2.1 of the TBT Agreement. 40
7.2.1 "Treatment
no less favourable" under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement 41
7.2.2 Less
favourable treatment – Detrimental impact 45
7.2.2.1 The
findings of detrimental impact in the original proceedings. 47
7.2.2.2 The
Panel's findings. 49
7.2.2.3 Whether
the Panel erred in its analysis of the detrimental impact of the amended tuna
measure 52
7.2.3 Less
favourable treatment – Stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction. 58
7.2.3.1 Whether
the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 2.1 and its articulation of
the legal standard for determining whether the detrimental impact on imported
products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. 58
7.2.3.2 Whether
the Panel erred in its assessment of whether the detrimental impact of the
amended tuna measure on Mexican tuna products stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction 66
7.2.3.2.1 Preliminary
observations. 66
7.2.3.2.2 The
eligibility criteria. 70
7.2.3.2.2.1 The
Panel's findings. 70
7.2.3.2.2.2 Whether
the Panel erred by misreading the findings of the Appellate Body in the
original proceedings. 71
7.2.3.2.3 The
certification and tracking and verification requirements. 74
7.2.3.2.3.1 The
Panel's findings. 75
7.2.3.2.3.2 Whether
the Panel erred by failing to examine whether the different certification and
tracking and verification requirements are "calibrated" to the risks
to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different areas of the oceans. 78
7.2.3.2.3.3 Whether
the Panel erred in finding that, by virtue of the determination provisions, the
detrimental impact does not stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction. 86
7.2.3.3 Whether
the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU. 92
7.2.3.4 Overall
conclusions on the Panel's analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement 102
7.2.4 Completion
of the legal analysis. 103
7.3 Articles
I, III, and XX of the GATT 1994. 116
7.3.1 Articles
I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. 116
7.3.2 The
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. 120
7.3.2.1 The
Panel's findings. 120
7.3.2.2 Whether
the Panel erred in its analysis under the chapeau of Article XX of the
GATT 1994 123
7.3.2.2.1 Discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail 124
7.3.2.2.2 Arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination. 127
7.3.2.2.3 Conclusion. 133
7.3.3 Completion
of the legal analysis. 134
7.3.3.1 Articles
I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. 134
7.3.3.2 Article
XX of the GATT 1994. 135
8 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 142
ABBREVIATIONS
USED IN THIS REPORT
Abbreviation
|
Description
|
2013
Final Rule
|
USDOC, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Enhanced Document Requirements to
Support Use of the Dolphin Safe Label on Tuna Products, United
States Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 131 (9 July 2013),
pp. 40997-41004 (Panel Exhibit MEX-7)
|
AIDCP
|
Agreement on the
International Dolphin Conservation Program (Original Panel Exhibits US-23a
and MEX-11; Panel Exhibit MEX-30)
|
AIDCP
Tracking and Verification System
|
AIDCP, Resolution to Adopt
the Modified System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna
(20 June 2001) (Original Panel Exhibit MEX-55; Panel Exhibit
MEX-36)
|
amended
tuna measure
|
The United States'
dolphin-safe labelling regime for tuna products, comprising: (i) the DPCIA;
(ii) Subpart H of Part 216 of CFR Title 50 as amended by the 2013 Final Rule
(implementing regulations); (iii) the Hogarth ruling; and (iv) any
implementing guidance, directives, policy announcements, or any other
document issued in relation to instruments (i) through (iii), including any
modifications or amendments in relation to those instruments
|
BCI
|
business confidential
information
|
CFR
|
United States Code of
Federal Regulations
|
DML
|
dolphin mortality limits
|
DPCIA
|
Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act of 1990, codified in USC Title 16, Section 1385
(Original Panel Exhibit US-5; Panel Exhibit MEX-8)
|
DSB
|
Dispute Settlement Body
|
DSU
|
Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
|
ETP
|
Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean
|
FAD(s)
|
fish aggregating device(s)
|
Form
370
|
NOAA, Fisheries Certificate
of Origin (Panel Exhibit MEX-22)
|
GATT 1994
|
General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994
|
Hogarth
ruling
|
United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Earth Island Institute
et al. v. William T. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Original Panel Exhibit MEX-31; Panel Exhibit MEX-16)
|
IATTC
|
Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission
|
IDCP
|
International Dolphin Conservation
Program
|
implementing
regulations
|
USDOC, National Marine
Fisheries Service/NOAA, Dolphin Safe Tuna Labeling, CFR Title 50, Part 216,
Subpart H (Sections 216.90-216.95) (Panel Exhibit US-2)
|
Mexico's
panel request
|
Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by Mexico pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU,
WT/DS381/20
|
MMPA
|
Marine Mammal Protection Act
of 1972, as amended
|
NMFS
|
National Marine Fisheries
Service
|
NOAA
|
National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
|
original
implementing regulations
|
CFR Title 50, Sections
216.91 and 216.92 (Original Panel Exhibit US‑6)
|
PBR
|
potential biological removal
|
TBT
Agreement
|
Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade
|
TTFs
|
Tuna Tracking Forms
|
TTVP
|
NMFS Tuna Tracking and
Verification Program
|
USC
|
United States Code
|
USDOC
|
United States Department of
Commerce
|
WIO
|
Western Indian Ocean
|
Working
Procedures
|
Working Procedures for
Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6,
16 August 2010
|
WTO
|
World Trade Organization
|
PANEL EXHIBITS
CITED IN THIS REPORT
Panel
Exhibit
|
Original Panel
Exhibit
|
Short Title
(if any)
|
Description
|
|
MEX-2
|
|
National Research Council, Dolphins and the Tuna Industry (National Academy Press:
Washington, D.C., 1992)
|
MEX-4
|
MEX-91
|
|
IDCP, Scientific Advisory
Board, "Updated Estimates of Nmin
and Stock Mortality Limits", 7th Meeting (30 October 2009), Document SAB‑07-05
|
MEX‑5
|
MEX-117
|
|
AIDCP,
22nd Meeting of the Parties, Minutes (30 October 2009)
|
MEX-7
|
|
2013 Final Rule
|
USDOC, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Enhanced Document Requirements to
Support Use of the Dolphin Safe Label on Tuna Products, United
States Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 131 (9 July 2013),
pp. 40997-41004
|
MEX-8
|
US-5
|
DPCIA
|
Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act of 1990, codified in USC Title 16, Section 1385
|
MEX-16
|
MEX-31
|
Hogarth
ruling
|
United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Earth Island Institute
et al. v. William T. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007)
|
MEX-20
|
|
|
CFR Title 50, Section 216
|
MEX-30
|
US-23a and MEX-11
|
AIDCP
|
Agreement on the
International Dolphin Conservation Program
|
MEX-22
|
|
Form
370
|
NOAA, Fisheries Certificate
of Origin
|
MEX-36
|
MEX-55
|
AIDCP Tracking and
Verification System
|
AIDCP, Resolution to Adopt
the Modified System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna
(20 June 2001)
|
MEX-40
|
US-10
|
|
National Marine Fisheries
Service, An Annotated Bibliography of Available Literature
Regarding Cetacean Interactions with Tuna Purse‑Seine Fisheries Outside of
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, Administrative Report LJ‑96‑20
(November 1996)
|
MEX-81
|
|
|
M.N.
Maunder, "Evaluating recent trends in EPO dolphin stocks", IATTC
draft paper
|
MEX-82
|
|
|
V.R. Restrepo, Chair's
Report of the ISSF Tuna Dolphin Workshop held on 25-26 October 2012
|
MEX-84
|
|
|
Programa Nacional de
Aprovechamiento del Atún y Protección de Delfines (National Program for the
Utilization of Tuna and Protection of Dolphins), Statement of Dr Michael
Dreyfus, Chief Researcher (28 March 2014)
|
MEX-115
|
MEX-56
|
AIDCP Dolphin Safe
Certification Resolution
|
AIDCP, Resolution to
Establish Procedures for AIDCP Dolphin Safe Tuna Certification
(20 June 2001)
|
MEX-132
|
|
|
Food and Agriculture
Organization, Fisheries Glossary, available at:
|
MEX-161
|
|
Anderson, Cetaceans and Tuna Fisheries
|
R.C. Anderson, Cetaceans and Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Indian Ocean,
International Pole and Line Foundation, Technical Report No. 2 (London, 2014)
|
US-2
|
|
implementing
regulations
|
USDOC, National Marine
Fisheries Service/NOAA, Dolphin Safe Tuna Labeling, CFR Title 50, Part 216,
Subpart H (Sections 216.90‑216.95)
|
|
US-6
|
original
implementing regulations
|
CFR Title 50, Sections
216.91 and 216.92
|
US-26
(corrected)
|
|
|
IATTC, EPO
Dataset 2009-2013
|
US-27
|
|
|
IDCP, 34th Meeting of the
International Review Panel held on 9-10 October 2003, "Effectiveness of
Technical Guidelines to Prevent High Mortality During Sets on Large Dolphin
Herds", Document IRP-34-10 (revised)
|
US-28
|
US-19
|
|
B. Reilly et al., Report of the Scientific Research Program Under the International
Dolphin Conservation Program Act (2005)
|
US-29
|
|
|
T. Gerrodette, "The
Tuna-Dolphin Issue", in Encyclopedia of Marine
Mammals, 2nd edn, W.F. Perrin, B. Würsig, J.G.M. Thewissen (eds.)
(Oxford, 2009), p. 1192
|
US-48
|
US-11
|
|
A.C. Myrick, Jr. and P.C.
Perkins, "Adrenocortical color darkness and correlates as indicators of
continuous acute premortem stress in chased and purse-seine captured male dolphins"
(1995) 2 Pathophysiology
|
US-49
|
|
|
IATTC, Initial assignment of
DMLs for 2008 (21 November 2007)
|
US-127
|
|
|
Tables Summarizing
Fishery-by-Fishery Evidence on the Record
|
CASES CITED IN
THIS REPORT
Short Title
|
Full Case
Title and Citation
|
Argentina – Hides and Leather
|
Panel Report, Argentina – Measures
Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and Import of Finished Leather,
WT/DS155/R and Corr.1, adopted 16 February 2001, DSR 2001:V,
p. 1779
|
Australia – Salmon
|
Appellate Body Report, Australia
– Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted
6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3327
|
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres
|
Appellate Body Report, Brazil –
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R,
adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527
|
Canada – Aircraft
|
Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R,
adopted 20 August 1999, DSR 1999:III, p. 1377
|
Canada – Aircraft
(Article 21.5 – Brazil)
|
Appellate Body Report, Canada –
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted 4 August
2000, DSR 2000:IX, p. 4299
|
Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program
|
Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program,
WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, DSR 2013:I, p. 7
|
Chile – Price Band System
|
Appellate Body Report, Chile –
Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural
Products, WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002,
DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3045 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5473)
|
Chile – Price Band System
(Article 21.5 – Argentina)
|
Appellate Body Report, Chile –
Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural
Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina,
WT/DS207/AB/RW, adopted 22 May 2007, DSR 2007:II, p. 513
|
China –
HP-SSST (Japan) / China – HP-SSST (EU)
|
Appellate Body Reports, China –
Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel
Seamless Tubes ("HP-SSST") from Japan / China – Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping
Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes
("HP-SSST") from the European Union, WT/DS454/AB/R and
Add.1 / WT/DS460/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 28 October 2015
|
China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products
|
Appellate Body Report, China –
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010,
DSR 2010:I, p. 3
|
China – Rare Earths
|
Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten,
and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R,
adopted 29 August 2014
|
China – Raw Materials
|
Appellate Body Reports, China –
Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R /
WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012, DSR 2012:VII,
p. 3295
|
Colombia – Ports of Entry
|
Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative
Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R and Corr.1,
adopted 20 May 2009, DSR 2009:VI, p. 2535
|
Dominican Republic – Import and
Sale of Cigarettes
|
Appellate Body Report, Dominican
Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes,
WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367
|
EC – Asbestos
|
Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos‑Containing Products,
WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243
|
EC – Bananas III
|
Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591
|
EC – Bed Linen
(Article 21.5 – India)
|
Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Anti‑Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton‑Type Bed Linen from
India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India, WT/DS141/AB/RW, adopted 24 April 2003,
DSR 2003:III, p. 965
|
EC –
Fasteners (China)
|
Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, adopted 28 July 2011, DSR 2011:VII, p. 3995
|
EC –
Fasteners (China)
|
Panel Report, European
Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel
Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/R and Corr.1, adopted 28 July 2011,
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS397/AB/R, DSR 2011:VIII, p. 4289
|
EC – Hormones
|
Appellate Body Report, EC
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I,
p. 135
|
EC – Sardines
|
Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R,
adopted 23 October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3359
|
EC – Seal
Products
|
Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted
18 June 2014
|
EC – Selected Customs Matters
|
Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted
11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3791
|
EC – Tariff Preferences
|
Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004,
DSR 2004:III, p. 925
|
EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings
|
Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Anti‑Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe
Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/AB/R, adopted 18 August 2003,
DSR 2003:VI, p. 2613
|
EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft
|
Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R,
adopted 1 June 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS316/AB/R, DSR 2011:II, p. 685
|
Japan – Agricultural
Products II
|
Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted
19 March 1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 277
|
Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II
|
Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 97
|
Japan – Apples
|
Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R,
adopted 10 December 2003, DSR 2003:IX, p. 4391
|
Japan – DRAMs (Korea)
|
Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea,
WT/DS336/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:VII,
p. 2703
|
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages
|
Appellate Body Report, Korea –
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted
17 February 1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 3
|
Korea – Dairy
|
Appellate Body Report, Korea –
Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products,
WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, p. 3
|
Korea – Various Measures on
Beef
|
Appellate Body Report, Korea –
Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 5
|
Mexico – Anti‑Dumping Measures
on Rice
|
Appellate Body Report, Mexico –
Definitive Anti‑Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice, Complaint with Respect to
Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted 20 December 2005,
DSR 2005:XXII, p. 10853
|
Mexico – Corn Syrup
(Article 21.5 – US)
|
Appellate Body Report, Mexico –
Anti‑Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United
States – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted
21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6675
|
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks
|
Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on
Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/R, adopted 24 March
2006, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS308/AB/R, DSR 2006:I,
p. 43
|
Thailand – Cigarettes
(Philippines)
|
Appellate Body Report, Thailand
– Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines,
WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, DSR 2011:IV,
p. 2203
|
Thailand – H‑Beams
|
Appellate Body Report, Thailand –
Anti‑Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non‑Alloy Steel
and H‑Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001,
DSR 2001:VII, p. 2701
|
US – Carbon Steel
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion‑Resistant Carbon Steel
Flat Products from Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted
19 December 2002, DSR 2002:IX, p. 3779
|
US – Clove Cigarettes
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted
24 April 2012, DSR 2012: XI, p. 5751
|
US – Continued Zeroing
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology,
WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 19 February 2009, DSR 2009:III, p. 1291
|
US – COOL
|
Appellate Body
Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin
Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, adopted
23 July 2012, DSR 2012:V, p. 2449
|
US – COOL
|
Panel Reports, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements, WT/DS384/R / WT/DS386/R, adopted 23 July
2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R,
DSR 2012:VI, p. 2745
|
US – COOL
(Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico)
|
Appellate Body Reports, United States
– Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico, WT/DS384/AB/RW
/ WT/DS386/AB/RW, adopted 29 May 2015
|
US – COOL
(Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico)
|
Panel Reports, United States –
Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements – Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico, WT/DS384/RW and
Add.1 / WT/DS386/RW and Add.1, adopted 29 May 2015, as modified by Appellate
Body Reports WT/DS384/AB/RW / WT/DS386/AB/RW
|
US – FSC
(Article 21.5 – EC)
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" – Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities,
WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 January 2002, DSR 2002:I, p. 55
|
US – FSC
(Article 21.5 – EC II)
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" – Second
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities,
WT/DS108/AB/RW2, adopted 14 March 2006, DSR 2006:XI, p. 4721
|
US – Gambling
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Measures Affecting the Cross‑Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005,
DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
|
US – Gasoline
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 3
|
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint)
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted
23 March 2012, DSR 2012:I, p. 7
|
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods
Sunset Reviews
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Sunset Reviews of Anti‑Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods
from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2004,
DSR 2004:VII, p. 3257
|
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods
Sunset Reviews
(Article 21.5 – Argentina)
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Sunset Reviews of Anti‑Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods
from Argentina – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina,
WT/DS268/AB/RW, adopted 11 May 2007, DSR 2007:IX, p. 3523
|
US – Section 337 Tariff Act
|
GATT Panel Report, United
States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, adopted 7
November 1989, BISD 36S, p. 345
|
US – Shrimp
|
Appellate Body Report, United States
– Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755
|
US – Shrimp
(Article 21.5 – Malaysia)
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW,
adopted 21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6481
|
US – Softwood Lumber IV
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain
Softwood Lumber from Canada
– Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU,
WT/DS257/AB/RW, adopted 20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII,
p. 11357
|
US – Softwood Lumber VI
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood
Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada,
WT/DS277/AB/RW, adopted 9 May 2006, and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XI,
p. 4865
|
US – Tuna (EEC)
|
GATT Panel Report, United
States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R, 16 June 1994,
unadopted
|
US – Tuna (Mexico)
|
GATT Panel Report, United
States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R, 3 September
1991, unadopted, BISD 39S, p. 155
|
US – Tuna II (Mexico)
|
Appellate Body Report, United States
– Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012, DSR 2012:IV,
p. 1837
|
US – Tuna II (Mexico)
|
Panel Report, United States –
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products, WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012, as modified by
Appellate Body Report WT/DS381/AB/R, DSR 2012:IV, p. 2013
|
US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil)
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted 20 June 2008,
DSR 2008:III, p. 809
|
US – Wheat Gluten
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the
European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2001,
DSR 2001:II, p. 717
|
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from
India, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, and Corr.1,
DSR 1997:I, p. 323
|
US – Zeroing (EC)
(Article 21.5 – EC)
|
Appellate Body Report, United
States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins
("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
European Communities, WT/DS294/AB/RW and Corr.1, adopted 11 June
2009, DSR 2009:VII, p. 2911
|
World Trade Organization
Appellate Body
United States
– Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products
Recourse to Article 21.5
of the DSU by Mexico
United States, Appellant/Appellee
Mexico, Other
Appellant/Appellee
Australia, Third Participant
Canada, Third
Participant
China, Third
Participant
European Union, Third Participant
Guatemala, Third Participant
Japan, Third
Participant
Korea, Third
Participant
New Zealand, Third Participant
Norway, Third
Participant
Thailand, Third Participant
|
AB-2015-6
Appellate Body
Division:
Servansing,
Presiding Member
Bhatia, Member
Zhang, Member
|
1.1. The United States and Mexico
each appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the
Panel Report, United States – Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products – Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico.[1] The Panel was established pursuant
to Article 21.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) to consider a complaint by Mexico[2] concerning the alleged failure of
the United States to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) in the original proceedings in United
States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products.[3]
1.2. This dispute concerns the United
States' labelling regime for "dolphin‑safe" tuna products. In the
original proceedings, Mexico raised claims under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) challenging the consistency with these
Agreements of certain measures imposed by the United States on the
importation, marketing, and sale of tuna and tuna products.[4] Specifically, Mexico challenged: the
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act of 1990, codified in United States Code, Title 16, Section 1385[5] (DPCIA); United States
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 50, Sections 216.91
and 216.92 (original implementing regulations)[6]; and a ruling by a US Federal
Appeals Court in Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth[7] (Hogarth ruling).[8] The original panel and the
Appellate Body referred to these measures, collectively[9], as the "measure at issue"
or the "US dolphin-safe labelling provisions".[10] In these compliance proceedings,
we refer to them as the "original tuna measure".
1.3. The original tuna measure specified
the conditions to be fulfilled in order for tuna products sold in the United
States to be labelled "dolphin-safe" or to make similar claims on
their labels.[11] The specific conditions varied
depending on the fishing method by which tuna contained in the tuna product was
harvested, the area of the ocean where the tuna was caught, and the type of
vessel used.[12] The original tuna measure did not
make the use of a dolphin‑safe label obligatory for the importation or sale of
tuna products in the United States[13], although the preferences of
retailers and consumers are such that the dolphin-safe label has
"significant commercial value", and access to that label constitutes
an "advantage" on the US market for tuna products.[14]
1.4. The original panel found that the US
"dolphin-safe" labelling provisions constituted a "technical
regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement.[15] With respect to Mexico's claim
that the original tuna measure was inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, the original panel found that Mexico had failed to
establish that the measure accorded treatment less favourable to Mexican tuna
products than to US tuna products and tuna products originating in other
countries.[16] The panel therefore concluded that
the measure was not inconsistent with the United States' obligations under
Article 2.1.[17] The original panel found, however,
that the original tuna measure was more trade restrictive than necessary to
fulfil its legitimate objectives, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment
would create, and concluded for that reason that the measure was inconsistent
with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.[18] With respect to Mexico's claim
under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the original panel found that the
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program[19] (AIDCP) dolphin-safe definition
and certification were a relevant international standard[20], but that Mexico had failed to
prove that this standard was an effective and appropriate means to fulfil the
United States' objectives at its chosen level of protection.[21] Therefore, the panel found that
the original tuna measure was not inconsistent with Article 2.4.[22] The original panel decided to
exercise judicial economy with respect to Mexico's claims under Articles I:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[23]
1.5. On appeal, the Appellate Body found
that the original panel did not err in characterizing the original tuna measure
as a "technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to
the TBT Agreement.[24] The Appellate Body found,
however, that the original panel had erred in its interpretation and
application of the phrase "treatment no less favourable" in Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement. The Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that
the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions were not inconsistent with Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, and found, instead, that the dolphin-safe labelling
provisions were inconsistent with that provision.[25] Furthermore, the
Appellate Body found that the original panel had erred in concluding that
the original tuna measure was more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil
the United States' legitimate objectives, taking account of the risks
non-fulfilment would create. Therefore, the Appellate Body reversed the
panel's finding that the original tuna measure was inconsistent with Article 2.2
of the TBT Agreement.[26] The Appellate Body also reversed
the panel's finding that the AIDCP dolphin‑safe definition and certification
constituted a relevant international standard within the meaning of Article 2.4
of the TBT Agreement, while leaving undisturbed the panel's finding that
the original tuna measure was not inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the
TBT Agreement.[27] Finally, the Appellate Body
found that the original panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the
DSU in deciding to exercise judicial economy with respect to Mexico's claims
under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[28] The Appellate Body recommended
that the DSB request the United States to bring its measure into
conformity with its obligations under the TBT Agreement.[29]
1.6. On 13 June 2012, the DSB adopted
the original panel and Appellate Body reports. On 2 August 2012,
Mexico and the United States informed the DSB that additional time was
required to discuss a mutually agreed reasonable period of time for the
United States to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.[30] On 17 September 2012,
Mexico and the United States informed the DSB that they had agreed on a
reasonable period of time of 13 months from 13 June 2012. The
reasonable period of time expired on 13 July 2013.[31]
1.7. On 9 July 2013, the
United States published in its Federal Register
a legal instrument entitled "Enhanced Document Requirements to Support Use
of the Dolphin Safe Label on Tuna Products"[32] (2013 Final Rule).[33] The 2013 Final Rule made certain changes to Sections 216.91 and 216.93
of CFR Title 50.[34] Both the DPCIA and the Hogarth ruling remained unchanged.[35] According to the United States, the 2013 Final Rule constitutes
the measure taken to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings pursuant
to Article 21.5 of the DSU.[36]
1.8. Mexico considers that the United
States has not brought its labelling regime for "dolphin‑safe" tuna
products into compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings, and that
the regime remains inconsistent with the United States' obligations under
the covered agreements.[37] On 2 August 2013, Mexico and the United States informed
the DSB of their Agreed Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU[38] and, on 14 November 2013, Mexico requested the establishment of a panel
under Articles 6 and 21.5 of the DSU, Article 14 of the TBT Agreement,
and Article XXIII of the GATT 1994.[39]
1.9. In its panel request, Mexico
indicated that the "measure taken to comply with the recommendations and
rulings" of the DSB, hereinafter referred to as the "amended tuna
measure", comprises: (i) the DPCIA; (ii) Subpart H of Part 216 of CFR Title
50 as amended by the 2013 Final Rule[40] (implementing regulations); (iii) the Hogarth ruling; and (iv) any
implementing guidance, directives, policy announcements, or any other document
issued in relation to instruments (i) through (iii), including any
modifications or amendments in relation to those instruments.[41] Mexico claimed that the amended tuna measure is still inconsistent with
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, and with Articles I:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[42] On this basis, Mexico requested the Panel to find that the
United States has failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings
adopted by the DSB.[43]
1.10. The Panel Report was circulated to
Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 14 April 2015.
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, the Panel addressed several
preliminary issues.[44] The Panel rejected two arguments
made by the United States relating to the scope of the Panel's jurisdiction in
these Article 21.5 proceedings, namely: (i) that the scope of the Panel's
review was limited to the measure taken to comply – the 2013 Final Rule –
rather than extending to the amended tuna measure as a whole; and (ii) that the
Panel could not entertain Mexico's claims relating to three elements of the
amended tuna measure – the eligibility criteria for the dolphin-safe label, the
different tracking and verification requirements, and the different observer or
certification requirements – because these elements were unchanged from the
original tuna measure, and were not found by the Appellate Body to be
WTO-inconsistent in the original proceedings. The Panel considered that the
legal question before it was whether the amended tuna measure, including the
2013 Final Rule, brought the United States into compliance with WTO law[45], and that it had jurisdiction to
consider all of Mexico's claims, including as they related to the eligibility
criteria, the certification requirements, and the tracking and verification
requirements.[46] In addition, at the outset of its
analysis of Mexico's claim under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, in the
light of the findings made in the original proceedings, as well as the
agreement of both parties, the Panel accepted that the US dolphin-safe
labelling regime is a "technical regulation" for purposes of the
TBT Agreement, and that the relevant tuna products are "like".[47]
1.11. In its Report, the Panel made the following
findings with respect to the "eligibility criteria", the
"certification requirements", and the "tracking and verification
requirements" in the amended tuna measure[48]:
a. with respect to Mexico's claims
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement:
i. the eligibility criteria in the
amended tuna measure do not accord less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna
and tuna products than that accorded to like products from the
United States and to like products originating in any other country, and
are thus consistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement[49];
ii. the different certification
requirements in the amended tuna measure accord less favourable treatment to
Mexican tuna and tuna products than that accorded to like products from the
United States and to like products originating in any other country, in
violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement[50]; and
iii. the different tracking and
verification requirements in the amended tuna measure accord less favourable
treatment to Mexican tuna and tuna products than that accorded to like products
from the United States and to like products originating in any other
country, in violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement[51];
b. with respect to Mexico's claims
under the GATT 1994:
i. the eligibility criteria in the
amended tuna measure accord less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna and tuna
products than that accorded to like products from the United States and to
like products originating in any other country, in violation of Articles I:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994[52];
ii. the different certification
requirements in the amended tuna measure accord less favourable treatment to
Mexican tuna and tuna products than that accorded to like products from the
United States and to like products originating in any other country, in
violation of Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994[53]; and
iii. the different tracking and
verification requirements in the amended tuna measure accord less favourable
treatment to Mexican tuna and tuna products than that accorded to like products
from the United States and to like products originating in any other
country, in violation of Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994[54];
c. with respect to the
United States' defence under Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, the
eligibility criteria, the different certification requirements, and the
different tracking and verification requirements in the amended tuna measure
are provisionally justified under Article XX(g)[55]; and
d. with regard to whether the
challenged aspects of the amended tuna measure satisfy the requirements of the
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, the eligibility criteria in
the amended tuna measure are applied in a manner that meets the requirements of
the chapeau of Article XX, whereas the different certification
requirements and the different tracking and verification requirements are
applied in a manner that does not meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX
of the GATT 1994.[56]
1.12. The Panel recommended, pursuant to Article 19.1
of the DSU, that the DSB request the United States to bring its measure
into conformity with its obligations under the TBT Agreement and the
GATT 1994.[57]
1.13. On 5 June 2015, the
United States notified
the DSB, pursuant to Articles 16.4 and 17 of the DSU, of its intention to
appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report, and certain legal
interpretations developed by the Panel, and filed a Notice of Appeal and an
appellant's submission.[58] On 10 June 2015, Mexico
notified the DSB,
pursuant to Articles 16.4 and 17 of the DSU, of its intention to appeal
certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report, and certain legal
interpretations developed by the Panel, and filed a Notice of Other Appeal
and an other appellant's submission.[59] On 23 June 2015, Mexico and the
United States each filed an appellee's submission.[60] On 26 June 2015, Canada,
the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand each filed a third participant's
submission.[61] On the same day, Australia, China,
Guatemala, Korea, and Norway each notified its intention to appear at the oral
hearing as a third participant.[62] On 17 September 2015,
Thailand also notified its intention to appear at the oral hearing as a
third participant.[63]
1.14. On 13 July 2015, the Appellate Body
Division hearing this appeal informed the participants and the third
participants that the oral hearing would take place on 7‑8 September 2015.
On 15 July 2015, the Division received a letter from Mexico
requesting that the oral hearing not be held as scheduled because a key member
of Mexico's litigation team would not be available on those dates. Mexico
submitted that attending the
hearing with a reduced legal team would have an impact on its ability to
present adequately its arguments before the Appellate Body. Mexico requested the Division to
modify the date of the oral hearing to a date either before, or after, 7‑8 September
2015, and proposed 3-4 September or 21-22 September as possible alternative
dates. The Division wrote to the United States and to the third participants
soliciting their views on Mexico's request. Neither the United
States nor any of the third participants objected to Mexico's request, at least
with respect to the proposed alternative dates of 21‑22 September 2015. On 21 July
2015, the Division issued a Procedural Ruling finding that Mexico had identified
"exceptional circumstances", within the meaning of Rule 16(2) of
the Working Procedures for Appellate Review[64], warranting modification of the dates
for the oral hearing, and deciding to hold the oral hearing on 21‑22 September
2015.[65] In
reaching its conclusion, the Division took into account Mexico's right to defend properly its case, as well as the
high level of activity experienced currently by the WTO dispute settlement system, which can
impair a Member's ability to engage effectively in multiple, parallel
proceedings.[66]
1.15. By letter dated 3 August 2015[67], the Chair of the
Appellate Body notified the Chair of the DSB that the Appellate Body
would not be able to circulate its Report within the 60‑day period pursuant to Article 17.5
of the DSU, or within the 90-day period pursuant to the same provision. The
Chair of the Appellate Body explained that this was due to a number of
factors, including the substantial workload of the Appellate Body,
scheduling difficulties arising from overlap in the composition of Divisions
hearing appeals concurrently pending before the Appellate Body, the
rescheduling of the oral hearing in this appeal, the number and complexity of
the issues raised in these and concurrent appellate proceedings, and the
shortage of staff in the Appellate Body Secretariat. The Chair of the
Appellate Body estimated that the Report in this appeal would be
circulated to WTO Members no later than Friday, 20 November 2015.
1.16. The oral
hearing in this appeal was held on 21-22 September 2015. The participants and
five of the third participants (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and
Norway) made opening oral statements. The participants and third participants
responded to questions posed by the Members of the Appellate Body Division
hearing the appeal.[68]
2.1. The claims and arguments of the
participants are reflected in the executive summaries of their written
submissions provided to the Appellate Body.[69] The Notices of Appeal and Other Appeal, and the executive
summaries of the participants' claims and arguments, are contained in Annexes A
and B of the Addendum to this Report, WT/DS381/AB/RW/Add.1.
3.1. The arguments of those third
participants that submitted written submissions are reflected in the executive
summaries of their written submissions provided to the Appellate Body[70], and are contained in Annex C
of the Addendum to this Report, WT/DS381/AB/RW/Add.1.
4.1. The following issues are raised in
this appeal:
a. whether the Panel erred in its
application of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Articles I:1,
III:4, and XX of the GATT 1994 by making discrete findings regarding each of
the three different sets of requirements under the amended tuna measure[71], rather than making findings under
those provisions in respect of the amended tuna measure as a whole (raised by
Mexico);
b. with respect to Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement:
i. with respect to the detrimental
impact of the amended tuna measure, whether the Panel erred by finding that the
different certification requirements and the different tracking and
verification requirements modify the conditions of competition to the detriment
of Mexican tuna products in the US market on the basis that such requirements
impose a lesser burden on tuna products derived from tuna caught outside the
ETP large purse-seine fishery than on tuna products derived from tuna caught
within that fishery (raised by the United States);
ii. with respect to the Panel's
analysis of whether the detrimental impact of the amended tuna measure stems
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction:
-
whether the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 2.1 by
articulating an incorrect legal standard (raised by the United States);
-
with respect to the "eligibility criteria" (raised by Mexico):
·
whether the Panel erred in its application of Article 2.1 by
misreading the Appellate Body's findings in the original proceedings; and
·
whether the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty to conduct an
objective assessment of the matter pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU in
reaching its findings: (i) regarding the unobserved adverse effects on dolphins
of the fishing method of "setting on" dolphins; (ii) regarding the
unobserved adverse effects on dolphins of tuna fishing methods other than
setting on dolphins; and (iii) that the Appellate Body had made a finding
in the original proceedings that setting on dolphins is more harmful to
dolphins than other fishing methods; and
-
with respect to the "certification requirements" and the
"tracking and verification requirements":
·
whether the Panel erred in its application of Article 2.1 by not
taking into account: (i) the different levels of risk to dolphins inside and
outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery; or (ii) the fact that the
certification requirements and the tracking and verification requirements that
apply to the ETP large purse-seine fishery reflect international obligations
under the AIDCP (raised by the United States);
·
whether the Panel disregarded evidence on the record and thereby acted
inconsistently with its duty to conduct an objective assessment of the matter
pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU by failing to find that: (i) captains in
some cases have an economic incentive to under-report dolphin injury and
mortality; and (ii) tuna‑dolphin association and setting on dolphins occur
in certain ocean regions outside the ETP (raised by Mexico); and
·
whether, with respect to the "determination provisions"[72] (raised by the United States):
o the
Panel erred in its application of Article 2.1 by: (i) improperly making
the case for Mexico; and (ii) making its findings based solely on the design of
the determination provisions and not on their application;
o the
Panel acted inconsistently with its duty to conduct an objective assessment of
the matter pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU by failing to base its
findings on a sufficient evidentiary basis; and
c. whether the Panel erred in its
application of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 to the amended tuna
measure by finding that the certification requirements and the tracking and
verification requirements under the amended tuna measure provide an
"advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity" to tuna products from
other Members that is not "accorded immediately and unconditionally"
to like products from Mexico because they impose a lesser burden on tuna
products derived from tuna caught outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery
than on tuna products derived from tuna caught within that fishery (raised by
the United States);
d. whether the Panel erred in its
application of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 to the amended tuna
measure by finding that the certification requirements and the tracking and
verification requirements under the amended tuna measure accord "treatment
less favourable" to Mexican tuna products than that accorded to like
domestic products because they impose a lesser burden on tuna products derived
from tuna caught outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery than on tuna
products derived from tuna caught within that fishery (raised by the
United States); and
e. with respect to the chapeau of
Article XX of the GATT 1994:
i. whether, in assessing "countries where the same conditions
prevail", the Panel erred in its application of the chapeau
of Article XX by finding that:
-
the conditions are not the same in respect of the eligibility criteria
(raised by Mexico); or
-
the conditions are the same in respect of the certification requirements
and the tracking and verification requirements (raised by the United States);
ii. whether, in assessing
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination":
- the Panel erred in its
interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX by articulating an incorrect
legal standard and improperly relying on its analysis under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement (raised by the United States);
-
the Panel erred in its application of the chapeau of Article XX by
finding that the eligibility criteria are not applied in a manner that
constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination (raised by
Mexico);
-
the Panel erred in its application of the chapeau of Article XX by
finding that the certification requirements and the tracking and verification
requirements are applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination and, more specifically, whether the Panel erred
(raised by the United States):
·
by not taking into account the different levels of risk to dolphins
inside and outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery;
·
by not taking into account the fact that the certification requirements
and the tracking and verification requirements that apply to the ETP large
purse-seine fishery reflect international obligations under the AIDCP; and
·
in finding that, due to the determination provisions, the certification
requirements constitute a means of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.
5.1. The cover page of Mexico's appellee's
submission indicates that it "[c]ontains business confidential information
(BCI) on page 13".[73] Mexico also indicates in the cover letter to its appellee's submission
that it has served a "non-BCI version" of that submission on the
third participants.
5.2. Neither participant has requested
that we adopt special procedures for handling information designated as BCI in these
appellate proceedings, although the European Union, in its
third participant's submission, requests that the issue of BCI be
addressed in this Report. The European Union does not, however, refer to
Mexico's appellee's submission. Rather, the European Union asserts that,
in these proceedings, its ability to comment upon the Panel Report is impaired
by the extensive redaction of text said to contain BCI from the Panel's
reasoning with respect to the tracking and verification requirements under the
amended tuna measure.[74]
5.3. In disputes raising issues relating
to BCI, the Appellate Body has highlighted the need to distinguish between
"the general layer of confidentiality that applies in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings, as foreseen in Articles 18.2 and 13.1 of the
DSU", and "the additional layer of protection of sensitive business
information that a panel may choose to adopt, usually at the request of a party".[75] It is for the parties to request and justify the need for additional
protection of BCI.[76] It is for the panel and/or the Appellate Body, relying upon
objective criteria, to determine whether particular information deserves
additional protection, as well as the degree of protection that is warranted.[77] When additional procedures to protect BCI are adopted, the panel and/or
Appellate Body must also "adjudicate any disagreement or dispute that may
arise under those procedures regarding the designation or the treatment of
information as business confidential".[78] It is, moreover, for the adjudicator to ensure that an appropriate
balance is struck between the need to guard against the risk of harm that could
result from the disclosure of particularly sensitive information, on the one
hand, and the integrity of the adjudication process, the participation rights of
third participants, and the rights and systemic interests of the WTO membership
at large, on the other hand.[79] That same balance must be struck by a panel in applying any additional
procedures adopted. This means, among other things, that, when considering
whether to redact information from its report, a panel "should bear in
mind the rights of third parties and other WTO Members under various provisions
of the DSU"[80] and "ensure that the public version of its report circulated to
all Members of the WTO is understandable."[81]
5.4. In these proceedings, while the
cover page of the Panel Report does not mention BCI, the Panel redacted, in
part or in full, 17 paragraphs and 3 footnotes of its Report, in each case
replacing the redacted text with the following designation: "[[BCI]]".[82] We see no indication in the Panel record suggesting that either Mexico
or the United States requested the adoption of special procedures to protect
BCI. Nor does the record show that the Panel adopted such special procedures
either as part of its Working Procedures or on an ad hoc
basis.[83] The Panel Report also lacks an indication of the criteria used to
identify the information considered to constitute BCI. We are therefore
surprised by the fact that the Panel redacted portions of its reasoning from
its Report, and uncertain of the legal basis on which it did so.
5.5. We also observe that, absent any
request from the participants, procedures for additional protection of BCI do
not apply in these appellate proceedings.
5.6. A second preliminary issue relates
to the scope of these proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU. We note
that neither Mexico nor the United States claims on appeal that the Panel erred
in interpreting Article 21.5, or in understanding the scope and nature of
proceedings conducted under that provision.[84] Nonetheless, we find it useful to recall certain observations that the
Appellate Body has previously made in this regard.
5.7. The task of a panel operating
pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU is to resolve disagreements "as
to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of a measure taken to
comply with the recommendations and rulings" of the DSB.[85] Article 21.5 proceedings involve "a new and different measure
which was not before the original panel"[86], such that "the claims, arguments and factual circumstances which
are pertinent to the 'measure taken to comply' will not, necessarily, be the
same as those which were pertinent in the original dispute."[87] When a Member revises a measure found to be WTO-inconsistent in the
original proceedings by modifying only certain aspects and leaving others
unchanged, such revision, in principle, turns the original measure "in its
totality"[88] into a "new and different measure".[89] Indeed, even when certain elements of a compliance measure remain
unchanged from an original measure, the legal import and significance of such
elements may be altered as a result of the modifications introduced in other
parts of the compliance measure.[90]
5.8. In reviewing the WTO-consistency of
a measure "taken to comply", compliance panels should be mindful of
the principle of prompt settlement of disputes embodied in Article 3.3 of
the DSU.[91] Accordingly, compliance proceedings cannot be used "to 're-open'
issues decided in substance in the original proceedings".[92] At the same time, if certain claims against
aspects of a measure were not decided on the merits in the original
proceedings, "they are not covered by the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB" and, therefore, "a Member should not be entitled to assume that those aspects
of the measure are consistent with the covered agreements."[93] In
US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 –
Brazil), the Appellate Body stated that "[a] complaining Member
ordinarily would not be allowed to raise claims in an Article 21.5
proceeding that it could have pursued in the original proceedings, but did
not."[94] In US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 –
EC), the Appellate Body clarified, however, that this is not the
case for "new claims against a measure taken to comply" when such
measure "incorporates components of the original measure that are
unchanged, but are not separable from other aspects of
the measure taken to comply".[95] Thus, the possibility to challenge
an element of the measure at issue for the first time in compliance
proceedings, even if that element may not have changed, hinges on the
"critical question" of whether such an element forms "an
integral part of the measure taken to comply".[96]
5.9. The Appellate Body has also
explained that "Article 21.5 proceedings do not occur in isolation
from the original proceedings, but that both proceedings form part of a
continuum of events."[97] Since Article 21.5 of the DSU
expressly links the "measures taken to comply" with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB concerning the original measure, a
panel's examination of a measure taken to comply "cannot … be undertaken
in abstraction from the findings by the original panel and the Appellate Body
adopted by the DSB"[98], but must rather be conducted
"with due cognizance of this background".[99] Indeed, "doubts could arise
about the objective nature of an Article 21.5 panel's assessment" if,
on a specific issue, that panel were to "deviate from the reasoning"
in the original report "in the absence of any change in the underlying
evidence in the record".[100] In other words, a compliance panel
should take due account of the relevant reasoning that led to the original
measure being found to be WTO-inconsistent in its examination of whether the
measure taken to comply redresses such WTO-inconsistencies. The relevance of
the original reasoning and findings to a compliance panel's analysis must be
ascertained on a case-by-case basis, and may vary depending on factors such as
the degree of similarity between the measure taken to comply with the original
measure, or the extent to which the features of the relevant market have
changed.
6.1. These proceedings under Article 21.5
of the DSU concern a labelling regime for tuna products[101] maintained by the United States.
6.2. Commercial tuna fishing can have
harmful effects on marine mammals, including dolphins, and these may vary
depending on factors such as the method of fishing used, the size of the
fishing vessel, and the area of the ocean in which the vessel engages in tuna
fishing. Since the 1970s[102], the United States has undertaken certain domestic measures, and
participated in certain multilateral initiatives, aimed at reducing the adverse
effects on dolphins associated with commercial fishing operations.
6.3. In 1990, the United States put in
place a domestic regime for labelling tuna products as "dolphin-safe"
through the enactment of the DPCIA.[103] As explained below, this instrument, as subsequently amended, together
with its implementing regulations and a court decision, constitute the
"amended tuna measure", the measure at issue in these compliance proceedings.
Together, these instruments aim to: (i) ensure that consumers are not misled or
deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna caught in a manner that adversely
affects dolphins; and (ii) contribute to the protection of dolphins by ensuring
that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna in
a manner that adversely affects dolphins.[104] The amended tuna measure defines what constitutes dolphin-safe tuna
products for purposes of the US market, and establishes certain
requirements and conditions that must be satisfied in order for a tuna product
sold in the United States to bear a label indicating that it is
dolphin-safe. The preferences of consumers and retailers in the United States
are such that a dolphin-safe label has "significant commercial value"
in the US market for tuna products.[105]
6.4. At the international level, both
the United States and Mexico are parties to the AIDCP, an agreement among 14
countries that entered into force in February 1999.[106] The AIDCP, administered by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC), addresses a particular tuna fishing method (purse-seine fishing) in a
specific area of the ocean, namely, the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP).[107]
6.5. Within this area of the ocean[108], there is a regular association between tuna and dolphins, meaning that
schools of tuna tend to aggregate and swim beneath certain species of dolphins.[109] Certain vessels operating in this area thus employ the fishing
technique known as "setting on" dolphins, which takes advantage of
this association, and involves chasing and encircling the dolphins with a
purse-seine net in order to catch the tuna swimming beneath the dolphins.[110] The ETP is a "traditional fishing ground" for Mexico, and its
tuna fleet operates almost exclusively therein using the method of setting on
dolphins.[111]
6.6. The AIDCP was negotiated in
response to evidence that many dolphins were dying in the ETP each year[112] and, together with the instruments that have been adopted thereunder[113], establishes a programme of monitoring, tracking, verification, and
certification of particular tuna fishing practices in the ETP.[114] The AIDCP is recognized to have made an important contribution to
dolphin protection and to the dramatic reduction of observed dolphin mortality
in the ETP.[115] The AIDCP regulates the fishing methods of purse-seine vessels in the
ETP according to the size of the vessel, by prohibiting small purse-seine
vessels from setting on dolphins and permitting large purse-seine vessels to
set on dolphins only within specified dolphin mortality limits (DMLs).[116] Under the AIDCP, large purse-seine vessels are also subject to a number
of requirements in respect of the fishing gear that they must carry and certain
procedures that they must perform, so as to reduce the risks to dolphins arising
from setting on dolphins. The AIDCP has established certain mechanisms to
enforce these requirements and mortality limits. In addition to mandating the presence
of independent observers on board large purse-seine vessels fishing in the ETP,
each party must also establish its own tracking and verification programme,
implemented and operated by a designated national authority, and ensure that it
includes periodic audits and spot checks for tuna products.[117] Finally, voluntary procedures are put in place to enable tuna caught
and tracked in accordance with this programme to receive an "AIDCP
dolphin-safe certification".[118] As discussed below, the AIDCP's definition of "dolphin safe"
is not coextensive with the definition of "dolphin safe" under
the US measure at issue in this dispute.[119]
6.7. Mexico challenges the
United States' regulatory regime establishing the conditions for the use
of a dolphin-safe label on tuna products sold in the US market. As discussed
above[120], in its request for the establishment of an Article 21.5 panel,
Mexico asserted that the US regime comprises the following three legal
instruments: (i) the DPCIA[121]; (ii) the implementing regulations[122]; and (iii) the Hogarth ruling.[123]
6.8. Taken together, the DPCIA, the
implementing regulations, and the Hogarth ruling constitute the "amended
tuna measure"[124] and condition access to a dolphin-safe label upon certain requirements that
vary depending on the fishing method by which tuna contained in the tuna
product is harvested, the ocean area where it is caught, and the type of vessel
used. The DPCIA and the implementing regulations also prohibit any reference to
dolphins, porpoises, or marine mammals on the label of a tuna product if the
tuna contained in the product does not comply with the labelling conditions
spelled out in these instruments.[125]
6.9. The amended tuna measure sets out several
substantive conditions for access to the dolphin‑safe label. First, the measure
disqualifies from access to that label all tuna products containing tuna
harvested by two methods of fishing: (i) large-scale driftnet fishing on the
high seas; and (ii) vessels using purse-seine nets to encircle or "set
on" dolphins anywhere in the world.[126] Although the DPCIA's disqualification of tuna products derived from tuna
caught by setting on dolphins was suspended in 2002 by virtue of administrative
action[127], the Hogarth ruling overturned that action shortly thereafter[128], thereby restoring this condition of access to the US dolphin-safe
labelling regime. The disqualification of tuna products containing tuna caught
by setting on dolphins thus formed part of, and is unchanged as compared to, the
original tuna measure. Second, all other tuna products, that is, those
containing tuna harvested by all other fishing methods, are eligible for the
dolphin-safe label only if no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the
sets or other gear deployment in which the tuna were caught. The amended tuna
measure also prescribes a number of certification requirements and tracking and
verification requirements relating to the substantive conditions.
6.10. Apart from large-scale driftnet
fishing on the high seas[129], the amended tuna measure distinguishes among three general categories
of fisheries[130]: (i) large purse-seine[131] vessels in the ETP[132] (the ETP large purse-seine fishery); (ii) purse-seine vessels
outside the ETP[133] (the non-ETP purse‑seine fishery); and (iii) other fisheries,
which include non-purse-seine vessels in any ocean area and small purse‑seine
vessels in the ETP ("all other fisheries").[134] Access to the dolphin-safe label for all fisheries requires
certification that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets or
other gear deployment in which the tuna were caught ("no dolphins killed
or seriously injured" certification). For tuna caught by purse-seine
vessels falling within the first two categories, certification that no
purse-seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins
during the particular trip on which the tuna were caught ("no setting on
dolphins" certification) is also a condition of access to the label. The
relevant certification(s) must be made by a vessel's captain. The relevant
certification(s) may also need to be made by an observer in certain defined
circumstances.
6.11. More specifically, for tuna products
derived from tuna caught in the ETP large purse-seine fishery, both of the
above certifications have to be provided by both the captain and an International
Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP)‑approved observer. For tuna products
derived from tuna caught in any fishery other than the ETP large purse-seine
fishery, these certifications have to be provided, in principle, only by the
vessel captain.[135] For such tuna products, it is only
where the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)[136] Assistant Administrator has made
certain determinations that the amended tuna measure also conditions access to
the label upon the provision of the above certifications by a qualified and
approved observer. This additional requirement to provide observer
certification(s) is triggered when the NMFS Assistant Administrator makes a
determination with respect to a specific fishery: (i) within the non-ETP purse‑seine
fishery, that there is a regular and significant association between dolphins
and tuna, similar to the association between dolphins and tuna in the ETP; or (ii) within
"all other fisheries", that there is a regular and significant
mortality or serious injury of dolphins.[137] The Panel referred to this aspect
of the amended tuna measure as the "determination provisions".[138]
6.12. Furthermore, under the amended tuna
measure, access to the dolphin-safe label requires the segregation of
dolphin-safe and non-dolphin-safe tuna from the moment of the catch through the
entire processing chain. In order to track and verify the dolphin-safe status
of tuna, the NMFS has established the Tuna Tracking and Verification Program
(TTVP).[139] The basic requirement to segregate dolphin-safe from non-dolphin-safe
tuna from the time it was caught through unloading and processing applies irrespective
of the area of the ocean in which the tuna was caught and the type of vessel
that harvested it.[140] More detailed segregation requirements apply, however, to tuna products
derived from tuna caught in the ETP large purse-seine fishery, given that the
tracking and verification of tuna caught in this fishery should be conducted
consistent with the AIDCP Resolution to Adopt the Modified System for Tracking
and Verification of Tuna[141] (AIDCP Tracking and Verification System).[142]
6.13. Certain documentation requirements
pertain to the segregation that is to be conducted by persons and entities
involved in the catch and processing of tuna. First, all tuna products imported
into the United States, regardless of where the tuna is caught and whether
the dolphin-safe label is used, must be accompanied by a Fisheries Certificate
of Origin[143] (Form 370) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).[144] Form 370 requires the importer to indicate whether it seeks to declare
the status of the tuna product as "dolphin‑safe", and, if so, to
attach the certification(s) identified as necessary to establish the
dolphin-safe status of the relevant category.[145] Second, tuna caught by US-flagged large purse-seine vessels fishing in
the ETP must be accompanied by Tuna Tracking Forms (TTFs), which record certain
information regarding each tuna set made on a particular fishing trip. One TTF
is used to record dolphin-safe sets and another one to record non-dolphin-safe
sets. For non-US-flagged large purse-seine vessels in the ETP, the TTF numbers
must be listed in a certification attached to the Form 370.[146]
6.14. Tracking and verification
requirements also apply regarding the oversight exercised by US authorities
on importers and US-based persons and entities involved in the catch and
processing of tuna for sale in the US market. The relevant provisions provide
for checks to be performed on the operation of US canneries[147], and require monthly reports from
canneries and other US tuna processors containing certain specified information,
including the certifications required for access to the dolphin-safe label.[148] US authorities may also conduct
audits and spot checks on any exporter, trans-shipper, importer, processor, or
wholesaler/distributor of tuna or tuna products.[149]
6.15. The specific conditions applicable
to the three categories of fisheries under the amended tuna measure are
described below.
6.16. We recall that the original tuna
measure comprised three legal instruments: the DPCIA; the original implementing
regulations; and the Hogarth ruling. In the amended tuna measure, the DPCIA and
the Hogarth ruling remain unchanged. Conversely, the 2013 Final Rule, which the
United States identifies as the measure taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the original proceedings[150], modified certain aspects of Sections 216.91 and 216.93 of CFR Title 50.[151] The other sections of the implementing regulations challenged by Mexico
– notably Section 216.92, which sets out requirements for access to the
dolphin-safe label that apply specifically to tuna products derived from tuna
harvested in the ETP by large purse-seine vessels – are unchanged by the
2013 Final Rule.
6.17. In order to qualify for the
dolphin-safe label, tuna products derived from tuna caught by a large
purse-seine vessel in the ETP must be accompanied by the following
certifications:
a.
a certification from an authorized IATTC or government official that an
IDCP‑approved observer was on board the vessel during the entire trip during
which the tuna was caught[152]; and
b.
a certification from the vessel captain and an IDCP-approved observer
that:
i.
no purse-seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle
dolphins during the same fishing trip[153]; and
ii.
no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets in which the
tuna was caught.[154]
6.18. These certification requirements
should be distinguished from those under the AIDCP, where
"dolphin-safe" tuna is defined as "tuna captured in sets in
which there is no mortality or serious injury of dolphins".[155]
6.19. As regards the tracking and
verification requirements, access to the dolphin-safe label for US-flagged
large purse-seine vessels fishing in the ETP is conditional upon maintaining
TTFs consistently with the AIDCP Tracking and Verification System.[156] IDCP‑approved TTFs, each bearing a unique number, are used by the
observer to record every set made during a fishing trip. Two TTFs are used for
each trip, one to record tuna harvested in dolphin-safe sets, and one to record
tuna harvested in non‑dolphin-safe sets.[157] A set is "non‑dolphin safe" if a dolphin died or was
seriously injured during the set.[158] The IDCP-approved observer[159] and the vessel engineer each initials the entry following each set, and
the vessel captain and the observer review and sign both TTFs at the end of the
fishing trip certifying that the information on the forms is accurate. Tuna
caught in sets designated as dolphin safe by the observer must be stored
separately from tuna caught in non-dolphin-safe sets from the time of capture
through unloading.[160] Independent observers monitor the
loading and unloading of wells, and individual lots of tuna are assigned the
corresponding TTF tracking numbers that can be traced through each step of
production of the tuna products.[161]
6.20. The amended tuna measure directly
conditions access to the dolphin-safe label upon maintaining TTFs only for tuna
products derived from tuna caught by US‑flagged ETP large purse‑seine vessels.[162] In practice, however, the same tracking and verification regime also
applies in respect of non-US-flagged large purse-seine vessels in the ETP. Under
the amended tuna measure, tuna products containing tuna harvested in the ETP by
non-US-flagged large purse-seine vessels may be labelled dolphin safe only
if the vessel belongs to a nation that is a party to the AIDCP.[163] In addition, it is undisputed between the parties that the AIDCP
requires imposition of the same TTF system as the one implemented by the
amended tuna measure for US-flagged ETP large purse-seine vessels.[164] Moreover, Form 370 requires that imports of tuna harvested by non‑US-flagged
ETP large purse-seine vessels, or of tuna products derived from the same, be
accompanied by documentation from the appropriate IDCP member country
certifying that there was an IDCP‑approved observer on board the vessel at all
times and listing the numbers for the associated TTFs.[165] Thus, under the amended tuna measure, tuna products containing tuna
caught by both US‑flagged and non-US-flagged large purse-seine vessels in the
ETP have access to the dolphin-safe label only if the handling of the TTFs and
the tracking and verification of tuna is conducted consistent with the AIDCP
Tracking and Verification System.[166]
6.21. The certification and tracking and
verification requirements applicable to large purse-seine vessels in the ETP
remain unchanged from the original tuna measure.[167]
6.22. In order to qualify for the
dolphin-safe label, tuna products derived from tuna caught by a non-ETP
purse-seine vessel[168] must be accompanied by a
certification from the vessel captain that:
a. no purse-seine net was
intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the same fishing
trip; and
b.
no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets in which the
tuna was caught.[169]
6.23. Therefore, in principle,
certification by the vessel captain is sufficient for tuna products derived
from tuna caught by purse-seine vessels outside the ETP to gain access to the
label. Nevertheless, a requirement also to provide these certifications from an
observer participating in a national or international programme acceptable to
the NMFS Assistant Administrator will be triggered, in the event that the NMFS Assistant Administrator determines for a specific fishery
that regular and significant association occurs between dolphins and tuna
similar to the association between dolphins and tuna in the ETP.[170] At the time of the panel request in these Article 21.5
proceedings, however, no fishery outside the ETP had been determined to have
regular and significant association between dolphins and tuna similar to that
in the ETP.[171]
6.24. Therefore, in order to obtain access
to the dolphin-safe label, tuna products derived from tuna caught by
purse-seine vessels outside the ETP are presently required to have a captain's
certification that there were "no dolphins killed or seriously
injured" and that there was "no setting on dolphins". Under the original tuna measure, the only requirement for
access to the dolphin-safe label applicable to such tuna products was to
provide a captain's certification of "no setting on dolphins".[172]
6.25. The amended tuna measure also
imposes segregation requirements on this fishery. Tuna caught in sets
designated as dolphin safe must be stored separately from tuna caught in
non‑dolphin-safe sets from the time of capture through unloading.[173] Imported tuna products must also be accompanied by a Form 370,
which identifies the gear type that was used to catch the tuna, and contains
the necessary certifications.[174]
6.26. Imported tuna products derived from
tuna caught in "all other fisheries", i.e. by non‑purse‑seine vessels
in any fishery and small purse-seine vessels in the ETP, may be labelled
dolphin safe when accompanied by a certification by the vessel captain
that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets in which the
tuna was caught.[175]
6.27. Nevertheless, a requirement also to
provide such certification from an observer participating in a national or
international programme acceptable to the NMFS Assistant Administrator will be
triggered, in the event that the NMFS Assistant Administrator determines for a
certain fishery that there is regular and
significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins.[176] At the time of the panel request in these Article 21.5
proceedings, no fishery outside the ETP had been determined to have regular and
significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins.[177]
6.28. Therefore, in order to obtain access
to the dolphin-safe label, tuna products derived from tuna caught by
non-purse-seine vessels in any fishery and by small purse-seine vessels in the
ETP are presently required to have a captain's certification that there were
"no dolphins killed or seriously injured". Under the original tuna
measure, access to the dolphin-safe label for such tuna products was not
subject to any certification requirements.[178]
6.29. The tracking and verification
requirements applicable to this category of fisheries correspond to those for
tuna caught by purse-seine vessels outside the ETP.[179]
6.30. In summary, under the amended tuna
measure, all tuna products derived from tuna caught on a fishing trip involving
setting on dolphins remain disqualified from access to the dolphin-safe label. Access
to the label is conditional upon the provision of a certification: (a) from
both the vessel captain and an IDCP-approved observer that there were "no
dolphins killed or seriously injured" and that there was "no setting
on dolphins", in the case of tuna products derived from tuna caught by a
large purse-seine vessel in the ETP[180]; (b) from the vessel captain that
there were "no dolphins killed or seriously injured" and that there
was "no setting on dolphins", in the case of tuna products derived
from tuna caught by a non-ETP purse-seine vessel; and (c) from the vessel
captain that there were "no dolphins killed or seriously injured", in
the case of tuna products derived from tuna caught in "all other
fisheries". Therefore, in the absence of any determinations made by the
NMFS Assistant Administrator[181], observer certification is a condition
for access to the dolphin-safe label only as regards tuna products derived from
tuna harvested in the ETP large purse‑seine fishery. Moreover, the amended tuna
measure extends the same basic condition to segregate dolphin-safe from non‑dolphin-safe
tuna across fisheries in all ocean areas. Specific documentation requirements
in the form of TTFs, however, exist only for tuna products derived from tuna
caught in the ETP large purse-seine fishery.
6.31. As the overview above shows, the
2013 Final Rule introduced several modifications to the conditions for access
to the dolphin-safe label, as compared to the original tuna measure. All of the
changes apply only in respect of tuna caught in fisheries outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery. For such fisheries, the 2013 Final
Rule introduced three additional conditions, as set out below.
6.32. First, outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery, the amended tuna measure adds as a condition of access to
the dolphin-safe label for any tuna product the requirement that a
certification be provided by the vessel captain that "no dolphins were
killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear deployments in which the
tuna were caught". No such certification was required under the original
tuna measure. Rather, under the original tuna measure, such certification was
required only for tuna products derived from tuna caught by large purse-seine
vessels fishing in the ETP.[182]
6.33. Second, outside the ETP large purse-seine
fishery, the amended tuna measure establishes as a condition of access to the
dolphin-safe label certain segregation requirements whereby tuna caught in sets
or other gear deployments designated as dolphin safe must be stored
separately from tuna caught in non-dolphin-safe sets or other gear deployments.
Such tuna must be offloaded and stored in such a way as to maintain segregation
as the tuna leaves the fishing vessel, as well as during the operations of US tuna
canneries and other processors. By contrast, under the original tuna measure,
segregation was a condition for access to the dolphin-safe label only for tuna
products derived from tuna caught by large purse-seine vessels fishing in the
ETP.[183]
6.34. Third, outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery, the amended tuna measure contemplates that access to the
dolphin-safe label for a particular fishery may also be subject to certification
by an observer of "no dolphins killed or seriously injured" and,
where applicable, of "no setting on dolphins"[184], where the NMFS Assistant Administrator has determined such observer to
be qualified and authorized to make the relevant certifications, and the
observer is already on board the vessel.[185] Under the original tuna measure, no such possibility to trigger an
additional requirement for certification by an observer existed as a condition
for access to the dolphin-safe label.
7.1. We first address Mexico's claim
that the Panel erred because it reached findings of inconsistency in "a
narrow manner rather than concluding that the amended tuna measure, as a whole,
is inconsistent with the covered agreements".[186] Specifically, Mexico considers
that the Panel erred in finding that only two of the three elements of the
amended tuna measure – the "certification requirements" and the
"tracking and verification requirements", but not the
"eligibility criteria" – are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement and Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. Mexico asserts that
it challenged the amended tuna measure "as a whole"[187], and that it differentiated
between the three different elements of the measure only in making its
arguments regarding the legitimate regulatory distinction that is the focus of
the second step in the analysis of "treatment no less favourable"
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, and regarding the chapeau analysis
under Article XX of the GATT 1994. According to Mexico, "it is the amended
tuna measure that violates WTO provisions, … not individual elements of the
measure considered in isolation".[188] Mexico requests us to modify the
findings and conclusions of the Panel and find that the amended tuna measure as
a whole is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Articles I:1
and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[189]
7.2. The United States maintains that
Mexico's claim should be rejected. First, the United States contends that
Mexico identifies no legal basis for its assertion that the Panel did not
properly consider Mexico's claims of discrimination.[190] Second, the United States
considers that the factual premise of Mexico's claim is wrong since Mexico did
refer to the certification and tracking and verification requirements elsewhere
in its submissions, notably in its arguments relating to detrimental impact
under the first step of the analysis of "treatment no less
favourable" under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[191] Third, the United States maintains
that, whether the detrimental impact caused by the three elements is assessed
together or separately, the Panel's analysis would have been the same.[192]
7.3. In addressing this claim by Mexico,
we first recount the relevant findings from the panel and the Appellate Body in
the original proceedings, as well as the relevant findings of the Panel in
these Article 21.5 proceedings. In the original proceedings, the panel
considered that the separate legal instruments challenged by Mexico –
consisting of the DPCIA, the original implementing regulations, and the Hogarth
ruling – together, set out the terms of the US dolphin-safe labelling regime,
and therefore comprised a single measure for purposes of its analysis of
Mexico's claims.[193] The Appellate Body made a similar
statement in its report, further noting that the requirements set out in these
separate legal instruments, together, "condition eligibility for a
'dolphin-safe' label upon
certain documentary evidence that varies depending on the area where the tuna
contained in the tuna product is harvested and the type of vessel and fishing
method by which it is harvested".[194] Although both the original panel
and the Appellate Body addressed different aspects of the conditions for access
to the US dolphin-safe label under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, including
certain certification and tracking and verification requirements[195], they also each defined, and
reached ultimate findings in respect of, a single measure consisting of
"the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions".[196]
7.4. The Article 21.5 Panel addressed
the scope and content of the amended tuna measure in two separate parts of its
reasoning. At the outset of its Report, in discussing its jurisdiction under
Article 21.5 of the DSU, the Panel considered it "clear" that
the Appellate Body's conclusions and recommendations in the original proceedings
were meant to apply to the original tuna measure "as a whole,
including all its components".[197] The Panel also addressed the
United States' argument that the distinctions drawn by the challenged elements
of the amended tuna measure were unchanged from the original measure and
therefore not subject to these Article 21.5 proceedings. In that analysis, the
Panel stressed that, in finding that the original tuna measure lacked even‑handedness,
the Appellate Body "did not say that any one particular element of the
regulatory scheme … was solely responsible for this lack of
even-handedness."[198] Instead, it was "the tuna
measure as a whole, with its varying regulatory requirements, that was found to
be inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement."[199] In particular, the Panel
considered that the Appellate Body's reference in the plural to "the
difference in labelling conditions" and "different requirements"
indicated that the Appellate Body's findings encompassed various distinctions
embedded in the original tuna measure, including in respect of the requirements
pertaining to certification and tracking and verification.[200] On the basis of this analysis, the
Panel concluded that it was faced with the legal question of whether the
amended tuna measure, including the 2013 Final Rule, brings the
United States into compliance with WTO law, and that it had jurisdiction
to consider all of Mexico's claims, including as they relate to the eligibility
criteria and the certification and tracking and verification requirements.[201]
7.5. Subsequently, in examining Mexico's
claim under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the Panel stated that its task
was "to determine whether the amended tuna measure as a whole affords
'less favourable treatment' to Mexican tuna and tuna products than to tuna and
tuna products from the United States and other WTO Members."[202] Noting Mexico's explanation that such an analysis focuses "on the
regulatory distinction that accounts for the detrimental treatment on Mexican
tuna products as compared to US tuna products and tuna products
originating in other countries"[203], the Panel considered that Mexico had identified three "central
regulatory distinctions" whose design and application give rise to less
favourable treatment, namely:
a. the "eligibility
criteria", defined as "[t]he disqualification of setting on dolphins
in accordance with [the] AIDCP as a fishing method that can be used to catch
tuna in the ETP in a dolphin-safe manner and the qualification of other fishing
methods to catch tuna in a dolphin-safe manner";
b. the "certification
requirements", defined as "[t]he mandatory independent observer
requirements for tuna caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins in accordance
with the AIDCP and the absence of such requirements for tuna caught outside the
ETP using the same and different fishing methods"; and
c. the "tracking and verification
requirements", defined as "[t]he record-keeping and verification
requirements for tuna caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins in accordance
with the AIDCP and the different requirements for tuna caught outside the ETP
using both the same and different fishing methods".[204]
7.6. Mexico referred to these
collectively as "the difference in labelling conditions and
requirements", and maintained that this difference means that "all
like US tuna products and most tuna products of other countries have
access to the dolphin-safe label", whereas "the amended tuna measure
denies access to this label for most Mexican tuna products."[205] The Panel also recalled the
United States' view that any detrimental impact results only from the
eligibility criteria, and that the certification and tracking and verification
requirements are not relevant because they "do not cause the detrimental
impact that was the basis for the DSB's recommendations and rulings".[206]
7.7. The Panel considered that Mexico's
argumentation on the detrimental impact caused by the certification and
tracking and verification requirements "developed" over the course of
its written submissions.[207] Although the Panel noted Mexico's
contention that it is the differences in labelling conditions and requirements
of the measure that "together"[208] deny Mexican products competitive
opportunities, the Panel considered that "Mexico's argumentation
throughout these proceedings made clear that different elements of the amended
tuna measure negatively affect Mexican tuna in different ways."[209] The Panel then summarized its understanding of the parties' arguments
and the structure of the analysis that it would follow, thusly:
[B]oth parties have structured their arguments throughout these
proceedings on the basis of the three regulatory distinctions identified by
Mexico. That is, while Mexico has argued that the relevant less favourable
treatment emerges only or at least most clearly when all three distinctions are
considered together, it has nevertheless presented its arguments on a
distinction-by-distinction basis. The United States has followed suit, and
presented its arguments on the three regulatory distinctions separately. We
have decided to follow the approach of the parties in presenting our own
analysis. Although we will indicate the connections between these distinctions
where relevant, we conduct our analysis in three parts, considering first the
eligibility criteria; second, the different certification requirements; and
third, the different tracking and verification requirements.[210]
7.8. In the remainder of its Report, the
Panel proceeded to undertake separate analyses, and to make separate findings,
in respect of each of: the "eligibility criteria"; the "different
certification requirements"; and the "different tracking and
verification requirements".
7.9. We make several observations about
the nature of Mexico's claim of error on appeal and how it relates to the
analytical approach that was adopted by the Panel.
7.10. First, we note Mexico's contention
that it identified and addressed the three different elements of the measure as
relevant to the second step of the analysis under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement (namely, whether any detrimental impact stems exclusively
from a legitimate regulatory distinction), rather than to the first step of
that analysis (namely, whether the measure at issue modifies the conditions of
competition to the detriment of imported products). According to Mexico, the
Panel confused Mexico's arguments relating to these two different steps of the
analysis and wrongly characterized Mexico's identification of the regulatory
distinctions that were relevant for the second step of the analysis under
Article 2.1 as arguments relating to the detrimental impact of the amended tuna
measure.[211] Although Mexico claims, generally,
that the Panel erred by making discrete findings of consistency and
inconsistency in respect of the three elements of the measure, instead of in
respect of the measure as a whole, we understand that Mexico is principally
targeting the Panel's decision to analyse three distinct forms of detrimental
impact and to segment its analysis of them.[212]
7.11. We further note that the Panel's
decision to segment its analysis and separately address the three elements of
the amended tuna measure had repercussions beyond its detrimental impact
analysis. Indeed, the Panel also segmented its consideration of the three
elements of the amended tuna measure for purposes of the second step of its
Article 2.1 analysis, namely, the assessment of whether the detrimental impact
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. In addition, the
Panel similarly segmented its analysis concerning Mexico's claims under
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, as well as the United States'
affirmative defence under Article XX. Thus, the Panel divided every stage of
its analysis under the substantive obligations of the TBT Agreement and
the GATT 1994 into three parts relating to the "eligibility
criteria", the "different certification requirements", and the
"different tracking and verification requirements."[213]
7.12. In addition, the Panel also made discrete findings regarding the conformity of each element with the applicable legal obligation. Thus, the
Panel found that the "eligibility criteria" in the amended tuna
measure do not accord less favourable treatment
to Mexican tuna and tuna products than that accorded to like products from the
United States and other countries, and are thus not inconsistent with
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[214] Conversely, the Panel separately
found that each set of "certification requirements" and
"tracking and verification requirements" accord less favourable
treatment to Mexican tuna and tuna products than that accorded to like products
from the United States and other countries, in violation of
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[215] Similarly, the Panel made three
discrete findings that each element of the amended tuna measure is inconsistent
with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[216] Finally, the Panel made discrete
findings with respect to each of the three elements of the amended tuna measure
under subparagraph (g) and the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.
Although the Panel found that each element of the amended tuna measure was
provisionally justified under Article XX(g), it found that the
"eligibility criteria" meet the requirements of the chapeau, whereas
the "different certification requirements" and the "different tracking
and verification requirements" do not.[217] Thus, the Panel found the
"eligibility criteria", but not the "certification
requirements" or "tracking and verification requirements", to be
justified under Article XX. At no point in its Report did the Panel reach a
finding of consistency or inconsistency of the amended tuna measure more broadly,
or as a whole, with a substantive obligation of the WTO covered agreements.[218]
7.13. We observe that analysing a measure
in a segmented manner may raise concerns when the constituent parts of the
measure are interrelated and operate in an integrated way. In
EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body
criticized the panel's approach of examining the measure at issue in two
separate stages by focusing first on the prohibitions of the measure, before
examining the measure's exceptions. Because the scope of the prohibitions of
that measure "can only be understood in light of the exceptions", and
because "the exceptions in the measure would have no autonomous legal
significance in the absence of the prohibitions", the Appellate Body
concluded that the measure should have been examined "as an integrated
whole".[219] In EC –
Seal Products, the Appellate Body noted that the issue of how best
to characterize a measure at issue that consists of several different elements
is an issue of "particular significance" in cases where the inclusion
or exclusion of certain elements in the definition of the measure "can affect the legal characterization, or substantive analysis
of the measure".[220] Noting that the panel had found
that the relevant legal instruments in that dispute operated in conjunction
with each other, that the permissive and the prohibitive elements of the measure were intertwined,
and that the parties had agreed that the measure at issue
should be treated as a single measure, the Appellate Body "consider[ed] it
appropriate to draw conclusions regarding the legal characterization of the EU
Seal Regime as a whole on the basis of an integrated analysis of the
constituent parts of the measure".[221] The Appellate Body went on to
consider that it was only the combined operation of the various aspects of the
measure at issue that gave rise to findings of discrimination under
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[222]
7.14. As a general matter, we do not see
that it is necessarily inappropriate for a panel, in analysing the conformity
of a measure with obligations under the WTO covered agreements, to proceed by
assessing different elements of the measure in a sequential manner. Indeed,
such an approach may, depending on the nature of the measure at issue, be
useful, or in some instances critical, to understanding how that measure is
designed and applied. In some instances, it may even be unobjectionable for a
panel to reach separate findings of inconsistency with respect to separate
elements of a measure, for instance, where the elements of the measure are
separable, such that they do not depend on each other in substance or in
operation.
7.15. Other types of measures, however,
may not be so easily parsed, and the approach taken in scrutinizing such
measures must not lead to the isolated consideration of a particular element,
or particular elements, of a measure in a manner that undermines the legal
analysis or leads to a legal conclusion that would have differed had that
element been assessed in relation to other relevant elements of the measure. In
scenarios where the elements of a measure are interrelated, and certain
elements cannot be properly understood without reference to other elements of
the measure, such a segmented approach may create artificial distinctions
constituting legal error. We also see that, depending on the nature of the
legal obligation at issue, a segmented approach may raise concerns when a panel
fails to make an overall assessment that synthesizes its reasoning or
intermediate conclusions concerning related elements of a measure at issue so
as to reach a proper finding of consistency or inconsistency in respect of that
measure.
7.16. In our view, there are various
"connections" between the different elements of the amended tuna
measure that are relevant to the regulatory distinctions examined by the Panel.
We observe, for instance, that the original panel and the Appellate Body found
that the objectives of the US dolphin-safe labelling regime are, first,
"ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna
products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins", and, second, "contributing to the protection of dolphins,
by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to
catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins".[223] These are also the objectives of
the amended tuna measure.[224] Thus, like the original measure,
the amended tuna measure establishes a labelling regime consisting of various
elements that are aimed at fulfilling the same objectives.
7.17. In addition to sharing a common
purpose, the elements of the amended tuna measure are also highly
interconnected. For instance, the two substantive conditions for access to the
dolphin‑safe label – namely, the conditions of "no setting on
dolphins" and "no dolphins killed or seriously injured" – are
both defined by, and verified through, the associated certification and
tracking and verification requirements. For all covered fisheries, compliance
with these conditions is demonstrated through the provision of certain certifications.[225] The measure also establishes a
programme for the tracking of tuna that is based on the substantive conditions
and that depends, inter alia, on the certifications
that must accompany tuna products derived from tuna meeting these conditions
throughout the catch and subsequent processing of such tuna.[226] In our view, these various
provisions underscore the interrelated nature of the different elements of the
amended tuna measure examined by the Panel. As the original panel and the
Appellate Body noted, the existence of the substantive conditions of "no
setting on dolphins" and "no dolphins killed or seriously
injured" would be meaningless in the absence of requirements that enforce
compliance with such standards.[227] Under these circumstances, we do
not consider that the substantive conditions for gaining access to the
dolphin-safe label can be properly understood without reference to the
certification and tracking and verification requirements that define, and
demonstrate compliance with, those very conditions.
7.18. At several points in its analysis,
the Panel acknowledged the interrelationships between the various elements of
the amended tuna measure. As we have noted, in discussing its jurisdiction
under Article 21.5, the Panel confirmed that it would examine the amended tuna
measure as a whole, including its varying regulatory requirements.[228] In addition, after noting that the
Appellate Body's findings encompassed various distinctions embedded in the
original tuna measure, including the certification and tracking and
verification requirements, the Panel stated that the US dolphin-safe labelling
regime "necessarily includes" not only the certification requirements,
but also the various documentation requirements constituting "the
mechanisms by which compliance with that standard is monitored and
demonstrated".[229] The Panel subsequently underscored
not only that the amended tuna measure, and in particular the 2013 Final
Rule, "relates directly to the substantive declarations or certifications
that must be made before a catch of tuna can be labelled as being dolphin‑safe",
but that, in addition, the tracking and verification mechanisms "are
central aspects of the tuna measure, working together with the substantive
certification requirements".[230] On that basis, the Panel disagreed
with the United States that the tracking and verification requirements are
"separable" from the certification rules set out in the 2013 Final
Rule.[231]
7.19. In the light of this understanding
by the Panel of the manner in which the various elements of the amended tuna
measure interrelate, it is not clear to us why the Panel considered it
appropriate to conduct its subsequent analysis in a segmented manner that
addressed particular elements of the measure in isolation from other related
elements. For instance, in its consideration of the "eligibility
criteria", the Panel adopted a particularly limited focus by examining
only the substantive condition that tuna products not be derived from tuna
caught on a trip involving setting on dolphins. As we have noted, however, tuna
products that meet this condition are eligible for the dolphin-safe label
only if they also meet another
substantive condition, namely, that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets
in which the tuna were caught. By focusing only on the criteria related to the
"no setting on dolphins" condition, the Panel's analysis excluded
consideration of whether the products concerned also meet the "no dolphins
killed or seriously injured" condition. Similarly, in its analysis of the "certification
requirements" and "tracking and verification requirements", the
Panel considered that such requirements "are relevant only to tuna
eligible and intended to receive the dolphin-safe label" – that is, only
to "tuna [not] caught by setting on dolphins".[232] In so proceeding, the Panel did
not assess how the certification and tracking and verification requirements,
which the Panel itself considered to be an integral part of the overall
measure, interrelate with each other and with the substantive conditions for
access to the dolphin‑safe label. The Panel's approach is even more surprising
given its earlier conclusion that the tracking and verification requirements
are not "separable" from the certification requirements set out in
the 2013 Final Rule. Although the Panel stated that it would "indicate the
connections between these distinctions where relevant"[233], we do not see that the Panel, in
its analysis of whether the amended tuna measure brought the United States into
conformity with provisions of the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994,
explained the "connections" between the different elements of the
measure giving rise to the distinctions examined by the Panel.
7.20. We further recall that the original
tuna measure, like the amended tuna measure, contained provisions relating to
qualifying fishing methods, certification, and tracking and verification. While
the amended tuna measure has introduced certain changes, as explained in our
description of the measure at issue, these have not altered the overall
architecture of the US dolphin-safe labelling regime by somehow undermining the
existence of interrelationships among its constituent elements. If anything,
the changes reflected in the amended tuna measure serve to reinforce the nature
of those interrelationships. The Panel, however, did not adopt an analytical
approach to the measure similar to the one used by the panel and the Appellate
Body in the original proceedings. In these circumstances, and given the Panel's
statements regarding the need to examine the amended tuna measure as a whole
and in an integrated manner, we would have expected some discussion by the
Panel, during the course, or at the conclusion, of its segmented analysis, as
to how the various findings related to one another, and on what basis the Panel
proceeded to make discrete findings of consistency and inconsistency
notwithstanding the interrelationships among the various elements of the
measure.
7.21. In sum, although the Panel had, in
discussing its jurisdiction under Article 21.5 of the DSU, emphasized the
interlinkages between elements of the amended tuna measure, it subsequently
conducted a segmented analysis that isolated consideration of each element of
the measure without accounting for the manner in which the elements are
interrelated, and without aggregating or synthesizing its analyses or findings
relating to those elements before reaching its ultimate conclusions as to the
consistency or inconsistency of the amended tuna measure. We recognize that a
proper appreciation of the extent to which the interrelationships are relevant,
and the extent to which a segmented analysis had a bearing on the outcome of
the legal analysis, will be a function of the particular legal obligation under
examination – in this case, those set out in Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement and Articles I:1, III:4, and XX of the GATT 1994. At this
stage of our Report, however, we see no merit in analysing the consequences of
the Panel's segmented approach in the abstract. Rather, we will assess whether
the Panel's approach amounted to, or led it to commit, legal error when we
examine the specific claims on appeal that the participants have directed at
the Panel's analysis and findings.
7.22. The United States and Mexico each
appeals certain aspects of the Panel's reasoning and findings under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement. Mexico requests us to reverse the Panel's finding that
the eligibility criteria in the amended tuna measure are consistent with
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement[234], whereas the United States seeks
reversal of the Panel's findings that the different certification requirements
and the different tracking and verification requirements in the amended tuna
measure are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[235]
7.23. Our analysis is divided into three
parts. First, we begin by recalling relevant jurisprudence on the legal
standard to be applied under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Second, we
consider the issues raised by the United States on appeal with regard to the
Panel's application of Article 2.1 to the measure at issue, and in
particular its analysis of whether the amended tuna measure, and the discrete
sets of requirements set out therein, adversely modify the conditions of
competition for Mexican tuna products in the US market. Third, we consider the
respective claims of error raised by the United States and Mexico in connection
with the Panel's analysis of whether the detrimental impact that it found the
measure at issue to have on Mexican tuna products in the United States' market
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. In this third part
of our analysis, we begin by assessing the United States' claim that the Panel
erred in its articulation of the legal standard under the second step of the
"treatment no less favourable" analysis under Article 2.1, before
turning to consider the various issues raised by the participants in connection
with the Panel's application of the second step of the "treatment no less
favourable" analysis under Article 2.1 to the amended tuna measure and to
the discrete sets of requirements set out therein.
7.24. Article 2 of the TBT Agreement
addresses the "Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical
Regulations by Central Government Bodies", and its first paragraph
provides that, "[w]ith respect to their central government bodies":
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like
products originating in any other country.
7.25. Article 2.1 contains both a
national treatment obligation and a most-favoured-nation treatment obligation.
In order to establish a violation of either obligation, a complainant must
demonstrate three elements: (i) that the measure at issue is a "technical
regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement; (ii)
that the relevant products are "like products"; and (iii) that the
measure at issue accords less favourable treatment to the imported products
than to the relevant group of like products.[236] As the United States' appeal with
respect to the Panel's interpretation of Article 2.1 concerns only the third of
these elements, we limit our summary below to recalling key aspects of the
"treatment no less favourable" requirement in Article 2.1, as
explained by the Appellate Body in previous reports.
7.26. In US – Clove
Cigarettes, the Appellate Body identified a two-step analysis to be
followed in examining whether the technical regulation at issue accords less
favourable treatment to imported products under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.[237] The Appellate Body indicated
that the first step of the analysis focuses on whether the technical regulation
at issue modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of such
imported products vis-à-vis like products of domestic origin and/or like
products originating in any other country.[238] However, a finding that the
measure at issue modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of
imported products is not sufficient to demonstrate less favourable treatment
under Article 2.1.[239] Rather, a second step of analysis
is needed, namely, an assessment of whether the detrimental impact on imports
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction rather than
reflecting discrimination against the group of imported products.[240] Where the detrimental impact
caused by a technical regulation stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction, such technical regulation is not according less favourable
treatment to imported products within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.
7.27. Regarding the first step in the
analysis, the scope of the comparison to be undertaken in assessing whether
there is less favourable treatment of imports depends on the products that a
panel has found to be "like" for the purposes of Article 2.1.[241] Once the like products have been
properly identified, Article 2.1 requires a panel to compare, on the one hand,
the treatment accorded under the measure at issue to the "group" of
like products imported from the complaining Member with, on the other hand,
that accorded to the "group" of like domestic products and/or the
"group" of like products originating in any other country.[242] In making this comparison, any
adverse impact on competitive opportunities for imported products vis-à-vis
like domestic products that is caused by a particular measure may potentially
be relevant to a detrimental impact finding.[243]
7.28. That there is a difference in
treatment between products of different country origins is neither necessary,
nor sufficient to establish detrimental impact.[244] By the same token, the application
of formally identical legal provisions to imported and like products of
different origins may nevertheless entail a detrimental impact on the
competitive conditions for the imported products.[245] In examining whether a technical
regulation has a de facto detrimental impact, a
panel "must take into consideration 'the totality of facts and
circumstances before it'"[246] and assess any
"implications" for competitive conditions "discernible from the
design, structure, and expected operation of the measure".[247] Such an examination must take
account of all the relevant features of the market, which may include the
particular characteristics of the industry at issue, the relative market shares
in a given industry, consumer preferences, and historical trade patterns.[248] That is, a panel must examine the
operation of the particular technical regulation at issue in the particular
market in which it is applied.[249]
7.29. Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement,
like Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, protects the equality of
competitive opportunities between like products rather than any particular
volume of trade.[250] Therefore, a panel is not required
under Article 2.1 to ground its legal conclusions on evidence of the actual
trade effects of the technical regulation in the relevant market.[251] Nor is a panel limited, in
analysing detrimental impact, to an examination of the operation of the
technical regulation at issue within the confines of scenarios that are
representative of current patterns of trade.[252] Rather, a party may make its case
and a panel may reach conclusions concerning detrimental impact on the basis of
evidence and arguments going to the "design, structure, and expected
operation of the measure".[253] At the same time, a finding of
detrimental impact cannot rest on simple assertion[254], and a panel should not
"ascribe undue weight to the effect of a technical regulation in any
hypothetical scenario".[255]
7.30. Turning to the second step of the
"treatment no less favourable" analysis under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, we note that the Appellate Body has emphasized that the
specific context provided by other provisions of the TBT Agreement is
instructive in understanding the expression "treatment no less
favourable" under Article 2.1. The specific context provided by, in
particular, Annex 1.1, Article 2.2, and the second, fifth, and sixth recitals
of the preamble, "supports a reading that Article 2.1 does not operate to
prohibit a priori any restriction on
international trade".[256] The sixth recital sheds light on
the meaning and ambit of the "treatment no less favourable"
requirement in Article 2.1 by making clear that technical regulations may
pursue legitimate objectives but must not be applied in a manner that would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.[257] Article 2.1 should not be read to
mean that any distinctions, in particular ones that are based exclusively on such particular product characteristics, or
on particular processes and production methods, would per se
constitute less favourable treatment within the meaning of Article 2.1.[258] Rather, some distinctions that
entail detrimental impact may not amount to less favourable treatment under
Article 2.1. This would be the case, in particular, where the detrimental
impact on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.
7.31. In determining whether the
detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction, a panel must carefully scrutinize whether the technical regulation
at issue is even‑handed in its design, architecture, revealing structure,
operation, and application in the light of the particular circumstances of the
case.[259] The Appellate Body has pointed out
that where a regulatory distinction is not designed and applied in an even‑handed
manner – because, for example, it is designed or applied in a manner that
constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination – that
distinction cannot be considered "legitimate", and thus the
detrimental impact will reflect discrimination prohibited under Article 2.1.[260] Therefore, a measure that involves
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" would not be designed and
applied in an "even-handed manner". At the same time, the fact that a
measure is designed in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination is not the only
way in which a measure may lack even-handedness, such that the detrimental
impact cannot be said to stem exclusively from legitimate regulatory
distinctions.
7.32. With respect to the burden of
showing that a technical regulation is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement, as we have already explained, a finding that a technical
regulation modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of imported
products is not sufficient to demonstrate less favourable treatment under
Article 2.1[261] because a regulation that has a de facto
detrimental impact on imports will not be inconsistent with Article 2.1 when
such impact stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.[262] With respect to the burden of demonstrating these elements of Article
2.1, in the original proceedings, the Appellate Body noted that it is well established
that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or
defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.[263] Where the complaining party has met the burden of making its prima facie case, it is then for the responding party to
rebut that showing.[264] Under Article 2.1, this means that a complainant must show that, under
the technical regulation at issue, the treatment accorded to imported products
is less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products or like
products originating in any other country. Provided that it has shown
detrimental impact, a complainant may, therefore, make a prima facie
showing of less favourable treatment by, for example, adducing evidence and
arguments showing that the measure is not even-handed, which would suggest that
the measure is inconsistent with Article 2.1.[265] If, however, the respondent shows that the detrimental impact on
imported products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction,
it follows that the challenged measure is not inconsistent with Article 2.1.[266]
7.33. Of course, there is no set formula
as to how a complainant must make out its case. Rather, the nature and scope of
arguments and evidence required to establish a prima facie
case will necessarily vary according to the facts of the case[267] and from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case.[268] Moreover, these rules and principles of WTO jurisprudence must not be
applied in an unduly formalistic or mechanistic fashion[269], nor inhibit the substantive analysis that must be undertaken by a
panel. In seeking to make out a claim of de facto
discrimination under Article 2.1, a complainant may elect to rely on some or
all of the same regulatory distinctions and evidence as to how they are
designed and operate in the relevant market both to establish de facto detrimental impact and to show that the regulatory
distinctions drawn under the technical regulation involve a lack of
even-handedness. While the complaining party bears the burden of making its prima facie case, the responding party must prove the case
it seeks to make in response[270], and each party bears the burden of substantiating the assertions that
it makes.[271] In our view, having promulgated the technical regulation containing the
regulatory distinctions that result in the detrimental impact, the responding
Member will be best situated to adduce the arguments and evidence needed to
explain why, contrary to the complainant's assertions, the technical regulation
is even-handed and thus why the
detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction. Thus, the Appellate Body noted in the original proceedings that,
although the burden of proof to show that the US dolphin-safe labelling
provisions were inconsistent with Article 2.1 was on Mexico as the complainant,
it was for the United States to support its assertion that its regime was
"calibrated" to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing
methods in different areas of the oceans.[272]
7.34. We are not certain that, in its
discussion of the burden of proof under Article 2.1, the Panel fully recognized
the responsibilities of both parties in this regard. To us, the Panel's
reasoning seems to cast the burden of proof as an entirely binary issue. For
example, the Panel stated that, on one possible understanding of the burden of
proof, "it is Mexico that bears the burden of showing prima facie
both that the amended tuna measure
modifies the conditions of competition in the United States' market to the
detriment of Mexican tuna and tuna products and that such
detrimental treatment reflects discrimination because it does not stem
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction and is not even‑handed".[273] Alternatively, the Panel
explained, the burden of proof might be allocated such that, if Mexico
established detrimental impact, "the Panel would need to determine whether
the United States has made a prima facie
case that this detrimental treatment nevertheless stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction."[274] These statements are not in
consonance with the Appellate Body's discussion of the burden of proof in the
original proceedings and seem to reflect a mechanistic articulation of the
function of the burden of proof[275], as well as an improper conflation
of the burden and the standard of proof.[276]
7.35. Moreover, we have reservations
about the reason given by the Panel for choosing the approach that it did,
namely, that "in the present proceedings both parties agree" on the
allocation of the burden of proof.[277] In the analysis leading up to its
decision to adopt this approach, the Panel expressed its
"uncertainty"[278] about what the Appellate Body had
previously found with respect to the burden of proving less favourable treatment
under Article 2.1. The Panel went on to set out in some detail the views of the
parties and the third parties with respect to the allocation of the burden of
proof, stating that it was "mindful that there may be systemic reasons for
favouring"[279] an approach different from the one
agreed upon by the parties, and then decided nevertheless to adopt the parties'
agreed approach to allocating the burden of proof.[280] To us, an approach whereby a panel
allocates the burden of proof under a provision of the covered agreements
solely on the basis of the parties' agreement would not be consistent with its
duty to interpret and apply such provision. We recognize that, in this context,
the Panel stated that it was aware that it was not "bound by the legal interpretations
offered by the parties or the third‑parties".[281] Yet, it does appear to have been
the parties' joint endorsement that ultimately induced the Panel to adopt the
approach that it did. In any event, neither participant has challenged on
appeal the Panel's approach to the burden of proof, and we will proceed on the
basis of the Appellate Body's articulation of the applicable burden of proof as
outlined in paragraphs 7.32 and 7.33 above.
7.36. We now turn to the issue of whether
the Panel erred in its analysis of whether the amended tuna measure modifies
the conditions of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products in the
US market.
7.37. The United States requests us
to reverse the Panel's findings of detrimental impact with respect to the
certification and tracking and verification requirements.[282] First, the United States claims
that, by grounding its findings on the difference in costs and burdens imposed
on tuna products originating inside and outside the ETP large purse-seine
fishery, the Panel improperly made the case for Mexico, given that Mexico had
not presented arguments and evidence concerning such costs and burdens in its written
submissions.[283] Second, according to the
United States, the Panel erred in finding that the certification and
tracking and verification requirements impose different costs and burdens on
tuna products derived from tuna caught inside the ETP large purse-seine fishery
as compared to tuna products derived from tuna caught in other fisheries. Even
assuming that any such differences exist, the United States claims that
the Panel failed to explain how such different costs and burdens modify the
conditions of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products in the
light of the relevant features of the US market.[284] Rather, the Panel erred by
reaching conclusions on detrimental impact "without making any factual
findings" other than to establish the existence of different certification
and tracking and verification requirements.[285] Third, the United States
submits that the Panel did not properly establish a genuine relationship
between the certification and tracking and verification requirements under the
amended tuna measure, on the one hand, and any detrimental impact on the
competitive opportunities for Mexican tuna products, on the other hand. In its
view, no such relationship exists. The amended tuna measure does not subject
Mexican tuna products to its certification and tracking and verification
requirements because those products are derived from tuna caught by setting on
dolphins and are therefore disqualified from access to the dolphin-safe label
from the outset. Further, the United States argues, since the
certification and tracking and verification requirements for tuna products
derived from tuna caught in the ETP large purse-seine fishery are mandated by
the AIDCP, any detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products is not attributable
to the amended tuna measure, but rather to Mexico's international obligations.[286]
7.38. Mexico, for its part, maintains
that the question of whether the amended tuna measure modifies the conditions
of competition to the detriment of its tuna products in the US market was
settled by the panel and the Appellate Body in the original proceedings. In
particular, Mexico recalls the Appellate Body's finding that the detrimental
impact of the original tuna measure on Mexican tuna products was caused by
the fact that most such products "contain tuna caught by setting on
dolphins in the ETP and are therefore not eligible for a 'dolphin-safe'
label", whereas "most tuna products from the United States and
other countries that are sold in the US market contain tuna caught by other fishing
methods outside the ETP and are therefore eligible for a 'dolphin‑safe'
label."[287] The amended tuna measure
"does not change those aspects of the design and structure of the original
tuna measure" that were found to cause detrimental impact.[288] In other words, the amended tuna
measure continues to permit all US tuna products and most tuna products from
other countries to have access to the dolphin-safe label, while it denies
access to this label for most Mexican tuna products.[289] Therefore, in Mexico's view, the
Appellate Body's findings, which have not been challenged by the parties in the
current proceedings, "definitively establish" that the US
dolphin-safe labelling regime modifies the competitive conditions in the
US market to the detriment of Mexican tuna products. At the oral hearing,
Mexico clarified that this argument relates to its claim on appeal, discussed
in section 7.1 above, that the Panel erred in analysing the three sets of
requirements under the amended tuna measure – the "eligibility
criteria", the "certification requirements", and the
"tracking and verification requirements" – separately, as opposed to
focusing on the WTO-consistency of the measure as a whole.[290] According to Mexico, these three
sets of requirements "operate together" to modify the competitive
conditions in the US market to the detriment of Mexican tuna products.[291] Because the amended measure as a
whole continues to have a detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products in the US
market, Mexico argues that it neither sought to, nor needed to, establish
"independent and complete prima facie
cases" of detrimental impact "for each of the three [sets of] labelling
conditions and requirements".[292]
7.39. As a third participant, the
European Union echoes Mexico's view and contends that a detrimental impact
assessment must focus on what is caused by the measure at issue as a whole –
that is, the entire "set of relevant regulatory distinctions".[293] According to the European Union, the main aspects that led the
original panel and the Appellate Body to find that the US dolphin‑safe
labelling regime has a detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products "remain
unchanged".[294] In the
European Union's view, the Panel should have taken into account the relevant
findings from the original proceedings, and should have refrained from
undertaking an analysis of whether the certification and tracking and
verification requirements, "considered in isolation", have a
detrimental impact.[295] The "increased" certification and tracking and verification
requirements bear only on the question of whether the amended tuna measure is
even‑handed.[296] In the light of the above, the European Union suggests that we declare
the Panel's findings regarding the detrimental impact of the certification and
tracking and verification requirements moot and of no legal effect.[297]
7.40. In addressing the issues raised by
the participants on appeal, we begin by providing an overview of the panel and
Appellate Body findings in the original proceedings concerning the detrimental
impact of the original tuna measure, as well as the Panel's findings in these
compliance proceedings concerning the detrimental impact of the amended tuna
measure. We then examine whether the Panel erred in its analysis of whether the
various elements constituting the amended tuna measure modify the conditions of
competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products in the US market within
the meaning of Article 2.1.
7.41. Before the original panel, Mexico
claimed that the original tuna measure modified the conditions of competition
in the US market to the detriment of its tuna products because:
(i) Mexican tuna products are derived almost exclusively from tuna caught
in the ETP by setting on dolphins, and cannot therefore access the dolphin-safe
label; (ii) US tuna products are derived from tuna caught outside the ETP using
other fishing methods, and are thus eligible for access to the label; (iii)
most consumers and retailers are sensitive to issues related to dolphin
mortality and will not purchase tuna products that are not designated as "dolphin safe";
and (iv) most US canneries will not accept non-dolphin-safe tuna for
processing.[298]
7.42. The original panel agreed with
Mexico that the dolphin-safe label has "significant commercial value on
the US market for tuna products", and that therefore access to such label
constitutes an "advantage" on that market.[299] The original panel then considered
whether the regulatory distinction drawn by the original tuna measure – whereby
tuna products containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins could not access
the dolphin-safe label, whereas tuna products containing tuna caught by other
fishing methods were eligible for such label – modified the conditions of
competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products vis‑à‑vis like products
from the United States and other countries. In its view, this regulatory
distinction did not, de jure, place
Mexican tuna products "at a disadvantage as compared to US and other
imported tuna products"[300], because "any fleet operating
anywhere in the world must comply with the requirement" not to set on
dolphins.[301]
7.43. Turning to examine whether the
original measure nonetheless had a de facto
detrimental impact in the light of the fishing practices of the Mexican and
other fishing fleets, the original panel noted that, since 1990, when the first
version of the DPCIA was adopted, US vessels had gradually discontinued setting
on dolphins to catch tuna in the ETP, whereas the Mexican fleet had not
abandoned the use of such fishing technique.[302] Thus, the original panel
considered that any difference in the relative competitive situations of
Mexican and other tuna products was not attributable to the original measure,
but was rather the result of the choices of private actors[303], including "Mexico's own fishing
fleet and canners".[304] It further held that, for similar
reasons, "[t]he existence of additional costs for some operators as a
result of factors such as existing practices also does not necessarily …
imply" a detrimental impact on the competitive conditions of such
operators' products.[305] In the light of the above, the
original panel was not persuaded that the original tuna measure modified the
conditions of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products as compared
to like products originating in the United States or in any other country.[306]
7.44. The Appellate Body noted that the
panel had made the following factual findings: (i) "the Mexican tuna
cannery industry is vertically integrated, and the major Mexican tuna products
producers and canneries own their vessels, which operate in the ETP";
(ii) "at least two thirds of Mexico's purse seine tuna fleet fishes in the
ETP by setting on dolphins" and is "therefore fishing for tuna that
would not be eligible to be contained in a 'dolphin‑safe' tuna product under
the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions"; (iii) "the US fleet
currently does not practice setting on dolphins in the ETP"; and (iv)
"as the practices of the US and Mexican tuna fleets currently stand, most
tuna caught by Mexican vessels, being caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins,
would not be eligible for inclusion in a dolphin-safe product under the
US dolphin-safe labelling provisions", while "most tuna caught
by US vessels is potentially eligible for the label".[307]
7.45. In the Appellate Body's view, such
findings "clearly establish[ed]" that the lack of access to the
dolphin-safe label of tuna products containing tuna caught by setting on
dolphins had a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities of Mexican
tuna products in the US market.[308] The Appellate Body stated that a
detrimental impact determination does not hinge on whether imported products
"could" somehow obtain market access "by complying with all
applicable conditions", but rather on "whether the contested measure
modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of imported
products".[309] The Appellate Body disagreed with
the Panel that the different competitive situations of Mexican and other tuna
products were not attributable to the original tuna measure, but rather to the
choices of private actors. For the Appellate Body, the relevant question for
assessing whether a genuine relationship exists between a measure and an
adverse impact on competitive opportunities for imported products is whether
"governmental action 'affects the conditions under which like goods,
domestic and imported, compete in the market within a Member's
territory'."[310] The Appellate Body took the view
that it was the "governmental action" in the form of adoption and
application of the original tuna measure that had modified the conditions of
competition in the market to the detriment of Mexican tuna products, and thus
that the detrimental impact flowed from the original measure.[311] In its opinion, "[t]he fact
that the detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products may involve some element
of private choice [did] not … relieve the United States of responsibility
under the TBT Agreement."[312]
7.46. Based on the foregoing, the
Appellate Body concluded that the original tuna measure did, indeed, modify the
conditions of competition in the US market to the detriment of Mexican tuna
products.[313] Later in its report, the Appellate
Body summarized its conclusions on detrimental impact in the following terms:
[T]he detrimental impact of the measure on Mexican tuna products is
caused by the fact that most Mexican tuna products contain tuna caught by
setting on dolphins in the ETP and are therefore not eligible for a
"dolphin-safe" label, whereas most tuna products from the United
States and other countries that are sold in the US market contain tuna caught
by other fishing methods outside the ETP and are therefore eligible for a
"dolphin-safe" label. The aspect of the measure that causes the
detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products is thus the difference in labelling
conditions for tuna products containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins in
the ETP, on the one hand, and for tuna products containing tuna caught by other
fishing methods outside the ETP, on the other hand.[314]
7.47. Before the Article 21.5 Panel,
both Mexico and the United States indicated that the detrimental impact of
the amended tuna measure is the same as that of the original measure. Mexico's
principal argument with respect to detrimental impact was that "[t]he key
elements of the design and structure of the measure that operated together to
deny competitive opportunities … have not been changed."[315] In particular, the detrimental impact found by the panel and the
Appellate Body in the original proceedings – namely, the disqualification of
most Mexican tuna products from access to the dolphin‑safe label, as opposed to
the eligibility of most like products originating in the United States and
in other countries for such label – continues to exist.[316] The United States, for its part, did not contest the Appellate Body's
conclusions on detrimental impact in the original proceedings[317], which, in its view, focused on access to the dolphin-safe label in the
light of "the fishing practices of the US and Mexican fleets".[318] According to the United States, the exclusion of tuna products
derived from tuna caught by setting on dolphins "is
the detrimental impact".[319] In the United States' opinion, the certification and tracking and
verification requirements were "not relevant" to the Panel's
detrimental impact analysis[320], because Mexican tuna products containing tuna caught by setting on
dolphins would still be ineligible for the dolphin-safe label even if those
requirements did not exist.[321]
7.48. The Panel took the view that
Mexico's arguments concerning the detrimental impact of the amended tuna
measure had "developed" over the course of the proceedings.[322] At first, Mexico had focused on
the fact that the amended measure denies access to the dolphin‑safe label to
most Mexican tuna products, whereas all US tuna products and most like products
from other countries have access to the label.[323] Subsequently, Mexico explained
that it is "the absence of sufficient fishing method qualification, record
keeping, verification and observer requirements" outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery that causes Mexican tuna products to "los[e]
competitive opportunities to tuna products that may be inaccurately labelled as
dolphin-safe".[324] For the Panel, Mexico's later
arguments "constitute[d] a clear and cognizable claim of
detrimental impact" that was "distinct" and "separate" from the type of
detrimental impact that Mexico identified as resulting from the eligibility
criteria.[325] While the eligibility criteria are
"responsible for the fact that most Mexican tuna products are ineligible
to receive the label", the certification and tracking and verification
requirements provide a "competitive advantage" to non-Mexican tuna
products.[326]
7.49. Accordingly, as discussed in
section 7.1 above, the Panel segmented its assessment of the consistency of the
amended tuna measure with Article 2.1 into three separate analyses, one for
each of the three sets of requirements constituting the measure – the
"eligibility criteria", the "different certification
requirements", and the "different tracking and verification
requirements".[327]
7.50. The Panel began by assessing the
consistency with Article 2.1 of the "eligibility criteria" – i.e. the
regulatory distinction between tuna products derived from tuna caught by
setting on dolphins and tuna products derived from tuna caught by other fishing
methods.[328] It observed that these criteria
lay "at the very heart of the original proceedings".[329] For this first set of
requirements, the Panel did not conduct a two-step analysis of: (i) whether the
eligibility criteria have a detrimental impact on the competitive conditions
for Mexican tuna products in the US market; and, if so, (ii) whether such
detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.
Rather, it took the view that, as an Article 21.5 panel, it ought to
"rely upon factual and legal conclusions made by the original panel and
the Appellate Body, at least in the absence of compelling new evidence that
would render those previous findings unsustainable."[330] The Panel understood the Appellate
Body in the original proceedings to have "clearly found" that the
United States is entitled to treat setting on dolphins differently from
other fishing methods[331] and that, therefore, the
disqualification from the dolphin-safe label of tuna caught by setting on
dolphins, coupled with the qualification for the label of tuna caught by other
fishing methods, is not inconsistent with Article 2.1.[332] The Panel did not consider it
appropriate to "re-open this inquiry" and, instead, stated that it
would "respect and reaffirm" the Appellate Body's finding that,
"to the extent that they modify the conditions of competition in the US
market to the detriment of Mexican … tuna products, the eligibility criteria
are even‑handed, and, accordingly, are not inconsistent with Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement."[333]
7.51. The Panel then moved on to assess,
in turn, the consistency with Article 2.1 of the "different certification
requirements"[334] and the "different tracking
and verification requirements".[335] For each of these sets of
requirements, the Panel did conduct a two-step analysis aimed at establishing:
(i) whether the set of requirements in question has a detrimental impact
on the competitive conditions of Mexican tuna products in the US market; and,
if so, (ii) whether such detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction.
7.52. In examining whether the different
"certification requirements" – i.e. the requirement that
certifications be made by both captains and observers in the ETP large
purse-seine fishery, as opposed to the requirement of captain certification
only for "all other fisheries" – give rise to detrimental impact on
Mexican tuna products in the US market, the Panel grounded its reasoning on the
costs of implementing observer coverage. It noted the United States'
recognition that "observer coverage involves the expenditure of
significant resources"[336], as well as the parties'
acknowledgement that "the costs of implementing observer coverage can be
significant."[337] In the light of the above, the
Panel found that, by not requiring independent observer coverage in fisheries
other than the ETP large purse-seine fishery, the certification requirements
"impose a lesser burden" on tuna products derived from tuna caught in
those other fisheries.[338] Having so
found, the Panel considered it unnecessary to also "make a definitive
finding"[339] on Mexico's allegation that the certification requirements
"make it more likely that tuna caught outside the ETP large purse seine
fishery will be inaccurately labelled".[340] Albeit seeing "some merit" in Mexico's allegation, the Panel
opined that "a definitive finding on this point would require a complex
and detailed analysis of all of the various factors that may lead to tuna being
inaccurately labelled."[341]
7.53. Based on the foregoing, the Panel
concluded that the certification requirements modify the conditions of
competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products in the US market.[342]
7.54. Subsequently, the Panel addressed
the alleged detrimental impact of the "tracking and verification
requirements" under the amended tuna measure – i.e. the different
"record-keeping and verification requirements" for tuna products containing
tuna caught in the ETP large purse‑seine fishery and for tuna products containing
tuna caught in other fisheries.[343] The Panel found that the tracking
and verification requirements for tuna products originating in the ETP large
purse-seine fishery, which are largely mandated by the AIDCP, bring with them
"strict obligations"[344] aimed at ensuring the segregation
of tuna caught without killing or seriously injuring dolphins from tuna caught
in sets involving dolphin mortality or serious injury throughout the whole
production process – including storage on board fishing vessels, unloading at
port, brokering through intermediaries, trans‑shipment, partial processing into
loins, and canning.[345] With respect to tuna products
derived from tuna caught outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery, the Panel
took note of the United States' explanations as to how the amended tuna measure
provides for verification that there has been segregation between dolphin-safe
and non‑dolphin‑safe tuna. The Panel found that the United States ensures
that tuna has been properly tracked and verified primarily through cannery
audits – including spot checks – aimed at acquiring "the documents that
track particular lots received by the canneries from the vessel trip on which
the tuna was caught."[346] Canneries are also required to
submit monthly reports containing information about the tuna received and
processed, including dolphin-safe status, weight, ocean of capture, gear type
used, type of catcher vessel, trip dates, carrier name, unloading dates, place
of unloading, and, if the tuna products are to be labelled as dolphin safe, the
required certifications.[347] Other forms of control on the part
of US authorities include retail spot checks – which work "in essentially
the same way as cannery audits"[348] – and inspections on the high
seas, in US waters, or at US ports.[349]
7.55. The Panel held that the tracking
and verification requirements applied inside and outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery, respectively, present "crucial differences" in
terms of "depth, accuracy, and degree of government oversight".[350] In terms of depth, the Panel found
that the system applied to the ETP large purse-seine fishery allows the trace-back
of tuna "all the way to the particular set in which the tuna was caught and the particular well in which it was stored".[351] Conversely, the system applied to
other fisheries allows the trace-back of tuna only "to the vessel and trip on which it was caught".[352] As for accuracy, the Panel found
that, in respect of the ETP large purse-seine fishery, the TTFs and the
relevant certifications accompany particular batches of tuna "throughout
the fishing and production process, from the point of catch right through to
the point of retail".[353] In contrast, for tuna harvested in
other fisheries, the United States had not shown how the relevant
certifications are kept with particular batches of tuna up until the tuna
reaches the cannery.[354] Finally, as regards government oversight,
the Panel took the view that, in respect of the ETP large purse-seine fishery,
information concerning every stage of tuna harvest and processing is made
available to the competent authorities by sending them copies of the TTFs and
notifying them whenever ownership of tuna changes.[355] Conversely, for tuna harvested in
other fisheries, the competent authorities receive information on the origin
and history of the tuna only from the canneries themselves – through the
mandatory monthly reports or audits and spot checks – and are thus not able to
go "behind the documents" and appraise the veracity of such
information.[356]
7.56. In the light of the above, the
Panel concluded that the tracking and verification system applied to tuna
caught in fisheries other than the ETP large purse-seine fishery presents some
"major gaps in coverage"[357], which "strongly suggest[]" that the system in question is
"significantly less burdensome" than the system in place for tuna
caught inside the ETP large purse‑seine fishery.[358] Having made such a finding, the Panel did not consider it necessary to
further examine Mexico's allegation that the differences in the two sets of
tracking and verification requirements make it more likely that tuna products
derived from tuna caught outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery will be
incorrectly labelled. While the Panel did see "some merit" in
Mexico's allegation, it took the view that a definitive finding on this point
would require "a detailed technical analysis of the system's effective
operation".[359]
7.57. Based on the foregoing, the Panel
found that the tracking and verification requirements modify the conditions of
competition in the US market to the detriment of Mexican tuna products.[360]
7.58. In each of its two analyses of
detrimental impact, the Panel addressed the United States' argument that
any detrimental impact suffered by Mexican tuna products because of the
certification and tracking and verification requirements applied to tuna
products derived from tuna caught in the ETP large purse-seine fishery "stems
from the AIDCP regime" rather than from the amended tuna measure,
with the consequence that there is no "genuine relationship" between
the measure and any detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for Mexican
tuna products.[361] The Panel found that, while the AIDCP imposes certain certification and
tracking and verification requirements on the ETP large purse-seine fishery,
"it has nothing to say" about analogous requirements applicable to
other fisheries.[362] The amended tuna measure, by contrast, imposes certain certification
and tracking and verification requirements on the ETP large purse-seine fishery
and different such requirements on other fisheries. Thus, the Panel reasoned
that "[i]t is the amended tuna measure" that, within the same
regulatory framework, "provides for two sets of rules for access to the
dolphin-safe label – one set for tuna caught by large purse seine vessels
in the ETP, and another set for all other tuna."[363] In the
Panel's view, the fact that one element of the regulatory distinction – i.e.
the requirements applicable to the ETP large purse-seine fishery – is mandated
by international obligations does not detract from a conclusion that the
distinction as a whole is attributable to "the design and structure of the
amended tuna measure itself".[364]
7.59. At the outset of our review of the
Panel's detrimental impact analysis, we recall that, in
examining whether a technical regulation entails de facto
detrimental impact, a panel must take into consideration "the totality of
facts and circumstances before it" and assess any implications for
competitive conditions "discernible from the design, structure, and
expected operation of the measure."[365] Such examination must also "take account of all the relevant
features of the market, which may include the particular characteristics of the
industry at issue, the relative market shares in a given industry, consumer
preferences, and historical trade patterns" – that is, "the operation
of the particular technical regulation at issue in the particular market in
which it is applied."[366] Thus, a
panel conducting a de facto
detrimental impact analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
ought to take into account both the design and structure of the measure at
issue and the way in which the measure operates (or can be expected to operate)
in the light of the relevant features of the market concerned.
7.60. We further recall that, as was
found in the original proceedings and as both parties have acknowledged in
these compliance proceedings, access to the dolphin-safe label constitutes an
"advantage" on the US market for tuna products by virtue of that
label's "significant commercial value".[367]
7.61. In section 7.1 above, we expressed
the view that it is only through the design and operation of all its labelling
conditions combined that the amended tuna measure establishes access to the
dolphin-safe label for tuna products sold in the US market. Indeed, different
labelling conditions may affect access to the dolphin-safe label for groups of
like tuna products in different ways. For instance, while the disqualification
of tuna products derived from tuna caught by setting on dolphins means that
most Mexican tuna products are not eligible for the dolphin-safe label[368], other elements of the amended
tuna measure – such as the new certification and tracking and verification
requirements imposed outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery by virtue of the
2013 Final Rule – may also exclude some tuna products of US or other origin
from access to the label. The various sets of requirements under the amended
tuna measure may have varying degrees of significance for the question of
whether Mexican tuna products are detrimentally affected, such that it may be
appropriate to unbundle the different elements and examine them in a sequential
manner. However, we do not consider that an examination of the detrimental
impact of the amended tuna measure could be properly conducted without also
taking account of the interrelationship among those elements and addressing the
manner in which they operate together to modify the conditions of competition
in the US market for tuna products.
7.62. We do not see that the Panel
considered such interrelationship in its examination. Instead, the Panel
conducted a segmented analysis for each of the "eligibility criteria"[369], the "different certification
requirements"[370], and the "different tracking
and verification requirements".[371] In setting out those separate analyses, the Panel
took the view that the type of detrimental impact caused by the sets of certification
and tracking and verification requirements is of a "distinct" and
"separate" nature from the detrimental impact caused by the
eligibility criteria.[372] In particular, the Panel referred
to Mexico's statement that the eligibility criteria "are responsible for
the fact that most Mexican tuna products are ineligible to receive the
label".[373] Conversely, the Panel identified
the nature of the detrimental impact flowing from the different certification
requirements and from the different tracking and verification requirements as
the "competitive advantage" that is accorded to tuna products derived
from tuna caught outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery, in the form of the
lesser costs and burdens that the amended tuna measure imposes on such tuna
products, as compared to those that it imposes on tuna products derived from
tuna caught within the ETP large purse-seine fishery.[374] After having conducted these three
segmented analyses, the Panel did not seek to synthesize them or to examine
more holistically the implications that the combined operation of the different
sets of requirements might have had for its analysis of the detrimental impact
of the amended tuna measure on Mexican tuna products.
7.63. In our view, the Panel's analytical
approach overlooks that the detrimental impact resulting from the amended tuna
measure cannot properly be examined through isolated analyses of the
detrimental impact associated with discrete sets of requirements under that
measure. Since all of the conditions for access to the dolphin-safe label may
bear on such detrimental impact[375], a proper assessment of the
detrimental impact of the amended tuna measure on Mexican tuna products calls
for an examination of the manner in which the different labelling conditions
under the measure operate together in a way that affects the conditions of
competition for Mexican tuna products in the US market.
7.64. We further recall that, as pointed
out in paragraph 5.9 above, "Article 21.5
proceedings do not occur in isolation from the original proceedings";
rather, "both proceedings form part of a continuum of events".[376] A panel's examination of a measure
taken to comply must take due account of the findings by the original panel and
the Appellate Body adopted by the DSB.[377] Thus, for example, in setting out
the analytical scope of its detrimental impact analysis, the panel in
US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico)
stated that it would "follow the original panel's approach".[378] On that basis, the compliance
panel assessed whether the measure taken to comply with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB modified the detrimental impact that was found to exist in
the original proceedings.[379]
7.65. Similarly, we believe that the
analytical approach to detrimental impact employed by the original panel and
the Appellate Body constitutes relevant background for a proper assessment of
the detrimental impact of the amended tuna measure. Such an assessment might usefully
build on, or take as its starting point, the Appellate Body's finding in the
original proceedings that the detrimental impact of the original tuna measure
was "caused by the fact that most Mexican tuna products contain tuna
caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP and are therefore not eligible for a
'dolphin-safe' label", whereas "most tuna products from the United
States and other countries that are sold in the US market contain tuna caught
by other fishing methods outside the ETP and are therefore eligible for a
'dolphin-safe' label."[380] In the original proceedings, the
original panel and the Appellate Body focused on access to the dolphin-safe
label. In doing so, they grounded their assessments on the regulatory
distinction whereby tuna products derived from tuna caught by setting on
dolphins were disqualified from access to the dolphin-safe label, whereas tuna
products derived from tuna caught by other fishing methods qualified for such
label, which was the regulatory distinction at the core of Mexico's challenge.[381] At the same time, the Appellate
Body acknowledged the interlinkages between the various elements of the US
dolphin-safe labelling regime when it stated that the aspect of the original
tuna measure that caused the detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products was
"the difference in labelling
conditions" for tuna products containing tuna caught by setting
on dolphins, on the one hand, and for tuna products containing tuna caught
by other fishing methods, on the other hand.[382]
7.66. Thus, it seems to us that the
findings of detrimental impact by the original panel and the Appellate Body
reinforce that a proper assessment of the detrimental impact of the amended
tuna measure on Mexican tuna products calls for an examination of the manner in
which the different labelling conditions under the measure operate together.
Such an analysis should also encompass consideration of whether these
conditions operate in a way that produces the same, or that modifies, the
detrimental impact that was found to exist in the original proceedings. For
instance, the Panel could have explained the extent to which the certification
and tracking and verification requirements introduced by the 2013 Final Rule
for tuna products originating outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery had the
effect of reducing (or increasing) access to the dolphin-safe label for such
tuna products.[383] On that basis, the Panel could
have examined whether the combined operation of the different labelling
conditions under the amended tuna measure narrowed (or broadened) the
detrimental impact of the regulatory differences in treatment of Mexican tuna
products as compared to like products of US or
other origin, in terms of access to the dolphin-safe label.
7.67. We observe that, in setting out its
analysis of the consistency with Article 2.1 of the "eligibility
criteria", the Panel did recognize the importance of the findings made by
the panel and the Appellate Body in the original proceedings.[384] However, in the remainder of its
discussion of the eligibility criteria, the Panel limited itself to
"respect[ing] and reaffirm[ing]" the Appellate Body's alleged
finding that the regulatory distinction between tuna products derived from tuna
caught by setting on dolphins and tuna products derived from tuna caught
by other fishing methods is "even-handed" and therefore "not
inconsistent with Article 2.1".[385] In other words, the Panel did not refer to the Appellate Body's findings under the first step of the analysis of less favourable treatment,
i.e. concerning the detrimental impact of this regulatory distinction. Nor did
the Panel conduct its own assessment of whether the disqualification from the
dolphin-safe label of tuna products derived from tuna caught by setting on
dolphins, coupled with the qualification for the label of tuna products derived
from tuna caught by other fishing methods, detrimentally affects the
competitive opportunities of Mexican tuna products in the US market.[386]
7.68. The Panel's approach is somewhat
surprising given that both Mexico and the United States indicated to the Panel
that, under the amended tuna measure, as under the original tuna measure, most
Mexican tuna products are still being excluded from access to the dolphin-safe
label, whereas most like products from the United States and other countries
are still eligible for access to such label.[387] In this regard, it is not clear to
us that, as the Panel contends, Mexico's position on detrimental impact
"developed"[388] over the course of the proceedings
to encompass allegations of separate and distinct detrimental impact flowing
from "the absence of sufficient fishing method qualification, record
keeping, verification and observer requirements" outside the ETP large
purse‑seine fishery.[389] We further note that, on appeal,
neither Mexico nor the United States considers that the Panel's analyses of the
detrimental impact of the certification requirements and the tracking and
verification requirements were warranted or necessary given the findings of
detrimental impact by the original panel and the Appellate Body.
7.69. Having identified these general
concerns regarding the Panel's segmented approach to detrimental impact, we now
turn to consider the analytical approach that the Panel used in conducting its
discrete analyses of detrimental impact based on the costs and burdens
associated with the certification requirements and the tracking and
verification requirements.
7.70. The Panel considered that the
certification and tracking and verification requirements "are relevant
only to tuna eligible and intended to receive the dolphin-safe label" –
that is, only to tuna not caught by setting on dolphins.[390] Accordingly, the Panel compared the
costs and burdens that the different certification and tracking and
verification requirements entail for, on the one hand, Mexican tuna products derived
from tuna caught other than by
setting on dolphins, and, on the other hand, tuna products of US or
other origin derived from tuna caught other than by setting on dolphins.[391] We recall that, for the purposes
of both the original and these compliance proceedings, "Mexican tuna
products are 'like' tuna products of United States' origin and tuna products
originating in any other country"[392], whether those products are, or
are not, derived from tuna caught by setting on dolphins. Thus, by limiting its
comparison to the treatment accorded to tuna products that are
"eligible" for the dolphin-safe label, the Panel's analyses of the
respective costs and burdens flowing from the different certification and
tracking and verification requirements focused on a subset
of the products found to be "like" in this dispute.
7.71. In considering the propriety of the
Panel's approach, we recall that the product scope for a detrimental impact
comparison depends on the products that a panel has found to be "like"
for the purposes of Article 2.1.[393] Once the "like" products
have been properly identified, Article 2.1 requires a panel to compare, on
the one hand, the treatment accorded under the measure at issue to the
"group" of like products imported from the complaining Member with,
on the other hand, that accorded to the "group" of like domestic
products and/or the "group" of like products originating in all other
countries.[394] This is not to say that a finding
of detrimental impact requires that all products
imported from the complaining Member be treated less favourably than all like domestic products and/or all
like products originating in other countries. However, in our view, a panel may
not artificially limit its analysis to only subsets of the relevant groups of
like products in a manner that risks skewing the proper comparison for purposes
of determining detrimental impact.
7.72. We also note that, in assessing
whether the original tuna measure had a detrimental impact on Mexican tuna
products in the US market, the original panel and the Appellate Body compared
the treatment accorded to the group of Mexican tuna products with that accorded
to the groups of like US products and like products from other countries,
in order to assess the relative positions of these product groups in respect of
access to the dolphin-safe label.[395] Given the particular
characteristics of the amended tuna measure, and in the light of the facts and
circumstances of this dispute, we consider that, in order to reach its
conclusions on detrimental impact, the Panel was called upon to compare the
treatment that the labelling conditions under the amended tuna measure accord
to the group of Mexican tuna products, on the
one hand, with the treatment accorded to the groups
of like tuna products from the United States and other countries, on the other
hand. Indeed, a proper identification of the product groups to be compared was
germane to all the steps of the Panel's analysis under Article 2.1,
including the assessment of whether the amended tuna measure modifies the
conditions of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products in the US
market and, if so, whether such a detrimental impact stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction.[396]
7.73. This does not imply that the
Panel's conclusions of detrimental impact had to rest on a finding that the
certification and tracking and verification requirements impose additional
costs and burdens on every Mexican
tuna product, or on the entire group of Mexican tuna products, as compared to every
like product, or on the entirety of the
groups of like products from the United States and other countries.
Indeed, there may well be instances in which an examination of the treatment
accorded to a portion of a relevant group of like products will suffice to
support a finding that such a product group is detrimentally affected by the
technical regulation at issue.[397] We note, however, that, elsewhere
in its Report, the Panel referred to Mexico's statement that "most"
Mexican tuna products are still excluded from access to the dolphin-safe label[398] as "virtually all of Mexico's
purse seine tuna fleet continues to fish in the ETP by setting on
dolphins".[399] These statements suggest that very
few, if any, Mexican tuna products are "eligible" for the
dolphin-safe label and therefore subject to any additional costs and burdens
flowing from the certification and tracking and verification requirements. The
Panel did not explain why an analysis of the treatment that the amended tuna
measure accords to this category of tuna products had explanatory force for,
and could properly support, a finding that the group
of Mexican tuna products is detrimentally affected by the certification and
tracking and verification requirements.[400]
7.74. Accordingly, we
have difficulty identifying the basis on which the Panel thought it appropriate
to limit its analysis to a subset of the product groups that have been found to
be "like" in this dispute. By focusing exclusively on the costs and
burdens imposed by the certification and tracking and verification requirements
on only "eligible" Mexican tuna products, the Panel artificially
skewed the proper comparison for purposes of determining detrimental impact,
rather than grounding its analysis on a full comparison of the relevant groups
of like products in the light of the particular facts and circumstances of this
dispute.
7.75. Based on the foregoing, we conclude
that the Panel employed an incorrect analytical approach to assessing whether
the amended tuna measure has a detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products in
the US market. First, by undertaking a segmented analysis of each of the three
sets of requirements under the amended tuna measure, the Panel failed to
recognize and take account of the interlinkages between the disqualification of
tuna products derived from tuna caught by setting on dolphins, on the one hand,
and the certification and tracking and verification requirements, on the other
hand, and to conduct a holistic assessment of how those various labelling
conditions adversely affect the conditions of competition for Mexican tuna
products in the US market as compared to like tuna products from the United
States and other countries. Because it adopted such a segmented approach, the
Panel failed to assess meaningfully the extent to which the detrimental impact
that was found to exist in the original proceedings might have been altered by
the changes introduced by the amended tuna measure. Second, in analysing the
detrimental impact of the certification and tracking and verification
requirements, the Panel engaged in a comparison of the treatment accorded to
subsets of the relevant groups of like products, instead of comparing the
treatment accorded to the group of
Mexican tuna products with that accorded to the groups
of like products of US or other origin, without identifying a proper basis for
doing so.
7.76. For the reasons set out above, we find
that the Panel erred in its analysis of whether the amended tuna measure has a
detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products in the US market within the meaning
of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Having found error in the Panel's
analysis, we do not consider it necessary to rule on the United States' claims
on appeal that: (i) the Panel improperly made the case for Mexico by grounding
its findings of detrimental impact with respect to the certification and
tracking and verification requirements on the different costs and burdens
imposed by such requirements on suppliers of tuna products operating inside and
outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery[401]; (ii) the Panel erred in finding a
difference in costs and burdens stemming from the certification and tracking
and verification requirements and in failing to explain how any such difference
modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products[402]; and (iii) the Panel did not
properly establish a genuine relationship between the certification and
tracking and verification requirements and any detrimental impact on Mexico's
competitive opportunities in the US market.[403]
7.77. The United States challenges the
Panel's articulation of the legal test under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
for determining whether the detrimental impact on imported products stems
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. In addition, the United
States and Mexico each raises certain claims of error under the second step of
the analysis of less favourable treatment in connection with the Panel's
application of the law to the facts in its analysis of the eligibility
criteria, the certification requirements, and the tracking and verification
requirements set out in the amended tuna measure. Before addressing the
participants' claims with respect to the Panel's application of Article 2.1, we
turn to analyse the United States' challenge to the Panel's articulation of the
"treatment no less favourable" standard under Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement.
7.78. The United States argues that the
Panel erred in its understanding of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and
articulated an incorrect legal standard for determining whether the detrimental
impact on imported products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction.[404] In particular, the Panel wrongly
indicated that the question in the second part of the analysis of less
favourable treatment under Article 2.1 is "whether 'detrimental treatment
is explained by, or at least reconcilable with, the objectives pursed by the
measure at issue.'"[405] The United States explains
that "[t]he second step of the Article 2.1 analysis is not a single-factor
test based on whether a 'rational connection' exists between the detrimental
impact and the objectives of the measure but an analysis of whether the
regulatory distinctions that account for the detrimental impact 'are designed and
applied in an even-handed manner.'"[406] In support of its position, the
United States points to the Appellate Body's explanation that "the
question for determining whether the 'detrimental impact stems exclusively from
legitimate regulatory distinctions' is whether the regulatory distinctions that
account for that detrimental impact 'are designed and applied in an even-handed
manner such that they may be considered "legitimate" for the purposes
of Article 2.1.'"[407] The United States adds that, in
the context of this dispute, the Appellate Body has been clear that this
question should be answered through an assessment of whether the requirement
"is even-handed in the manner in which it addresses the risks to dolphins
arising from different fishing methods in different areas of the ocean."[408] The United States accepts
that the objectives of the measure, and an inquiry into whether the detrimental
impact can be reconciled with those objectives, are not necessarily irrelevant
to the analysis. For the United States, however, in this dispute, such
considerations are relevant as part of the analysis of whether the regulatory
distinction is "calibrated" to the risks to dolphins arising from
different fishing methods in different areas of the oceans.[409] "Even-handedness" is the
appropriate inquiry to determine whether the detrimental impact stems
exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinction, and, in the United States'
view, an inquiry into "calibration" is not a separate test from
"even‑handedness". Rather, the original proceedings show that the
Appellate Body used the analytical tool of "calibration" in its application of the "even-handedness" standard. The
United States adds that the Panel's analysis of the certification
requirements, however, suggests that the Panel wrongly considered that the
legal standard under Article 2.1 prohibits an evaluation of different risks.
7.79. Mexico contends that "the
question of whether the regulatory distinction that accounts for the
detrimental impact is designed and applied in an even-handed manner" and "the
question of whether the detrimental impact caused by the regulatory distinction
can be explained by, or reconciled with, the objectives of the measure at issue"
are "not mutually exclusive".[410] Rather, the latter question is a
factor that may be relevant in resolving the first question. In particular,
Mexico argues that the legal test under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
focuses on whether the detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction, that is, whether the relevant regulatory
distinction is "even-handed". This does not mean that all like
products must always be treated identically, but rather that there must be a
rational, objective, and non-discriminatory basis for distinguishing among products.[411] Thus, Mexico adds, the test for
determining whether the application of a measure results in arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination should focus on the cause of the discrimination,
or the rationale put forward to explain its existence.[412]
7.80. According to Mexico, the
jurisprudence developed by the Appellate Body in interpreting Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement and Article XX of the GATT 1994 does not include a
"calibration" test.[413] Rather, Mexico points out, the
term "calibration" was introduced by the United States in the
original proceedings when it argued that the original tuna measure was
"calibrated" to the risk that dolphins may be killed or seriously
injured when tuna was caught.[414] Mexico further argues that the
notion of "calibration" is not equivalent to the notions of
"even‑handedness" or "arbitrary or unjustifiable". In
response to questioning at the oral hearing, Mexico added that, even if "calibration"
may be one way to assess whether a regulatory distinction involves arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination, such an examination is not appropriate in the
present dispute, in particular, given that the amended tuna measure does not
incorporate or reflect any concept of "calibration". Mexico added
that, in any event, an assessment into whether the measure at issue is
"calibrated" must be done in the light of the design and architecture
of the measure, as well as the circumstances surrounding the measure.
7.81. In order to assess the United
States' claim on appeal, we first identify the test articulated by the Panel
for assessing "treatment no less favourable" under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement. Then, we turn to analyse the central question raised in the
United States' claim, namely, whether the test articulated by the Panel
regarding the second step of the "treatment no less favourable"
requirement under Article 2.1 reflects and is consistent with the proper legal
standard under that provision, as identified by the Appellate Body. Our
analysis in the present subsection is limited to assessing the Panel's
interpretation and articulation of the legal standard. We address the issue of
whether the Panel incorrectly applied the
legal test in the subsections that follow, which deal with the various claims
of error raised by both the United States and Mexico in this regard.
7.82. In identifying the second step of
the "treatment no less favourable" requirement under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement, the Panel recalled that, in line with Appellate Body
jurisprudence, panels must examine whether the detrimental impact on imports
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction rather than reflects
discrimination against the group of imported products.[415] The Panel stated that:
… the Appellate Body has explained that an analysis of whether
detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction
(or whether a technical regulation that causes detrimental impact is even
handed) must take account of whether the technical regulation at issue is
"applied in [a] manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade".[416]
7.83. The Panel highlighted the
similarity between this language and that of the chapeau of Article XX of
the GATT 1994, and posed the question of whether this meant that panels should
draw on the jurisprudence elaborated under the chapeau in interpreting and
applying Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, noting that this issue was
"highly contested by the parties".[417] The Panel, first, indicated that
it could not agree with the United States that the provisions set out in
Article 2.1 and the chapeau of Article XX "are entirely
different".[418] In the Panel's view, the Appellate
Body "has consistently instructed panels to look for 'arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination' as one indication that a technical regulation
provides less favourable treatment to imported products in contravention of
TBT Article 2.1."[419] The Panel considered that the
Appellate Body thus "clearly intended that panels would apply the
'less favourable treatment' requirement in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement in
light of the jurisprudence developed in the context of the chapeau of Article
XX."[420] The Panel also understood the
Appellate Body's ruling in EC – Seal Products
to mean that, while the tests under Article 2.1 and the chapeau of Article
XX are not identical and should not be conflated, there are nevertheless
important similarities and overlaps between them, and thus that the
Appellate Body jurisprudence developed in the context of one provision may
be used to interpret similar concepts in the other.[421]
7.84. The Panel proceeded to make two
further interpretative points. First, the Panel stated that, in considering
whether detrimental impact caused by a technical regulation reflects
"arbitrary discrimination", it could consider, inter alia,
whether the detrimental treatment can be reconciled with, or is rationally
related to, the policy pursued by the measure at issue. In so doing, the Panel
adopted a test of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" that
has previously been used by the Appellate Body – for example, in EC – Seal Products – to assess the conformity of a measure
with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. In
the Panel's view, even if the analysis under Article 2.1 may involve
examination of more than just the existence or not of "arbitrary
discrimination", using such an analysis to determine whether a technical
regulation involves arbitrary discrimination "may help the Panel determine
whether the detrimental impact complained of … stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction".[422] Second, the Panel expressed its
understanding that the concept of "even-handedness" is not a separate
criterion required under Article 2.1, but rather "an analytical tool, a
kind of rhetorical measure or test that deploys a fluid, broadly equitable
concept as a proxy or gauge to help a panel determine whether identified
detrimental treatment stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction".[423] For the Panel, determining whether
a measure is even‑handed can help to determine whether the identified
detrimental treatment is fully explainable as a consequence of a
legitimate regulatory distinction – in which case it could be said to stem
exclusively from that distinction – or
whether the detrimental treatment, while perhaps connected to or broadly based
on a legitimate regulatory distinction, is nevertheless not fully or precisely
accounted for by the regulatory distinction that the responding Member seeks to
pursue – in which case it could not be
concluded that the detrimental treatment stems exclusively
from the distinction pursued.[424] The Panel also stated that it
viewed the notion of even-handedness as directing a panel's attention to the
"fit" or "fairness" of a technical regulation, and as
broader than the concept of "arbitrary discrimination".[425]
7.85. In sum, the Panel stated that, in
determining whether the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction, it could consider whether the detrimental treatment can
be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the objectives pursued by the
measure at issue.[426] However, the Panel did not, as the United States suggests, indicate that this
is a "single-factor test" that should always and exclusively be used
for assessing whether detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction.[427] To the contrary, the Panel
explicitly stated that such an analysis "may help" in determining
whether the relevant distinction involves "arbitrary discrimination".[428] The Panel further qualified the
role of this inquiry by pointing out that examining whether a measure involves
"arbitrary discrimination" is one way of
demonstrating that a measure is not even-handed, but that ascertaining whether
the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction "may involve examination of more than just the existence (or
not) or 'arbitrary discrimination'".[429]
7.86. Having described the relevant Panel
findings, we turn to assess whether, as alleged by the United States, they
amount to an erroneous articulation of the "treatment no less
favourable" requirement under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. In our
view, in challenging the Panel's finding that the relevant test under the
second step of a "less favourable treatment" analysis may involve
assessing whether the detrimental treatment can be reconciled with, or is
rationally related to, the objectives pursued by the measure, the United States
is also challenging the Panel's statement that the Appellate Body "clearly
intended" for panels to apply the "treatment no less favourable"
requirement in Article 2.1 in the light of the jurisprudence developed in the
context of the chapeau of Article XX.[430]
7.87. We begin by noting that, having
posed the question as to how panels should undertake the second step of the "treatment
no less favourable" analysis under Article 2.1 of TBT Agreement[431], the Panel turned, in the very
next paragraph of its Report, to the question of whether it could rely upon the
jurisprudence relating to the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.[432] In contrast, when seeking to
ascertain the analysis required under Article 2.1, the Appellate Body has
first looked to more immediate context for that provision.[433] As set out above, the Appellate
Body has emphasized that the specific context provided by other provisions of
the TBT Agreement – notably, Annex 1.1, Article 2.2, and the second,
fifth, and sixth recitals of the preamble – is instructive in understanding the
expression "treatment no less favourable" under Article 2.1. This
specific context "supports a reading that Article 2.1 does not operate to
prohibit a priori any restriction on
international trade".[434] In particular, the sixth recital
sheds light on the meaning and ambit of the "treatment no less
favourable" requirement in Article 2.1 by making clear that technical
regulations may pursue legitimate objectives, but must not be applied in a
manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.[435]
7.88. At the same time, given that the
sixth recital of the preamble of the TBT Agreement serves as relevant context
for understanding Article 2.1, and the language of that recital has important
commonalities with the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, the
jurisprudence under the chapeau of Article XX is not irrelevant to
understanding the content of the second step of the "treatment no less
favourable" requirement under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Indeed,
previous Appellate Body decisions concerning one provision of a covered
agreement may shed light on a proper understanding of the scope and meaning of
a different provision in another agreement where the same or similar language
is used in both provisions[436], provided always that due account
is taken of more immediate context, and of the function of each provision.
7.89. We recall that, in EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body indicated that
"there are important parallels between the analyses under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement and the chapeau of Article XX."[437] Prominent among them is the fact
that the concepts of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail" and a "disguised
restriction on trade" are found both in the chapeau of Article XX and in
the sixth recital of the preamble of the TBT Agreement. Yet, "there are
significant differences between the analyses under Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement and the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994"[438], and the legal standards
applicable under the two provisions differ.[439] Article 2.1 imposes affirmative
obligations on Members in respect of their technical regulations. By contrast,
Article XX establishes exceptions to obligations under the GATT 1994, and
the function of its chapeau "is to maintain a balance between a Member's
right to invoke the exceptions under the subparagraphs of Article XX and the
substantive rights of the other Members under the various other provisions of
the GATT 1994."[440]
7.90. We can see that the Panel
recognized both these similarities and differences. It noted, for example, the
Appellate Body's statement that "important parallels" exist between
the chapeau of Article XX and the "treatment no less favourable"
requirement under Article 2.1. Moreover, the Panel explicitly acknowledged that,
"while the tests in the chapeau of Article XX and Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement overlap, they are not identical."[441] In the Panel's view,
"[w]hereas Article 2.1 asks whether detrimental treatment stems from a
legitimate regulatory distinction, and while the existence of 'arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination' is one way in
which inconsistency with this aspect of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement can be
shown, the chapeau of Article XX is focused solely on
whether a measure is applied in an arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory
manner (or is a disguised restriction on international trade)."[442]
7.91. These considerations suggest to us
that, while the Panel jumped quickly to the chapeau of Article XX and certain
jurisprudence relating to that provision in seeking guidance as to the proper
legal test for the second step in the analysis of "treatment no less
favourable" under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the Panel was not
wrong to seek such guidance. Previous decisions under Article XX of the GATT
1994, particularly regarding the notion of "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination", may provide useful insight as to how the same concept
should be understood in the context of the second step of the "treatment
no less favourable" analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.92. As regards the specific insight
that the Panel drew from the jurisprudence under the chapeau of Article XX, we
recall that, in the context of its analysis of Article XX, in EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body stated that
"[o]ne of the most important factors in the assessment of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination is the question of whether the discrimination can
be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy objective with
respect to which the measure has been provisionally justified under one of the
subparagraphs of Article XX."[443] This was the test adopted by the
Panel for purposes of the second step of its "treatment no less
favourable" analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, to which the
United States now objects. In the context of the chapeau of Article XX, the
Appellate Body has explained that the reason why the assessment of whether
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable should be made in the light of the
objective of the measure is that it is difficult to understand "how
discrimination might be viewed as complying with the chapeau of Article XX when
the alleged rationale for discriminating does not relate to the pursuit of or
would go against the objective that was provisionally found to justify a
measure under a paragraph of Article XX".[444] The same considerations, in our
view, are valid in the context of the second step of the analysis of
"treatment no less favourable" under Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement. For the reasons set out above, and in particular the reference in
the sixth recital of the preamble of the TBT Agreement to "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination", the Panel's adoption of this test as part
of its "treatment no less favourable" analysis does not, in itself,
appear to us to be problematic.
7.93. Of course, in EC – Seal
Products, the Appellate Body also noted that, depending on the
nature of the measure at issue and the circumstances of the case at hand,
additional factors – beyond the question of whether the discrimination can be reconciled
with the policy objective – could also be relevant to the analysis of whether
the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable.[445] In a similar manner, the Panel
expressly stated that, in considering whether the detrimental impact caused by
a technical regulation reflects arbitrary discrimination, it might "consider,
among other things, whether the
detrimental treatment can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the
policy pursued by the measure at issue".[446] Thus, the Panel correctly and explicitly
recognized that merely inquiring into whether the detrimental impact of the
amended tuna measure can be reconciled with the objectives of that measure
might not, alone, be sufficient to ascertain whether the amended tuna measure
discriminates against Mexican tuna products in an arbitrary or unjustifiable
manner. In other words, and as already explained, the Panel did not
characterize this legal test as a "single-factor test"[447], or as an exclusive means of
assessing whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable.
7.94. In this connection, we further
recall that one of the ways to determine whether the
detrimental impacted caused by a technical regulation is even‑handed and
therefore stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction is by examining
whether the regulatory distinction is designed or applied in a manner that
constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.[448] Therefore, as set out above, a
measure that involves arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination would not be
designed or applied in an even-handed manner. At the same time, an examination
of whether a measure is designed or applied in a manner that constitutes a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination is not the
only way to assess whether a measure
lacks even‑handedness. Similarly, the Panel explicitly acknowledged that an
examination into arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination is not the only
means to determine whether a measure lacks even-handedness.[449]
7.95. As the above considerations show, a
panel does not err by assessing whether the detrimental impact can be
reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy pursued by the measure
at issue, so long as, in doing so, it does not preclude consideration of other
factors that may also be relevant to the analysis. In the present case, we do
not see that the Panel's articulation of
the legal standard precluded such consideration.
7.96. Moreover, as indicated above, in
determining whether the detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction, a panel must carefully scrutinize whether
the technical regulation at issue is even‑handed in its "design,
architecture, revealing structure, operation, and application" in the
light of the "particular circumstances of the case".[450] We note that the Panel correctly
indicated that the concept of "even‑handedness" is not a separate
criterion in the assessment of the second step of the "treatment no less
favourable" requirement under Article 2.1; rather,
"even-handedness" is the central concept for determining whether the
identified detrimental treatment stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction.[451] In a situation where the
detrimental impact caused by a technical regulation stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction, it must be concluded that such a technical
regulation does not accord less favourable treatment to imported products and
is therefore consistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.97. With regard to the relationship
between the notions of "even-handedness" and "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination", the Panel stated that, while
"even-handedness" may overlap with the concept of "arbitrary
discrimination", both terms are "conceptually distinct". For the
Panel, while a showing of arbitrary discrimination is one way of demonstrating
that a measure is not even‑handed, the concept of "even-handedness",
and the range of facts and circumstances that could lead a panel to find that a
measure is not even‑handed, is wider than those that could give rise to a
finding of arbitrary discrimination.[452] In this regard, a regulatory
distinction cannot be said to be designed and applied in an even‑handed manner
if "it is designed or applied in a manner that constitutes a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination".[453] While an examination of whether a
technical regulation constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
and thus is not even‑handed must be conducted in the light of the
"particular circumstances of the case"[454], it is likely that this assessment
involves consideration of the nexus between the regulatory distinctions found
in the measure and the measure's policy objectives, including by examining
whether the requirements imposed by the measure are disproportionate in the
light of the objectives pursued.[455]
7.98. At this juncture, we consider it
important to recall that, in the original proceedings, the United States
sought to explain that its measure was even‑handed and that the detrimental
impact did stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction by
introducing the notion of "calibration". In particular, the United
States contended that its measure was even‑handed because the distinctions that
it drew between different tuna fishing methods and different areas of the
oceans could be explained or justified by differences in the risks associated
with such fishing methods and areas of the oceans. This, in turn, led the
Appellate Body in the original proceedings to examine the legitimacy of the
original measure's regulatory distinctions through the lens of the concept of
"calibration" relied upon by the United States. We emphasize that the
Appellate Body's use of the terms "even-handed" and
"calibrated" did not constitute different legal tests, since the
entire inquiry by the Appellate Body revolved around whether the United States
had properly substantiated its argument that the original tuna measure was
even-handed, and thus not inconsistent with Article 2.1, because it was
"calibrated" to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing
methods in different areas of the oceans.
7.99. On the basis of the foregoing
discussion, we find that the United States has not established that the
Panel erred in recognizing the relevance of the concept of "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination" in the chapeau of Article XX of the
GATT 1994, or in identifying an examination of whether the detrimental
treatment can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the measure's
objectives as potentially "helpful" for purposes of the second step
of the analysis of "treatment no less favourable" under
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.100. At the same time, we also wish to
express doubts about certain aspects of the Panel's articulation of the legal
test for the "treatment no less favourable" requirement under
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. As noted, we find it somewhat odd
that, after identifying the relevant interpretative question under Article 2.1,
the Panel turned first to determine whether it could rely on the jurisprudence
developed under Article XX of the GATT 1994, rather than turning to assess the
jurisprudence on Article 2.1 itself, including the relevance of the sixth
recital of the preamble of the TBT Agreement and the role of the
"even-handedness" test.[456] Indeed, the Panel's discussion of
the test of even-handedness is brief and is located at the very end of the
subsection setting out its understanding of the legal test under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement.[457] Moreover, albeit brief, many of
the statements made by the Panel regarding its understanding of "even‑handedness"
are quite sweeping in nature.[458]
7.101. It is also surprising that, in this
part of its reasoning, the Panel made little reference to the original
Appellate Body report in this dispute[459], and did not acknowledge or
discuss the concept of "calibration" advanced by the United States,
and used by the Appellate Body as a means of testing the even-handedness of the
original tuna measure.[460] In taking account of the
United States' arguments, the concept of "calibration" was used
by the Appellate Body in the original proceedings to assess compliance with
Article 2.1. In these compliance proceedings, the United States has defended
its dolphin‑safe labelling regime from the claim raised by Mexico under Article
2.1 of the TBT Agreement in terms similar to those that it used in the
original proceedings. In the light of these considerations, as is explained in
more detail below, there is a special relevance in these Article 21.5
proceedings in conducting an assessment of whether, under the amended tuna
measure, the differences in labelling conditions for tuna products containing
tuna caught by large purse-seine vessels in the ETP, on the one hand, and for
tuna products containing tuna caught in other fisheries, on the other hand, are
"calibrated" to the differences in the likelihood that dolphins will
be adversely affected in the course of tuna fishing operations by different
vessels, using different fishing methods, in different areas of the oceans.
7.102. Having addressed the United States'
challenge to the Panel's articulation of
the legal standard for the second step in an analysis of "treatment no
less favourable" under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, we examine
below whether the Panel erred in its application of this
provision. In particular, we consider whether the Panel, having correctly
recognized that the second step of the "treatment no less favourable"
analysis is not focused solely on
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" and that
"even-handedness" may call for an examination of other elements, took
account of all the relevant elements in the particular circumstances of this
case in assessing whether the amended tuna measure's detrimental impact on
Mexican tuna products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction.
7.103. We begin by making certain
preliminary observations regarding the analytical approach taken by the Panel
in its assessment of whether the detrimental impact of the amended tuna measure
on Mexican tuna products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction. Our observations relate to several of the issues that we have
already discussed in this Report. We consider, specifically: the Panel's
segmented analytical approach; the test that it employed in assessing
"even-handedness"; and the extent to which the analytical approach
that it adopted relied upon, and took "due cognizance" of, the
findings in the original proceedings that were adopted by, and became part of
the recommendations and rulings of, the DSB.
7.104. As already explained, the Panel
adopted a segmented approach and assessed the amended tuna measure on a
"distinction-by-distinction basis".[461] Pursuant to this approach, the
Panel separately considered the consistency of the following three sets of
labelling conditions with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement: (i) the
eligibility criteria; (ii) the certification requirements; and (iii) the
tracking and verification requirements. With respect to the eligibility
criteria, the Panel did not itself conduct the two-step analysis required for
assessing less favourable treatment under Article 2.1. Instead, the Panel
relied upon the Appellate Body's findings in the original proceedings,
which it understood as having "settled" that the disqualification of
all tuna products derived from tuna caught by setting on dolphins from access
to the dolphin-safe label, while allowing those products derived from tuna
caught by other fishing methods to qualify for such access, is "even‑handed,
and accordingly … not inconsistent with Article 2.1".[462] This meant, according to the
Panel, that it had to examine "only the regulatory regime that currently applies
to those other fishing methods, which are
qualified to catch dolphin-safe tuna".[463] The Panel then proceeded, for each
of the sets of certification and tracking and verification requirements, to
conduct its own analysis of less favourable treatment. In the second step of
these analyses, the Panel found that the certification[464] and tracking and verification[465] requirements are not even‑handed
and, therefore, cannot be said to stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction. Thus, the Panel found each of these two sets of requirements to be
inconsistent with Article 2.1.[466]
7.105. We have already expressed the view
that, like the original tuna measure, the amended tuna measure has established a
labelling regime comprised of various elements that work together towards the
objectives pursued by the measure. We have also noted that, in discussing its
jurisdiction under Article 21.5 of the DSU, the Panel itself emphasized
the interlinkages between elements of the amended tuna measure, and stated that
it would indicate and analyse these connections where relevant. We will examine
below whether the Panel's segmented analysis of the even-handedness of each of
the eligibility criteria, the certification requirements, and the tracking and
verification requirements reflects and accounts for the manner in which the
various elements of the amended tuna measure are interrelated.
7.106. We also recall that, in the
preceding subsection of this Report, we found that the United States has
not established that the Panel erred in recognizing the relevance of the
concept of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" in the chapeau
of Article XX of the GATT 1994, or in identifying an examination of
whether the detrimental treatment can be reconciled with, or is rationally
related to, the measure's objectives as potentially "helpful" for
purposes of the second step of the analysis of "treatment no less
favourable" under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The Panel
did not use such an inquiry with respect to the eligibility criteria; rather,
the Panel mainly relied on its understanding of the Appellate Body's analysis
of the even‑handedness of the original tuna measure. The Panel did, however,
use such an inquiry in analysing the even-handedness of the different
certification and tracking and verification requirements. At the outset of its
consideration of the certification requirements, the Panel explicitly
reiterated its view that, "in examining whether detrimental treatment
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction, a panel may take
into account the extent to which the identified detrimental treatment is
explained by, or at least reconcilable with, the objectives [pursued] by the
measure at issue."[467] The Panel was ultimately persuaded
by Mexico that the different certification requirements are not even‑handed
because "captains may not necessarily and always have the technical skills
required to certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in a set
or other gear deployment, and this may result in inaccurate information being
passed to consumers, in contradiction with the objectives of the amended tuna
measure."[468] In analysing the different
tracking and verification requirements, the Panel was persuaded that there is
no rational or obvious connection between the amended tuna measure's imposition
of a lighter burden on tuna caught outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery
and the goals of the amended tuna measure[469], and found that none of the
explanations provided by the United States suggested otherwise.[470] This analysis supplied the basis
for the Panel's finding that the tracking and verification "system
currently in place under the amended tuna measure is not even-handed, and
therefore does not stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction."[471]
7.107. In both of these analyses, the
Panel referred, generally, to the "goals" or "objectives"
of the amended tuna measure. Elsewhere in its Report[472], the Panel identified these
objectives to be twofold – ensuring that US consumers are not misled about the
dolphin-safe status of their tuna products, and contributing to the protection
of dolphins. We nevertheless note that, in assessing whether
"a particular instance of detrimental treatment is reconcilable with
or explicable by reference to the objectives" of the measure[473], the Panel's reasoning with
respect to each of the sets of certification requirements, and tracking and
verification requirements relies predominantly on the first of these
objectives. Moreover, we have already explained that the Panel identified this
test as "a relevant consideration"[474] that may "help"[475] to determine whether the
distinctions drawn involve arbitrary discrimination, while also acknowledging
that an inquiry into whether a distinction constitutes arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination is not the only means to determine whether a
measure lacks even-handedness such that the detrimental treatment cannot be
said to stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.[476] Yet, we do not see that, in its
analysis of the certification and tracking and verification requirements, the
Panel took account of other considerations, employed additional tests, or
analysed other dimensions (e.g. protection of dolphins from observed and
unobserved harms) of "even-handedness" before reaching its
conclusions in respect of the certification and tracking and verification
requirements.
7.108. In this connection, as we have already
explained, in the original proceedings, the United States defended the
original tuna measure by arguing that it was "calibrated", that is,
that the distinctions drawn between different tuna fishing methods and
different areas of the oceans could be explained or justified by the
differences in risk associated with such fishing methods and areas of the
oceans.[477] This, in turn, led the Appellate
Body to address the question of whether the original measure's detrimental
impact on Mexican tuna products stemmed exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction by testing the "even-handedness" of the original
tuna measure using the concept of "calibration". Ultimately, the
Appellate Body compared, on the one hand, the existence of risks to dolphins
associated with the fishing method of setting on dolphins within the ETP, which
were fully addressed by the labelling conditions under the original tuna
measure with, on the other hand, the existence of risks of mortality or serious
injury of dolphins in all fisheries other than the ETP large purse-seine
fishery, which were unaddressed, given the absence of any requirement under the
original tuna measure to certify the dolphin-safe status in terms of mortality
or serious injury of tuna caught outside the ETP by non-purse-seine vessels.[478] Having done so, the Appellate Body
reached the conclusion that the United States had failed to show that its
measure was "'calibrated' to the risks to dolphins arising from different
fishing methods in different areas of the ocean", and thus that it had not
demonstrated that the original tuna measure was even-handed "in the
relevant respects".[479]
7.109. With respect to the manner in which
the rules on the allocation of the burden of proof under Article 2.1 were
applied in the original proceedings, we note that the Appellate Body considered
first whether Mexico had made a prima facie
case establishing that the original tuna measure modifies competitive
conditions to the detriment of Mexican tuna products and found that it had. It
then proceeded to analyse whether that detrimental impact reflected
discrimination or stemmed exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.
The Appellate Body stated in its Report that, although the burden of proof to
show that the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions were inconsistent with
Article 2.1 was on Mexico as the complainant, it was for the United States to
support its assertion that its dolphin-safe labelling provisions were
"calibrated" to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing
methods in different areas of the oceans.[480]
7.110. The Appellate Body recalled the reasons
why the original panel was "not persuaded" that the United States had
demonstrated that the requirements of the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions
were "calibrated", referring to key evidence presented, and key
arguments substantiated, by the parties.[481] The Appellate Body noted that the
United States had presented "extensive evidence and arguments", and
the original panel made "uncontested findings, to the effect that the
fishing method of setting on dolphins causes observed and unobserved adverse
effects on dolphins."[482] It also noted that the
original panel appeared to have accepted the United States' argument that "the
fishing technique of setting on dolphins is particularly harmful to dolphins."[483] While the original panel agreed
with the United States that "certain fishing techniques seem to pose
greater risks to dolphins than others"[484], it was "not persuaded"
that "at least some of the dolphin populations affected by fishing
techniques other than setting on dolphins are not facing risks at least
equivalent to those currently faced by dolphin populations in the ETP under
AIDCP monitoring."[485] Referring to evidence and
arguments submitted by Mexico, the original panel found that there were
"clear indications that the use of certain tuna fishing techniques other than setting on dolphins may also cause harm to
dolphins"[486], and agreed with Mexico that risks
from other fishing methods are not insignificant and do, under some
circumstances, rise to the same level as the risk from setting on dolphins.
7.111. On the basis of these
considerations, the Appellate Body concluded that "the United States ha[d]
not demonstrated that the difference in labelling conditions [was] 'calibrated'
to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different
areas of the ocean", that "the detrimental impact of the US measure
on Mexican tuna products stem[med] exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction," and that the measure was "even-handed in the relevant
respects".[487] In the light of all the above, the
Appellate Body reached overall conclusions on what the participants had
established, or failed to establish, under Article 2.1. It considered that
Mexico had "established a prima facie
case that the US 'dolphin-safe' labelling provisions modif[ied] the conditions
of competition in the US market to the detriment of Mexican tuna products and
[were] not even-handed in the way in which they address[ed] the risks to
dolphins arising from different fishing techniques in different areas of the
ocean".[488] However, the Appellate Body
considered that the United States had not "met its burden of rebutting
this prima facie case" because it
had not "justified as non-discriminatory under Article 2.1 the different
requirements … for access to the US 'dolphin-safe' label."[489] The Appellate Body thus concluded
that the United States had not "demonstrated that the detrimental impact
of the US measure on Mexican tuna products stem[med] exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction."[490]
7.112. We reiterate that these Article
21.5 proceedings form part of a continuum, such that due cognizance must be
accorded to the recommendations and rulings made by the DSB in the original
proceedings, based on the adopted findings of the Appellate Body and original
panel.[491] In their submissions to the Panel,
both the United States and Mexico advanced arguments relating to the respective
risks to dolphins associated with different methods of fishing inside and
outside the ETP. Mexico sought to establish that tuna fishing methods other
than setting on dolphins have substantial adverse effects and that dolphins
face risks of mortality or serious injury from tuna fishing outside the ETP
that are equal to or greater than those posed to dolphins by fishing within the
ETP.[492] For its part, the
United States contended that the changes incorporated into the amended
tuna measure through the 2013 Final Rule responded directly to the
lack of calibration that the Appellate Body found to be responsible for the
lack of even-handedness of the original tuna measure. In making its arguments,
the United States relied on the findings from the original proceedings, as well
as additional evidence, to establish that setting on dolphins in the ETP is
"particularly harmful" to dolphins, and that the risks associated
with such a tuna fishing method are greater than those associated with fishing
methods that are not disqualified from access to the dolphin-safe label under
the amended tuna measure.
7.113. Having made these preliminary
observations, and bearing them in mind, we proceed to examine the three
separate parts of the Panel's analysis and findings in the light of the
specific claims of error raised by the participants in this appeal.
7.114. Mexico argues that the Panel erred
in its analysis of the eligibility criteria when assessing the consistency of
the amended tuna measure with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. In
particular, Mexico contends that the Panel erred in finding that, in the
original dispute, the Appellate Body "settled" the issue of
even-handedness with respect to the granting of eligibility for the dolphin‑safe
label to tuna products containing tuna caught by fishing methods other than
setting on dolphins.[493]
7.115. Before addressing Mexico's claim of
error on appeal, we describe the main findings by the Panel regarding the
eligibility criteria in the amended tuna measure.
7.116. The Panel began by posing the question of what,
precisely, had been "definitively settled" by the Appellate Body
in the original proceedings regarding the eligibility criteria.[494] For the Panel, it was "quite
clear that the Appellate Body in the original proceedings settled the
question whether the United States can disqualify tuna caught by setting
on dolphins from accessing the dolphin‑safe label."[495] In the Panel's view, "the
Appellate Body clearly found that setting on dolphins causes observed and
unobserved harm to dolphins."[496] The Panel further explained its
understanding that "what makes setting on dolphins particularly harmful is
the fact that it causes certain unobserved effects beyond
mortality and injury 'as a result of the chase itself'"[497], and emphasized that it was
"precisely because these unobserved harms cannot be mitigated by measures
to avoid killing and injuring dolphins that the original panel and the
Appellate Body found that the United States is entitled to treat setting
on dolphins differently from other fishing methods."[498] On this basis, the Panel
"reaffirm[ed] the Appellate Body's finding that the
United States is entitled, in pursuit of its desired level of protection,
to disqualify tuna caught by that method from ever being labelled as
dolphin-safe".[499] The Panel added that the original tuna
measure was considered WTO‑inconsistent, "not because it disqualified tuna
caught by setting on dolphins from accessing the dolphin-safe label, but
because the original tuna measure was not even‑handed with
respect to other methods of fishing which may also cause harm to
dolphins".[500]
7.117. Next, the Panel stated that, in the
original proceedings, the Appellate Body answered the question of whether
the failure of the US labelling regime to disqualify other
methods of tuna fishing necessarily deprived the original tuna measure of even‑handedness.
In the Panel's view, the Appellate Body found that
the disqualification of tuna caught by setting on dolphins, together with the
qualification of tuna caught by other fishing methods, is not inconsistent with
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The Panel thus considered this
issue to be "settled" and proceeded to "reaffirm the finding of
the Appellate Body that, to the extent that they modify the conditions of
competition in the US market to the detriment of Mexican tuna and
tuna products, the eligibility criteria are even‑handed, and accordingly are
not inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement".[501]
7.118. Mexico asserts that the Panel erred
in finding that the Appellate Body had already "settled" in the
original dispute the issue of "even-handedness" concerning the
granting of eligibility for the dolphin-safe label to tuna products containing
tuna caught by fishing methods other than setting on dolphins. Mexico
stresses that the analysis of even-handedness under Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement "is complicated both legally and factually" and that the
Appellate Body did not undertake the "rigorous assessment" required
to assess the even-handedness of the granting of the eligibility for the
dolphin-safe label to tuna products containing tuna caught by other fishing
methods.[502] Nor, according to Mexico, did the
Appellate Body make the findings of even-handedness or consistency with
Article 2.1 that the Panel imputed to it.[503] Rather, in Mexico's view, the
findings of the Appellate Body related to the issue of disqualification of
tuna caught by setting on dolphins from accessing the dolphin-safe label and
did not address the granting of
the dolphin‑safe label to tuna products containing tuna caught by other
fishing methods.[504] Therefore, Mexico emphasizes that
this issue was not "definitively settled".[505]
7.119. The United States responds that,
contrary to Mexico's assertions, the Panel correctly concluded that the
Appellate Body had already rejected that the United States could not
distinguish between different fishing methods consistently with
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The United States contends that Mexico
wrongly argues that the Appellate Body's "even‑handedness" analysis
was limited to the disqualification of tuna caught by setting on dolphins and
did not cover the eligibility of tuna caught by other fishing methods.
According to the United States, that issue was "squarely before"[506] the Appellate Body in the original
proceedings. Therefore, the United States asserts that the Panel did not err in
finding that the issue was "definitively settled" in the original
proceedings, given that the central question for the Appellate Body was
whether the challenged measure was "calibrated" to the risks to
dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different areas of the oceans.[507]
7.120. To address this claim of error by
Mexico, we must first recall the main findings made by the Appellate Body
in the original dispute.
7.121. Having found that the original tuna
measure modified the conditions of competition in the US market to the
detriment of Mexican products, the Appellate Body turned to assess whether
the detrimental impact reflected discrimination and, in particular, whether the
measure at issue was "calibrated" to the risks to dolphins. The
Appellate Body began by noting that the United States had argued
before the original panel that, "to the extent that there are any
differences in criteria that must be satisfied in order to substantiate
'dolphin-safe' claims, they are 'calibrated' to the risk that dolphins may be
killed or seriously injured when tuna is caught".[508] The Appellate Body pointed
out that "[t]he aspect of the measure that causes the detrimental impact
on Mexican tuna products is thus the difference in labelling conditions for
tuna products containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP, on the
one hand, and for tuna products containing tuna caught by other fishing methods
outside the ETP, on the other hand."[509] Therefore, the Appellate Body
considered that the question before it was whether the United States had
demonstrated "that this difference
in labelling conditions is a legitimate regulatory distinction, and hence
whether the detrimental impact of the measure stem[med] exclusively from such a
distinction rather than reflecting discrimination."[510]
7.122. In addressing this question, the
Appellate Body recalled and relied upon a number of findings made by the
original panel. These included: that "the fishing method of setting on
dolphins causes observed and unobserved adverse effects on dolphins"[511]; that "these adverse effects [were]
fully addressed in the measure at issue"[512]; and that "the use of certain
tuna fishing techniques other than
setting on dolphins may also cause harm to dolphins'."[513] The Appellate Body
highlighted that, while the original panel "accepted the United States'
argument that the fishing technique of setting on dolphins is particularly harmful
to dolphins", it "did not agree with the United States … that the
risks to dolphins from other fishing techniques are insignificant and do not
under some circumstances rise to the same level as the risks from setting on
dolphins."[514] In the view of the Appellate Body,
these findings formed the basis for the original panel's concerns about the way
in which the original tuna measure addressed the potential adverse effects on
dolphins from the use of fishing techniques other than setting on dolphins
outside the ETP.[515] Like the original panel, the Appellate
Body concluded that the original tuna measure did not
address adverse effects on dolphins resulting from the use of fishing methods
predominantly employed by fishing fleets supplying the United States' and other
countries' tuna producers, because there was no requirement for certification
that no dolphins had been killed or seriously injured applicable to fisheries outside
the ETP.[516] Rather, the only requirement that
the original tuna measure applied to vessels fishing outside the ETP was, in
respect of tuna caught by purse-seine vessels, to provide a certification by
the captain that setting on dolphins had not taken
place. The Appellate Body agreed with the original panel that this
requirement did not address risks to dolphins resulting from fishing methods
other than setting on dolphins.[517]
7.123. For these reasons, the
Appellate Body concluded that "the
United States ha[d] not demonstrated that the difference in
labelling conditions for tuna products containing tuna caught by setting on
dolphins in the ETP, on the one hand, and for tuna products containing tuna
caught by other fishing methods outside the ETP, on the other hand, [was]
'calibrated' to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in
different areas of the ocean."[518] Consequently, the
Appellate Body considered that the United States had not rebutted
Mexico's prima facie case that "the US
'dolphin-safe' labelling provisions modify the conditions of competition in the
US market to the detriment of Mexican tuna products and are not
even-handed in the way in which they address the risks to dolphins arising from
different fishing techniques in different areas of the ocean."[519]
7.124. As can be seen from the above, the
Appellate Body did not make the
findings attributed to it by the Panel. Although the Panel stated that it was
"reaffirm[ing]" the Appellate Body's findings, the
Appellate Body report contains no statement that the United States is
"entitled" to disqualify tuna caught by setting on dolphins "from
ever being labelled as dolphin-safe", much less that "the eligibility
criteria are even‑handed, and accordingly are not inconsistent with
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement".[520] Indeed, the Panel does not refer to
any paragraph(s) in the Appellate Body report that contain these alleged
findings. Importantly, and as the Panel acknowledged, the Appellate Body
found the original tuna measure to lack even-handedness
and, for that reason, to be inconsistent
with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[521]
7.125. As we have already explained, and
as the term itself implies, "even-handedness" is a relational
concept, and must be tested through a comparative analysis. Regulatory
distinctions by definition treat groups of products differently. Thus, the
even-handedness of a measure and a regulatory distinction drawn thereunder
cannot properly be appreciated through an examination of how they treat a
single group of products or production methods. Rather, it is only through
scrutiny of the treatment accorded to all the groups that are being compared
that a proper assessment of even-handedness can be made.
7.126. In some parts of its reasoning, the
Panel seemed to be aware of the relational and comparative nature of the
analysis of whether the amended measure is calibrated and even‑handed. The
Panel noted that, in the original proceedings, the Appellate Body's
finding of inconsistency with Article 2.1 was made not because the
United States disqualified tuna caught by setting on dolphins from
accessing the dolphin-safe label, but rather because the regulatory regime imposed
by the United States on tuna fishing methods other
than setting on dolphins did not sufficiently address the risks posed to
dolphins by those methods.[522] However, it does not follow from
the Appellate Body's findings in the original dispute that the measure's "disqualification"
of products containing tuna caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins could be –
or was – assessed for consistency with Article 2.1 in isolation from the
requirements applied with respect to other fishing methods that also cause harm
to dolphins in other fisheries. As noted, in order to assess whether the
regulatory distinctions drawn under a measure are even-handed, the treatment of
both groups between which the measure's regulatory treatment differs has to be
appreciated. Whether a regulatory distinction that involves a denial of access
to the dolphin-safe label in respect of setting on dolphins is even‑handed
depends not only on how the risks associated with this method of fishing are
addressed, but also on whether the risks associated with other fishing methods
in other fisheries are addressed, commensurately with their respective risk
profiles, in the labelling conditions that apply in respect of tuna caught in
such other fisheries. By finding that the issue of disqualifying setting on
dolphins had been "settled" in the original proceedings, the Panel
precluded a proper relational and comparative analysis of the regulatory
distinctions and the treatment of both groups of products (i.e. those that are
ineligible for access to the label under the amended measure and those that are
eligible for such access).
7.127. The same is true when, as was the
case with the changes introduced to the dolphin-safe labelling regime through
the measure taken to comply (the 2013 Final Rule), a measure is modified in a
way that affects the treatment of only one of the two groups subject to that
distinction. Following such modification, the even-handedness of the regulatory
treatment and relevant distinctions must be assessed anew. The legal
significance of the changed treatment afforded to one group of products cannot
properly be understood by examining that group in isolation. Rather, answering
the question of whether the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction also requires consideration of the unchanged
regulatory treatment accorded to the other group.
7.128. To us, the Panel's statements are
all the more surprising given that they do not seem entirely consonant with the
way in which the Panel itself described the findings of the Appellate Body
in an earlier section of the Panel Report. As explained in section 7.1 of this
Report, in considering the scope of its jurisdiction, the Panel stressed that
the Appellate Body "did not say that any one particular element" of
the dolphin-safe labelling regime was "solely responsible" for the
original tuna measure's lack of even-handedness.[523] The Panel observed that "[i]t
is true that the Appellate Body's reasoning focused primarily on the
disqualification of tuna caught by setting on dolphins from accessing the
dolphin-safe label", but added that this "may very well have been a
consequence of the way the case was argued by the parties".[524] In any event, the Panel explained,
it was "the tuna measure as a whole, with its varying regulatory
requirements, that was found [by the Appellate Body] to be inconsistent with
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement."[525] In particular, the Panel
considered that the Appellate Body's reference in the plural to "the
difference in labelling conditions" and "different requirements"
indicated that the Appellate Body's findings encompassed various distinctions
embedded in the original tuna measure, including in respect of the requirements
pertaining to certification and tracking and verification.[526]
7.129. We do not see how, in the light of
the Appellate Body's findings, the Panel formed the view that the
Appellate Body report in the original proceedings had "settled":
(i) that the United States can disqualify tuna caught by setting on
dolphins from ever accessing the dolphin-safe label[527]; and (ii) the question
whether the disqualification of tuna caught by setting on dolphins, together
with the qualification of tuna caught by other fishing methods, is inconsistent
with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[528] In particular, the
Appellate Body did not assess the questions identified by the Panel
independently from each other. Nor does the Appellate Body report either
state or imply that these issues had been "settled", especially in
the categorical manner in which the Panel described them. Rather, in assessing
whether the measure at issue was "calibrated", the
Appellate Body scrutinized and compared the difference in labelling
conditions for tuna products containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins in
the ETP, on the one hand, and for tuna products containing tuna caught by other
fishing methods outside the ETP, on the other hand. Therefore, it is only
through an examination of the treatment accorded to both
of the groups that are being compared that a proper assessment of the
even-handedness of the measure at issue can be made.
7.130. We further observe that the Panel's
decision, in addressing the eligibility criteria under the amended tuna
measure, to focus on the aspects that it considered the Appellate Body had
already "settled" appeared to prevent it from engaging in a full
exploration of the central question in these compliance proceedings, namely,
whether the changes introduced by the United States through the amended
tuna measure suffice to bring that measure into compliance with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB concerning Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.
7.131. In sum, the Appellate Body report
contains no finding that the United States is entitled "to disqualify
tuna caught by that method from ever being labelled as dolphin-safe"[529], or that the original proceedings
"settled the question whether the disqualification of tuna caught by
setting on dolphins, together with the qualification of tuna caught by other
fishing methods, is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement."[530] Accordingly, the Panel's
"reaffirm[ation]" of the supposed "finding" of the
Appellate Body that "the eligibility criteria are even‑handed, and
accordingly are not inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement", is incorrect.[531] For the foregoing reasons, we find
that the Panel erred in finding that the Appellate Body
"settled" the issue of the even-handedness of the eligibility
criteria in the original proceedings.
7.132. The United States claims that
the Panel erred in reaching findings that the detrimental impact caused by the
certification requirements, and the tracking and verification requirements, does
not stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. As a result of
these alleged errors, the United States seeks reversal of the Panel's ultimate
findings that: (i) the certification requirements accord less favourable
treatment to Mexican tuna products than that accorded to like products from the
United States and to like products originating in any other country, in
violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement; and (ii) the tracking and
verification requirements accord less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna
products than that accorded to like products from the United States and to
like products originating in any other country, in violation of Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement.[532]
7.133. The United States appeals two main
aspects of the Panel's assessment of the even‑handedness of the certification
requirements. First, the United States submits that the Panel erred in
finding that the different certification requirements lack even-handedness
because captains may not necessarily and always have the technical skills to
certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured, and this may result
in inaccurate information being passed to consumers, in contradiction with the
objectives of the amended tuna measure. Second, the United States argues
that the Panel erred in finding that the determination provisions prove that
the detrimental impact caused by the certification requirements does not stem
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.[533] We address the United States'
challenge to the Panel's analysis of the determination provisions in the next
subsection of this Report. Following that subsection, we deal with claims
raised by the participants under Article 11 of the DSU in connection with the
Panel's analysis of the even-handedness of the different certification
requirements.
7.134. In this subsection of our Report,
we address the claims of error raised by the United States in respect of the
first part of the Panel's analysis of the even-handedness of the different
certification requirements, and in respect of the Panel's analysis of the
even-handedness of the different tracking and verification requirements. We
begin by providing a summary of the relevant Panel findings, first with respect
to the even-handedness of the different certification requirements and, second,
with respect to the different tracking and verification requirements.
The different certification requirements
7.135. With respect to the different
certification requirements, Mexico submitted to the Panel that, like the
original tuna measure, the amended tuna measure lacks even-handedness, because
it fully addresses the risks posed to dolphins by setting on dolphins in the
ETP, but does not fully address the risk posed by other fishing methods in
other fisheries. Mexico highlighted that, within the ETP large purse-seine
fishery, the required certifications must be provided both by the captain of
the vessel and by an independent on-board observer, but, outside that fishery,
the certifications need be provided only by the captain. The Panel expressed
the view that Mexico's claim that the different certification requirements are
not even‑handed rested on the "fundamental factual premise" that
captains' certifications are "inherently unreliable" and
"meaningless"[534] for two main reasons: (i) captains
have a financial incentive to certify that their catch is "dolphin
safe" even when it is not, and the amended tuna measure contains no
mechanism to check this incentive; and (ii) captains lack the technical
expertise necessary to certify accurately that no dolphins were killed or
seriously injured, and therefore their certifications do not ensure that tuna
labelled as "dolphin safe" in fact meet the statutory and regulatory
requirements.
7.136. In considering the first of these
assertions, the Panel was of the view that "the fact that many domestic,
regional, and international regimes rely on captains' self-certification raises
a strong presumption that, from a systemic perspective, such certifications are
reliable."[535] The Panel considered that the
arguments and evidence submitted by Mexico were not sufficient to rebut this
presumption[536], and noted that the
United States' alternative understanding of the economic incentives facing
captains seemed equally plausible.[537] The Panel was thus not convinced
that relying on captains' certifications outside the ETP large purse-seine
fishery deprives the amended tuna measure of even‑handedness.[538]
7.137. Next, in assessing Mexico's
argument that captains may not have the necessary technical expertise to
certify accurately that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured, the Panel
considered it useful to compare the kinds of tasks expected to be carried out
by observers in the ETP and other oceans with those that are customarily
carried out by captains.[539] Having examined the evidence
concerning the kinds of tasks performed by observers, the Panel concluded that
this evidence "strongly suggests that certifying whether a dolphin has
been killed or seriously injured in a set or other gear deployment is a highly
complex task."[540] Next, the Panel analysed the
evidence regarding the tasks generally expected of captains and was not
convinced that certifying dolphin mortality or serious injury is the kind of
task generally expected of captains, or that captains necessarily have the
skills to certify whether dolphins have been killed or seriously injured.[541] For these reasons, the Panel held
that "the United States ha[d] not rebutted Mexico's showing that
captains may not necessarily and always have the technical skills required to
certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in a set or other gear
deployment"[542], because "the
United States ha[d] not explained why its measure assumes that captains
have at their disposal the skills necessary to ensure accurate certification."[543] Accordingly, the Panel reasoned
that captain certification of the dolphin-safe status of tuna "may result
in inaccurate information being passed to consumers, in contradiction with the
objectives of the amended tuna measure".[544] The Panel therefore found that
"the different certification requirements are not even-handed, and so cannot
be said to stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction."[545]
7.138. Subsequently, the Panel set out to
"sketch" how it would analyse the even-handedness of the
certification requirements if the United States, rather than Mexico, bore the
burden of proof with respect to the second step of the analysis of
"treatment no less favourable" under Article 2.1.[546] The Panel accepted the
United States' argument that "the 100 per cent observer requirement
in the ETP is intricately tied to the special and, in some senses, 'unique'
nature of the harms that the ETP large purse seine fishery poses to
dolphins."[547] In doing so, the Panel clarified
that it did not understand the United States to have taken the position that
such observer certifications are required in the ETP large purse-seine fishery
but not in other fisheries "because the risk of dolphin mortality or
serious injury is somehow less important in other fisheries".[548] Rather, according to the Panel,
the United States explained the different certification requirements as
due to "the nature of the fishing technique used by ETP large purse
seiners, which essentially involves the chasing and encirclement of many
dolphins over an extended period of time, [and that this] means that it is
necessary to have one single person on board with the responsibility of keeping
track of those dolphins caught up in the chase and/or the purse seine nets
set."[549] In contrast, because the nature
and degree of the interaction between dolphins and tuna fishers using other
fishing methods in other oceans is "different in quantitative and
qualitative terms (since dolphins are not set on intentionally, and interaction
is only accidental), there is no need to have a single person on board whose
sole task is to monitor the safety of dolphins during the set or other gear
deployment".[550]
7.139. The Panel considered that Mexico's
evidence was not sufficient to rebut the United States' argument that the
special and unique risks to dolphins posed in the ETP large purse-seine fishery
justify the different certification requirements applied to the ETP large purse-seine
fishery and other fisheries.[551] On this
basis, the Panel observed that it "would find that the United States
ha[d] made a prima facie case that the
different certification requirements stem exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction".[552] However, the Panel then pointed out that, since the United States
had not rebutted the evidence submitted by Mexico concerning the complexity of
certifying the dolphin-safe status of a tuna catch, it "would find that
the United States ha[d] not explained sufficiently why it assumes that
captains are capable of carrying out an activity that the amended tuna measure
itself recognizes as highly complex and for which training and education are
required".[553] In the absence of such explanation, the Panel felt
"compelled" to find that, while the United States may
legitimately draw distinctions between the ETP large purse-seine fishery and
other fisheries, the lack of explanation concerning the technical capacities of
captains means that the different certification requirements cannot be said to
be even-handed, and as such to stem exclusively
from a legitimate regulatory distinction.[554] One of the panelists was unable to
agree with the reasoning and conclusions of the Panel's majority.[555]
The different tracking and verification requirements
7.140. In assessing the even-handedness of
the different tracking and verification requirements, the Panel began its
analysis by recalling that it was for Mexico to show
prima facie that the different tracking and verification
requirements are not even‑handed.[556] Then, the Panel expressed its
agreement with Mexico's argument that "there is no obvious connection
between the imposition of a lighter burden on tuna caught outside the ETP large
purse‑seine fishery and the goals of the amended tuna measure."[557] The Panel found that Mexico had
shown prima facie "that there is no
rational connection between the different burden created by the tracking and
verification requirements and the objectives of the amended tuna measure."[558]
7.141. The Panel disagreed with the
arguments put forward by the United States to rebut this showing. First,
the Panel considered that the United States' argument that the tracking
and verification requirements are origin neutral was not responsive to the
point that the differences in the requirements are inconsistent with the
objectives pursued by the amended tuna measure.[559] Second, the Panel disagreed with
the United States' argument that the tracking and verification requirements
simply reflect international commitments undertaken by the United States
and Mexico under the AIDCP, because this does not explain why the amended tuna
measure contains a regulatory distinction whose effect is to impose a
significantly lighter compliance burden on tuna caught in some fisheries than
on tuna caught in others.[560]
7.142. The Panel also did not accept the
United States' explanation that the tracking and verification requirements
are different because of the higher degree of risk to dolphins in the ETP large
purse-seine fishery. This higher risk "does not explain why the tracking
and verification requirements, which by their very nature concern the movement
of fish subsequent to the time of catch, differ
between fisheries to the detriment of like Mexican tuna and tuna
products".[561] For the Panel, the different risk
profiles of different fisheries may explain regulatory differences concerning
the eligibility criteria for fishing methods, as well as the need for an
independent observer to monitor and certify during and immediately
following the fishing activity itself, but they do not explain the different
tracking and verification requirements, since such requirements apply only after the tuna has been caught. Finally, while the Panel
agreed that the United States is free to pursue its objectives at a level
it considers appropriate, the Panel pointed out that this principle "is
not a licence to modify the conditions of competition in a market to the
detriment of imported products where such modification does not stem exclusively
from a legitimate regulatory distinction".[562]
7.143. For these reasons, the Panel found
that the United States had not rebutted Mexico's prima facie
showing that the different tracking and verification requirements do not stem
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction, and therefore found that
these requirements accord less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna products,
in contravention of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[563]
7.144. The United States argues that
the Panel erred and applied an incorrect legal standard in failing to consider
whether the different sets of certification and tracking and verification
requirements are each "calibrated" to the risks to dolphins arising
from different fishing methods in different areas of the oceans.[564] The United States highlights
that, in contrast, the panelist who wrote a separate opinion on one part of the
certification requirements correctly recognized that the issue of calibration
is determinative, and that "the analysis of whether the [different]
requirements are calibrated to the differing risk profiles of the different
fisheries lay 'at the very heart of the even-handedness analysis [] in this
case.'"[565] In the United States' view,
unlike the Panel majority's analysis of the certification requirements and the
Panel's analysis of the tracking and verification requirements, the analysis by
the panelist who wrote a separate opinion is consistent with the
Appellate Body's guidance in the original proceedings.[566]
7.145. The United States considers
that the "central question" for the Appellate Body was whether the
relevant regulatory distinction was "even-handed in the manner in which it
addresse[d] the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in
different areas of the ocean."[567] Moreover, the United States
indicates that it relied on the Appellate Body's "calibration"
analysis in designing its measure taken to comply with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings. The United States adds that, apart from the
opinion of the panelist who wrote a separate opinion, the Panel "erred in
not similarly taking the Appellate Body's guidance [on calibration] into
account".[568] The United States also highlights
that, even in the original proceedings, the Appellate Body's "calibration"
analysis also related to the
certification requirements themselves. In particular, the Appellate Body noted
that an observer requirement "may be appropriate in circumstances in which
dolphins face higher risks of mortality or serious injury".[569] Thus, for the United States, the
Appellate Body has already accepted the "critical principle" that
"a WTO Member is not required to impose the same
requirements for all Members – but may impose different requirements to address
different risks".[570]
7.146. The United States points out,
in this regard, that the Panel "did, in fact, conclude that the ETP large
purse seine fishery has a different 'risk profile' for dolphin harm than other
fisheries do".[571] According to the
United States, it is thus entirely appropriate to set different
requirements for tuna produced in the ETP large purse‑seine fishery than for
tuna produced in other fisheries.[572] Therefore, "the fact that the
[requirements applicable to the ETP large purse‑seine fishery and all other
fisheries] are different – and may have
different rates of accuracy – cannot, standing alone, be a basis on which to
find that the difference in the regimes is not even-handed where the risk
profiles between the ETP large purse seine fishery and all other fisheries
are so dramatically different."[573] The United States adds that
the differences in the applicable requirements are "calibrated" to
the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different areas
of the oceans.[574]
7.147. Furthermore, with respect to the
tracking and verification requirements, the United States disagrees with
the Panel that a "calibration" analysis is not legally relevant to
whether the regulatory distinction is even‑handed because such requirements
apply after the tuna has already been caught. The United States argues that,
for purposes of the "calibration" analysis, it is immaterial when any
degree of inaccuracy is introduced into the system (i.e. at the initial
designation of the set as dolphin safe or non-dolphin safe, or in the
subsequent tracking of the tuna). For the United States, the fact that
there is so much more tuna harvested where a dolphin has been killed or
seriously injured in one fishery compared to other fisheries provides a basis
for treating that fishery differently.[575] Consequently, the
United States submits that the tracking and verification requirements of
the amended tuna measure are consistent with Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.
7.148. Mexico makes three main arguments
in response. First, Mexico disagrees that "calibrated" is equivalent
to "even-handed" or "not arbitrary or unjustifiable", and
disputes that the Appellate Body jurisprudence on Article 2.1 includes a
"calibration test". Second, Mexico contends that the amended tuna
measure does not incorporate any concept of "calibration". Third,
Mexico disagrees that there are relevant differences between the ETP and other
ocean regions that could justify any regulatory distinctions in the
certification requirements and the tracking and verification requirements.[576] Mexico argues that the Panel
correctly concluded that the different certification requirements and the
different tracking and verification requirements evidence a lack of even‑handedness,
such that the detrimental impact caused by the amended tuna measure's different
labelling conditions cannot be said to stem exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction.
7.149. Mexico argues that it cannot be
even‑handed for the amended tuna measure to permit a higher proportion of
incorrect dolphin-safe information with respect to tuna caught in allegedly
low-risk fisheries outside the ETP than for tuna caught in the allegedly
high-risk ETP large purse‑seine fishery. Thus, the "calibration" that
the United States proposes is clearly arbitrary, unjustifiable, and lacking in
even-handedness because it results in inaccurate and misleading information, in
direct contradiction with the measure's objectives.[577]
7.150. With respect to the different
certification requirements, Mexico asserts that the Panel correctly found that
they lack even-handedness because captains may not necessarily always have the
technical skills required for accurate dolphin-safe certification. Since,
according to Mexico, the United States does not disagree that captain
certifications are less accurate than AIDCP-approved observer certifications,
"[i]t is therefore uncontested that requiring only captains' certifications
for tuna caught outside the ETP large purse seine fishery results in a 'margin
of error', meaning that at least some tuna products containing non-dolphin-safe
tuna caught outside the ETP are being incorrectly labelled as dolphin safe in
the U.S. market."[578] Since, in Mexico's view, the
amended tuna measure's objective of "ensuring that consumers are not
misled or deceived about whether tuna products contain tuna caught in a manner
that adversely affects dolphins" is "absolute", it follows that
this difference in the certification requirements is "arbitrary,
unjustifiable and lacking in even-handedness".[579]
7.151. Mexico also disagrees with the
United States' argument that the different tracking and verification
requirements are even‑handed because they are "calibrated" to the
risks to dolphins posed by different fishing methods in different fisheries.
Mexico highlights that, as the Panel properly found, the risk profile of harm
to dolphins is no longer a relevant consideration after the tuna has been
harvested and stored aboard a fishing vessel. Therefore, in Mexico's view,
there is no nexus between the different tracking and verification requirements
and the allegedly different risk profiles of harm to dolphins from different
fishing methods in different areas of the oceans.[580] Mexico also rejects the
United States' position that, "[f]or purposes of the calibration
analysis, it is immaterial when any degree
of inaccuracy is introduced into the system".[581]
7.152. In our view, these claims of error
by the United States raise several issues. The first issue that we have to
examine is whether, in applying the second step of the "treatment no less
favourable" requirement under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement,
the Panel was required to assess whether the certification and tracking and
verification requirements in the amended tuna measure are
"calibrated" to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing
methods in different areas of the oceans. If the Panel was required to do so, a
related issue is whether the Panel in fact undertook such an analysis. In
addressing these issues, we also need to give consideration to the questions of
whether the even‑handedness of each set of requirements could properly be
assessed separately and in isolation from the other elements of the amended
tuna measure and, if so, whether the appropriateness or nature of the approach
adopted in order to assess such even-handedness would differ as between the
different elements of the amended tuna measure.
7.153. We have already undertaken some
analysis relevant to the first issue when we addressed the United States'
appeal of the Panel's articulation of the legal standard to be applied in the
second step of an assessment of whether a technical regulation accords less
favourable treatment under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. We noted
that, in determining whether the detrimental impact on imports stems
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction, the "particular
circumstances" of the case may inform the appropriate way in which to
assess even‑handedness in that specific case. While acknowledging the potential
utility to the even‑handedness assessment of an inquiry into whether the
detrimental impact, and the explanations given for it, can be reconciled with,
or are rationally related to, the policy pursued by the measure at issue, we
explained that this is one possible examination that could be undertaken to
determine whether a regulatory distinction is arbitrary or unjustifiable and
thus not even‑handed under Article 2.1. Yet, taking too narrow an approach to
such an inquiry could lead a panel into error. To appreciate properly whether a
measure is even-handed, an inquiry into the nexus between the regulatory
distinctions found in the measure and the measure's policy objective may have
to encompass also, or to be supplemented by, consideration of whether the
differences in the treatment accorded to different groups of products by virtue
of those distinctions, and the resulting detrimental impact, are
disproportionate in the light of the objective pursued.[582]
7.154. We also explained above that an
assessment of the "calibration" of a measure and the regulatory
distinctions that it draws is not, in and of itself, a generally applicable
test of whether detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction. Rather, this term is nomenclature from the original proceedings
that was used by the United States, and employed by the Appellate Body, to test
whether the original tuna measure was even-handed. Indeed, the
Appellate Body found in the original proceedings that "the United States ha[d] not demonstrated
that the difference in labelling conditions for tuna products containing
tuna caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP, on the one hand, and for tuna
products containing tuna caught by other fishing methods outside the ETP, on
the other hand, [was] 'calibrated' to the risks to dolphins arising from
different fishing methods in different areas of the ocean."[583] It followed from this that
"the United States ha[d] not demonstrated that the detrimental impact
of the US measure on Mexican tuna products stem[med] exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction."[584] The Appellate Body added
that, "[i]n these circumstances, [it was] not persuaded that the
United States ha[d] demonstrated that the measure [was] even-handed in the relevant respects."[585]
7.155. These passages, in our view,
demonstrate that the Appellate Body's assessment of "even‑handedness"
in the original proceedings was focused on the question of whether the original
tuna measure was "calibrated" to the risks to dolphins arising from
different fishing methods in different areas of the oceans. They further show
that this question was answered through a comparison of the conditions of
access to the dolphin-safe label for tuna products derived from tuna caught
within the ETP large purse-seine fishery, on the one hand, with those applied
to tuna products derived from tuna caught outside that fishery by fishing
methods other than setting on dolphins, on the other hand. By engaging with the
United States' arguments as it did, the Appellate Body accepted the premise
that such regime will not violate Article 2.1 if it is properly
"calibrated" to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing
methods in different areas of the oceans.[586] This, in turn, indicates that, in
the context of the original proceedings, the Appellate Body considered
appropriate an analysis involving: first, an identification of whether
different tuna fishing methods in different areas of the oceans pose different
risks to dolphins; and, second, examination of whether, in the light of these
risks, the different treatment created by the relevant regulatory distinction
shows that, as between different groups, the treatment accorded to each group
is commensurate with the relevant risks, taking account of the objectives of
the measure. This assessment was conducted in order to determine whether or not
the original US dolphin-safe labelling regime was even-handed.
7.156. We also consider it appropriate for
WTO Members to seek guidance in the reasoning set out in adopted Appellate Body
and panel reports when seeking to bring their inconsistent measures into
compliance with their obligations under the covered agreements. Indeed, this
contributes to the security and predictability of the multilateral trading
system, as well as to the prompt settlement of disputes. In these compliance
proceedings, the United States has defended its dolphin‑safe labelling regime
from the claim raised by Mexico under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement by
explaining why the distinctions drawn under the amended tuna measure stem
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction in terms very similar to
those that it used in the original proceedings. The United States has argued
that, to the extent that there is detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products,
by virtue of the differences in the labelling conditions for tuna products
containing tuna caught inside and outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery,
such differences are explained by, or "calibrated" to, the different
risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different areas of
the oceans.[587] Before the Panel, the United
States also submitted extensive arguments and evidence seeking to show that the
different risks associated with different fisheries explain the differential
treatment accorded under the amended tuna measure.
7.157. These considerations suggest to us
that the Panel's inquiry in these Article 21.5 proceedings should have
included an assessment of whether, under the amended tuna measure, the differences
in labelling conditions for tuna products containing tuna caught in the ETP
large purse‑seine fishery, on the one hand, and for tuna products containing
tuna caught in other fisheries, on the other hand, are "calibrated"
to the likelihood that dolphins would be adversely affected in the course of
tuna fishing operations in the different fisheries.[588]
7.158. Having reached this preliminary
conclusion, we next examine more specifically the inquiry that the Panel did
undertake, including the question of whether such analysis encompassed an
evaluation and comparison of the different risks to dolphins associated with
different fishing methods in different oceans. As we have indicated, the Panel
explained that, "in examining whether detrimental treatment stems exclusively
from a legitimate regulatory distinction, a panel may take into account the
extent to which the identified detrimental treatment is explained by, or at
least reconcilable with, the objectives [pursued] by the measure at
issue."[589] The Panel found that the different
certification requirements are not even‑handed because "captains may not
necessarily and always have the technical skills required to certify that no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured in a set or other gear deployment,
and this may result in inaccurate information being passed to consumers, in
contradiction with the objectives of the amended tuna measure."[590] In analysing the different
tracking and verification requirements, the Panel found that there is no
rational or obvious connection between the amended tuna measure's imposition of
a lighter burden on tuna caught outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery and
the objectives of the amended tuna measure, and that none of the explanations
provided by the United States suggested otherwise.[591] On these bases, the Panel found
that the certification and tracking and verification requirements in place
under the amended tuna measure are not even-handed, and therefore do not stem
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.[592]
7.159. In our view, the manner in which
the Panel applied the legal standard to ascertain the even‑handedness of the
certification and tracking and verification requirements presents certain
difficulties. The first and most important of these arises from the segmented
analysis adopted by the Panel. As we have indicated, the certification and
tracking and verification requirements work together with the substantive
conditions of the amended tuna measure to limit access to the dolphin-safe
label. This means, in our view, that it is only when the conditions of access
are viewed together that the nexus between the regulatory distinctions found in
the measure and the measure's policy objectives can be understood. Assessing
these discrete sets of requirements in isolation from the other elements of the
measure may thus hinder a comprehensive analysis of the design and structure of
the measure and how it pursues its objectives. Moreover, the Panel's segmented
analysis of the amended tuna measure also appears to have led the Panel to
overlook that, at least when compared to the
original tuna measure, the amended tuna measure as a whole furthers
the objectives of providing information to consumers and protecting dolphins
from harms arising from tuna fishing. For these reasons, we consider that the
Panel's decision to adopt a segmented analytical approach prevented it from
properly applying the legal standard that it articulated.
7.160. We next consider whether,
notwithstanding that it did not explicitly engage with the explanations
provided by the United States for the differences in the respective sets of
certification and tracking and verification requirements, the Panel's analyses
of the even-handedness of these requirements in fact reflect that it did assess
and take due account of the different risks associated with tuna fishing in
different fisheries. If, for example, the Panel established that the risks
posed to dolphins in the different fishing areas and by the different fishing
methods are the same, then it may properly have reached the conclusion that
treating them differently is not "even-handed". If, however, the
Panel considered that the risk profiles are different, then further inquiry
would have been needed into whether the regulatory distinctions drawn by the
amended tuna measure, and the resulting detrimental impact, could be explained
as commensurate with the different risks associated with tuna fishing in
different oceans and using different fishing methods.
7.161. In its analysis of the eligibility
criteria, the Panel found that there is a difference in the nature of the risks
posed to dolphins by the fishing method of setting on dolphins, as opposed to
other fishing methods. In particular, the Panel stated that it agreed with the
United States that "even if there are tuna fisheries using … gear types that
produce the same number of dolphin mortalities and serious injuries allowed or
caused in the ETP … it is simply not the case
that such fisheries are producing the same level of unobserved harms".[593] In reaching this finding, the
Panel appears to have focused solely on its understanding that the unobserved harms differed as between setting on dolphins and
other fishing methods. On this basis, the Panel found that the new evidence did
not overcome or contradict the finding from the original proceedings that
setting on dolphins causes a level of unobserved harms to dolphins that is not
found with other fishing methods. By focusing solely on its understanding that
the unobserved harms differed between
setting on dolphins and other fishing methods, the Panel did not consider the
relative risks posed by the relevant fishing methods in respect of observed mortality or serious injury, and therefore did not
resolve the questions of the overall levels of risk in the different fisheries
and how they compare to each other. However, it was precisely this kind of
examination that was the focus of the Appellate Body's analysis in the original
proceedings, which revolved around an assessment of the US dolphin-safe
labelling provisions in the light of the overall levels of risk in the relevant
fisheries, including risks of both observed and unobserved harms. Indeed, we
recall that, in its conclusion, the Appellate Body emphasized that "the US
measure fully addresse[d] the adverse effects on
dolphins resulting from setting on dolphins in the ETP, whereas it d[id] 'not
address mortality (observed or unobserved) arising from fishing methods other
than setting on dolphins outside the ETP'."[594] Therefore, we do not consider
that, in examining the eligibility criteria, the Panel's analysis reflects that it did assess and
take due account of the different risks associated with tuna fishing in
different oceans and using different fishing methods in a way that would have
enabled it properly to evaluate the parties' arguments regarding the
even-handedness of the amended tuna measure's regulatory distinctions.
7.162. In assessing the certification and
tracking and verification requirements, the Panel stated that it considered
these two regulatory distinctions to be relevant "only to tuna eligible
and intended to receive the dolphin‑safe label".[595] Accordingly, in the Panel's view,
"tuna that is either ineligible to access this label (i.e. tuna
caught by setting on dolphins) or not intended to be sold under the
dolphin-safe label is not affected by these regulatory distinctions."[596] We understand from this that, as
it did in analysing the detrimental impact of each of the three distinctions,
the Panel's analyses of the even-handedness of the certification and tracking
and verification requirements involved, in each case, a comparison of the
treatment accorded to tuna products derived from tuna caught in the ETP large
purse‑seine fishery other than on a trip involving setting on dolphins, on the
one hand, with that accorded to tuna products containing tuna caught outside
the ETP large purse-seine fishery other than on a trip involving
setting on dolphins, on the other hand. As explained below, however, it is not
entirely clear whether the Panel considered, for purposes of these analyses, that
the respective risks to dolphins posed in these fisheries compared was the
same, different, or simply not relevant to its analyses. Nor did the Panel
explicitly indicate whether it considered the respective risks to dolphins
identified by the original panel, and "reaffirm[ed]"[597] by this Panel, in its analysis of
the eligibility criteria, to also be relevant in analysing the even-handedness
of the certification and tracking and verification requirements.
7.163. In examining the different
certification requirements, the Panel devoted most of its reasoning to a
comparison of the different tasks carried out by observers in the ETP and
captains, as well as their respective expertise, training, and education for
purposes of providing certifications. In particular, the Panel based its
finding that "the different certification requirements are not even‑handed"
on the conclusion that "captains may not necessarily and always have the
technical skills required to certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously
injured" and that "this may result in inaccurate information
being passed to consumers, in contradiction with the objectives of the amended
tuna measure."[598] The Panel's reasoning includes
only limited references to the risks to dolphins in the relevant fisheries, and
does not address whether, in the light of the risk profiles, the different
treatment created by the relevant regulatory distinctions show that, as between
different groups, the treatment accorded to each group is explained by, and appropriately
tailored to, the relevant risks. Having identified the "key problem with
the amended tuna measure" as being that "the United States has
not explained why its measure assumes that captains have at their disposal the
skills necessary to ensure accurate certification", the Panel indicated
that, "[a]ccordingly", it was "not convinced that the different
certification requirements, as currently designed, sufficiently address 'the
risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different areas of
the ocean'".[599] While this statement could be read
to suggest that the Panel acknowledged that an examination of the different
risk profiles attached to the different fishing methods in different areas of
the oceans might have been relevant to its analysis, it does not appear to us
that such an examination formed part of the Panel's analysis or served as a
basis for its conclusions.[600]
7.164. As noted above, the Panel also
analysed the even-handedness of the certification requirements assuming arguendo that the United States, rather than Mexico, bore
the burden of proof. In this alternative analysis, the Panel examined certain
facts related to the risks to dolphins arising from various fishing methods in
different areas of the oceans. The Panel accepted the United States'
argument regarding the "special and, in some senses, 'unique' nature of
the harms that the ETP large purse seine fishery poses to dolphins".[601] The Panel considered that Mexico's
arguments and evidence relating to tuna‑dolphin association and the prevalence
of setting on dolphins outside the ETP were not sufficient to rebut the
United States' argument that the situation in the ETP is unique or
different in a way that would justify the different treatment of the ETP large
purse‑seine fishery and other fisheries.[602] On this basis, the Panel observed
that it "would find that the United States ha[d] made a prima facie case that the different certification
requirements stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction".[603] To us, this part of the Panel's
reasoning appears to have employed a concept that looks like
"calibration". Ultimately, however, the Panel concluded that the
different certification requirements are not even‑handed. Pointing out that the
United States had not rebutted evidence submitted by Mexico concerning the
complexity of certifying the dolphin-safe status of a tuna catch, the Panel
stated that it "would find that the United States ha[d] not explained
sufficiently why it assumes that captains are capable of carrying out an
activity that the amended tuna measure itself recognizes as highly complex and
for which training and education are required".[604] For the Panel, the lack of
explanation concerning the technical capacities of captains meant that the
different certification requirements could not be said to be even‑handed, and
as such to stem exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction.[605]
7.165. It appears to us that certain
aspects of this part of the Panel's analysis suggest that the Panel gave some
consideration to the respective risk profiles associated with different fishing
methods in different areas of the oceans. Thus, for example, the Panel
explained that the distinction between different fishing methods is
"especially important" given that setting on is "inherently
dangerous" to dolphins, even where no dolphin is seen to be killed or
seriously injured, "because it has unobservable deleterious effects on
dolphins' physical and emotional well‑being".[606] At the same time, we note that,
notwithstanding that it had stated that the treatment of tuna products derived
from tuna caught by setting on dolphins would not
be relevant to its analyses of the certification and tracking and verification
requirements, the Panel's discussion of the respective risk profiles seems to have
focused exclusively on this fishing technique. We are not certain whether, in
the context of the different certification requirements, the Panel ultimately
considered that the risk profiles of the relevant fisheries giving rise to the
different groups of tuna products are the same or different. Moreover the Panel's ultimate conclusion that the
different certification requirements were not even‑handed under Article 2.1 was
due to the fact that the United States had failed to "explain [] sufficiently
why it assumes that captains are capable of carrying out an activity that the
amended tuna measure itself recognizes as highly complex and for which training
and education are required".[607] Therefore, while the concept of
different risks to dolphins in the relevant fisheries seems to have played some
part in its analysis, we do not see that such analysis encompassed a clear
identification of the respective risks or an assessment of whether such risks
were addressed in an even‑handed manner by the different certification
requirements.[608]
7.166. In analysing the even-handedness of
the tracking and verification requirements, the Panel dismissed the
United States' argument that the different tracking and verification
requirements are justified or explained in the light of the higher degree of
risk to dolphins in the ETP large purse‑seine fishery. The Panel explained that
any higher risk "does not explain why the tracking and verification
requirements, which by their very nature concern the movement of fish subsequent to the time of catch, differ between fisheries to
the detriment of like Mexican tuna and tuna products".[609] According to the Panel, the
"different risk profiles" of different fisheries may explain
regulatory distinctions concerning the eligibility criteria for fishing
methods, as well as the need for an independent observer to monitor and certify
during and immediately following the fishing activity itself, but do not
explain the tracking and verification requirements, which are triggered after the tuna has been caught.[610] We are not convinced that, as the
Panel seems to have thought, considerations of the similarities and differences
in risks may not be reflected in and relevant to all stages of the capture and
subsequent transport and processing of tuna. We read the Panel as having taken the
view that the relevant risk profiles would change or
become irrelevant to the analysis of
"even-handedness" merely because those requirements regulate a
situation that occurs after the tuna has been caught. In our view, this
approach by the Panel does not seem to comport with its own reasoning that the
accuracy of the US dolphin-safe label can be compromised at any stage of
the tuna production stage, in contradiction with the objectives of the amended
tuna measure.[611] Moreover, we consider that the
Panel's approach also runs counter to our observations that an assessment of
the even-handedness of the amended tuna measure must take account of the fact that
its various elements – the eligibility criteria, the certification requirements,
and the tracking and verification requirements – establish a series of
conditions of access to the dolphin‑safe label that are cumulative and highly
interrelated.
7.167. In the light of these
considerations, it is clear that, since the Panel did not consider the risks to
dolphins to be relevant to its analysis of the even-handedness of the tracking
and verification requirements, the Panel did not seek to identify those risks
in respect of eligible tuna caught both inside and outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery in this part of its analysis. Nor did the Panel compare the
different tracking and verification requirements in the light of those risks and
the amended tuna measure's objectives concerning the protection of dolphins and
providing accurate consumer information.
7.168. As an additional argument, the
United States contends that any detrimental impact caused by the
certification and tracking and verification requirements stems exclusively from
a legitimate regulatory distinction because the differences leading to the
detrimental impact can be explained by a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason,
namely, that these differences reflect that the parties to the AIDCP have
consented to impose a unique observer programme on their tuna industries, while
other regulatory authorities have not imposed like requirements.[612] In principle, we do not exclude
that the fact that the amended tuna measure sets out rules for the ETP large
purse‑seine fishery reflecting requirements imposed under the AIDCP may be relevant to the question of whether the detrimental impact stems
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement, in particular because it may shed light on the reasons for the
distinctions drawn as well as on the nexus between such distinctions and the
objectives of the relevant measure. Yet, tying some
aspects of a measure to an international agreement cannot, alone, suffice to
establish that the measure does not embody discrimination of a type prohibited
under Article 2.1. Moreover, we observe that, while there is an absence of any
international regulation comparable to the AIDCP with respect to all tuna
fisheries other than the ETP large purse-seine fishery, the amended tuna
measure sets forth conditions for those tuna
fisheries. In this dispute, the relevant regulatory distinction drawn by the
amended tuna measure consists of the requirements applicable to tuna products
derived from tuna caught in the ETP large purse‑seine fishery vis-à-vis the
requirements applicable to tuna products derived from tuna caught in other fisheries.
As we have said above, assessing the even-handedness of the amended tuna
measure requires looking at both sides of the regulatory distinctions that it
draws. The AIDCP, however, is mainly relevant for one side of this regulatory
distinction: the requirements applicable to tuna caught in the ETP large
purse-seine fishery. Moreover, we observe that the relevant certification and
tracking and verification requirements that the amended tuna measure applies in
respect of tuna caught in the ETP large purse-seine fishery are not identical to, or coextensive with, those under the
AIDCP, particularly given that the amended tuna measure, unlike the AIDCP,
disqualifies from access to the dolphin-safe label all tuna products derived
from tuna caught by setting on dolphins.
7.169. In sum, in the light of the
circumstances of this dispute and the nature of the distinctions drawn under
the amended tuna measure, we are of the view that, in applying the second step
of the "treatment no less favourable" requirement under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, the Panel was required to assess whether the
certification and tracking and verification requirements are
"calibrated" to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing
methods in different areas of the oceans. Our review of the Panel Report
reveals that the Panel's analysis failed to encompass consideration of the
relative risks to dolphins from different fishing techniques in different areas
of the oceans, and of whether the distinctions that the amended tuna measure draws
in terms of the different conditions of access to the dolphin-safe label are
explained in the light of the relative profiles. We therefore consider that the
Panel failed to take full account of "the particular circumstances"
of this case, including "the design, architecture, revealing structure,
operation, and application" of the amended tuna measure, as well as of the
manner in which similar circumstances pertaining to the original tuna measure
had been assessed in the original proceedings. In addition, due to the
segmented approach that it adopted in its analyses of the different sets of
certification and tracking and verification requirements, the Panel did not
properly apply the legal test that it had identified as relevant to an
assessment of even‑handedness, namely, "whether the detrimental treatment
can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy pursued by the
measure at issue."[613] The Panel thus erred in its
discrete assessments of the even-handedness of the different certification
requirements, and of the different tracking and verification requirements.
Accordingly, we find that, in assessing Mexico's claim that the
certification requirements and the tracking and verification requirements are
not "even-handed", the Panel erred in its application of the second
step of the "treatment no less favourable" test under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement.
7.170. The United States raises two
challenges to the Panel's findings regarding the "determination
provisions". First, the United States argues that, in finding that
the "gap" in the determination provisions does not stem exclusively
from a legitimate regulatory distinction, the Panel erred by improperly making
the case for Mexico. Second, the United States contends that the Panel
erred in making its findings on the determination provisions based solely on
their design, and not on their application.[614]
7.171. Before addressing the United
States' claims, we begin by recalling the Panel's explanation of the
determination provisions, as well as the main findings by the Panel regarding
these provisions. After reaching its conclusions regarding captains'
certifications, the Panel turned to examine an additional aspect of the amended
tuna measure that it considered to bear on, and to be of "some importance
to"[615], its analysis of the
even-handedness of the different certification requirements. The Panel noted
that the United States had confirmed in response to a question from the
Panel that the determination of regular and significant mortality or serious
injury provided for under Section 216.91(a)(4)(iii) of the implementing
regulations does not apply to purse-seine fisheries outside the ETP, and that
the determination of regular and significant association that may be made
pursuant to Section 216.91(a)(2)(i) of those regulations only applies to the
non‑ETP purse-seine fishery.[616] In this regard, the Panel made the
following finding:
[T]he determination provisions appear to reduce the range of
circumstances in which observers can be required outside of the ETP large purse
seine fishery (or in small purse seine fisheries inside the ETP), further entrenching
the less favourable treatment caused by the different certification
requirements. This is so because the design of the determination provisions is
such that like tuna products may be subject to different requirements even
where, as a matter of fact, the conditions in a non‑ETP fishery (or a
small purse seine fishery inside the ETP) are the same as those in the ETP
large purse seine fishery. They thus seem to us to represent a further way in
which the amended tuna measure lacks even-handedness in its treatment of
different tuna fishing methods in different oceans, and may also make it easier
for tuna caught other than by [a] large purse seine vessel in the ETP to be
incorrectly labelled as dolphin‑safe, thus modifying the conditions of
competition in the US tuna market to the detriment of Mexican tuna and tuna
products.[617]
7.172. In addition, the Panel held that
"the determination provisions appear to be arbitrary in the sense that
they are difficult to reconcile with, or justify by reference to, the objectives
pursued by the amended tuna measure itself."[618] The Panel noted that the United
States had not explained why purse-seine vessels outside the ETP cannot be
subject to a declaration that they are causing regular and significant dolphin
mortality.[619] Moreover, the Panel expressed
doubt about the United States' argument that the existence and nature of
tuna-dolphin association has no impact on the degree of mortality or serious
injury caused by fishing methods other than setting on dolphins, and observed
that this seemed incompatible with the United States' own explanation of
the reasons why observers are necessary in the ETP large purse-seine fishery.[620]
7.173. For these reasons, the Panel
expressed its understanding that the determination provisions open up a
"gap" in the certification procedures applied outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery.[621] The Panel emphasized that "a
determination of regular and significant mortality cannot be made in respect of
purse seine fisheries outside the ETP, and a determination of regular and
significant tuna-dolphin association cannot be made in respect of non‑purse seine
fisheries."[622] This means that, in some cases,
fisheries other than the ETP large purse-seine fishery may be treated
differently, and less stringently, under the amended tuna measure even where
the conditions in that fishery mirror those in the ETP large purse-seine
fishery, either in terms of the level of dolphin mortality or the degree of
tuna-dolphin association. The Panel therefore expressed the view that, by
virtue of the determination provisions, the different certification procedures lack
even‑handedness.[623] Moreover, although one panelist
had disagreed with the Panel majority regarding the even-handedness of the
different certification requirements under the amended tuna measure, that
panelist agreed with the majority that "the fact that a determination of
regular and significant mortality cannot be made in respect of purse seine
fisheries outside the ETP, and the fact that a determination of regular and
significant tuna-dolphin association cannot be made in respect of non‑purse
seine fisheries, has not been explained or justified", and that,
therefore, this aspect of the different certification requirements is
inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[624]
Whether the Panel improperly
made the case for Mexico in reaching its findings regarding the determination
provisions
7.174. The United States submits that
the Panel erred in finding that the determination provisions "represent a
further way" in which the certification requirements "lack[] even‑handedness".[625] In the United States' view, "Mexico
put forward no affirmative argument with regard to
the determination provisions in its case-in-chief for its Article 2.1
claim" and, as a consequence, the United States did not present any
rebuttal arguments in that respect.[626] The Panel, however, raised the
issue on its own initiative in its written questions to the United States,
and reached its conclusions despite the fact that Mexico did not
"explicitly connect" the determination provisions to its claims under
Article 2.1 until it submitted its comments on the United States'
responses to Panel questions.[627] Accordingly, the
United States claims that the Panel improperly made a prima facie
case for the complainant and relieved Mexico of its duty to prove its claims
under Article 2.1.[628]
7.175. Mexico rejects the
United States' claim and observes that it identified the determination
provisions in its first written submission, where it explained that the US
Department of Commerce (USDOC) has never made any determination under those
provisions[629], and in its responses to Panel
questions, where it argued that the failure of the USDOC to make any such
determination was "an indication of arbitrariness".[630] Mexico acknowledges that it did
not argue that "the determination provisions themselves directly result in
detrimental impact".[631] However, in Mexico's opinion, it
need not have done so, because the relevant detrimental impact of the
US dolphin‑safe labelling regime was definitively established by the panel
and the Appellate Body in the original proceedings. Further, in examining
whether the determination provisions are even‑handed, it was appropriate for
the Panel to focus on their "design, architecture and revealing
structure" because such provisions "have never been applied".[632]
7.176. In addressing this issue, we first
recall that, while panels enjoy latitude to develop their reasoning and to
decide which evidence on the record they wish to rely upon in reaching their
findings[633], such discretion is not unfettered.
Instead, it is limited by the requirement that the complainant satisfy its
burden of proof by adducing evidence and arguments sufficient to make a prima facie case in relation to each of the elements of its
claims.[634] This does not mean that a
complainant must necessarily put forward all evidence
and arguments relevant to the question of the measure's consistency with the
covered agreements. However, at a minimum, it must adduce arguments and
evidence that, in the absence of effective refutation by the respondent, would
enable a panel to rule in its favour.[635] A panel may not use its
interrogative powers to make the case for the complainant[636], nor to make good the absence of
argumentation on a party's behalf.[637]
7.177. Where, however, the complainant has
made out a prima facie case, a panel may in
principle draw from arguments and evidence on the record, or develop its own
reasoning in reaching its findings[638], provided that it does so
consistently with the requirements of due process. While arguments may be
progressively refined throughout the course of the proceedings[639], each party must be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to comment on the arguments and evidence adduced by the
other party.[640] Finally, a panel is not required
to test its intended reasoning with the parties.[641] However, due process could be
compromised in circumstances where the panel adopts an approach that departs so
radically from the cases put forward by the parties that the parties are left
guessing as to what proof they would have needed to adduce.[642]
7.178. With these considerations in mind,
we briefly describe the progression of the parties' arguments and the Panel's
inquiry concerning the determination provisions throughout the proceedings. In
its first written submission, Mexico referred to the determination provisions
by noting, inter alia, that the USDOC has never
defined the term "regular and significant", nor made any
determination of either regular tuna-dolphin association or of mortality or
serious injury of dolphins with respect to fisheries outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery.[643] Mexico relied on the absence of
any such determinations to support its view that the certification requirements
lack even-handedness.[644] After the first substantive
meeting, the Panel sent the parties a set of written questions in order to
explore further the application of the determination provisions by the
Administrator. In response to questioning from the Panel, both parties
confirmed that the Administrator has not made any determination of regular and
significant mortality or serious injury or a determination of regular and
significant tuna-dolphin association.[645]
7.179. The Panel also asked the
United States a number of questions concerning the functioning of the
determination provisions. In particular, the Panel asked the United States
to confirm its understanding that, if the NMFS Assistant Administrator makes a
determination of regular and significant tuna‑dolphin association with respect
to a given fishery, the observer coverage so imposed would concern only
purse-seine vessels (as opposed to all vessels) operating in that fishery. The
United States confirmed the Panel's understanding.[646] After receiving written responses
from the parties to its initial round of written questions, the Panel
additionally asked the parties to confirm whether it was correct in
understanding that:
… large and small purse seine fisheries outside the ETP can never be
required to have observers on board because of "regular and significant
mortality or serious injuries of dolphins". Rather, observers can only be
required in such fisheries where there is "regular and significant
association between dolphins and tuna similar to the ETP". Conversely, …
non-purse seine fisheries outside the ETP, as well as small purse seine
fisheries inside the ETP, can only be required to have observers in board in
cases where they are causing "regular and significant mortality or serious
injury of dolphins". A determination of "regular and significant
association" cannot be made in respect of these fisheries.[647]
7.180. In responding to this question,
Mexico submitted that the determination provisions are designed in a way
whereby: (i) "even if purse seine vessels operating in a region outside
the ETP are causing substantial dolphin mortalities, that region could never be
the subject of a determination that there is regular and significant mortality
or serious injury of dolphins on that basis"[648]; and (ii) "even though
dolphins strongly associate with longline fishing … the
Amended Tuna Measure does not allow for a determination that such an association
in a fishery is 'regular and significant' such that an observer requirement
could be imposed for all tuna that is labelled dolphin-safe from that
fishery".[649] According to Mexico, these
features of the determination provisions are "arbitrary".[650] In its response to the Panel's
question, the United States noted that the determination provisions
"appropriately provide[] for the possibility that the association in the ETP is not
unique" and that "other fisheries (such as longline,
hand line, etc.) may also, like the ETP large purse seine vessel
fishery, be so problematic that it would be appropriate to require an observer
statement to attest to the dolphin safe status of tuna product containing tuna
harvested in those fisheries".[651] Further, the United States
reiterated its view that Mexico "made no claim" that any difference
between the two types of determinations is inconsistent with the covered
agreements, and has therefore "made no prima facie
case with regard to the determination [provisions]".[652] Finally, Mexico connected the
features of the determination provisions that it had previously characterized
as yet another indication of "arbitrariness"[653] to its argument concerning the
"absence of a 'rational connection' between" the detrimental impact
of the amended tuna measure and the measure's objective.[654]
7.181. Like the Panel, we see the
determination provisions as "an integral part of the certification system
put in place by the amended tuna measure".[655] As such, they are relevant to the
analysis of whether the United States has brought its dolphin-safe
labelling regime into conformity with the recommendations and rulings of the
DSB. Furthermore, it does not seem to us that the United States could have
been unaware of the legal issues relating to the role of the determination
provisions during these Article 21.5 proceedings. In particular, the original
panel and Appellate Body reports contain several references to the
determination provisions and their content.[656] For instance, the original panel
observed that it was not aware of any process or procedure having been
established or initiated, under the US dolphin-safe labelling regime, in
order to trigger a determination of regular and significant mortality or
serious injury of dolphins.[657] The Appellate Body also made
reference to the determination provisions in connection with its discussion of
the role that a requirement that an independent observer certify
that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured would play in determining
whether the dolphin-safe labelling provisions are "calibrated" to the
risks arising from fishing techniques other than setting on dolphins.[658] In these compliance proceedings,
the determination provisions are within the terms of reference of the Panel
since they were identified by Mexico in its request for the establishment of a
panel. Moreover, Mexico identified in its first written submission the
determination provisions as part of its argument concerning the lack of even‑handedness
of the certification requirements[659], and, as set out above, highlighted
key features relating to the design of the determination provisions in response
to the Panel's questions and in its comments on the United States' answers. In
addition, we also observe that the United States had an opportunity to
counter Mexico's allegations and to put forward its own arguments on the design
of such provisions. However, the United States chose not to do so, and instead
maintained that Mexico had "made no prima facie
case with regard to the determination [provisions]".[660]
7.182. Based on our review of the Panel
record, viewed against the backdrop of the original proceedings, we do not
consider that the Panel improperly made the case for Mexico in respect of the
determination provisions. In the light of the above considerations, we find
that the United States has failed to establish that the Panel improperly
made the case for Mexico by finding that, by virtue of the determination
provisions, the detrimental impact of the amended tuna measure does not stem
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.
Whether the Panel erred in
making its findings on the determination provisions based solely on their
design and not on their application
7.183. The United States argues that
the Panel erred and applied an incorrect legal analysis by, in particular, failing
to analyse whether the determination provisions support a finding that the
certification requirements "are designed and applied" in an
even-handed manner. Rather, "the Panel appears to have examined only
how the determination provisions are designed
without also examining how those provisions are applied."[661] Thus, according to the United
States, there is no basis for finding that the application of the determination
provisions means that the certification requirements are not even‑handed
"as designed and applied".[662]
7.184. Mexico responds that, in order to
determine whether the regulatory distinctions of the amended tuna measure are
even-handed, the Panel was required to assess the design, architecture,
revealing structure, operation, and application of the measure. Since the
determination provisions are an integral part of the amended tuna measure and,
as recognized by the United States, they have never been applied, it was
appropriate – and indeed required – for the Panel to focus on their design,
architecture, and revealing structure.[663] Thus, Mexico asserts that the
United States incorrectly faults the Panel for analysing the "design"
of the determination provisions alone, instead of also examining how the
determination provisions are "applied". Arguing that the
United States can point to no evidence that the provisions have been
applied, Mexico asserts that it was appropriate for the Panel to make findings
based on the design of the determination provisions.[664]
7.185. At the outset, we note the Panel's
statement that the determination provisions "appear to be designed to
enable the United States to impose conditions on fisheries other than the
ETP large purse seine fishery where the conditions in the former approach those
of the latter".[665] In particular, we observe that, in
the non-ETP large purse-seine fishery, the existing requirement for captain
certification in respect of the conditions of "no setting on
dolphins" and "no dolphins killed or seriously injured" is
supplemented by a requirement of observer certification in respect of those two
conditions when a determination has been made that there is regular and
significant tuna‑dolphin association, similar to the tuna‑dolphin association
in the ETP. Moreover, with respect to "all other fisheries", the
United States' authorities can make a determination that there is regular
and significant mortality or serious injury in a specific fishery, which would
supplement the existing requirement that a captain provide a certification in
respect of the condition of "no dolphins killed or seriously
injured" by requiring the same certification from an observer in such a
fishery. At the same time, the Panel indicated that the determination
provisions do not contemplate the possibility that the US authorities make a
determination of regular and significant mortality within the non-ETP purse‑seine
fishery, or a determination of regular and significant tuna-dolphin association
within "all other fisheries".[666] The United States confirmed to the
Panel that this understanding was correct.[667]
7.186. In advancing this claim, the
United States appears to rely on the Appellate Body's reasoning that
the relevant inquiry "probes the legitimacy of regulatory distinctions
through careful scrutiny of whether they are designed and
applied in an even-handed manner such that they may be considered
'legitimate' for the purposes of Article 2.1".[668] We do not, however, read this
statement to preclude that, depending on the relevant circumstances of a
particular case, it may be appropriate for a panel's examination of the measure
at issue to focus on its design, rather than also focusing on its application.
In the present case, it is uncontested that "no fishery outside the ETP
has been determined to have a regular and significant association between tuna
and dolphins similar to the association in the ETP."[669] Similarly, it is uncontested that
the US authorities have not made a determination that any fishery belonging
to the category of "all other fisheries" has regular and significant
dolphin mortality.[670] Yet, we do not regard the absence
of such determinations as conclusively establishing that the factual
circumstances that they contemplate do not exist. Nor does the absence of such
determinations say anything about whether the circumstances that should trigger
such determinations are likely to exist in the future. For these reasons, we do
not see what probative or legal value the United States considers the Panel
ought to have attached to the "application" of the determination
provisions. It follows that, contrary to the United States' position, we
do not consider that, in the present circumstances, a focus on the design of
the determination provisions per se renders
the Panel's analysis faulty.
7.187. The United States contends
that the current fishery-by-fishery data clearly supports that there is no evidence to establish that there is currently regular and
significant association and regular or significant mortality or serious injury
in any fishery other than the ETP large purse‑seine fishery.[671] In criticizing the Panel for not examining
how the determination provisions are applied, the
United States appears to be taking issue with the fact that the Panel
never assessed whether the evidence on the record
established that there is currently regular and significant association or regular
and significant mortality or serious injury in any fishery other than the ETP
large purse‑seine fishery.[672] However, the Panel never sought to
scrutinize the evidentiary basis supporting the proposition that the US
authorities have failed to make a determination as to the existence of a
fishery, other than the ETP large purse‑seine fishery, presenting regular
and significant association or regular and significant mortality or serious
injury. Rather, the Panel was focusing on the content, structure, and expected
operation of the measure at issue with a view to delineating the scope of
application of each of the relevant determinations. Therefore, we see as
somewhat beside the point the United States' assertion that "there is
no basis on which to find that the certification requirements, in fact, impose
an observer requirement on tuna product produced from Mexican large purse seine
vessels operating in the ETP and not on tuna product produced from other
fisheries 'where, as a matter of fact, the conditions in [that other fishery]
are the same as those in the ETP large purse seine fishery.'"[673]
7.188. For the foregoing reasons, we find
that the United States has not established that the Panel erred in its
assessment of whether the determination provisions are even-handed under
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.189. Each of the participants raises
several claims under Article 11 of the DSU in connection with the Panel's
analysis of whether the detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products flowing from
the eligibility criteria and the certification requirements stems exclusively
from a legitimate regulatory distinction. With respect to the Panel's analysis
of the eligibility criteria, Mexico raises three claims of error under Article
11 of the DSU. First, Mexico argues that the Panel erred by changing the factual
findings from the original proceedings regarding the adverse effects from
setting on dolphins.[674] Mexico's second challenge under
Article 11 of the DSU is that the Panel erred in finding that other fishing
methods have no unobservable adverse effects.[675] Third, Mexico contends that the
Panel incorrectly asserted that the Appellate Body made a finding that
setting on dolphins is more harmful to dolphins than other fishing methods.[676]
7.190. As regards the Panel's analysis of
the certification requirements, the United States contends that the Panel acted
inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by reaching a finding with respect to
the determination provisions that is unsupported by the evidence on the record.
Mexico, in turn, raises two Article 11 claims in connection with this part of
the Panel's analysis. First, Mexico argues that the Panel erred in rejecting
Mexico's argument and evidence that fishing vessel captains have an economic
self-interest in not reporting that dolphins were killed or seriously injured.[677] Second, Mexico contends that, in
finding that setting on dolphins occurs only in the ETP, the Panel erred in
disregarding evidence that "dolphins associate with tuna and are
intentionally set upon in the Indian Ocean."[678]
7.191. Before turning to these various
claims of error on appeal, we recall the legal standard for establishing that a
panel has acted inconsistently with its duties under Article 11 of the DSU. To
comply with its duty to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, the
Appellate Body has stated that a panel must "consider all the evidence
presented to it, assess its credibility, determine its weight, and ensure that
its factual findings have a proper basis in that evidence".[679] Panels may not "make
affirmative findings that lack a basis in the evidence contained in the panel
record".[680] Within these parameters, panels
enjoy a margin of discretion in their assessment of the facts.[681] This margin includes the
discretion to determine how much weight to attach to the various items of
evidence placed before them by the parties.[682] Moreover, the mere fact that a
panel did not explicitly refer to each and every piece of evidence in its
reasoning is insufficient to establish a claim of violation under
Article 11.[683] Rather, a participant must explain
why such evidence is so material to its case that the panel's failure to
address explicitly and rely upon the evidence has a bearing on the objectivity
of the panel's factual assessment.[684] The Appellate Body has also
considered that a participant cannot simply recast factual arguments that it
made before the panel in the guise of a claim under Article 11.[685] Instead, for a claim under
Article 11 to succeed, the Appellate Body "must be
satisfied that the panel has exceeded the bounds of its discretion, as the
trier of facts".[686] "[N]ot every error allegedly
committed by a panel amounts to a violation of Article 11 of the DSU"[687], but only those that are so
material that, "taken together or singly"[688], they undermine the objectivity of
the panel's assessment of the matter before it.[689] The Appellate Body has stated
that a claim that a panel has failed to conduct the "objective assessment
of the matter before it" required by Article 11 of the DSU is "a very
serious allegation"[690], and the Appellate Body will
not "interfere lightly"[691] with a panel's fact‑finding
authority.
7.192. As noted above, Mexico raises three
claims of error under Article 11 of the DSU relating to the Panel's application
of the "less favourable treatment" test to the eligibility criteria.
Mexico's first challenge under Article 11 of the DSU is that the Panel erred in
"changing" the factual findings regarding setting on dolphins from
the original proceedings. In particular, Mexico claims that the original
panel's findings that setting on dolphins in the ETP causes unobserved harms to
dolphins were "not as strong" in the original proceedings as the
Panel now asserts them to be.[692] Mexico points out that the
original panel had found that:
… it appears that there is a degree of uncertainty in relation to the
extent to which setting on dolphins may have an adverse impact on dolphins
beyond observed mortality. Nonetheless, we consider that sufficient evidence
has been put forward by the United States to raise a presumption that
genuine concerns exist in this respect.[693]
7.193. According to Mexico, even though
there was no new evidence on the unobserved effects of setting on dolphins in
the ETP in these Article 21.5 proceedings, the Panel converted the prior
finding that "genuine concerns" exist regarding the extent to which
setting on dolphins may have an adverse impact on dolphins beyond observed
mortality into a finding of "conclusive evidence" of significant
unobserved effects.[694]
7.194. The United States responds that the
Panel did not "change" the finding concerning the unobserved harms caused
by dolphin sets from the original proceedings, nor mischaracterize the finding
of the original panel in this regard. The United States adds that the
Panel accurately concluded that the original panel made definitive findings
that setting on dolphins can cause adverse effects on dolphins apart from
observed mortalities.[695] According to the United States,
the Appellate Body confirmed the original panel's analysis that dolphins
suffer adverse impact beyond observed mortalities from setting on dolphins.[696]
7.195. We begin by noting that Mexico does
not identify any specific paragraph in the Panel Report where the Panel
allegedly "changed" the factual findings made by the original panel
regarding the unobserved adverse effects on dolphins from setting on dolphins.
From the context of Mexico's submission, we understand this allegation to
relate to the findings made by the Panel in paragraphs 7.120 through 7.122 of
its Report. In these paragraphs, the Panel made several observations regarding
the unobserved adverse effects of setting on dolphins. According to the Panel,
the Appellate Body "found that setting on dolphins is 'particularly
harmful to dolphins'".[697] The Panel quoted various adverse effects
"beyond observed mortalities" that can arise from setting on
dolphins.[698] The Panel also indicated that,
"[i]mportantly, the Appellate Body also accepted that these harms
arise as a result of the 'chase itself'."[699] The Panel observed that, as a
consequence, "[the Appellate Body] affirmed the original panel's
conclusion that 'the US objectives … to minimize unobserved consequences
of setting on dolphins' would not be attainable if tuna caught by setting‑on
dolphins were eligible for the dolphin-safe label".[700] Then, the Panel expressed its
understanding that "the Appellate Body clearly found that setting on
dolphins causes observed and unobserved harm to dolphins."[701]
7.196. Mexico claims that "[t]he
original panel's findings that dolphin sets in the ETP cause unobserved harms
to dolphins were not as strong in the original proceedings as the Panel now
asserts them to be."[702] In this regard, we consider it
important to clarify that, in paragraphs 7.120 through 7.122 of its Report, the
Panel was not referring to the findings of the
original panel, but was rather describing its understanding of the findings
reached by the Appellate Body in the original proceedings. In any event,
the Panel's references to the Appellate Body report do not, in our view,
mischaracterize the findings made in the original proceedings regarding the
existence of unobserved effects on dolphins. We recall that, in a subsection of
its report entitled "Uncontested Findings by the Panel", the
Appellate Body made the following observations:
The [original panel] further remarked that "there is a degree of
uncertainty in relation to the extent to which setting on dolphins may have an
adverse impact on dolphins beyond observed mortality." Nonetheless, the
[original panel] determined "that sufficient evidence has been put forward
by the United States to raise a presumption that genuine concerns exist in
this respect". The [original panel] also found that the United States
had put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption "that the
method of setting on dolphins 'has the capacity' of resulting in observed and
unobserved adverse effects on dolphins".[703]
7.197. The Appellate Body report also
shows that, in response to questioning at the oral hearing in the original
proceedings, Mexico accepted that "setting on dolphins within the ETP …
has the capacity of resulting in observed and unobserved
effects on dolphins".[704] It follows that, in our view, the
Panel reiterated the substance of the Appellate Body's findings when it
indicated that "the Appellate Body clearly found that setting on
dolphins causes observed and unobserved harm to dolphins."[705] Therefore, we do not agree with
Mexico that the Panel's findings regarding the unobserved harms to dolphins due
to setting on dolphins are somehow "stronger" than in the original
proceedings, or that the Panel breached Article 11 of the DSU in reaching them.
7.198. Mexico's second challenge under
Article 11 of the DSU is that the Panel erred in finding that fishing methods
other than setting on dolphins have no unobservable adverse effects. According
to Mexico, in paragraphs 7.132 and 7.134 of its Report, the Panel found that all of the effects on dolphins caused by other fishing
methods would be "observable" if a trained person were watching for
them. In Mexico's view, this is a factual error, given that it had submitted
evidence that not all effects are observable.[706] In particular, Mexico argues that
the Panel ignored evidence presented by Mexico regarding gillnet and longline
fishing showing that not all the effects from fishing techniques other than
setting on dolphins are observable.
7.199. In response, the United States
argues that the Panel did not err in finding that other fishing methods do not
have unobservable effects similar to those associated with setting on dolphins
in the ETP. Contrary to Mexico's argument, the Panel's in-depth examination of
the evidence on this point clearly satisfied its obligations under Article 11
of the DSU. The Panel's finding that fishing methods, other than setting on
dolphins, do not cause "the kinds of unobservable harms that are caused by
setting on dolphins"[707] is amply supported by evidence on
the record and reflects a weighing and balancing of that evidence in line with
Article 11.
7.200. We begin by noting that the essence
of Mexico's claim is that the Panel erred in finding that other fishing methods
have no unobservable adverse effects. This, however, is not an accurate
characterization of the findings made by the Panel. Contrary to Mexico's
assertion, the Panel did not make a finding that all
of the effects on dolphins of other fishing methods would be
"observable" if a trained person were watching for them. Rather, in
paragraph 7.132, the Panel found that none of the evidence presented by Mexico
regarding the adverse effects on dolphins caused by other fishing methods
"suggests that fishing methods other than setting on dolphins inflict the
same kinds of unobservable harms that are caused by net sets" (i.e.
setting on dolphins).[708] In paragraph 7.134, the Panel
rejected Mexico's contention that the United States had conceded that "fishing
methods other than setting on dolphins cause the kind of unobservable harms
that dolphins suffer as a 'result of the chase in itself'."[709] Therefore, contrary to Mexico's
assertion, we do not read the Panel's reasoning to include any finding that all of the adverse effects on dolphins caused by other
fishing methods would be "observable" if a trained person were
watching for them.
7.201. Moreover, we note that, in raising
this claim of error under Article 11 of the DSU, Mexico appears to be rearguing
the case that it put to the Panel and asking us to attribute to its evidence
greater significance than did the Panel. Such a request is neither compatible
with the scope of appellate review, nor a proper way to establish a breach of
Article 11 of the DSU.[710] In any event, we disagree with
Mexico's assertion that the Panel "did not even mention" the evidence
concerning the adverse effects on dolphins caused by fishing using gillnets and
longlines.[711] Our review of the Panel Report
reveals, rather, that the Panel did examine evidence regarding gillnet fishing,
in paragraph 7.130, and evidence on longline fishing, in paragraph 7.131
of its Report.
7.202. For the foregoing reasons, we
consider that Mexico has not properly substantiated its claim under Article 11
of the DSU, nor established that the Panel found that fishing methods other
than setting on dolphins have no unobservable adverse effects.
7.203. In its third challenge under
Article 11 of the DSU, Mexico asks us to reverse the Panel's finding that the
Appellate Body made a factual finding that "dolphin sets under the rules
of [the] AIDCP are more harmful to dolphins than other fishing methods."[712] In making its arguments on this
issue, Mexico refers to the following statement by the Panel:
The Appellate Body found that setting on dolphins is
"particularly harmful to dolphins", because:
[V]arious adverse impacts can arise from setting on
dolphins, beyond observed mortalities, including cow-calf separation during the
chasing and encirclement, threatening the subsistence of the calf and adding
casualties to the number of observed moralities [sic], as well as muscular
damage, immune and reproductive system failures, and other adverse health
consequences.[713]
7.204. Mexico highlights that the quoted
text that the Panel attributed to the Appellate Body is actually a
quotation from the original panel report, which does not appear in the
Appellate Body report. Mexico also refers to paragraph 260 of the
Appellate Body report, where the Appellate Body noted that the original
panel had distinguished between the risks associated with setting on dolphins before the AIDCP controls were adopted (unregulated
dolphin sets), and dolphin sets that are regulated under the rules of the
AIDCP. On this basis, Mexico argues that, when read in context, "the
Appellate Body did not find, nor did it imply, that [setting on dolphins]
is more harmful to dolphins than other fishing methods when the dolphin set
method is regulated under the AIDCP."[714] To the contrary, Mexico considers
that the Appellate Body affirmed the finding of the original panel that
dolphins face "equivalent" risks from AIDCP-regulated setting on
dolphins and from other fishing methods.[715]
7.205. The United States rejects
Mexico's claims of error. In its view, the original proceedings clearly
resolved that setting on dolphins, including under the AIDCP regime, causes
various adverse impacts "beyond observed mortalities". Moreover,
"it is clear from the Appellate Body report that the finding that
setting on dolphins is 'particularly harmful to dolphins' was not limited to
setting on dolphins other than under the AIDCP regime."[716]
7.206. In addressing Mexico's third
challenge under Article 11 of the DSU, we begin by pointing out that the
paragraph of the Panel Report to which Mexico objects is silent as to the relative harms associated with setting on dolphins, on the
one hand, as compared to other fishing methods, on the other hand. Rather, in
the paragraph identified by Mexico, the Panel is addressing only the fishing
method of setting on dolphins. The Panel's language is somewhat unfortunate
insofar as it may be read to imply that the Appellate Body, itself,
"found" that setting on dolphins is "particularly harmful to
dolphins".[717] What the Appellate Body actually
stated, as Mexico also points out[718], was that the original panel
appeared to have "accepted the United States' argument that the
fishing technique of setting on dolphins is particularly harmful to
dolphins".[719] Moreover, while Mexico is correct
that the passage quoted by the Panel comes from the original panel report
rather than the Appellate Body report, we do not see that this alone amounts to
error under Article 11, particularly given that the Appellate Body did
refer to precisely these types of harms in its report. Specifically, in addressing
the United States' appeal under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, the
Appellate Body took note of the original panel's finding, "undisputed by
the participants, that dolphins
suffer adverse impact beyond observed mortalities from setting on dolphins, even
under the restrictions contained in the AIDCP rules."[720] In
footnotes to this observation, the Appellate Body also referred to the original
panel's statements regarding the unobserved effects that arise "as a
result of the chase itself"[721] and
to the examples given by the original panel of these various adverse effects.[722]
7.207. We see no merit in this allegation
of error under Article 11 of the DSU by Mexico. Mexico has neither established
that the Panel made a finding "that the dolphin set method is more harmful
to dolphins than other fishing methods when the dolphin set method is regulated
under the AIDCP", nor identified any problem with the statements made by
the Panel regarding the Appellate Body's use of the phrase
"particularly harmful" in connection with the fishing method of
setting on dolphins. We further observe that Mexico's arguments in support of
this claim of error are cursory and do not explain why any alleged error made
by the Panel would rise to the level required in order to establish a breach of
Article 11 of the DSU.
7.208. For all of the above reasons, we find
that Mexico has not established that the Panel acted inconsistently with its
duty to conduct an objective assessment of the matter, pursuant to
Article 11 of the DSU, in its analysis of the consistency of the
eligibility criteria set out in the amended tuna measure with Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement.
7.209. We next examine the participants'
claims in connection with the Panel's analysis of the certification
requirements. We begin with the United States' claim that the Panel acted
inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in its assessment of the
determination provisions.
7.210. The United States contends
that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by arriving
at a finding that is unsupported by the evidence on the record. The
United States recalls that the Panel expressed concern over two particular
"gaps" in the determination provisions.[723] The first "gap"
identified by the Panel would occur within the non-ETP purse‑seine fishery
where there is regular and significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins
without regular and significant tuna-dolphin association. The
United States notes that the evidence establishes that there is a direct
positive correlation between association and observed mortality or serious
injury in purse‑seine fisheries. As a consequence, "the evidence
establishes that a 'gap' such as the Panel envisioned does not, in fact, occur
– there is no evidence on the record that a purse seine fishery exists
where a 'regular and significant' mortality is occurring without a tuna‑dolphin
association also being present."[724] The United States indicates
that, in the Panel's view, the second "gap" would occur in a
non-purse‑seine fishery where there is regular and significant tuna‑dolphin association
without regular and significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins. The
United States considers that the Panel's analysis appears to be a
"self-defeating proposition"[725], because, if the Panel is correct
that the risk of mortality or serious injury is positively correlated with the
existence of a tuna-dolphin association in non-purse‑seine fisheries, then any
regular and significant association would imply that there is regular and
significant mortality or serious injury. In such situation, "the non-purse
seine fishery would not fall into a 'gap' at all but would be designated under [Section]
216.91(a)(4)(iii)."[726]
7.211. Mexico disagrees with the
United States' argument that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article
11 of the DSU by finding that there are two "gaps" in the
determination provisions. Mexico argues that there is considerable evidence on
the record to support the Panel's findings.[727] Moreover, in Mexico's view, it was
"both reasonable and appropriate for the Panel to conclude that dolphin
association with fishing methods other than purse seine nets could be
harmful to dolphins, and that purse seine fishing could cause dolphin
mortalities even if an ocean region did not feature tuna-dolphin association
similar to the ETP".[728]
7.212. We understand the essence of the
United States' claim to be that the Panel's reasoning and findings
regarding the determination provisions were not based on "sufficient"
evidence and, consequently, that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11
of the DSU in making such findings. The United States contends that it is
incorrect to believe that there are two "gaps" in the determination
provisions.
7.213. Our assessment of the United
States' arguments reveals that a number of them are aimed at establishing that
there is no evidence on the record supporting the
conclusion that there is any fishery, other than the ETP large purse‑seine
fishery, where there is regular and significant tuna‑dolphin association or
regular and significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins. We have
examined and rejected this argument above in the context of the United States'
challenge to the Panel's application of Article 2.1 to the determination
provisions. We recall that the Panel never sought to scrutinize the evidentiary
basis supporting the proposition that the US authorities have failed to
make a determination as to the existence of a fishery, other than the
ETP large purse‑seine fishery presenting regular and significant tuna‑dolphin
association or regular and significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins.
Rather, the Panel was focusing on the content, structure, and expected
operation of the measure at issue with a view to delineating the scope of
application of each of the relevant determinations. The Panel was thus
providing a series of hypothetical situations regarding the applicability of
the determination provisions to the various fisheries that are subject to the
amended tuna measure.
7.214. In the light of the above
considerations, we find that the United States has not established that
the Panel acted inconsistently with its duty to conduct an objective assessment
of the matter before it pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU in its analysis
of the consistency of the determination provisions set out in the amended tuna
measure with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.215. We now turn to Mexico's claims that
the Panel acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU
in its analysis of the certification requirements under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement. In its first claim, Mexico asserts that the Panel erred in
rejecting Mexico's argument and evidence that fishing vessel captains have an
economic self-interest in not reporting that dolphins were killed or seriously
injured.[729] Mexico asserts that, despite its
finding that "[t]he documents submitted by Mexico certainly suggest that
there have been instances in which captains' certifications have been
unreliable"[730], the Panel declined to "draw
the inevitable conclusions from that evidence".[731] Consequently, Mexico submits that
the Panel did not make an objective assessment of the matter "because it
conflated captains' reliability in general with the reliability, specifically,
of captains' self-certifications with respect to the 'dolphin-safe' status of
tuna for the purposes of accessing the market advantage of the U.S. label",
and requests us to reverse the Panel's finding that "captains'
dolphin-safe certifications are always reliable."[732]
7.216. In response, the United States
asserts that the Panel's findings regarding the reliability of captains'
certifications were not inconsistent with Article 11 of the DSU. For the United
States, Mexico wrongly argues that the Panel failed to understand that Mexico's
argument concerned the specific situation of captains making dolphin-safe
certifications. To the contrary, "the Panel described Mexico's argument as
relating to vessel captains' 'financial incentive to certify that their catch
is dolphin-safe even when it is not'".[733] The United States also disagrees
that the Panel erred by finding that Mexico had not established that captains'
statements are unreliable, because the Panel's finding "was supported by a
significant amount of evidence on the record, which Mexico fails to confront in
making this appeal".[734] The United States points out
that Mexico "does not articulate any basis for finding that the Panel
exceeded its discretion as the trier of fact, or that the Panel's finding was
not based on a weighing of the evidence before it", or "allege that
the Panel's treatment of the evidence undermined its objectivity".[735] Consequently, the
United States concludes that Mexico's claim should be rejected.
7.217. At the outset, we note that, in
response to questioning at the oral hearing, Mexico indicated that this claim
is both a challenge to the Panel's application of the law to the facts and a
challenge that the Panel acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Article 11 of the DSU. We recall that the Appellate Body has stated that,
"[i]n most cases … an issue will either be one
of application of the law to the facts or an issue of
the objective assessment of facts, and not both."[736] Allegations implicating a panel's
assessment of the facts and evidence fall under Article 11 of the DSU.[737] Mexico's central argument is that
the Panel did not make "an objective assessment" because it
"declined to draw the inevitable conclusions from [certain] evidence"[738] and because it "conflated
captains' reliability in general with the reliability, specifically, of
captains' self-certifications with respect to the 'dolphin-safe' status of tuna".[739] In the light of the nature of
Mexico's arguments, which relate, in our view, to the Panel's weighing of the
evidence, we analyse Mexico's claim as a challenge to the Panel's findings
under Article 11 of the DSU.
7.218. Having made this preliminary observation,
we also note that Mexico requests us to reverse the Panel's finding that
"captains' dolphin-safe certifications are always reliable."[740] Our review of the Panel Report
reveals that, in fact, the Panel made no such
finding. Rather, after examining the arguments and evidence submitted by each
party, the Panel considered the evidence presented by the United States to be a
"highly relevant and probative fact" that "many regional and
international organizations and arrangements rely on captains' certifications
and logbooks".[741] In the Panel's view, this fact
raised "a strong presumption that, from a systemic perspective, such
certifications are reliable."[742] Then, the Panel explicitly
acknowledged that Mexico's evidence "suggest[ed] that there have been
instances in which captains' certifications have been unreliable".[743] However, the Panel noted that this
evidence did not suffice to rebut the United States' general demonstration
regarding the reliability of captains' certifications.[744] Furthermore, the Panel was also
not convinced by Mexico's argumentation concerning the economic incentives
facing captains.[745]
7.219. As established by the Appellate
Body, panels enjoy a margin of discretion in their assessment of the facts
under Article 11 of the DSU.[746] A panel does not err simply
because it declines to accord to the evidence the weight that one of the
parties believes should be accorded to it.[747] In the present claim, Mexico does not single out any particular exhibit that the Panel
misinterpreted or failed to take into consideration. Nor does Mexico point to
any mistakes regarding the Panel's objectivity in its assessment of the
evidence. Consequently, we consider that Mexico has not established that the
Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU in concluding that "Mexico
ha[d] not met its burden of making a prima facie
case that captains' certifications are unreliable because captains have a
financial incentive not to report accurately on the dolphin-safe status of
tuna".[748]
7.220. In its second claim under Article
11 of the DSU, Mexico argues that the Panel erred in its finding that setting
on dolphins only occurs in the ETP.[749] According to Mexico, "[t]he
failure of the Panel to even mention, let alone address, evidence Mexico
submitted that dolphins associate with tuna and are intentionally set upon in
the Indian Ocean was inconsistent with the Panel's obligations under Article 11
of the DSU".[750] Mexico points out that Exhibit
MEX-161 was not mentioned or addressed by the Panel.[751] According to Mexico, Exhibit
MEX-161, a report by Dr R. Charles Anderson on Cetaceans
and Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Indian Ocean[752], contains a comprehensive and
scientific analysis of dolphin mortalities in the Indian Ocean tuna
fishery.[753] Mexico submits that "the
refusal of the Panel to deal with this crucial evidence played a key role in
its finding that independent observers are unnecessary outside the ETP to
assure the accuracy of dolphin-safe claims."[754]
7.221. The United States rejects
Mexico's appeal and asserts that "Mexico has failed to meet the high
standard required for a successful Article 11 claim".[755] The United States argues, first,
that the Panel fulfilled its obligations under Article 11 since it analysed
Mexico's evidence and arguments concerning the existence of dolphin sets
outside the ETP.[756] The United States points out
that Exhibit MEX-161 was acknowledged by the Panel in a citation in another
part of the Panel Report.[757] Accordingly, the Panel "had
discretion to choose 'which evidence … to utilize in making findings' and the
fact that it did not rely on one of Mexico's exhibits in a particular place is
not sufficient to establish an Article 11 violation."[758] The United States submits
that, in any event, Exhibit MEX-161 in "no way undermines the Panel's
finding", since the report in this exhibit makes no mention of
"dolphins sets, as they occur in the ETP – involving chasing dolphins to
catch tuna – ever occurring outside the ETP" and does not suggest that "the
type of 'association' that ETP large purse seiners exploit … occurs anywhere
outside the ETP".[759]
7.222. Mexico's central claim on appeal is
that the Panel failed to address the evidence contained in Exhibit MEX-161,
which, in its view, indicates that dolphins associate with tuna and are
intentionally set upon in the Indian Ocean. According to Mexico, this amounts
to a breach of the Panel's obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.
7.223. At the outset, we observe that
Mexico correctly points out that the Panel did not discuss Exhibit MEX-161 in
the section of the Panel Report addressing the certification requirements.[760] However, this does not necessarily
amount to a breach of the Panel's obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.
As established by the Appellate Body, the mere fact that a panel did not
explicitly refer to each and every piece of evidence in its reasoning is
insufficient to establish a claim of violation under Article 11.[761] Indeed, it is within the Panel's
discretion in assessing the facts "to decide which evidence it chooses to
utilize in making findings"[762] and to determine how much weight
to attach to the various items of evidence placed before it by the parties.[763]
7.224. Moreover, we observe that the
content of Exhibit MEX-161 is entirely compatible with the Panel's findings.
Indeed, we note that, before the Panel, Mexico argued that "'tuna dolphin associations
have been sighted and deliberately set on' outside of the ETP, and accordingly
the absence of independent observers outside the ETP is unjustifiable."[764] After reviewing evidence submitted
by both parties, the Panel was not persuaded by Mexico's arguments and
evidence. We note that, in response to Mexico's argument, the Panel
acknowledged that the evidence submitted by Mexico suggests that "there
may be some interaction between tuna and marine mammals, including dolphins,
outside of the ETP".[765] However, the Panel also pointed out that "dolphins in the Atlantic,
Indian, and western Pacific Oceans [do not associate with tuna] as
systematically as they do in the Eastern Tropical Pacific".[766] This passage reveals that the
Panel did acknowledge and accept the existence of association between tuna and
dolphins in the Indian Ocean, which is one of the issues addressed in Exhibit
MEX-161. Furthermore, we observe that, while this exhibit concludes that
"dolphins and tuna do associate in the [Western Indian Ocean (WIO)]"[767], it also notes that "the only
comparative study of the cetaceans from the [WIO] and the ETP … suggested that
tuna-dolphin schools were seen less frequently in the WIO than in the ETP."[768] This observation from Exhibit
MEX-161 also seems to be in line with the above‑mentioned Panel findings.
7.225. Furthermore, we note that the Panel
indicated that, "although dolphins may occasionally and incidentally be
set on outside the ETP, it is only inside the ETP that setting on dolphins is
practiced consistently or 'systematically'".[769] This passage shows that, contrary
to Mexico's assertion, the Panel never made the finding that "dolphin sets
are only made in the ETP".[770] To the contrary, the Panel
acknowledged that setting on dolphins may, "occasionally and incidentally",
occur outside the ETP. Exhibit MEX-161 notes that "it is possible that
there has been more setting on dolphins in the WIO than has been
reported".[771] At the same time, this exhibit
also indicates that "[t]his does not imply that the tuna-dolphin fishery
in the WIO is of the same scale as that in the ETP."[772] The study concludes that
"[t]he true scale of purse seine fishing on dolphin‑associated schools in
the WIO is therefore open to question."[773] These passages, in our view, also
indicate that the Panel's findings regarding the use of the fishing technique
of setting on dolphins in fisheries outside the ETP are consistent with the
conclusions found in Exhibit MEX‑161.
7.226. For the foregoing reasons, we
conclude that, while the Panel did not expressly refer to Exhibit MEX-161 in
the context of its assessment of the certification requirements, this, in and
of itself, is insufficient to establish a breach of Article 11 of the DSU.[774] The excerpts from Exhibit MEX-161
cited by Mexico show that the content of this exhibit is entirely compatible
with the Panel's findings, and do not suggest widespread tuna-dolphin
association or widespread use of the fishing technique of setting on dolphins
outside the ETP.
7.227. For all of the above reasons, we find
that Mexico has not established that the Panel acted inconsistently with its
duty to conduct an objective assessment of the matter, pursuant to
Article 11 of the DSU, in its analysis of the consistency of the
certification requirements set out in the amended tuna measure with Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement.
7.228. We have found that the Panel erred
in its analysis of whether the amended tuna measure has a detrimental impact on
Mexican tuna products in the US market within the meaning of Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement.
7.229. As regards the Panel's analysis of
whether the detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products stems exclusively from
a legitimate regulatory distinction, we have not found error in the Panel's
articulation of the legal standard. However, we have found error in the Panel's
"reaffirm[ation]" of the supposed "finding" of the
Appellate Body that "the eligibility criteria are even‑handed, and
accordingly are not inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement."[775] We have further found that, in the
light of the circumstances of this dispute and the nature of the distinctions
drawn under the amended tuna measure, the Panel erred by failing to consider
whether differences in the relative risks of harm to dolphins from different
fishing techniques in different areas of the oceans explain or justify the
differences in the certification requirements and the tracking and verification
requirements applied inside and outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery. In
addition, we have indicated that, due to the segmented approach that it adopted
in its analysis of the different sets of certification and tracking and
verification requirements, the Panel did not properly apply the legal test that
it had identified as relevant to an assessment of even‑handedness, namely,
"whether the detrimental treatment can be reconciled with, or is
rationally related to, the policy pursued by the measure at issue".[776]
7.230. Taken together, the errors that we
have identified in the two steps of the Panel's analysis of "treatment no
less favourable" under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement constitute
error in the application of that provision to the amended tuna measure, and
deprive the Panel's ultimate findings thereunder of a proper legal basis.
Accordingly, we reverse the Panel's discrete findings, in paragraph 8.2
of the Panel Report, that:
a. the eligibility criteria in the
amended tuna measure do not accord less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna
and tuna products than that accorded to like products from the
United States and to like products originating in any other country, and
are thus consistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement;
b. the different certification
requirements in the amended tuna measure accord less favourable treatment to
Mexican tuna and tuna products than that accorded to like products from the
United States and to like products originating in any other country, in
violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement; and
c. the different tracking and
verification requirements in the amended tuna measure accord less favourable
treatment to Mexican tuna and tuna products than that accorded to like products
from the United States and to like products originating in any other
country, in violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.231. We now turn to consider whether the
amended tuna measure has brought the United States into compliance with
the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original proceedings. We recall
that completion of the legal analysis may assist in ensuring the prompt
settlement and effective resolution of the dispute. However, the Appellate Body
has completed the legal analysis only when sufficient factual findings by the
panel and undisputed facts on the record have allowed it to do so.
7.232. In order to establish that a
measure is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the
following elements must be established: (i) that the measure constitutes a
technical regulation within the meaning of Annex 1.1; (ii) that the imported products
are "like" the domestic products and products of other origins; and
(iii) that the treatment accorded to imported products is "less favourable"
than that accorded to like domestic products and/or like products from any
other country.[777] Based largely on the findings in
the original proceedings and the positions of the parties, the Panel accepted
that the first two elements had been established in these compliance
proceedings, and this is not appealed by the participants.[778]
7.233. With respect to the third element,
we recall that an analysis of "treatment no less favourable" under
Article 2.1 consists of two steps: (i) whether the technical regulation at
issue modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of imported
products vis-à-vis like products of domestic origin and/or like products
originating in any other country; and, if so, (ii) whether such
detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.[779]
7.234. Beginning with the first step, we
consider whether the labelling conditions under the amended tuna measure, taken
together, modify the conditions of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna
products in the US market. In so doing, we must take "due cognizance"[780] of the DSB's recommendations and rulings, including the findings of
detrimental impact in the original proceedings, which constitute relevant
background for our assessment. Accordingly, we begin by recalling the Appellate
Body's finding in the original proceedings that the detrimental impact of the
original tuna measure was "caused by the fact that most Mexican tuna
products contain tuna caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP and are
therefore not eligible for a 'dolphin-safe' label, whereas most tuna products
from the United States and other countries that are sold in the
US market contain tuna caught by other fishing methods outside the ETP and
are therefore eligible for a 'dolphin-safe' label."[781] Our task is to ascertain whether the amended tuna measure has altered
the detrimental impact that was associated with the original tuna measure, as
established in the findings that were made by the original panel and the
Appellate Body in the original proceedings and, by virtue of the DSB's adoption
of the reports from the original proceedings, form part of the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.
7.235. As we have already explained,
before the Panel and in these appellate proceedings, Mexico and the
United States have both expressed the view that the detrimental impact of
the amended tuna measure is the same as that of the original measure. Mexico's
core argument with respect to detrimental impact is that the key elements of
the original measure – in particular, the disqualification of all tuna caught
by setting on dolphins – and the relevant features of the US market for
tuna products remain unchanged, such that most Mexican tuna products are still
being excluded from access to the dolphin-safe label, whereas most like
products from the United States and other Members are still eligible for
such label.[782] Mexico also submitted that
"virtually all of [its] purse seine tuna fleet continues to fish in the
ETP by setting on dolphins".[783] The United States, for its
part, does not contest the continuing applicability of the Appellate Body's
conclusions on detrimental impact in the original proceedings.[784] Rather, it expressly acknowledges
that, "because Mexico's tuna fleet is comprised 'virtually' entirely of
large purse seine vessels setting on dolphins in the ETP, Mexico does not
export 'any products to the United States that are eligible to be labelled
dolphin-safe under the Amended Tuna Measure'."[785]
7.236. As the original panel found and as
both participants have acknowledged in these compliance proceedings, access to
the dolphin-safe label constitutes an "advantage" on the US market
for tuna products by virtue of that label's "significant commercial
value".[786] We further recall that, in the
original proceedings, the Appellate Body relied on the following factual
findings by the original panel: (i) "the Mexican tuna cannery industry is
vertically integrated, and the major Mexican tuna products producers and
canneries own their vessels, which operate in the ETP"; (ii) "at
least two thirds of Mexico's purse seine tuna fleet fishes in the ETP by
setting on dolphins" and is "therefore fishing for tuna that would
not be eligible to be contained in a 'dolphin‑safe' tuna product under the US
dolphin-safe labelling provisions"; (iii) "the US fleet currently
does not practice setting on dolphins in the ETP"; and (iv) "as the
practices of the US and Mexican tuna fleets currently stand, most tuna
caught by Mexican vessels, being caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins,
would not be eligible for inclusion in a dolphin-safe product under the US
dolphin-safe labelling provisions", while "most tuna caught by US
vessels is potentially eligible for the label".[787] These various factual elements
thus supplied the foundation for the Appellate Body's finding of detrimental
impact. At the oral hearing in these appellate proceedings, both Mexico and the
United States confirmed that the relevant factual situation, as defined by
these findings relied upon by the Appellate Body, has not changed.
7.237. We do not see that the Panel made
any factual findings that go against those original findings. In fact, the
opposite is true. In its assessment of the consistency of the amended
tuna measure with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Panel found
that the regulatory distinction between tuna products derived from tuna caught
by setting on dolphins and tuna products derived from tuna caught by other
fishing methods "has the effect of denying [Mexican] tuna products …
access to the dolphin-safe label".[788] In the light of the above, we do
not see any Panel findings or uncontested evidence on the record indicating
that the position of Mexican tuna products in terms of access to the
dolphin-safe label has substantially changed as a result of the amended tuna
measure.[789]
7.238. Since the amended tuna measure
maintains the overall architecture and structure of the original tuna measure –
in particular, in terms of the regulatory distinction between tuna products
derived from tuna caught by setting on dolphins and tuna products derived from
tuna caught by other fishing methods – and given the participants' agreement
that the relevant factual situation has not changed from the original
proceedings, we find that, by excluding most Mexican tuna products from
access to the dolphin-safe label, while granting conditional access to such
label to like products from the United States and other countries, the
amended tuna measure, similar to the original measure, modifies the conditions
of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products in the US market.
7.239. Next, we address whether the
amended tuna measure can nevertheless be said not to constitute less favourable
treatment of Mexican tuna products by virtue of the fact that the detrimental
impact on Mexican tuna products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory
distinction. Such an examination requires scrutiny of whether the
amended tuna measure is, in the light of the particular circumstances of the
case, even-handed in its design, architecture, revealing structure, operation,
and application.[790] As we have
noted, where a regulatory distinction is not designed and applied in an
even-handed manner, because, for example, it is designed or applied in a manner
that constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, that
distinction cannot be considered legitimate for purposes of Article 2.1.[791] We have
also explained that, in the circumstances of this dispute, it is appropriate to
assess whether the differences in the labelling conditions for tuna products containing
tuna caught in the ETP large purse-seine fishery, on the one hand, and for tuna
products containing tuna caught outside that fishery, on the other hand, are
calibrated to the likelihood that dolphins will be adversely affected in the
course of tuna fishing operations in the respective fisheries.[792]
7.240. In these Article 21.5 proceedings,
the Panel pointed to the statements in paragraph 292 of the Appellate Body
report in the original proceedings regarding the basis for the finding of WTO‑inconsistency
of the original tuna measure.[793] In that paragraph, the Appellate
Body stated:
From the [original panel's] findings, it thus appears that the measure
at issue does not address adverse effects on dolphins resulting from the use of
fishing methods predominantly employed by fishing fleets supplying the United
States' and other countries' tuna producers. The [original panel] noted that
the only requirement currently applicable to purse seine vessels fishing
outside the ETP is to provide a certification by the captain that no purse
seine net was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the
fishing trip. This requirement, however, does not address risks from other
fishing methods, such as [fish aggregating devices] FADs. As the [original
panel] stated, risks to dolphins resulting from fishing methods other than
setting on dolphins "could only be monitored by imposing a different
substantive requirement, i.e. that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured
in the sets in which the tuna was caught."[794]
7.241. The Panel went on to state that
adding a new substantive requirement to the amended tuna measure addressing the
mortality or serious injury of dolphins is "precisely what the
United States has done".[795] The Panel recalled that, by virtue
of the additional requirements that the 2013 Final Rule incorporated into the
US dolphin-safe labelling regime, "all tuna,
wherever and however caught, can only be labelled as dolphin safe if it was not
caught in a set or other gear deployment in which one or more dolphins was
killed or seriously injured."[796] The Panel stated that this meant
that "the substantive certification required for all tuna … is now the
same."[797] In the Panel's view, "this
new uniformity in the required substantive certification addresses the specific
concern identified by the Appellate Body at paragraph 292 of its report, and
moves the amended measure towards compliance with WTO law."[798]
7.242. We agree with this reasoning by the
Panel. As we have noted, the question before the Panel was whether the amended
tuna measure, including the new elements introduced by the 2013 Final Rule, has
brought the United States into compliance with the DSB's recommendations and
rulings. The 2013 Final Rule introduced into the amended tuna measure
additional requirements that apply outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery,
the principal of which are the new requirements: (i) that captains certify that
no dolphins were killed or seriously injured irrespective of the fishing method
used; and (ii) that all dolphin-safe tuna be segregated from non‑dolphin‑safe
tuna from the time of the catch through the entire processing chain.[799] Thus, to the extent that these requirements
serve to enhance the capacity of the amended tuna measure to "address
adverse effects on dolphins resulting from the use of fishing methods
predominantly employed by fishing fleets supplying the United States' and other
countries' tuna producers"[800] outside the ETP large purse-seine
fishery, they may be said to respond to the "calibration" of the
dolphin-safe labelling regime that the Appellate Body found was lacking in the
original tuna measure. In assessing whether the amended tuna measure is adequately
calibrated to the relative adverse effects on dolphins arising outside the ETP
large purse-seine fishery as compared to those inside that fishery, we must
examine whether there are relevant factual findings by the Panel or undisputed
evidence on the record regarding the different risk profiles in these different
fisheries.
7.243. The Panel had before it
considerable evidence concerning the nature and scope of the relative risks
associated with different fishing practices in different areas of the oceans.
Mexico claimed before the Panel that the amended tuna measure is not
even-handed because it imposes different and heightened requirements in the ETP
large purse-seine fishery as compared to other fisheries, and that this is not
justified because the adverse effects on dolphins arising from fishing
methods other than setting on dolphins are equal to or greater than the risks
associated with the setting on method.[801] Mexico
further argued that "dolphins
suffer observed and unobserved adverse effects – including serious injury or
death – as a result of commercial tuna fishing operations throughout the
fisheries of the world (i.e., both within and outside the ETP) by every country
with a commercial tuna fishing fleet."[802] Mexico indicated before the Panel
that, since the original proceedings, it had collected "substantial
additional evidence showing that (i) tuna fishers intentionally set nets on
marine mammals outside the ETP, and (ii) other methods of fishing for tuna are
causing many thousands of dolphin mortalities."[803] Mexico submitted
evidence regarding fishing methods and bycatch arising from various fishing
methods outside the ETP, including dolphin mortalities due to setting on
practices, and other fishing methods such as using FADs, gillnets, and longline
fishing.[804]
7.244. The United
States responded to Mexico's claims by arguing that it was justified in drawing
distinctions between the method of setting on dolphins and other fishing
methods due to the different risks posed to dolphins by these different fishing
methods.[805] The United
States did not contest that fishing methods other than setting on dolphins
present risks to dolphins, but rather drew support from the original panel's
conclusion that "certain fishing techniques seem to pose greater risks to
dolphins than others"[806] and the
Appellate Body's "conclusion" that "setting on dolphins is
particularly harmful to dolphins."[807] The United
States also submitted considerable evidence to demonstrate that "setting on dolphins causes
both observed and unobserved harms to dolphins."[808] In relation to observed harms, the
United States claimed that the "number of dolphins killed in the ETP tuna
purse-seine fishery … is the greatest known for any fishery" and that
Mexico had failed to put forward evidence demonstrating that other fishing
methods had killed as many dolphins in any fishery as had setting on dolphins.[809] Moreover, the United States
addressed Mexico's contention that other fishing methods pose harms to dolphins
that are equal to or greater than the harms caused by setting on dolphins, by
introducing evidence of regional fishing management organizations, observer
programmes, and scientists, on the levels of observed harms associated with fishing
methods used to produce tuna products for the US market, such as
non-setting on purse-seine fishing, longline fishing, and pole-and-line
fishing.[810] In regards to unobserved harms,
the United States submitted that other fisheries are not "producing the
same level of unobserved harms, such as cow-calf separation, muscular damage,
immune and reproductive system failures, which 'arise as a result
of the chase in itself,' as the purse seine fishery in the ETP."[811] In support of this position, the
United States offered IATTC data on the numbers of dolphins chased and captured
in the years 2009-2013 showing that "the scale of the unobserved harms
caused by the chase in the ETP is unprecedented."[812]
7.245. We recall
that, at the outset of its assessment of the relative harms posed by setting on
dolphins versus other fishing methods, the Panel focused
mainly on the unobserved harms associated with different fishing methods.[813] Observing
that the Appellate
Body found that setting on dolphins causes both observed and unobserved harm to
dolphins, the Panel nevertheless considered that "what makes setting on
dolphins particularly harmful is the fact that it causes certain unobserved
effects beyond mortality and injury 'as a
result of the chase itself'."[814] Subsequently,
the Panel acknowledged that "[t]he evidence presented by Mexico, especially in its first written submission,
certainly suggests that very significant numbers of dolphins are killed in tuna
fishing operations outside of the ETP large purse seine fishery."[815] The Panel therefore accepted that
tuna fisheries other than the ETP large purse-seine fishery may, and in fact
have, caused harms to dolphins.
7.246. The Panel, however, did not address
what the evidence adduced by the parties indicated in respect of the overall relative harms, both observed and unobserved, associated
with setting on dolphins versus other fishing practices, but rather focused
only on whether that evidence undermined its understanding that these fishing
practices are distinguishable on the basis of unobserved harms. Thus, in
respect of gillnet fishing, the Panel referenced Mexico's substantial
evidence showing that gillnets kill and seriously injure dolphins, but stated
that none of this evidence indicated that gillnets have the same kind of
unobserved effects as has setting on dolphins.[816] Similarly,
in respect of longline fishing, the Panel stated that, although Mexico's
evidence indicated that longlining is having a negative effect on the
sustainability of dolphin populations, none of that evidence suggests that
longline fishing has unobserved effects similar to those caused by setting on
dolphins.[817]
Furthermore, the Panel explicitly acknowledged that Mexico submitted evidence
concerning the extent of mortality and serious injury caused by tuna fishing
methods including FAD fishing, longline fishing, gillnet fishing, trawl
fishing, and driftnet fishing, but again opined that none of this evidence suggested
that such fishing methods inflict the same kinds of unobserved effects as
setting on dolphins.[818] The Panel
therefore concluded that Mexico had not demonstrated that fishing methods other
than setting on dolphins "consistently cause" harms similar to
the harms to dolphins caused by setting on dolphins.[819]
7.247. We note that the Panel's conclusion
could be read to imply that it found that Mexico had not demonstrated that
fishing methods other than setting on dolphins consistently cause observed and
unobserved harms to dolphins similar to the observed harms caused by setting on
dolphins, and that Mexico had also failed to demonstrate that such other
fishing methods cause unobserved harms to dolphins similar to those caused by
setting on dolphins. In fact, however, when read together with the reasoning
that preceded it, it is clear that the Panel's conclusion rests solely on its
finding that the unobserved harms differed between
setting on and other fishing methods. This is because, whenever the Panel
referred to the evidence of observed mortality or serious injury arising from
fishing methods other than setting on dolphins, it was only to establish that
such harms occur, but without indicating how the nature or extent of those
harms compare to the observed harms arising
from setting on dolphins. Indeed, although the Panel referred to observed
mortality or serious injury arising from fishing methods other than setting on
dolphins, we do not see that the Panel ever compared those harms with those
arising from setting on dolphins in a manner that allowed for a comparative
assessment of the extent of those harms in relation to each other.
7.248. The limited scope of the Panel's
conclusion is relevant in two respects. First, the disagreement between the
parties regarding whether the amended tuna measure is even-handed rested on
fundamentally different premises concerning the risks associated with different
fishing practices. Mexico maintained that the observed mortality or serious
injury from practices other than setting on dolphins was "equal to or
greater than"[820] that associated with setting on
dolphins, whereas the United States asserted that the risks associated with
practices other than setting on dolphins produced "nowhere near the
observed dolphin mortality or serious injury that setting on dolphins
does".[821] The parties also disagreed
regarding the nature and extent of unobserved harms. The United States
contended that tuna-dolphin association and related unobserved harms are unique
to the ETP large purse-seine fishery[822], whereas Mexico maintained that
such association also occurs outside the ETP, and that unobserved harms also
result from fishing methods other than setting on dolphins.[823] By failing to consider the
relative risks posed by different fishing methods in respect of observed mortality or serious injury, while focusing solely
on the narrower difference in the respective risks attributable to unobserved harms, the Panel never resolved the question of
the overall levels of risk in the different fisheries, and how they compared to
each other, notwithstanding that both parties had addressed such comparative
risk profiles in their pleadings in support of their arguments regarding
even-handedness. We note, in this regard, that, at the oral hearing in this
appeal, both Mexico and the United States criticized the Panel for focusing on
too narrow a range of harms and, in particular, for not dealing with observed
harms.
7.249. Second, arriving at a conclusion in
respect of the relative risks attributable to
different fisheries, including in respect of both observed and
unobserved harms, was, in our view, particularly important given that the very
issue the Panel was seeking to address was whether the new requirements of the
amended tuna measure, which apply exclusively to fisheries other than the ETP
large purse-seine fishery, adequately address the risks of harm to dolphins
arising in such fisheries.[824] Moreover, the two principal
additional requirements – namely, that a captain must certify that there were
no dolphins killed or seriously injured, and that tuna caught must be
segregated into dolphin-safe and non-dolphin‑safe storage areas – both seek to
enhance the manner in which the measure addresses the risks of observed
mortality or serious injury outside of the ETP large purse-seine fishery. Yet,
the Panel never sought to compare the relative harms
in respect of observed mortality or serious
injury. Instead, the Panel reached a conclusion only on the basis of a
comparative assessment of unobserved
harms. On the basis of the foregoing concerns, we do not consider that the
Panel put itself in a position to conduct an assessment of whether the amended
tuna measure is even-handed in addressing the respective risks of setting on dolphins
in the ETP large purse-seine fishery versus other fishing methods outside that
fishery.
7.250. We recall that, in the original
proceedings, the question concerning the relative risks to dolphins arising in
different fisheries was framed by the original panel's findings that adverse
effects consisting of observed mortality or serious injury arise in fisheries
outside the ETP, but that the original tuna measure did not require any
certification in respect of tuna caught in those fisheries that no dolphins were
killed or seriously injured. On that basis, the Appellate Body was able to
conclude that, while the
original tuna measure fully addressed the adverse effects on dolphins resulting from setting on dolphins in the
ETP, it did "not
address mortality (observed or unobserved) arising from fishing methods other
than setting on dolphins outside the ETP".[825] In these circumstances, it was
reasonable to consider that, irrespective of any differences in the relative
risks, the original tuna measure did not address the incidence of harms arising
from practices other than setting on dolphins because there was no
certification required to document whether any dolphins had been killed or
seriously injured. For that reason, the Appellate Body was able to state that,
"even accepting that the fishing
technique of setting on dolphins is particularly harmful to dolphins", it was not persuaded that the measure
was even-handed, as argued by the United States.[826]
7.251. In these
Article 21.5 proceedings, however, the question as to the relative risk
profiles associated with different fishing practices in different areas of the
oceans has become more acute. Given that the amended tuna measure introduced a
requirement outside the ETP large purse‑seine fishery that captains certify
that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured, and that, for that purpose,
segregation of dolphin-safe and non-dolphin-safe tuna must be maintained, the
exercise of gauging whether these new requirements are sufficient to address
the risks posed to dolphins outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery requires
a more thorough understanding of the relative risk profile outside that fishery
as compared to the risks to dolphins within that fishery, and, in particular,
the risks associated with setting on dolphins.[827] Moreover,
as we have noted, the parties presented conflicting accounts, supported by
considerable arguments and evidence, as to why the relative risks of observed
mortality or serious injury did or did not justify the differences in
regulatory treatment inside and outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery
provided for under the amended tuna measure.
7.252. We do not
discount the difficulty associated with making such an assessment of the
respective risks, particularly in the light of the highly contested evidence
adduced by the parties.[828] Neither do
we consider that the Panel was necessarily in a position to come to a
definitive or precise view as to the extent to which the relevant risk profiles
differed. However, for
the reasons set out above, we do not see that the Panel in these
proceedings set out to examine the extent of mortality or serious injury
arising from fishing methods in different areas of the oceans so as to enable
itself to gauge properly the overall relative risks or levels of harm to
dolphins arising in those fisheries, which was needed in order to assess
whether the differences in the dolphin-safe labelling conditions under the amended
tuna measure are appropriately tailored to, and commensurate with, those
respective risks.
7.253. For
instance, we note the Panel's finding that captains, in comparison to
observers, do not necessarily and always have the technical skills required to
certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured.[829] As the
Panel found, this difference, as between captains and independent observers, in
the respective training and technical skills required to certify the
dolphin-safe status of tuna "may
result in inaccurate information being passed to consumers, in contradiction
with the objectives of the amended tuna measure".[830] We also
note the Panel's conclusions that the tracking and verification requirements that
apply outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery are less burdensome than those that
apply inside that fishery in terms of their depth, accuracy, and degree of
government oversight[831] and that
this "may
contribute to inaccurate labelling of tuna caught outside the ETP large purse
seine fishery".[832] In the
absence of a proper assessment by the Panel of the relative risks existing
inside and outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery, the Panel limited its
ability to determine whether the discriminatory aspects of the amended tuna
measure can be explained as being properly tailored to, or commensurate with,
the differences in such risks in the light of the objective of protecting
dolphins from adverse effects arising in different fisheries. For similar
reasons, the Panel's limited analysis in respect of the relative risk profiles
in turn constrains our ability to complete the legal analysis in this regard.
7.254. There are, however, other features
of the amended tuna measure that are not dependent on an assessment of the
relative risks associated with different fishing methods in different areas of
the oceans. In particular, we have previously examined the Panel's analysis
regarding the determination provisions set out in the amended tuna measure, and
in particular the provisions that trigger a requirement to provide
certification by observers for specific fisheries in scenarios in which the
risks of harm to dolphins in such fisheries would be comparably high to those
existing in the ETP large purse-seine fishery. We recall, in this context, the
Panel's finding that the determination provisions are "an integral
part" of the "certification system" under the US dolphin‑safe
labelling regime.[833] In general, for tuna caught in
fisheries other than the ETP large purse-seine fishery, the required
certification(s) need be provided only by a captain. Yet, as we previously
explained, depending on the category of fishery concerned, and on whether
certain determinations have been made by the NMFS Assistant Administrator, then,
in addition to the required captain certification(s), the amended tuna measure
in some circumstances also conditions access to the dolphin-safe label on the
provision of a certification by a qualified and approved observer in respect of
the conditions, where applicable, of "no setting on dolphins" and
"no dolphins killed or seriously injured". In particular, such
observer certification is required if a determination has been made by the NMFS
Assistant Administrator: (i) within the non-ETP purse‑seine fishery, that there
is a regular and significant tuna-dolphin association, similar to the tuna‑dolphin
association in the ETP; or (ii) within "all other fisheries"[834], that there is a regular and
significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins.[835]
7.255. In
addressing the Panel's analysis of the certification requirements under the
second stage of the "treatment no less favourable" analysis under
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, we did not accept the United States' claims that the Panel erred in its
analysis of the determination provisions set out in
Sections 1385(d)(1)(B)(i) and (d)(1)(D) of the DPCIA and Sections 216.91(a)(2)(i)
and (a)(4)(iii) of the implementing regulations. Specifically, we found
that Mexico has properly identified the determination provisions as part of its
broader claim under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, and that the United
States has not established that the Panel erred, either in its application of
Article 2.1 or under Article 11 of the DSU, in analysing the determination
provisions by focusing on the design, structure, and expected operation of the
measure.
7.256. We note that, in their design[836], the determination provisions seem
to apply to all fisheries other than the ETP large purse-seine fishery where
the risk of harm to dolphins approximates that existing in the ETP large
purse-seine fishery. Indeed, this link is explicit on the face of the
determination provision applicable to the non-ETP purse-seine fishery in that
it concerns a finding that regular and significant association occurs
"similar to the association between dolphins and tuna in the [ETP]".[837] As the Panel explained, the
determination provisions "appear to be designed to enable the
United States to impose conditions on fisheries other than the ETP large
purse seine fishery where the conditions in the former approach those of the
latter".[838] As the Panel remarked, this helps
to ensure that similar situations are treated similarly under the amended tuna
measure. Thus, in the non-ETP purse-seine fishery, the existing requirement
that a captain provide a certification in respect of the conditions of "no
setting on dolphins" and "no dolphins killed or seriously
injured" is supplemented by an additional requirement of observer certification
in respect of those two conditions when a determination is made that there is
regular and significant tuna‑dolphin association, similar to the tuna-dolphin association
in the ETP. When such a determination of tuna-dolphin association in the non-ETP
purse‑seine fishery is made, the certification requirements are thereby
heightened in terms of who is to make
the required certifications (captain and observer).
Moreover, the amended tuna measure explicitly states that such a determination
is to be made when the association is similar to the association between
dolphins and tuna in the ETP.[839] Because the Panel found that
observers are more qualified, and therefore more likely to make accurate
certifications in respect of mortality or serious injury, this determination
appears, in our view, to enhance the correlation, for fisheries other than the
ETP large purse-seine fishery, between the risks of harm to dolphins and
the manner in which the measure seeks to address those risks.
7.257. The same can be said of the determination
provision applicable to "all other fisheries", which supplements the
existing requirement that a captain provide a certification in respect of the
condition of "no dolphins killed or seriously injured" with a
requirement for the same certification from an observer when there is a
determination made that there is regular and significant mortality or serious
injury in that fishery. When such a determination is made, the certification
requirements are thereby heightened in terms of who
is to make the required certifications (captain and
observer). Although the amended tuna measure does not state what criteria
inform a determination of regular and significant mortality or serious injury,
we would understand the reference to "regular" and "significant"
mortality or serious injury as indicating that there exist risks of dolphin
death or serious injury that are equivalent to or greater than those existing
in the ETP large purse-seine fishery. We therefore consider that this
determination also appears to enhance the correlation, in respect of "all
other fisheries", between the risks of harm to dolphins and the manner in
which the measure seeks to address those risks.
7.258. Like the Panel, however, we observe
that the determination provisions do not appear to address other scenarios in
which there may be heightened risks of harm to dolphins associated with
particular fishing methods in fisheries other than the ETP large purse-seine
fishery.[840] As noted, the determination
provision applicable to the non-ETP purse-seine fishery allows for the addition
of a requirement for observer certification if there is a determination of
"regular and significant association", but not for a determination of
"regular and significant mortality or serious injury".[841] In our view, this is difficult to
reconcile with the fact that such an observer certification is required in the
ETP large purse-seine fishery, and that such a determination, on the basis of
"regular and significant mortality or serious injury", can be made
pursuant to the other relevant determination provision, which is applicable to
"all other fisheries".[842] We recall, in this
regard, the Panel's finding that captains, in comparison to observers, do not
necessarily and always have the technical skills required to certify that no
dolphins were killed or seriously injured.[843]
7.259. According to the Panel, when asked
why specific fisheries within the non-ETP purse-seine fishery cannot be subject
to a determination that they are causing "regular and significant dolphin
mortality or serious injury", the United States provided no explanation.[844] On appeal, the United States
explains that a focus on mortality would not take into account the unobserved
harms to dolphins resulting from setting on dolphins.[845] The United States also
maintains that, due to the direct positive correlation between tuna‑dolphin
association and observed mortality and serious injury in purse‑seine fisheries,
there is no evidence on the record that a purse-seine fishery exists where there
is regular and significant mortality without tuna-dolphin association also
being present.[846] We do not find these arguments
convincing. First, while we agree that a focus only
on mortality might not take into account the unobserved
harms to dolphins resulting from setting on dolphins, the question here is
rather whether the determination provisions should also
address a situation of regular and significant mortality or serious injury in addition to addressing a situation of regular and
significant tuna-dolphin association. Any concerns in respect of unobserved
harms arising from setting on dolphins would be addressed by the existing
determination provision to the extent that it requires observer certification
if there is a determination of "regular and significant association".
Instead, we are expressing concern that the determination provision does not
allow for comparable regulation of a risk scenario where there is regular and
significant mortality or serious injury in respect of non-setting on practices
by purse‑seine vessels inside versus outside the ETP.
7.260. Second, we do not find persuasive
the United States' argument that there is no basis for imposing an observer
requirement in the absence of evidence that a purse-seine fishery exists where
there is regular and significant mortality without tuna-dolphin association
also being present. We are not convinced that, in the absence of tuna-dolphin
association, there is no possibility of regular and significant mortality or
serious injury occurring in a fishery. As the Appellate Body noted in the original
proceedings, requiring certification that purse-seine vessels have not engaged
in setting on dolphins does not address the risks involved in such vessels' use
of other fishing methods, such as using FADs.[847] Moreover, the amended tuna measure
contemplates the existence of risks of mortality or serious injury in the
absence of setting on dolphins given that the determination provision linked to
regular and significant mortality or serious injury applies in "all other
fisheries" existing both inside and outside the ETP. For the foregoing
reasons, we see no convincing explanation as to why such a scenario should be
excluded from the dolphin-safe labelling regime, thereby preventing the possibility
of triggering the addition
of an observer requirement for non-setting on activities in the non-ETP
purse-seine fishery, when such a requirement already exists for non-setting on
activities in the ETP large purse-seine fishery and, upon a determination, in
"all other fisheries".
7.261. We also consider that our observations
about the determination provisions are particularly relevant in the light of
statements made by the Appellate Body regarding the shortcomings of the
original tuna measure. The Appellate Body stated that it did not understand
the original panel to have suggested that imposing a requirement that an
independent observer certify that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured
would be the only way for the United States to calibrate its dolphin‑safe
labelling provisions to the risks that the original panel found were posed by
fishing techniques other than setting on dolphins. The Appellate Body added,
however, that "such
a requirement may be appropriate in circumstances in which dolphins face higher
risks of mortality or serious injury".[848] Thus, even if the United States
may reasonably have sought to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings
by implementing a condition of "no dolphins killed or seriously
injured" other than through an observer certification, the Appellate Body
also suggested that an observer requirement may be appropriate when dolphins
face higher risks of mortality or serious injury.
7.262. In respect of the determination
provision applicable to "all other fisheries", there is also a
question as to whether this provision sufficiently addresses scenarios in which
there may be elevated risks of harm associated with particular fishing methods
outside the ETP large purse‑seine fishery. We recall that, for this category of
fisheries, the determination provision allows for the addition of a requirement
of observer certification if there is a determination of "regular and
significant mortality or serious injury", but does not provide for a
determination of "regular and significant association".[849]
7.263. Both before the Panel, and again on
appeal, the United States argues that there is no need to provide for the
possibility to make a determination linked to tuna-dolphin association in these
fisheries since such determination would have no impact on the degree of
mortality or serious injury caused by fishing methods other than setting on
dolphins.[850] As the United States explains, if
there is a correlation between tuna-dolphin association and the risk of
mortality or serious injury, then the higher risks to dolphins would already be
addressed by a determination regarding regular and significant mortality or
serious injury.[851] The United States also questions
the risks posed by such a correlation by noting that the tuna-dolphin
association is only dangerous to dolphins when a purse-seine vessel intentionally
interacts with dolphins and seeks to take advantage of that association by
encircling them with purse-seine nets.[852]
7.264. We see some merit in the United
States' contention that the more relevant consideration in respect of a
tuna-dolphin association is whether there is a vessel that is capable of
intentionally targeting and taking advantage of that association, and which would
thereby produce the observed and unobserved harms to dolphins that are linked
to the fishing method of setting on dolphins. Like the United States, we
recognize that the other fisheries to which this determination provision
applies do not concern the operation of large purse-seine vessels, which are
the only vessels that are recognized as capable of setting on dolphins. At the
same time, we also take note of the Panel's view that, wherever dolphins
associate with tuna, "they are more likely to interact with tuna fishing
gear, even if such interaction is accidental or unintentional".[853] For this reason, the Panel
considered that, even for fishing methods that do not deliberately target the
association of dolphins with tuna, "the risk of mortality or serious
injury is necessarily heightened"[854] where there is association and
that, accordingly, "observers may be necessary whenever there is a
'regular and significant' tuna-dolphin association, regardless of whether the
association occurs in a purse seine fishery or any other type of fishery".[855] It is also not clear to us whether
the association of dolphins and tuna necessarily heightens the risk to dolphins
from non-purse-seine fishing methods, nor whether any such heightened risk
could be adequately addressed by a determination that there is "regular
and significant mortality or serious injury". To the extent that there may
in fact be a heightened risk to dolphins due to association, comparable to that
existing in the ETP large purse-seine fishery, even where the fishing methods
employed are not capable of setting on dolphins, and that such risk would not
be addressed by a determination of "regular or significant mortality or
serious injury", we would consider this to be relevant to an assessment of
the even-handedness of the amended tuna measure.
7.265. Finally, we note that our analysis
regarding the determination provisions is premised on the existence of risks
outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery that are comparably high to the risks
existing in the ETP large purse-seine fishery.[856] As the Panel explained, the
determination provisions "appear to be designed to enable the
United States to impose conditions on fisheries other than the ETP large
purse seine fishery where the conditions in the former approach those of the
latter".[857] We recall from our discussion of
the measure at issue that there are differences between the documentation
requirements that the amended tuna measure applies inside and outside the ETP
large purse-seine fishery in respect of segregation.[858] We also recall that the Panel
found that the differences in the tracking and verification requirements are
such that there are differences in the depth, accuracy, and degree of
government oversight that is legally required under the amended tuna measure
with respect to tuna products derived from tuna caught in the ETP large
purse-seine fishery, on the one hand, and from tuna caught in all fisheries
other than the ETP large purse-seine fishery, on the other hand.[859] In such circumstances, we would
expect that any determination outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery would
entail not only the heightened certification requirements, but also tracking
and verification requirements that work together with and reinforce
certification in addressing this heightened risk.
7.266. In conclusion, in the absence of a
proper assessment by the Panel of the respective risks posed to dolphins inside
and outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery, we are unable to complete the
legal analysis and assess fully whether all of the regulatory distinctions
drawn under the amended tuna measure can be explained and justified in the
light of differences in the relative risks associated with different methods of
fishing for tuna in different areas of the oceans. Nevertheless, we have been
able to examine the even-handedness of the labelling conditions applied under
the amended tuna measure in certain scenarios that would present comparably
high risks to dolphins inside and outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery. We
found, in this respect, that aspects of the design of the amended tuna measure
reflect a lack of even-handedness. In particular, we considered that the
determination provisions do not provide for the substantive conditions of
access to the dolphin-safe label to be reinforced by observer certification in
all circumstances of comparably high risks, and that this may also entail
different tracking and verification requirements than those that apply inside
the ETP large purse-seine fishery. For this reason, it has not been
demonstrated that the differences in the dolphin-safe labelling conditions
under the amended tuna measure are calibrated to, or commensurate with, the
risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different areas of
the oceans. Since it therefore follows that the detrimental impact of the
amended tuna measure cannot be said to stem exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction, we find that the amended tuna measure is
inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
7.267. We now turn to address whether the
Panel erred in its analysis of the consistency of the amended tuna measure with
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
7.268. The United States requests us to
reverse the Panel's findings that the certification requirements and the
tracking and verification requirements of the amended tuna measure are
inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4.[860] The United States claims that the
Panel erred in finding that the two sets of requirements under the amended tuna
measure: (i) provide an "advantage, favour, privilege, or
immunity" to tuna and tuna products from other Members that is not "accorded
immediately and unconditionally" to like products from Mexico, in a manner
inconsistent with Article I:1; and (ii) accord "less favourable
treatment" to Mexican tuna and tuna products than that accorded to like
domestic products, in a manner inconsistent with Article III:4. The United
States does not advance independent arguments in support of these claims, but
rather refers back to the arguments it developed in its challenge to the
Panel's alleged errors regarding the detrimental impact of the certification
and tracking and verification requirements under Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement.[861] In response, Mexico reiterates its
claim that, instead of making separate findings of inconsistency with respect
to each set of criteria, "the Panel should have analysed the amended tuna
measure as a whole"[862] and concluded that the measure is
inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[863] In Mexico's view, the Panel's
failure to make findings of inconsistency with Articles I:1 and III:4 with
respect to the amended tuna measure as a whole amounts to legal error.[864]
7.269. Before addressing the merits of the
participants' claims of error, we first recount the relevant analysis and
findings by the Panel.
7.270. In setting out its analysis, the
Panel noted that Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 embodies a "different legal
standard[]" from that in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[865] For the Panel, "whereas
Article I:1 requires only an
analysis of whether the conditions attached to an advantage detrimentally
impact the competitive opportunities of imported products in the relevant
market, Article 2.1 … requires an additional
consideration of whether any detrimental impact nevertheless stems exclusively
from a legitimate regulatory distinction."[866] The Panel noted, however, that the
focus on the question of "whether conditions imposed on access to an
advantage modify the conditions of competition to the detriment of imported
like products" is "similar" to a detrimental impact analysis
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, "which similarly looks to the
effect of a measure on the competitive opportunities of imported
products".[867] Likewise, in its analysis under
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Panel observed that, unlike Article
2.1 of the TBT Agreement, Article III:4 does not require a panel to
examine whether the detrimental impact of a measure on competitive
opportunities for like imported products stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction.[868] The Panel noted, however, that the
"treatment no less favourable" test under that provision "is
very similar to the first element of the 'less favourable treatment' test in
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement".[869] In the light of the above, the
Panel found it "appropriate" to apply the findings it made with
respect to detrimental impact under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement to its
analysis of the amended tuna measure's consistency with Articles I:1 and III:4
of the GATT 1994.[870]
7.271. The Panel then separately examined
whether each of the three sets of requirements under the amended tuna measure –
the eligibility criteria, the certification requirements, and the tracking and
verification requirements – is consistent with Article I:1.[871] Similarly, the Panel conducted
separate examinations of the consistency of each of the three sets of
requirements with Article III:4.[872]
7.272. Starting with the eligibility
criteria, the Panel noted that the parties agreed that, under the amended tuna
measure, most Mexican tuna products continue to be derived from tuna caught by
setting on dolphins and are therefore denied access to the dolphin-safe label,
while most like products from the United States and other Members are not
derived from tuna caught by setting on dolphins and are therefore eligible for
the label.[873] The Panel considered that the
regulatory distinction between tuna products derived from tuna caught by
setting on dolphins and tuna products derived from tuna caught by other fishing
methods "has the effect of denying [Mexican] tuna products a valuable
market advantage (that is, access to the dolphin-safe label)".[874] Therefore, the Panel concluded
that the eligibility criteria modify the conditions of competition to the
detriment of Mexican tuna products in the US market, in a manner inconsistent
with Articles I:1[875] and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[876]
7.273. As for the certification
requirements, the Panel recalled that, in its detrimental impact analysis under
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, it had found that such requirements impose
"a lighter burden" on tuna products derived from tuna caught outside
the ETP large purse-seine fishery than on tuna products derived from tuna
caught within that fishery.[877] According to the Panel, the
imposition of an observer requirement in the ETP large purse-seine fishery,
coupled with the absence of such a requirement in other fisheries, "in itself
strongly suggests that the amended tuna measure imposes certain conditions on
access to the dolphin-safe label on only some tuna
products".[878] In the Panel's view, by imposing
on tuna products containing tuna caught in the ETP large purse-seine
fishery an "additional, heavier or more burdensome" condition for
access to the dolphin-safe label than on tuna products containing tuna caught in
other fisheries, the certification requirements "modif[y] the competitive
opportunities of like … tuna products", inconsistently with Articles I:1[879] and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[880]
7.274. Finally, as regards the tracking
and verification requirements, the Panel recalled that, in its detrimental
impact analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, it had found that the
requirements for tuna products containing tuna caught outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery are "less burdensome" than those for tuna
products containing tuna caught within that fishery.[881] The Panel considered that, by
imposing on the latter group of products an "additional" and more
"burdensome" condition for access to the label than on the former
group of products, the tracking and verification requirements "upset the
equality of competitive opportunities", inconsistently with Articles I:1[882] and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[883]
7.275. Based on the foregoing, the Panel
made separate findings that the eligibility criteria, the different certification
requirements, and the different tracking and verification requirements are each
inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[884]
7.276. As the overview above shows, the
Panel's analysis of the consistency of the eligibility criteria with Articles
I:1 and III:4 somewhat differs from its analysis of the alleged detrimental
impact flowing from such criteria under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. In
the context of Articles I:1 and III:4, the Panel assessed the extent to
which the disqualification of tuna products derived from tuna caught by setting
on dolphins affects the relative competitive conditions of Mexican, US, and
other tuna products in the US market, whereas, in the context of Article 2.1,
the Panel simply "reaffirm[ed]" the Appellate Body's alleged finding
that the eligibility criteria are even-handed, without expressly evaluating
their impact on access to the dolphin-safe label for the relevant groups of
like tuna products.[885] Conversely, in its separate
analyses of the consistency with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the different certification
requirements and the different tracking and verification requirements, the
Panel's approach closely mirrored its approach to assessing of the alleged
detrimental impact of each such set of requirements under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement.
7.277. We recall that, in the original
proceedings, the Appellate Body criticized the original panel's "assumption"
that the claims under the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994 were
"substantially the same". The Appellate Body found, for this reason,
that the original panel had acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU and
exercised false judicial economy in refraining from ruling on Mexico's claims
under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.[886] This is because, unlike Article
2.1 of the TBT Agreement, Articles I:1 and III:4 do not require a panel to
examine whether the detrimental impact of a measure on competitive
opportunities for like imported products stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction.[887] Moreover, unlike in
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the most‑favoured nation obligation
in Article I:1 is not expressed in terms of "treatment no less
favourable", but rather through an obligation to extend any "advantage" granted by a Member to any product originating in or destined for any other country "immediately and
unconditionally" to the "like product" originating in or
destined for all other countries.[888]
7.278. These differences notwithstanding,
important parallels exist between the non‑discrimination provisions contained
in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Articles I:1 and III:4 of the
GATT 1994. In particular, the inquiry under these provisions hinges on the
question of whether the measure at issue modifies the conditions of competition
in the responding Member's market to the detriment of products imported from
the complaining Member vis-à-vis like domestic products or like products imported
from any other country.[889] Accordingly, in assessing whether
a measure affects competitive conditions under Article I:1 and/or Article III:4
of the GATT 1994, it may be reasonable for a panel to rely on any relevant
findings it made in examining that measure's detrimental impact under Article
2.1 of the TBT Agreement. For these reasons, we do not see that the
Panel's reliance, in its analyses under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the
GATT 1994, on certain reasoning and findings from its analysis of
detrimental impact under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement was, in itself,
inappropriate.
7.279. However, we recall that we have
already expressed a number of concerns with respect to the Panel's approach, in
its analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, to assessing whether the
amended tuna measure has a detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products in the
US market.[890]
7.280. First, we held that, by segmenting
its analysis along the three sets of requirements under the amended tuna
measure, the Panel failed to conduct a holistic assessment of how those various
labelling conditions, taken together, adversely affect the conditions of
competition for Mexican tuna products in the US market as compared to like US
and other tuna products. Nor did the Panel give due consideration to the
question of whether and how such detrimental impact resembles, in nature or
extent, the detrimental impact that was found, in the original proceedings, to
exist under the original tuna measure. These considerations apply equally to
the Panel's analytical approach under Articles I:1 and III:4. In our view, the
Panel's examination of relative access to the dolphin‑safe label for Mexican,
US, and other tuna products should not have been limited to the regulatory
distinction between tuna products derived from tuna caught by setting on
dolphins and tuna products derived from tuna caught by other fishing methods.
Indeed, while Mexican tuna products may be denied access to the dolphin-safe
label by virtue of the fact that they are derived from tuna caught by setting
on dolphins, other elements of the amended tuna measure, such as the "no dolphin
killed or seriously injured" standard and the certification and tracking
and verification requirements, may also exclude some tuna products of US or
other origin from access to the label. Thus, the Panel should also have assessed how the certification and tracking and
verification requirements introduced by the 2013 Final Rule for tuna products
originating outside the ETP large purse-seine fishery had the effect of
reducing (or increasing) access to the dolphin‑safe label for such tuna
products, thus narrowing (or broadening) the difference in treatment between
Mexican tuna products and like US or other products in terms of access to the
dolphin‑safe label. By failing to do so, the Panel's segmented analysis falls
short of a proper examination of the extent to which the various labelling
conditions under the amended tuna measure, taken together, modify the
detrimental impact that was found to exist in the original proceedings.
7.281. Second, we noted that, in its
discrete detrimental impact analyses regarding the certification and tracking
and verification requirements, the Panel engaged in a comparison of a subset of
the relevant groups of products found to be "like" in this dispute –
on the one hand, Mexican tuna products derived from tuna caught other than by
setting on dolphins; on the other hand, tuna products from the United States
and other countries derived from tuna caught other than by setting on dolphins.
We took the view that, in order to reach its conclusions on detrimental impact,
the Panel should have, instead, compared the treatment that the labelling
conditions under the amended tuna measure accord to the group
of Mexican tuna products, on the one hand, with the treatment accorded to the groups of like tuna products from the United States and
other countries, on the other hand. These considerations apply with equal force
to the analytical approach adopted, and the product groups compared by the
Panel in order to assess whether the certification and tracking and
verification requirements discriminate against Mexican tuna products under
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
7.282. For the above reasons, we consider
that, in assessing whether the amended tuna measure modifies the conditions of
competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products in the US market under
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Panel applied an incorrect
approach. We therefore find that the Panel erred in its analysis of
whether the amended tuna measure: (i) provides an "advantage,
favour, privilege, or immunity" to tuna products from other Members that
is not "accorded immediately and unconditionally" to like products
from Mexico, in a manner inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994;
and (ii) accords "less favourable treatment" to Mexican tuna
products than that accorded to like domestic products, in a manner inconsistent
with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. Accordingly, we reverse the
Panel's findings, in paragraphs 8.3.a, 8.3.b, and 8.3.c of the Panel Report,
that the eligibility criteria, the different certification requirements, and
the different tracking and verification requirements are each inconsistent with
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
7.283. Having reversed these findings by the
Panel, we do not consider it necessary to rule on the United States' claims on
appeal that: (i) the Panel improperly allocated the burden of proof under
Articles I:1 and III:4 by making findings on the different costs and burdens
imposed by the certification and tracking and verification requirements on
suppliers of tuna products operating inside and outside the ETP large
purse-seine fishery[891]; (ii) the Panel erred in finding a
difference in costs and burdens stemming from the certification and tracking and
verification requirements and in failing to explain how any such difference
modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna
products[892]; and (iii) the Panel did not
properly establish a genuine relationship between the certification and
tracking and verification requirements and any detrimental impact on Mexico's
competitive opportunities in the US market.[893]
7.284. The Panel found that the features
of the amended tuna measure that gave rise to violations of Articles I and
III relate to the goal of conserving dolphins and, accordingly, are
provisionally justified under Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994.[894] Neither participant has challenged
this finding on appeal.[895] We therefore turn to address the
claims of the United States and Mexico regarding the Panel's analysis and
findings under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. Before turning
to address these claims, we first recount the relevant findings of the Panel.
7.285. In analysing the United States'
defence under Article XX of the GATT 1994, the Panel sought to determine
whether the requirements of the amended tuna measure, including its eligibility
criteria, certification requirements, and tracking and verification
requirements, are justified under Article XX(g).[896] The Panel agreed with the parties
that dolphins are an "exhaustible natural resource"[897], and considered that measures
designed to reduce the harm done to dolphins in commercial fishing practices "concern"
the protection of dolphins, and "relate to" the conservation of
dolphins.[898] The Panel considered that
"the amended tuna measure remains centrally concerned with the pain caused
to dolphins in the context of commercial fishing practices both inside and
outside the ETP, and caused by both setting on dolphins and other methods of
tuna fishing."[899] The Panel therefore found that the
requirements concerning eligibility, certification, and tracking and
verification "relate to" the goal of conserving dolphins since they
help to ensure that the US tuna market does not operate in a way that
encourages fishing techniques that are not dolphin safe.[900] The Panel therefore concluded that
"the features of the amended tuna measure that give rise to violations of
Articles I and III of the GATT 1994 are nevertheless provisionally
justified under subparagraph (g) of Article XX [of] the
GATT 1994."[901]
7.286. Turning to the chapeau of Article
XX of the GATT 1994, the Panel considered that, where even‑handedness
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement is analysed through the lens
of, or using, the analytical framework of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination, it may be appropriate to rely on that reasoning in the context
of assessing a measure's consistency with the chapeau of Article XX.[902] The Panel acknowledged that, in EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body faulted
the panel for automatically importing its analysis under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement into its analysis under the chapeau of Article XX
of the GATT 1994.[903] The Panel in this dispute did not
consider that this precluded reliance on Article 2.1 findings in the context of
the chapeau of Article XX, but rather that a panel need only justify its
reliance on such findings. The Panel noted that its findings in the context of
Article 2.1 were based on its conclusion that particular features of the
amended tuna measure are arbitrarily discriminatory because they are not
reconcilable with the measure's objectives.[904] Accordingly, the Panel considered
that it was "appropriate" to rely on the reasoning it had developed
in the context of Article 2.1 in the course of its analysis under the
chapeau of Article XX.[905]
7.287. The Panel separately analysed the
requirements of the amended tuna measure as they relate to eligibility,
certification, and tracking and verification. With respect to the eligibility criteria,
the Panel noted that the main regulatory distinction of the amended tuna measure
does not concern different countries, but rather different fishing methods, and
that it is the fishing method of setting on dolphins that is regulated
differently and more tightly than other fishing methods. The Panel noted,
moreover, that tuna products containing tuna caught in instances where a
dolphin was killed or seriously injured are ineligible to be labelled dolphin safe
regardless of what fishing method was used, and regardless of where or how the
tuna was caught. The Panel agreed with the United States that the most
appropriate condition to examine is the different harms to dolphins caused by
setting on dolphins versus those caused by other fishing methods.[906] The Panel recalled that setting on
dolphins causes unobservable harms to dolphins beyond mortality and serious
injury. These harms arise "as a result of the chase itself", and
support the Appellate Body's conclusion in the original proceedings that
setting on dolphins is "particularly harmful" to dolphins.[907] The Panel also noted the finding
by the original panel that the observed and unobserved effects of setting on
dolphins were "fully addressed" by the original measure
precisely because it "disqualif[ied] all tuna products containing tuna
harvested with that method from access to the 'dolphin‑safe' label"[908], and that
"to the extent that it would not discourage these unobserved effects
of setting on dolphins and their potential consequences on dolphin
populations … the use of the AIDCP labelling requirements … could
potentially provide a lesser degree of protection than the existing
US dolphin-safe provisions."[909]
7.288. Applying these findings in the
present case, the Panel was not convinced that fishing methods other than
setting on dolphins cause the same or similar unobserved harms. Rather,
the Panel agreed with the United States that, even if there are tuna
fisheries using gear types that produce the same number of dolphin mortalities
and serious injuries allowed or caused in the ETP, "it is simply not the case that such fisheries are producing the same
level of unobserved harms, such as cow-calf separation, muscular damage, immune
and reproductive system failures, which arise as a result of the chase in
itself."[910] The Panel also observed that the
Appellate Body did not say in the original proceedings that the
United States must disqualify all other fishing methods from accessing the
dolphin-safe label, or that setting on dolphins and other methods of fishing
must be regulated in the same manner. To the contrary, the Appellate Body
accepted that the United States is permitted to "calibrate" the
requirements imposed by the amended tuna measure according to "the
likelihood that dolphins would be adversely affected in the course of tuna
fishing operations in the respective conditions" of different fisheries.[911]
7.289. The Panel noted the parties'
agreement that one of the most important factors in determining whether
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable is whether the discrimination can
be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy objective with
respect to which the measure has been provisionally justified under one of the
subparagraphs of Article XX.[912] The Panel considered that the
eligibility criteria are rationally related to the dolphin protection objective
of the amended tuna measure. In the Panel's view, the fact that other fishing
methods do not cause the kind of unobservable harms as those caused by setting
on dolphins means that, at least insofar as the eligibility criteria are
concerned, the conditions prevailing in fisheries where tuna is caught by
setting on dolphins and fisheries where that method is not used are not the
same. Having considered that any discrimination that the eligibility criteria
cause is directly connected to the main goal of the amended tuna measure, the
Panel found that this aspect of the measure is not inconsistent with the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.[913]
7.290. With respect to the certification requirements,
the Panel recalled its finding that, while fishing methods other than setting
on dolphins cause dolphin mortality and serious injury, the nature and degree
of the interaction between tuna fishing vessels and dolphins is different in
quantitative and qualitative terms.[914] Accordingly, there may be no need
to have an observer on board whose sole task is to monitor the safety of
dolphins during the set or other gear deployment. The Panel considered this
sufficient to demonstrate that maintaining different certification requirements
does not necessarily amount to unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination,
although neither is it necessarily determinative of whether the system in place
in fisheries other than the ETP large purse‑seine fishery – which requires certification
by captains only – is balanced and justified within the meaning of the chapeau
of Article XX.[915]
7.291. The Panel agreed with Mexico that
captains' certificates may be unreliable because captains may not have the
technical expertise necessary to certify accurately that no dolphins were
killed or seriously injured in a particular set or gear deployment.[916] In
particular, the Panel considered that the tasks generally expected of a captain
may be rather different from those involved in certifying that no dolphins were
killed or seriously injured in sets or other gear deployments, and captains or
other crew members are not always and necessarily in possession of such highly
specialized skills.[917] In the Panel's view, the
United States had not explained sufficiently how captains can perform the
duties inherent to the certification for the dolphin-safe label since they do
not appear to have the specific expertise required to do so thoroughly.[918] The Panel further recalled its
concerns with the determination provisions due to the fact that
such determinations are only possible in respect of certain fisheries, and the
United States had not explained adequately how this limitation is
rationally connected to the objectives pursued by the amended tuna measure.[919]
7.292. On the
basis of this analysis, the Panel considered that the findings that it had made
in the context of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement applied with equal
force in the context of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. The
Panel considered that, insofar as the different certification requirements are
not justified by the objective of conserving dolphins by providing consumers
with accurate information about the dolphin-safe status of tuna products, this aspect of the amended tuna
measure is unjustifiably and arbitrarily discriminatory. The Panel also stated
that, unlike in the context of the eligibility criteria, for the purposes of
this element of the measure, the conditions prevailing among Members are the
same, because dolphins may be killed or seriously injured by all fishing
methods in all oceans, and, accordingly, accurate certification is necessary
regardless of the particular fishery in which tuna is caught. The Panel thus
found that the different certification requirements are not applied consistently
with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.[920] One of the panelists expressed a
separate opinion similar to that which had been expressed in the context of
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.[921]
7.293. With respect to the tracking and
verification requirements, the Panel recalled its conclusion that such requirements
impose a lighter burden on tuna products containing tuna caught other than in
the ETP large purse‑seine fishery.[922] The Panel
saw merit in Mexico's arguments that the lighter tracking and verification
requirements imposed outside of the ETP large purse-seine fishery may make it
more likely that tuna products containing tuna caught by vessels other than
large purse-seine vessels will be incorrectly labelled as dolphin safe,
although it did not find it necessary to make a definitive finding on that
point. The Panel agreed with Mexico that the lesser burden placed on tuna
products containing tuna caught other than in the ETP large purse-seine fishery
is not rationally related to the amended tuna measure's objective of conserving
dolphins by providing information to consumers concerning the dolphin-safe
status of tuna products. Moreover, the Panel considered that, to the extent
that the different requirements may make it easier for tuna products containing
tuna caught other than by large purse-seine vessels in the ETP to be
incorrectly labelled, this would also be inconsistent with the measure's goal
of providing accurate information to consumers. In the Panel's view, the
United States had not provided any explanation as to how this differential
treatment is related to, let alone justified by, the objectives pursued by the
amended tuna measure. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the different
tracking and verification requirements are applied in a manner that constitutes
unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination, contrary to the chapeau of
Article XX of the GATT 1994.[923]
7.294. The participants advance claims
challenging different parts of the Panel's analysis and findings under the
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. Mexico challenges the Panel's findings
regarding the eligibility criteria, and requests us to modify the reasoning of
the Panel and find that the eligibility criteria also demonstrate that the
amended tuna measure as a whole is applied in a manner that constitutes
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.[924] For its part, the
United States challenges the Panel's findings regarding the certification requirements
and the tracking and verification requirements, and requests us to reverse the
Panel's findings and complete the legal analysis in this regard.[925]
7.295. Both participants contend that the
Panel erred in its analysis of whether discrimination occurs "between countries
where the same conditions prevail". The Panel found that, with respect to
the eligibility criteria, the conditions between countries are not the
same.[926] This finding is appealed by
Mexico. In respect of the certification requirements and the tracking and
verification requirements, however, the Panel found that the conditions between
countries are the same.[927] The United States appeals these
findings of the Panel.
7.296. In addition, both participants
advance claims of error regarding the Panel's analysis as to whether the
discrimination is "arbitrary or unjustifiable". The Panel found that
the eligibility criteria are directly
related to the objectives of the measure, and therefore are applied in a manner
that meets the requirements of the chapeau.[928] This finding is appealed by
Mexico. Conversely, the Panel found that the certification requirements
and the tracking and verification requirements are not
directly related to the objectives of the measure, and therefore are applied in
a manner that does not meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.[929] These findings are appealed by the
United States.
7.297. In respect of the Panel's analysis
of the eligibility criteria, Mexico claims that the Panel erred by finding that
"the conditions prevailing in fisheries where tuna is caught by setting on
dolphins and fisheries where that method is not used are not
the same."[930] Mexico considers this finding to
be erroneous because, in its view, the relevant conditions are not the
differences in unobservable harms, but rather in dolphin mortalities and
serious injuries (both observed and unobserved) caused by commercial tuna
fishing operations. As a result, because there are mortalities and injuries in
tuna fisheries other than the ETP large purse-seine fishery, the relevant
conditions are the same, and the Panel erred by limiting the relevant
conditions to the impact of unobservable effects only.[931]
7.298. The United States responds that
"the relevant 'conditions' relate to all adverse effects suffered by dolphins, which … include
not only mortality and serious injuries, but those unobservable harms that
dolphins incur from being chased."_[932]