United
States – measures concerning the importation, marketing and sale of tuna and
tuna products
recourse to article 21.5 of the dsu by mexico
Report of the Panel
Addendum
This addendum
contains Annexes A to C to the Report of the Panel to be
found in document WT/DS381/RW.
_______________
·
LIST OF ANNEXES
·
ANNEX A
Working
Procedures of The Panel
Contents
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Page
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Annex A
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Working Procedures of the Panel
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A-1
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·
ANNEX B
Arguments
of the Parties
MEXICO
Contents
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Page
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Annex B-1
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Executive summary of the first written submission of Mexico
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B-2
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Annex B-2
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Executive summary of the second written submission of Mexico
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B-14
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Annex B-3
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Executive summary of the opening oral statement of Mexico at the
meeting of the panel
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B-21
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UNITED STATES
Contents
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Page
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Annex B-4
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Executive summary of the first written submission of the United
States
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B-26
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Annex B-5
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Executive summary of the second written submission of the United
States
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B-34
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Annex B-6
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Executive summary of the opening oral statement of the
United States at the meeting of the panel
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B-42
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·
ANNEX C
Arguments
of the Third Parties
Contents
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Page
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Annex C-1
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Executive summary of the third-party submission of Australia
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C-2
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Annex C-2
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Executive summary of the oral statement of Australia at the meeting
of the panel, and responses to Panel questions
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C-6
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Annex C-3
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Executive summary of the third-party submission of Canada
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C-8
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Annex C-4
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Executive summary of the oral statement of Canada at the meeting of
the panel
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C-11
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Annex C-5
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Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union
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C-13
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Annex C-6
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Executive summary of the third-party submission of Japan
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C-18
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Annex C-7
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Executive summary of the oral statement of the Republic of Korea at
the meeting of the panel
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C-22
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Annex C-8
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Integrated executive summary of the arguments of New Zealand
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C-24
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Annex C-9
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Executive summary of the third-party submission of Norway
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C-28
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Annex C-10
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Executive summary of the oral statement of Norway at the meeting of
the panel
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C-31
|
·
ANNEX A
working procedures of THE
PANEL
Adopted on
19 February 2014
1. In
its proceedings, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU). In addition, the following Working Procedures shall apply.
General
2. The
deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept
confidential. Nothing in the DSU or in these Working Procedures shall preclude
a party to the dispute (hereafter "party") from disclosing statements
of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential
information submitted by another Member to the Panel which the submitting
Member has designated as confidential. Where a party submits a confidential
version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall also, upon request of
a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in
its submissions that could be disclosed to the public.
3. The
Panel shall meet in closed session. The parties, and Members having notified
their interest in the dispute to the Dispute Settlement Body in accordance with
Article 10 of the DSU (hereafter "third parties"), shall be present
at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it.
4. Each
party and third party has the right to determine the composition of its own
delegation when meeting with the Panel. Each party and third party shall have
responsibility for all members of its own delegation and shall ensure that each
member of such delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these Working
Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceedings.
Submissions
5. Before
the substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall
transmit to the Panel a first written submission, and subsequently a written
rebuttal, in which it presents the facts of the case and its arguments, and
counter-arguments, respectively, in accordance with the timetable adopted by
the Panel.
6. A
party shall submit any request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest
possible opportunity and in any event no later than in its first written
submission to the Panel. If Mexico requests such a ruling, the United States
shall submit its response to the request in its first written submission. If
the United States requests such a ruling, Mexico shall submit its response to
the request prior to the substantive meeting of the Panel, at a time to be
determined by the Panel in light of the request. Exceptions to this procedure
shall be granted upon a showing of good cause.
7. Each
party shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the
substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of
rebuttal, answers to questions or comments on answers provided by the other
party. Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good
cause. Where such exception has been granted, the Panel shall accord the other
party a period of time for comment, as appropriate, on any new factual evidence
submitted after the substantive meeting.
8. Where
an original exhibit is not in the language of the submitting party's written
submissions, that party shall also submit a translation in the language of its
written submissions. The Panel may grant reasonable extensions of time for the
translation of such exhibits upon a showing of good cause. Any objection as to
the accuracy of a translation should be raised promptly in writing. Any
objection shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the grounds of
objection and an alternative translation.
9. To
facilitate the maintenance of the record of the dispute, and maximize the
clarity of submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number
its exhibits throughout the course of the compliance proceedings. For example,
exhibits submitted by Mexico could be numbered MEX‑1, MEX‑2, etc. If the last
exhibit in connection with the first submission was numbered MEX‑5, the first
exhibit of the next submission thus would be numbered MEX‑6. The first
time a party or third party submits to the Panel an exhibit that corresponds to
an exhibit submitted in the original panel proceedings, the party or third
party submitting such exhibit shall also identify the number of the original
exhibit in the original panel proceedings.
Questions
10. The
Panel may at any time pose questions to the parties and third parties, orally
in the course of the substantive meeting or in writing.
Substantive
meeting
11. Each
party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in
advance of the meeting with the Panel and no later than 6.00 p.m. the
previous working day.
12. The
substantive meeting of the Panel shall be conducted as follows:
a. The Panel shall invite Mexico to make an
opening statement to present its case first. Subsequently, the Panel shall
invite the United States to present its point of view. Before each party takes
the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting
with a provisional written version of its statement. In the event that
interpretation is needed, each party shall provide additional copies to the
interpreters. Each party shall make available to the Panel and the other party
the final version of its statement, preferably at the end of the meeting, and
in any event no later than 6.00 p.m. on the first working day following
the meeting.
b. After the conclusion of the statements, the
Panel shall give each party the opportunity to ask questions or make comments,
through the Panel. Each party shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be
determined by the Panel, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to
receive a response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in
writing to the other party's questions within a deadline to be determined by
the Panel.
c. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to
the parties. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be
determined by it, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a
response in writing. Each party shall be invited to respond in writing to such
questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
d. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel
shall afford each party an opportunity to present a brief closing statement,
with Mexico presenting its statement first.
Third
parties
13. The
Panel shall invite each third party to transmit to the Panel a written
submission prior to the substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, in
accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.
14. Each
third party shall also be invited to present its views orally during a session
of the substantive meeting, set aside for that purpose. Each third party shall
provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation in advance of this
session and no later than 6.00 p.m. the previous working day.
15. The
third party session shall be conducted as follows:
a. All third parties may be present during the
entirety of this session.
b. The Panel shall first hear the arguments of
the third parties in alphabetical order. Third parties present at the
third-party session and intending to present their views orally at that
session, shall provide the Panel, the parties and other third parties with
provisional written versions of their statements before they take the floor.
Third parties shall make available to the Panel, the parties and other third
parties the final versions of their statements, preferably at the end of the
session, and in any event no later than 6.00 p.m. of the first working day
following the session.
c. After the third parties have made their
statements, the parties may be given the opportunity, through the Panel, to ask
the third parties questions for clarification on any matter raised in the third
parties' submissions or statements. Each party shall send in writing, within a
timeframe to be determined by the Panel, any questions to a third party to
which it wishes to receive a response in writing.
d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to
the third parties. The Panel shall send in writing, within a timeframe to be
determined by it, any questions to the third parties to which it wishes to
receive a response in writing. Each third party shall be invited to respond in
writing to such questions within a deadline to be determined by the Panel.
Descriptive
part
16. The
description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the
descriptive part of the Panel report shall consist of executive summaries
provided by the parties and third parties, which shall be annexed as addenda to
the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve as a
substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel's
examination of the case.
17. Each
party shall submit an executive summary of each of its written submissions and
a consolidated executive summary of its opening and closing oral statements, as
applicable, at the latest 7 calendar days following the delivery to the
Panel of the written version of the relevant submission or statement. A party may include its responses to questions in the executive
summary of its statements. In that case, the executive summary, covering the
party's statements and responses to questions, shall be submitted at the latest
7 calendar days following the delivery to the Panel of its written responses to
questions. The Panel will not summarize in the descriptive part of its report,
or annex to its report, the parties' responses to questions. The total length
of these summaries shall not exceed 30 pages.
18. The
third parties shall submit executive summaries of their written submission and
oral statements at the latest 7 calendar days following the delivery to
the Panel of the written version of the relevant submission or statement. A third party may include its responses to questions in the
executive summary of its statement. In that case, the executive summary,
covering the third party's statement and responses to questions, shall be
submitted at the latest 7 calendar days following the delivery to the Panel of
its written responses to questions. The total length of these summaries shall
not exceed 6 pages.
Interim
review
19. Following
issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to
review precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with
the Panel in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to
request such a meeting shall be exercised no later than at the time the written
request for review is submitted.
20. In
the event that no further meeting with the Panel is requested, each party may
submit written comments on the other party's written request for review in
accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. Such comments shall be
limited to commenting on the other party's written request for review.
21. The
interim report, as well as the final report prior to its official circulation,
shall be kept strictly confidential and shall not be disclosed.
Service of
documents
22. The following procedures
regarding service of documents shall apply:
a. Each party and third party shall submit all
documents to the Panel by filing them with the DS Registry (office No.
2047).
b. Each party and third party shall file 3 paper
copies of all documents it submits to the Panel. However, when exhibits are
provided on CD‑ROMS/DVDs, 5 CD‑ROMS/DVDs and 2 paper copies of those exhibits
shall be filed. The DS Registrar shall stamp the documents with the date
and time of the filing. The paper version shall constitute the official version
for the purposes of the record of the dispute.
c. Each party and third party shall also provide
an electronic copy of all documents it submits to the Panel at the same time as
the paper versions, in Microsoft Word format, either on a CD-ROM, a DVD or as
an e-mail attachment. If the electronic copy is provided by e-mail, it should
be addressed to *****@wto.org, with a copy to *****.*****@wto.org,
*****.*****@wto.org and *****.*****@wto.org. If a CD-ROM or DVD is provided, it
shall be filed with the DS Registry.
d. Each party shall serve any document submitted
to the Panel directly on the other party. Each party shall, in addition, serve
on all third parties its written submissions in advance of the substantive
meeting with the Panel. Each third party shall serve any document submitted to
the Panel directly on the parties and all other third parties. Each party and
third party shall confirm, in writing, that copies have been served as required
at the time it provides each document to the Panel.
e. Each party and third party shall file its
documents with the DS Registry and serve copies on the other party (and third
parties where appropriate) by 6.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the due dates
established by the Panel.
f. The Panel shall provide the parties with an
electronic version of the descriptive part, the interim report and the final
report, as well as of other documents as appropriate. When the Panel transmits
to the parties or third parties both paper and electronic versions of a
document, the paper version shall constitute the official version for the
purposes of the record of the dispute.
Modification
of working procedures
23. The
Panel may modify these working procedures after consulting with the parties.
_______________
·
ANNEX B
Arguments
of the Parties
MEXICO
Contents
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Page
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Annex B-1
|
Executive summary of the first written submission of Mexico
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B-2
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Annex B-2
|
Executive summary of the second written submission of Mexico
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B-14
|
Annex B-3
|
Executive summary of the opening oral statement of Mexico at the
meeting of the panel
|
B-21
|
UNITED STATES
Contents
|
Page
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Annex B-4
|
Executive summary of the first written submission of the United
States
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B-26
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Annex B-5
|
Executive summary of the second written submission of the United
States
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B-34
|
Annex B-6
|
Executive summary of the opening oral statement of the
United States at the meeting of the panel
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B-42
|
·
ANNEX B-1
executive
summary of the first written submission of mexico
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This proceeding concerns a
disagreement as to the consistency with the WTO covered agreements of measures
taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) in the dispute United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products (Tuna dispute).
2. In the original
proceedings, Mexico demonstrated that the multilateral Agreement on
International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP) has been a tremendous
success, reducing dolphin mortality in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP).
Mexico also showed that the alternative method of fishing on fish aggregating
devices (FADs) promoted by the United States is extremely harmful to tuna
stocks because that method captures juvenile tuna. FAD fishing also results in
highly destructive bycatch of billfish, turtles, sharks, and other species.
3. On 13 June 2012, the DSB
adopted the reports and ruled that the U.S. "dolphin‑safe"
labelling provisions were inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and recommended that the United States
bring its measure into conformity with its obligations under that Agreement.
4. On 9 July 2013, the United States
published in its Federal Register a Final Rule entitled "Enhanced Document
Requirements to Support Use of the Dolphin Safe Label on Tuna Products"
(2013 Final Rule). The action taken by the United States does not bring
its measure into compliance with the WTO Agreements, and also perpetuates a
tragic situation for dolphins worldwide and the global marine environment. Although the "effective date" of the Final Rule was stated to
be July 13, 2013, the notice accompanying its publication also stated that the United States
would not require compliance until 1 January 2014.
5. The
"measure taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings" of the
DSB (Amended Tuna Measure) comprises: (a) Section 1385 ("Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act" (DPCIA)), as contained in Subchapter
II ("Conservation and Protection of Marine Mammals") of Chapter 31 ("Marine
Mammal Protection"), in Title 16 of the U.S. Code; (b) U.S. Code
of Federal Regulations, Title 50, Part 216, Subpart H ("Dolphin Safe Tuna
Labeling"), as amended by the 2013 Final Rule; (c) The court ruling in
Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007); and
(d) any implementing guidance, directives, policy announcements or any other
document issued in relation to instruments (a) through (c) above, including any
modifications or amendments in relation to those instruments.
6. The Amended Tuna Measure, like the original Tuna Measure, imposes discriminatory requirements for access to the United States'
"dolphin‑safe" label in violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement,
and Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.
II. THE
AMENDED TUNA MEASURE
7. The Amended Tuna Measure entailed changes only to the
implementing regulations, and not to either the DPCIA or the Hogarth ruling. Key aspects of the original Tuna Measure
were maintained in the Amended Tuna Measure, particularly that tuna caught by
setting on dolphins is not eligible for a dolphin‑safe label.
A. The Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act
8. In the original proceeding, the Panel reviewed the most pertinent
aspects of the DPCIA. Those provisions remain unchanged. The three major categories of requirements of the DPCIA are (i) the
definition/scope of "dolphin‑safe," (ii) the obligation to have
independent observers ensuring compliance, and (iii) specification of the
documentation needed to support the certification.
9. In accordance with
subsection (d)(1)(C) of the statute, a tuna product containing tuna caught
inside the ETP can be labeled as dolphin‑safe only if the product is supported
by: (a) a statement by the vessel's captain providing certification under
subsection (h), i.e., that no tuna were caught on the trip in which such tuna
were harvested using a purse-seine net intentionally deployed on or to encircle
dolphins, and that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured during the sets
in which the tuna were caught; (b) a statement by the onboard, independent and
AIDCP-approved observer, also providing certification under subsection (h); (c)
a statement by the Secretary of Commerce, a Secretary's designee, a
representative of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), or a
representative of a nation whose national program meets the requirements of the
AIDCP, stating that an AIDCP-approved observer was onboard during the entire
trip.
10. The statute contemplated the possibility that the U.S. definition
of "dolphin‑safe tuna" could be made consistent with the definition
in the AIDCP. This potential change in the dolphin‑safe labelling standard for
the ETP was made contingent on the outcome of studies of dolphin populations in
the ETP. In 1999, the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) made an Initial
Finding that determined that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that
intentional encirclement of dolphins with purse-seine nets was having a
significant adverse effect on what the United States labeled as "depleted"
dolphin stocks in the ETP. The USDOC then did additional studies and, in a
Final Finding issued in December 2002, reached the same conclusion that it had previously
reached in the Initial Finding. These findings should have allowed the U.S. definition
of "dolphin‑safe" to be amended to allow tuna caught in compliance
with the AIDCP to bear the dolphin‑safe label. However, the U.S. courts,
in the Hogarth case, held that the USDOC's
findings were not in accordance with the statute's requirements, and ordered
that the definition of "dolphin‑safe" continue to ban the use of
dolphin sets entirely. The statute does not permit that determination to be
re-evaluated at any time in the future.For tuna caught outside the ETP
using purse seine nets, the statute only requires a self-certification by the
captain of the vessel that a purse seine net was not intentionally deployed on
or used to encircle dolphins during the particular voyage on which the tuna was
harvested. For tuna caught without the use of purse seine nets (e.g., longline
or trawl), no certification is required at all. For tuna by a vessel less than
400 short tons, no certification is required at all. These requirements have
been modified by the 2013 Final Rule.
11. In addition, the DPCIA purports to
prohibit the use of the "dolphin‑safe" label on tuna caught "on the high seas by a vessel engaged in driftnet fishing." However,
in actual operation this restriction has no meaning, because it has never been
implemented by the Department of Commerce. Indeed, the United States
itself allows fishing with driftnets in its Exclusive Economic Zone.
12. The
DPCIA designates when a dolphin‑safe certification must be supported by an
independent observer. The DPCIA does not require
independent observers outside the ETP, except where the USDOC has designated a
purse seine fishery as having a regular and significant association between tuna and
dolphins or a non‑purse seine fishery as having regular and significant dolphin
mortality. The USDOC has not designated any fishery under
these categories, so observers are not required for any fishery other than the
ETP.
13. In the case of a tuna product
containing tuna harvested in the ETP by a purse seine vessel, the DPCIA states
that the certifications by the captain and observer must "comply with
regulations promulgated by the Secretary which provide for the verification of
tuna products as dolphin safe." Those regulations incorporate the
requirements for tuna tracking to which the members of the AIDCP have agreed.
For other tuna products (i.e., non‑ETP tuna), the DPCIA contains no requirement
to verify the products as dolphin‑safe.
14. Under
U.S. law, implementing regulations may not change any of the requirements
set out in the authorizing statute. Accordingly, all of the DPCIA's
requirements that were the subject of review by the Panel and Appellate Body
remain in effect today, unchanged. The statute is therefore an integral element
of the Amended Tuna Measure.
B. U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 50, Part 216, Subpart H
15. The
implementing regulations for the DPCIA address the certifications for "dolphin‑safe"
and also impose specific requirements, which vary depending on whether the tuna
is sourced from the ETP or elsewhere, for: segregating tuna; having independent
observers on board vessels; and documenting and verifying compliance.
16. For
tuna products made from tuna caught by large purse seine vessels in the ETP,
the content of the certification requirement is the same as set forth in the
DPCIA. For tuna products containing tuna caught
outside the ETP with purse seine nets, the 2013 Final Rule changed
the certification to require an additional statement from the captain of the
vessel that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets in which
the tuna were caught.
17. For tuna products containing tuna caught (i)
not using purse seine nets or (ii) by smaller vessels, that did not require any
certification, the 2013 Final Rule requires that all such tuna be supported by
a captain's statement that that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in
the sets or other gear deployments
in which the tuna were caught. Note that if the dolphin‑set fishing method is
used even a single time during a voyage, none of the tuna caught during the
voyage may be designated as dolphin‑safe, including tuna caught without using
dolphin sets. The three major tuna products in the U.S. market – Starkist,
Chicken of the Sea and Bumble Bee – jointly submitted comments on the new
requirement for captains' certifications from vessels not using purse seine
nets, saying that such certificates will not be credible.
18. Under the original Tuna Measure, for tuna
caught by large purse seine vessels in the ETP only, tuna caught in sets
designated as dolphin‑safe by the vessel observer must be stored separately
from tuna caught in non‑dolphin‑safe sets from the time of capture through
unloading at port. For tuna caught outside the ETP, there were no such
requirements. Under the Amended Tuna Measure, similar requirements for
segregating purportedly now apply to all tuna and tuna products. However,
because of the absence of monitoring, verification, and tracking requirements
for non‑ETP tuna products, the separation-of-tuna obligations for non‑ETP tuna
are unenforceable and meaningless.
19. For tuna caught by large
purse seine vessels in the ETP, including vessels of the Mexican fleet, the
original Tuna Measure requires an independent observer on every vessel to
monitor compliance with dolphin‑safe requirements. The AIDCP requires that
every large purse seine vessel carry an independent observer, and Mexico has
implemented that requirement in its domestic regulations
(NOM-001-SAG/PESC-2013).
20. Under the Tuna Measure, no
requirements for independent observers were imposed other than for large purse
seine vessels fishing in the ETP. The 2013 Final Rule appears to create the
possibility that the USDOC could require independent observer verification of dolphin‑safe
certifications. However, the USDOC has neither made a determination that
observers participating in any non‑ETP observer program are so qualified and
authorized, nor has it announced plans to even consider doing so.
21. Under the original Tuna
Measure, tuna products containing tuna harvested in the ETP have to be
supported not only by the required certification, but also by "the
documentation requirements for dolphin‑safe tuna under § 216.92 and 216.93".
These requirements have been maintained under the Amended Tuna Measure. There
are no documentation requirements, other than a captain's self-certification,
for other tuna products.
22. For U.S. tuna products,
section 216.93 establishes a "tracking and verification program" for
large U.S. purse seine vessels fishing in the ETP (but not elsewhere)
which is designed to be consistent with the AIDCP. U.S. statistics indicate that in 2013 tuna from the ETP constituted
about one percent of the tuna used to make tuna products in U.S. canneries.
Accordingly, the requirement for ETP tuna tracking forms imposes extremely
little, if any, burden on the U.S. processing industry.
23. Compliance with the AIDCP
brings with it strict obligations to comply with the tuna tracking system of
the AIDCP – the same tracking system that the U.S. regulations implement
for U.S. vessels through section 216.93(a). The rules for tracking dolphin‑safe tuna are very detailed and
comprehensive, and apply from the moment of capture of the tuna all the way
through unloading of the tuna, and then to the processing and marketing of the
tuna products containing that tuna. Mexico implemented
the AIDCP tuna tracking requirements through the regulation
NOM-EM-002-PESC-1999, which was issued in December 1999 and subsequently updated
through NOM-001-SAG/PESC-2013. The United States has verified Mexico's
compliance with the AIDCP continuously since 2000.
24. For Mexican tuna products to
be eligible for the dolphin‑safe label under the Amended Tuna Measure: the tuna
must be certified as having being been caught without killing or seriously
injuring a dolphin in the set in which the tuna was caught and that dolphin
sets have not been used during the entire voyage in which the tuna was caught;
an independent observer must verify that the certification is accurate; and the
certification must be supported by the above-described extensive tracking
system, which is audited by the Mexican government.
25. There are no documentation
requirements for any type of non‑ETP tuna products other than the captain's
self-certification.
C. The Hogarth Ruling
26. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has the effect of permanently denying Mexican tuna products the benefit
of the "dolphin‑safe" label in the U.S. marketplace, and this
ruling remains an integral element of the Amended Tuna Measure.
D. The 2013 Final Rule
27. The United States did
not modify the DPCIA. The
revised regulations made only a few changes to the prior regulations. An
important feature of the new regulations is that they delayed implementation of
the changes. In effect, therefore, the United States unilaterally granted
itself a further extension to the RPT by not enforcing the measure that it has
introduced for the purpose of bringing itself into compliance. The captains'
certifications are not publically available, and there is no transparency
regarding how non‑ETP vessels and processors verify compliance. A key aspect of
the Amended Tuna Measure is that, for tuna caught outside the ETP, the United States
still allows the use of the dolphin‑safe label when dolphins were killed and
seriously injured, and even when nets were set around dolphins.
III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE GLOBAL TUNA INDUSTRY, ALTERNATIVE
FISHING METHODS, AND STATUS OF DOLPHIN POPULATIONS IN the ETP
28. Dolphin mortalities are a
significant problem outside the ETP. Fishers set nets on dolphins outside the
ETP, and fishing methods other than the dolphin set method kill and seriously
injure dolphins. Moreover, outside the ETP, tuna is frequently brokered through
intermediaries and there are no mandatory procedures for tracking the dolphin‑safe
status of tuna. Meanwhile, the latest evidence indicates that the dolphin
stocks in the ETP that the United States designated as "depleted"
are actually growing at their maximum expected rates, contrary to what the United States
believed in 2002, when the Department of Commerce made its "Final Findings."
A. Fishers
Set Nets on Dolphins Outside the ETP, and Other Fishing Methods Kill and
Seriously Injure Dolphins
29. During the original
proceedings, the Panel found that there were associations between dolphins and
tuna outside the ETP, and that methods of fishing other than dolphin sets cause
dolphin mortalities. Mexico has collected substantial additional evidence showing
that (i) tuna fishers intentionally set nets on marine mammals outside the ETP,
and (ii) other methods of fishing for tuna are causing many thousands of
dolphin mortalities.
1. Fishers
Intentionally Set Purse Seine Nets on Marine Mammals outside the ETP
30. There has been a widely
repeated claim that the association between dolphins and tuna in the ETP is "unique",
and that dolphin sets rarely occur elsewhere. The evidence demonstrates
otherwise.
31. An Administrative Report of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) states that "an
obvious problem with concluding … that incidental mortality of dolphins in tuna
purse-seines outside the ETP is minimal is that many of the existing reports
have been produced by groups with vested interests in one or another viewpoint:
groups related to commercial fishing interests will obviously hope to find
little evidence of tuna-dolphin problems similar those occurring in the ETP …".
32. More recently, the
Secretariat of the Pacific has published an evaluation of the impact of the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) fishery on cetaceans. No data have
been made publicly available on the overall interaction of this fishery with
marine mammals. Nonetheless, the key point is that observers witnessed dolphin
and whale sets being made, indicating that there is an association between tuna
and marine mammals in the WCPO. Accordingly, there are good reasons to believe
that these figures are significantly underestimated.
33. Other sources confirm that
nets are intentionally set on marine mammals in the WCPO. In 2012, the WCPFC
adopted a measure to protect whale sharks. In April 2013, Australia and the
Maldives presented a proposal to the IOTC to adopt a measure to protect whale
sharks.
34. The fact that vessels claim
to fish only on FADs does not mean that dolphins are not being harmed. For
example, a report on bycatch of dolphins sponsored by the USDOC states "[i]n
the Philippines, scientists estimated that about 2,000 dolphins—primarily
spinner, pan-tropical spotted, and Fraser's—were being killed each year,
probably at unsustainable levels, by a fleet of five tuna purse-seiners using
fish-aggregating devices".
35. A recent enforcement action taken by the USDOC against U.S. vessels
further validates that fishers intentionally set nets on dolphins in the WCPO.
The case at issue, entitled In the Matter of Matthew
James Freitas, et al. ("Freitas case"), involved five
U.S.-flagged vessels that fish in the WCPO with FADs, and all of which are
managed by the South Pacific Tuna Corporation
(SPTC). Two of the vessels were penalized for setting
purse seine nets on marine mammals, in violation of the U.S. MMPA.
Although the Freitas case refers to the animals as "whales", it also
provides details that the animals were pilot whales and false killer whales,
which are species of dolphin.
2. Gillnet
Fishing Kills and Injures Dolphins
36. As explained by the
Fisheries and Aquaculture Department of the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), drifting gillnets are used to catch tuna. In 2004-2005, the
Central Marine Fisheries Institute in India conducted a study to quantify the
number of cetaceans incidentally caught as by-catch by local fishers. The study
concluded that such fishing operations could be killing about 10,000 cetaceans
including dolphins every year, which it considered "alarmingly high."
37. A report prepared for the
IOTC in 2012 on the gillnet tuna fishery in the coastal waters of Pakistan
included the following information "[d]olphins seem to be more frequent in
getting entangled in tuna gillnets … According to fishermen, most of dolphins
entangled in gillnet die immediately … Although it is not possible to
accurately estimate the number of dolphins killed every year in tuna gillnet
fisheries of Pakistan but based on limited information collected recently
(Moazzam, 2012) it is estimated that 25- 35 dolphins are killed every month."
38. There have also been reports
of substantial dolphin bycatch in tuna gillnet fishing operations in Europe.
3. Longline
Fishing Kills and Injures Dolphins
39. The association between
dolphins and longline fishing is well-established. In the past, analyses of
this issue tended to focus on negative effects on fishing caused by "depredation"
– i.e., the consuming by marine mammals of both bait and target fish on
longline hooks – but it is now widely recognized that dolphins are severely
harmed by such interactions.
40. A recent study summarized
that "[o]perational interactions between odontocetes [cetaceans in the suborder
Odontoceti or "toothed whales", it includes all species of dolphins
and porpoises] and the longline industry is a global problem." Another
recent study examined the whale and dolphin species involved in pelagic
longline depredation in the tropical and subtropical waters of the western
Indian Ocean. The report draws a connection between where these species are
found and where pelagic longline fishing areas exist in the Indian Ocean. Other
reports confirm that dolphins are attracted to longline fishing operations.
41. Unfortunately, there are no
comprehensive programs to monitor the harm caused to dolphins by longline
fishing. Difficulties also arise from the fact that the lines can be as long as
90 miles in length, which would impair the ability of observers to see the
deaths and injuries as they are occurring. There is no doubt, however, that
longline fishing operations kill and maim dolphins.
42. The United States
itself has designated the longline tuna fishery in the area of the U.S. State
of Hawaii as threatening the population of false killer whales (a species of
dolphin) in that region, which are classified as "endangered" and "depleted".
Yet this tuna is eligible for a dolphin‑safe label. The United States has
also designated the "Atlantic pelagic longline fishery" as a fishery
harmful to marine mammals that requires a "take reduction plan". The United States
does not maintain a comprehensive observer program for its longline fleet
operating off the U.S. coast in the Atlantic; the coverage is only eight
percent.
43. A report published by the
Sea Turtle Restoration Project on longline fishing estimates that over 18,000
dolphins are killed annually by longline fishing in the Pacific Ocean. The
report bases its estimate on an extrapolation of data from the Hawaii longline
fishery. The report cautions that the number is likely underestimated.
44. Another report discusses the damage to dolphin's dorsal fins
caused by longline fishing. Longlines
also get tangled on dolphins' tails. Thus, even when dolphins do not
immediately die from an interaction with a longline, they are at risk to suffer
from maiming of their mouths, dorsal fins and other body parts, as well as from
eventual drowning when they cannot free themselves from the lines.
45. Mexican longline vessels fishing in the Gulf of Mexico for tuna are
subject to comprehensive regulations (NOM-023-SAG/PESCA-2014) that require an
independent observer on every vessel to monitor fishing practices. To Mexico's
knowledge, it is the only country that requires 100 percent observer coverage
of its longline vessels; the United States has no such regulation.
4. Trawl Fishing Kills and Injures Dolphins
46. Dolphins are regularly
captured in trawl nets. For example, a report included in a 2004 study prepared for the United Kingdom's
House of Commons stated "an Irish study of a trial pelagic pair trawl
fishery for albacore tuna observed 30 dolphins being caught in a single haul,
with 145 cetaceans caught by just four pairs of trawlers in a single
season."
47. Clearly dolphins and other
marine mammals are at grave risk in tuna fisheries outside the ETP and from
fishing methods other than dolphin sets, yet the United States has done
nothing to discourage American consumers from purchasing such tuna.
B. Tracking Procedures for Dolphin-Safe Tuna
48. To understand both the
complexity and necessity of a tracking system for dolphin‑safe tuna, it is
crucial to review how tuna is sourced, handled and tracked during the
manufacturing process.
49. The major Mexican producers
are vertically integrated. Specifically, they have their own fishing fleets,
which deliver tuna to their processing facilities within Mexico. Thus, the
chain of ownership over the tuna caught by the Mexican fleet is maintained from
the time of harvesting through the processing of the tuna into tuna products
and the eventual marketing of the tuna products.
50. Outside the ETP, because of
the extensive use of intermediaries (brokers), it would be difficult to trace
the dolphin‑safe status of tuna even if there were enforceable requirements to
do so outside the ETP. There are no verifiable procedures or requirements for
such tracking for non‑ETP vessels and non‑ETP tuna processors.
51. Unlike the Mexican industry,
most major tuna products companies in other countries are not vertically
integrated. They purchase tuna from third party companies, and in many cases
the tuna has passed through at least two parties before it is processed.
52. For both longline and purse
seine fishing, an important role is played by refrigerated fish carriers, who
consolidate the catch of multiple fishing vessels. Some of these are believed
to be engaged in transshipment at sea. Transshipment at sea can be particularly
vulnerable to "tuna laundering," where "black boats" may
conduct illegal, unauthorized and unrestricted (IUU) fishing and then transfer
their catch to licensed vessels to transship. It has been indicated that
observers likely cannot detect IUU fishing and fish laundering.
53. Importantly, the reporting
required for transshipments does not address the U.S. dolphin‑safe
requirements. There are no authorities with responsibility to monitor whether
captains' certificates match to a particular lot of tuna, or whether that tuna
has been mixed with uncertified tuna in a storage well.
54. Where the vessels have not
caught the tuna in the ETP, there is no requirement for dolphin‑safe tuna
tracking, no TTF forms, and no means to verify the accuracy of the information
about how the tuna was caught and whether or not dolphins were killed or
seriously injured during the capture of the tuna. Except for tuna caught in the
ETP, there is no procedure through which the USDOC can verify – or rely on
another country to verify – that a tuna product represented to contain dolphin‑safe
tuna actually does so. Other than the AIDCP the United States has no
international agreements obligating other countries to enforce or verify
compliance with dolphin‑safe standards. Other than in the ETP, there is no way
to determine whether a captain's claim not to have set nets around dolphins
during an entire voyage is accurate, whether a claim that no dolphins were
killed or seriously injured in a particular set in which the tuna was caught is
accurate, whether tuna caught in a dolphin‑safe set has been kept segregated
from tuna caught in a non‑dolphin‑safe set, or even whether a certification
accompanying imported tuna products matches up correctly to the vessel and
voyage that caught the tuna.
55. Because of the absence of
controls and tracking mechanisms for non‑ETP vessels, tuna processors outside
of Mexico in other countries cannot verify (let alone segregate and track) dolphin‑safe
tuna after they receive it.
56. The U.S. MMPA,
independent of the Amended Tuna Measure, requires U.S. vessels to report
the "taking" of marine mammals outside the ETP. However, in the
absence of independent observers to monitor compliance, the effectiveness of
that requirement is questionable.
57. Testimony in the recent
enforcement action in the Freitas case, further validates that without
independent observers, a captain's certificate is unreliable. Thus, it is
impossible for those vessels to comply with the Amended Tuna Measure's
requirement that tuna caught in a set that harms dolphins be segregated from
tuna caught in dolphin‑safe sets. It is important to
emphasize that the Freitas case involved U.S.-flagged vessels. Foreign-flagged
vessels are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction and have even less incentive
to comply with the Amended Tuna Measure.
58. The two canneries in
American Samoa apparently receive at least some tuna directly offloaded from
the vessels that caught the tuna, and in such cases could verify that a captain's
statement matched the vessel. However, there is no tuna tracking system for
such tuna, so there is no other documentation available to verify that the tuna
was caught in dolphin‑safe sets, or kept separate from non‑dolphin‑safe tuna.
Other U.S. canneries (in California and in Georgia) import tuna loins from
Thailand, not whole fish. Because the tuna from which those loins were made
were landed, skinned and boned in another country, it would be even more
difficult to track them to a specific vessel, voyage and storage well – if any
effort were being made to do so.
59. Virtually no ETP tuna is
used by U.S. processors and ETP tuna products have a very small share of
the U.S. market. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of tuna products
sold in the U.S. market as "dolphin‑safe" lack documentation of
compliance from any moment earlier than import into the United States.
C. Status
of Dolphin Populations in the ETP
60. The AIDCP regime remains
extremely effective. The incidental mortality of dolphins in the ETP tuna
fishery in 2012 was only 870 animals, an 11.8 percent decrease from the 986 mortalities
recorded in 2011. As was addressed in the original proceedings, the primary
excuse of the United States for refusing to change the definition of "dolphin‑safe"
to conform to the AIDCP was that the populations of the two dolphin stocks it
considers to be "depleted" were not recovering at a rate the United States
considered acceptable. In 2009, however, the United States agreed with
AIDCP to increase the DMLs for these two dolphin stocks, reflecting the more
recent evidence that the populations of the stocks are, in fact, growing.
61. Under
the Amended Tuna Measure, the USDOC lacks authority to evaluate any evidence regarding dolphin
stocks and their recovery, including the evidence referred to above, which has
become available since its Final Finding was published in 2002.
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. The Panel Must Rule on all of
Mexico's Violation Claims
62. In order to resolve this dispute, it
is necessary for the Panel to rule on all of Mexico's claims under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement and Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. The
scope and content of the obligations under these provisions are not the same. If the Panel does not make all of the necessary findings under
Mexico's three claims, there would only be a partial resolution of the dispute.
B. The
Amended Tuna Measure is Inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
63. For a violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the following elements must be satisfied: (i) the measure at issue must be a "technical
regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1; (ii) the imported
products at issue must be like the domestic product and the products of other
origins; and (iii) the treatment accorded to imported products must be less
favourable than that accorded to like domestic products and to like products originating in
other countries.
64. The Amended Tuna Measure fulfills each of the three criteria
of the legal test under Annex 1.1 the TBT Agreement, and therefore
continues to qualify as a "technical regulation". Also, the relevant
imported products at issue –
i.e., tuna products from Mexico – continue to be "like" tuna products
of U.S. origin and tuna products originating in any other country. The
remaining aspect to be considered is whether the Amended Tuna Measure accords to imported
products less favourable treatment.
1. Treatment no Less Favourable
65. The
key elements of the design and structure of the measure that operated together
to deny competitive opportunities were set out in the provisions of the DPCIA
that govern dolphin‑safe labeling. These elements remain integral components of
the Amended Tuna Measure and have not been changed.
66. The
features of the relevant market remain unchanged. U.S. retailers and
consumers are sensitive to the dolphin‑safe issue, and tuna products labeled "dolphin‑safe"
have an advantage in the marketplace. Major U.S. grocery chains continue
to refuse to buy Mexican tuna products because they are unable to sell the
brand that does not have the dolphin‑safe label.
67. The
situation of Mexican tuna producers continues without any material changes from
the situation they had during the original proceedings. The U.S. tuna
fleet continues not to fish in the ETP. Thus, most tuna caught by Mexican
vessels would not be eligible for inclusion in a dolphin‑safe product under the
U.S. dolphin‑safe labelling provisions, while virtually all tuna caught by
U.S. vessels is potentially eligible for the label. During 2013,
approximately 86 percent of the tuna used by U.S. canners was caught in
the Western Pacific. U.S. canners obtained only about one percent of their
supply from the ETP. Thus, U.S. canneries used virtually no tuna caught in
the ETP.
68. Nothing
in the Amended Tuna Measure reduces or minimizes the detrimental impact on
imported Mexican tuna products. Accordingly, it is clear that the operation of
the Amended Tuna Measure in the relevant market has a de facto
detrimental impact on the group of like imported products.
69. Based on the two-step approach
established by the Appellate Body in US – Tuna II (Mexico),
the Panel must analyze whether the above-noted detrimental impact on imports
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction rather than
reflecting discrimination against the group of imported products.
70. The
relevant regulatory distinction (i.e., the difference in labeling conditions
and requirements) includes the following conditions and requirements of the
Amended Tuna Measure: (i) the disqualification of setting on dolphins in
accordance with the AIDCP as a fishing method that can be used to catch tuna in
the ETP in a dolphin‑safe manner and the qualification of other fishing methods
to catch tuna in a dolphin‑safe manner; (ii) the record-keeping and
verification requirements for tuna caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins in
accordance with the AIDCP and the different requirements for tuna caught
outside the ETP using both the same and different fishing methods; and (iii)
the mandatory independent observer requirements for tuna caught in the ETP by
setting on dolphins in accordance with the AIDCP and the absence of such
requirements for tuna caught outside the ETP using the same and different
fishing methods.
71. When
the facts and circumstances related to the design and application of these
conditions and requirements are examined, it is clear that the detrimental
impact on imports of Mexican tuna products does not stem exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction. Rather, the detrimental impact reflects
discrimination against the group of imported products.
(1) The Differences in Labelling Conditions and Requirements are Not
Legitimate
72. In
the original dispute, the Appellate Body concluded that the United States
had not demonstrated that the difference in labelling conditions was "calibrated"
to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different
areas of the ocean. It followed from this that the United States had not
demonstrated that the detrimental impact of the U.S. measure on Mexican
tuna products stemmed exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. The
Appellate Body also observed that the U.S. measure fully addressed the
adverse effects on dolphins resulting from setting on dolphins in the ETP,
whereas it did not address mortality (observed or unobserved) arising from fishing
methods other than setting on dolphins outside the ETP.
(a) Disqualification/Qualification of Fishing
Methods
73. Under
the Amended Tuna Measure, the labeling conditions and requirements differ
depending on the fishing method used to catch tuna. Setting on dolphins is a
fishing method that is permanently "disqualified" from being
used to catch dolphin‑safe tuna, even if the utilization of this method
complies with the stringent AIDCP requirements and there are no dolphin
mortalities or serious injuries in the set in which the tuna is caught, as
confirmed by an independent on-board observer and certified under the
comprehensive tracking and verification system established by the AIDCP and
Mexican law.
74. The
situation is different for the fishing methods used to catch tuna outside the
ETP. With the exception of driftnet fishing for tuna on the high seas by the
Italian fleet, all of the other tuna fishing methods (including other driftnet
fishing) are qualified to be used to catch tuna in a dolphin‑safe manner, even
though it is well documented that these methods cause substantial dolphin
mortalities and serious injuries.
75. The
facts and circumstances related to the design and the application of the
measure at issue clearly establish that the regulatory distinction, i.e., the
difference in these labeling conditions and requirements, is not even-handed.
As a consequence, under the approaches of both the Appellate Body and the Panel
in EC – Seal Products, the detrimental
impact on Mexican imports does not stem exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction.
76. The
regulatory distinction is not legitimate because it is not rationally connected
to the objective of the measure. The objectives of the original Tuna Measure
were: (i) "ensuring that consumers are not misled or deceived about
whether tuna products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely
affects dolphins"; and (ii) "contributing to the protection of
dolphins, by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing
fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins". The
Amended Tuna Measure maintains the same objectives. The "qualified"
tuna fishing methods have substantial adverse effects on dolphins and pose
substantial risks for dolphins, therefore, their qualification for use in
catching "dolphin‑safe" tuna is inconsistent with the objectives of
the Amended Tuna Measure. The "disqualification" of Mexico's
principal fishing method and the "qualification" of other alternative
fishing methods do not bear a rational connection to the objectives of the
Amended Tuna Measure. There are no reasons extraneous to the objective of
dolphin protection that provide a cause or rationale to justify allowing tuna
caught by these fishing methods to be designated as "dolphin‑safe".
The distinction in labelling conditions and requirements relating to the
disqualification/qualification of fishing methods is designed and applied in a
manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, such that it
lacks even-handedness.
(b) Record-keeping and Verification Requirements
77. The
relevant regulatory distinction includes record-keeping and verification
requirements. These are important because the fundamental character of the
Amended Tuna Measure is the distinction between tuna products that are
and are not dolphin‑safe under the U.S. definition. Consistent with
this fundamental character, and in order to achieve the objectives of the
Amended Tuna Measure, accurate information must be provided to consumers
on whether the tuna contained in a tuna product is caught in a manner that
adversely affects dolphins. It is only through the provision of accurate
information that the label can be made available exclusively to products
containing tuna that was not caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins.
78. Under
the Amended Tuna Measure, the record-keeping and verification requirements
differ depending on the geographic area in which the tuna are caught.
79. Strict
record-keeping and verification requirements and procedures are applied to tuna
caught in the ETP which provide a meticulous audit trail which ensures that the
information provided on the dolphin‑safe status of Mexican tuna under the U.S. definition
of dolphin‑safe is accurate. In stark contrast, similar requirements and
procedures are not applied to tuna that is caught in other geographic areas
outside the ETP. The route taken by this tuna to U.S consumers is more complex
than the route taken by Mexican tuna, and there are many actions that could occur
during a fishing voyage and in the downstream processing and distribution chain
that could eliminate the dolphin‑safe status of such tuna. As a consequence,
accurate information is not being provided. The difference in
record-keeping and verification requirements for tuna caught inside and outside
the ETP does not bear a rational connection to the objectives of the Amended
Tuna Measure. Inside the ETP the requirements are comprehensive and the
information accurate. Outside the ETP, the requirements are unreliable and do
not provide accurate information on the dolphin‑safe status of the tuna
products comprising this tuna. Thus, U.S. consumers are not receiving
accurate information on such tuna products and could be misled or deceived or
could encourage fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins. . There are no reasons extraneous to the objective of dolphin
protection that provide a cause or rationale for providing inaccurate
information on the dolphin‑safe status of tuna that is caught outside the ETP,
while only providing accurate information for tuna that is caught within the
ETP. All dolphin‑safe tuna should be accurately labeled. Under the Amended Tuna
Measure, differences in record-keeping and verification requirements are
designed and applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination, such that it lacks even-handedness.
(c) Mandatory Independent Observer Requirements
80. Mexico
addresses the mandatory independent observer requirement separately because of
its fundamental importance to the designation of tuna as dolphin‑safe at the
time of capture. Notwithstanding the fact that none of the tuna that is caught
using "qualified" fishing methods can be accurately designated as dolphin‑safe,
it will not matter if a comprehensive and meticulous audit trail is implemented
downstream to the U.S. consumer if the initial dolphin‑safe designation is
inaccurate. The entire audit trail will be tainted.
81. Observers
who are independent, specially trained, and approved by the AIDCP are mandated
for tuna fishing in the ETP, and they ensure the accuracy of information
concerning the dolphin‑safe status of tuna caught in the ETP. Outside of the
ETP, there is no requirement for independent observers. Instead, under the
Amended Tuna Measure, the dolphin‑safe status of tuna is based solely on
self-certification by the captain in charge of the fishing vessel. Such
self-certification is meaningless. Captains of vessels are not qualified to
make dolphin‑safe determinations and, even if they were qualified, their
certifications are inherently unreliable. While the measure contemplates the
possibility of observers being used outside the ETP in certain circumstances,
this is meaningless because the USDOC has made no determination that the
circumstances are met, i.e., that observers are qualified and authorized in non‑ETP
fisheries.
82. The
difference in the treatment of independent observers inside and outside the ETP
is not rationally connected to the objective of the measure. Captain
self-certification for tuna caught outside the ETP does not provide reliable or
accurate information on the dolphin‑safe status of the tuna products comprising
this tuna. As a consequence, the initial designation of the dolphin‑safe status
of tuna caught outside the ETP is unreliable and inaccurate. This taints all
subsequent stages in the audit trail up to the U.S. consumer. Thus, U.S. consumers
are receiving unreliable and inaccurate information on such tuna products, and
they could be misled or deceived, or could unknowingly be supporting or
encouraging fishing fleets to catch tuna in a manner that adversely affects
dolphins. There are no reasons extraneous to the objective of dolphin
protection that provide a cause or rationale that can justify providing U.S. consumers
with reliable and accurate information for tuna that is caught within the ETP,
while providing them with unreliable and inaccurate information for tuna that
is caught outside the ETP. The differences in the treatment of independent
observers inside and outside the ETP are designed and applied in a manner that
constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, such that it lacks
even-handedness.
C. The Amended Tuna Measure is Inconsistent with Article I:1 of
the GATT 1994
83. In the circumstances of this
dispute, to determine whether there is a violation of Article I:1,
three questions must be answered: (i) are the imported products concerned "like"
products; (ii) does the measure at issue confer an advantage, favour or
privilege on products originating in any other country; and (iii) was the
advantage, favour or privilege granted "immediately and unconditionally"
to the like product originating in the territories of all other Members?
84. For the same reasons set out above for Mexico's claim under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, the imported products at
issue are "like" domestic tuna products within the meaning of Article I:1
of the GATT 1994.
85. The Amended Tuna Measure confers an advantage, within the meaning of Article I:1
of the GATT 1994, to tuna products of U.S. origin and tuna products
originating in countries other than Mexico. The advantage granted by the Amended Tuna Measure is the authorization to
use "dolphin‑safe" labelling in the United States on tuna
products. This advantage is granted only to tuna products containing tuna that
meets the applicable conditions and requirements set out under the implementing
regulations of the Amended Tuna Measure. The Amended Tuna Measure therefore
affects "the internal sale, offering for sale, [and] purchase" of
tuna products in the United States. This advantage is made available to
tuna products originating in other countries, including Thailand and the
Philippines, who are the largest sources of imported tuna products into the United States.
86. The "advantage" of access to the dolphin‑safe label is not
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like tuna products originating
in the territories of all other WTO Members, namely Mexico. The Panel and
Appellate Body found that most tuna caught by Mexican vessels, being caught in
the ETP by setting on dolphins, would not be eligible for inclusion in a dolphin‑safe
product under the US dolphin‑safe labelling provisions. This continues to be
the case.
D. The Amended Tuna Measure
is Inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
87. The Amended Tuna Measure accords Mexican tuna products treatment less favourable than that accorded to U.S. tuna products in a manner that is inconsistent
with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body has made
clear that the scope and content of the provisions of Article III:4 and Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement are different. Accordingly, the Panel's decision on
Mexico's claim under Article 2.1 will not necessarily resolve Mexico's Article III:4
claim, and it is therefore crucial that the Panel make findings on the Article III:4
claim.
88. The Appellate Body explained
that a Member's measure is inconsistent with Article III:4 if three
elements are met: (i) the imported and domestic products at issue are "like
products"; (ii) the measure at issue is a law, regulation or requirement
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution, or use; and (iii) the imported products are accorded "less favourable"
treatment than that accorded to like domestic products.
89. For the same reasons set out above for Mexico's claim under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, the imported products at
issue are "like" domestic tuna products within the meaning of Article III:4
of the GATT 1994.
90. The Amended Tuna Measure, which comprises a group of laws
and regulations that set out the dolphin‑safe labeling requirements, pertains
to the category of "laws, regulations and requirements".
91. The Amended Tuna Measure clearly "affects" the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase and distribution of tuna products. As found by the
Panel and the Appellate Body, access to the "dolphin‑safe" label
constitutes an "advantage" on the US market; lack of access to the "dolphin‑safe"
label has a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities in the U.S. market;
and government intervention, in the form of adoption and application of the U.S. "dolphin‑safe"
labelling provisions, affects the conditions under which like goods, both
domestic and imported, compete in the market within a Member's territory.
92. Also,
Article III:4 stipulates that WTO Members shall accord imported products "treatment
no less favourable" than the treatment accorded to like products of
national origin. As explained above, the Appellate Body found that access to
the "dolphin‑safe" label constitutes an "advantage" on the
US market, lack of access to the "dolphin‑safe" label has a
detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities in the US market, and
government intervention, in the form of adoption and application of the US "dolphin‑safe"
labelling provisions, affects the conditions under which like goods, domestic
and imported, compete in the market within a Member's territory. Moreover, the
Panel and Appellate Body found that most tuna caught by Mexican vessels, being
caught in the ETP by setting on dolphins, would not be eligible for inclusion
in a dolphin‑safe product under the US dolphin‑safe labelling provisions, while
most tuna caught by US vessels is potentially eligible for the label. This
continues to be the case.
V. CONCLUSION
93. On the basis of the foregoing, Mexico respectfully requests that the
Panel find that the United States has failed to comply with the
recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB on the basis that the Amended Tuna Measure remains inconsistent with Articles
2.1 of the TBT Agreement, Article I:1 and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
·
ANNEX B-2
executive
summary of the second written submission of mexico
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this submission, Mexico responds
to the arguments raised by the United States and further supplements the
legal and factual basis for its claims that the Amended Tuna Measure is
inconsistent with Articles 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994
and, in the case of the violations of the GATT 1994, cannot be saved by
the general exceptions in Article XX.
2. Mexican tuna products continue to be denied the dolphin-safe label,
while tuna products from tuna fisheries other than the ETP can be easily
labelled dolphin-safe when supported only by an unverified copy of a simple
statement from a ship's captain claiming that the tuna is dolphin‑safe, with no
comparable tracking requirements to verify the source of the tuna and its
dolphin-safe status, and without accounting for the substantial adverse impact
that the fishing methods used to catch the tuna have on dolphins in non-ETP
fisheries. The balance of competitive opportunities between Mexican tuna
products and like products from the United States and other countries is
being upset on the premise that these other products are dolphin-safe when, in
fact, this status cannot be proven. As a consequence, it is highly likely that
tuna products containing tuna caught outside the ETP under circumstances
causing adverse effects to dolphins are entering the U.S. market
inaccurately labeled as dolphin-safe.
3. The United States has
mischaracterized and disregarded Mexico's arguments and evidence. For example, throughout its submission, the United States repeatedly states
that "setting on dolphins is particularly harmful
to dolphins" (italics original), citing paragraph 289 of the Appellate
Body Report. This statement mischaracterizes the Appellate Body's statement and
quotes it out of context.
II. RESPONSE
TO U.S. DESCRIPTION OF THE RELEVANT FACTS
4. The United States argues that tuna
imported from non-ETP locations is unlikely to be non-dolphin-safe because some
of the examples Mexico provided related to fishing in the waters of countries
that export relatively little tuna to the United States, such as India and
Sri Lanka. In support of this argument, the United States relies on
customs import statistics and a confidential database of data on vessel flags
and gear types purportedly derived from Form 370s and information reported by U.S. canneries
when receiving tuna from U.S.-flag vessels. The United States also claims
that Mexico has not identified any evidence of dolphin mortalities caused by
vessels of the nations that are the principal exporters of tuna products to the
United States.
5. In particular, the United States
asserts that vessels flagged to Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Ecuador,
Indonesia and the United States catch the tuna contained in over 96
percent of the U.S. market for canned tuna. In support of this statement,
the United States cites statistics on imports of canned and pouched tuna
products. But the processing of whole tuna into loins (which are then
packed into canned or pouched tuna products) is considered under U.S. law
to be a "substantial transformation" that changes the country of
origin of the fish to the country where the processing takes place. Accordingly,
the country of origin of a tuna product is the country in which the processing
took place, not the country of the vessel that caught the tuna. The fact that
tuna products have Thai origin, therefore, provides no indication of which
nation's vessels caught the tuna. This is verified by the fact that Thailand's
tuna fishing fleet is capable of providing only an extremely small portion of
the tuna used in Thai-processed tuna products. Thailand imports 800,000 to
900,000 tons of frozen tuna annually to supply its canning industry, and that
the leading sources are Taiwan, the United States, South Korea, Vanuatu,
Japan, and ASEAN countries. Further, it is undisputed that as Mexico previously
demonstrated, tuna processors in Thailand obtain 80 percent of their supply
from tuna trading companies, who (i) purchase tuna from third parties and (ii)
regularly consolidate catches of tuna from different vessels on carrier ships,
making it especially difficult, if not impossible, to trace the original
sources of the tuna.
6. The problem of accuracy is not limited to
Thailand. IUU fishing is a global phenomenon. For example, the European Union
recently issued warnings to a number of countries, including South Korea and
Vanuatu (both major suppliers to Thailand) about their failure to keep up with
international obligations to fight illegal fishing.
7. Thus, the claim of the United States
that all Thai-origin tuna products contain tuna caught by Thai-flagged vessels
is self-evidently and blatantly incorrect. The United States lacks
information on the sources of the tuna used in Thai tuna products, as well as
in tuna products imported from other countries that are not members of the
AIDCP, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The lack of such
information extends to tuna loins imported from Thailand for use in the U.S. canneries
of Bumblebee and Chicken of the Sea, as the origin of the loins would be
reported as Thai even though the tuna was caught, for example, by a Taiwanese-
or Sri Lankan-flagged vessel. This blatant inaccuracy in the U.S. information
calls into doubt much, if not all, of the U.S. data on the sources of tuna
in non-ETP tuna products and the gear types used to capture that tuna.
8. Mexico has previously established that many
dolphins have been killed in the WCPO by vessels fishing for tuna with purse
seine nets. In addition, Mexico has established that other fishing methods that
are used globally, especially longline fishing, gillnet fishing and trawl
fishing, are highly destructive to dolphins, with both direct and indirect
effects.
9. In particular, Mexico has established that
U.S.-flag vessels set purse seine nets on dolphins in the WCPO without
self-reporting such events, and that U.S. longline vessels kill and injure
dolphins, both in the area of Hawaii and in the Atlantic.
10. According to a report on Vietnam presented to
the WCPFC, Vietnam's fleet fishes for tuna using longlines, purse seine nets,
gillnets and hand lines; Vietnam lacks a reliable count of its tuna fishing
vessels; Vietnam lacks a reliable method to track the quantity of tuna
landings; and Vietnam has not established an observer program. In addition,
Mexico submitted evidence that Philippine tuna purse seine vessels have killed
thousands of dolphins, that Philippine fishers use gillnets to catch dolphins,
and that Philippine "group seine operations" are eligible for
exemption from the WCPFC's general prohibition on transshipments at sea. Taiwan has by far the largest tuna fishing fleet in
the WCPO, and is the largest supplier of tuna to Thailand and other countries. Mexico
has established that Taiwanese vessels use gillnets to catch tuna, and that the
Taiwanese longline fleet kills dolphins.
11. The evidence clearly demonstrates that there
are significant risks to dolphins in tuna fisheries outside the ETP, resulting
from the use of a number of different fishing methods. The United States
has not explained why these other fishing methods – including the use of purse
seine nets outside the ETP, longlines, gillnets, trawls and high seas driftnets
– should be considered to be inherently dolphin-safe. As Mexico described in
its first written submission, the association of tuna and dolphins has been
observed and documented in ocean regions other than the ETP. The fact that
thousands of dolphins are being killed in purse seine nets outside the ETP
suggests that vessels are regularly intentionally setting on dolphins outside
the ETP, even when claiming to be FAD fishing. On the other hand, if the
thousands of dolphins are being killed because of "accidents", as the
United States alleges, the association between dolphins and purse seine fishing
outside the ETP must be especially strong.
12. Longline fishing attracts dolphins – which
are drawn to the bait on the hooks – meaning that dolphins "associate"
with longline fishing. Mexico also has shown that even when dolphins do not die
immediately from an interaction with longlines, they are at risk of serious
mutilation and other harm. Mexico also
has established that gillnet fishing kills hundreds of thousands of dolphins
annually, and that this fishing method is used by some of the nations that are
the largest suppliers of the tuna used in the production of tuna products. Mexico
also has shown that trawl fishing kills and injures dolphins.
13. The United States claims that a captain's
self-certification is sufficient to verify compliance with the requirements for
dolphin-safe tuna products. But the record-keeping and inspections at
processing facilities – which is only required for processing facilities in the
United States and in the ETP, but not elsewhere – cannot improve the
accuracy of captains' certificates. Nor can certifications by importers and
exporters, who of course are not present on the vessels when the tuna are
caught. In fact, the U.S. assertion that captain statements are a "core
implementation tool" to verify compliance with all applicable fishing
rules is contradicted by the widespread IUU fishing that certain nations,
including the European Union as discussed above, are attempting to combat. Indeed,
President Obama recently announced a new initiative to focus the resources of
the U.S. government in discouraging IUU fishing.
14. With regard to record-keeping, the United States
agrees that detailed record-keeping requirements exist only for the tuna
caught by large purse seine vessels operating in the ETP pursuant to the AIDCP.
The United States also agrees that those requirements apply to tuna
products imported from an AIDCP country. The United States also expressly
agrees that the Amended Tuna Measure does not impose any new record-keeping or
verification requirements for non-U.S. processors. It is therefore
undisputed that with regard to record-keeping, the Amended Tuna Measure imposes
different requirements on tuna products from the ETP than it does on tuna
products from other regions.
15. Also, importantly, the United States has
confirmed that no U.S.-flagged large purse seine vessels currently operate in
the ETP. Thus, no tuna products containing U.S.-caught tuna are subject to the
extensive tracking and record-keeping requirements for ETP tuna contained in 50
CFR sections 216.92 and 216.93. When the U.S. authorities perform their "verification"
of U.S. canneries, they can only check whether a cannery maintains records
of the documentation that it receives; there is no way to check the validity of
the documentation. The United States does not perform any verification of
non-U.S. canneries, and acknowledged during the comment period for its new
regulations that the U.S. government lacks the authority or legal capacity
to do so outside of U.S. territory.
16. The evidence presented by Mexico of dolphin
mortalities and injuries in tuna fisheries outside the ETP, and mortalities and
injuries caused by other fishing methods, is both substantial and uncontested. Certainly
Mexico's evidence also supports a presumption that there are genuine concerns
about harm to dolphins occurring outside the ETP.
17. Currently the value of tuna caught by a purse
seine vessel during a typical voyage would range from approximately US$1.4
million to US$2.2 million for skipjack tuna, and US$2.7 million to US$4 million
for yellowfin tuna. Because under the U.S. measure the dolphin set method
may not be used even one time during a voyage, there is an extremely strong
disincentive for a captain to self-report a dolphin set. In the unlikely event
that a U.S. vessel is caught in a misrepresentation – such as in the
Freitas case – the penalty is only US$11,000 per violation, which is de minimis in relation to the value of the catch. Non-U.S. vessels,
of course, are not subject to any penalty at all because they are not within U.S. jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the U.S. fines for setting on dolphins do not create a
deterrent. Yet, tuna products containing tuna caught in that manner, as a
practical matter, can be labeled dolphin-safe if harvested outside the ETP,
because there are no independent observers to monitor the fishing practices.
III. Legal
Argument
A. The Panel has Jurisdiction
under Article 21.5 of the DSU to Rule on Mexico's Claim under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement
18. The arguments raised by the United States
that the Panel does not have jurisdiction to consider Mexico's claim that the
Amended Tuna Measure is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
unnecessarily complicate a very simple situation. The Panel clearly has
jurisdiction to rule on Mexico's Article 2.1 claim. In making its
arguments, the United States conflates Mexico's Article 2.1 "claim"
with Mexico's "arguments" in support of that claim.
19. Mexico disagrees that the
labelling conditions and requirements are "unchanged" from the
original Tuna Measure. In addition to the specific changes to the provisions of
the measure, Mexico's claim relates to the Amended Tuna Measure in its
totality, which, as the measure "taken to comply", is "in
principle, a new and different measure". In the alternative, to the extent
that the Panel finds that any labelling conditions or requirements are
unchanged, the Appellate Body has held that a claim previously raised in the
original proceedings may be re-asserted against an unchanged "aspect"
of the measure "taken to comply" if the claim was not resolved on the
merits in the original proceeding, such that the DSB made no findings in
respect of the claim. Further, in US – Zeroing (Article 21.5
– EC), the Appellate Body clarified that "new claims against
inseparable aspects of a measure taken to comply, which are unchanged from the
original measure" are within a panel's terms of reference under Article 21.5,
even if such claims could have been raised, but were not raised, in the
original proceedings. Contrary to the allegations of the United States,
Mexico's claim under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement in respect of
the Amended Tuna Measure in no way "jeopardize[s] the principles of
fundamental fairness and due process."
B. The Amended Tuna Measure
is Inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
20. There is no merit to the United States'
argument that the Amended Tuna Measure does not violate Article 2.1
because the detrimental impact on imported Mexican tuna products stems
exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. Given the Appellate Body's
recent ruling in EC – Seal Products, Mexico limits
its submission to the approach of the Appellate Body.
21. Contrary to the arguments of
the United States, the relevant regulatory distinction encompasses the
three labelling conditions and requirements identified by Mexico in the present
proceeding. If a regulatory distinction constitutes a means of "arbitrary
discrimination" it is not even-handed and therefore not a legitimate
distinction. In such circumstances, the detrimental impact cannot be said to
stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. The meaning of "arbitrary
discrimination" in the chapeau of Article XX provides context for the
meaning of the term in Article 2.1. In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body found that where the elements of a
measure are "contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3",
which establishes certain minimum standards for transparency and procedural
fairness in the administration of trade regulations, the measure is applied in
a manner that amounts to arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of the
chapeau. The evaluation of impartial
administration pursuant to Article X:3(a) of the GATT and the evaluation
of even-handedness pursuant to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement both
depend upon an examination of the manner in which the law or regulation in
question is applied. Moreover, as the Appellate Body held in EC – Seal Products, one of the most important factors in the
assessment of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau to Article XX
is the question of "whether the discrimination can be reconciled with, or
is rationally related to," the relevant policy objective. Accordingly, the
analysis of impartial administration under Article X:3(a) and the analysis
of a rational connection under the chapeau to Article XX can be used as
tools to assess even-handedness within the meaning of Article 2.1.
22. Disqualification/Qualification
of Fishing Methods. The United States has not rebutted
Mexico's prima facie case that the labelling
conditions and requirements imposed by the Amended Tuna Measure differed
depending on the fishing method used to catch tuna and that this regulatory
difference – which effectively disqualifies the fishing method used by the
majority of the Mexican tuna fishing fleet from catching tuna eligible for the U.S. dolphin-safe
label, while effectively qualifying other fishing methods that are known to
cause harm to dolphins – was not even-handed.
23. The United States
argues that "Mexico is unable to prove that certain other fishing
techniques have adverse effects on dolphins that are equal to or greater than
what setting on dolphins has on dolphins," but this merely highlights that
the benchmark used by the United States for qualifying or disqualifying a
fishing method is entirely unclear. The changing and inconsistent
justifications given by the United States provide strong evidence of
arbitrariness. Although the United States also argues that there is "significant
scientific evidence" underlying the distinction between fishing methods,
the United States has not filed any scientific evidence to support the
regulatory difference. Moreover, the Amended Tuna Measure does not allow for a
further scientific assessment of the adverse impact on dolphin stocks in the
ETP, and the National Marine Fisheries Service has never undertaken to evaluate
the risks to dolphins in other ocean regions. Finally, the United States
attempts to distinguish setting on dolphins from other fishing methods by
arguing that "setting on dolphins is the only fishing technique that
specifically targets dolphins", "is inherently harmful to dolphins"
and "this harm is not replicated in other fishing methods," while the
harm caused by gillnets is "merely by accident." This argument
emphasizes the absence of a rational connection between the difference in
labelling conditions and requirements under the Amended Tuna Measure and the
objectives of that measure. Whether or not the operators of the vessel claim
mortalities or serious injury were an "accident" is not relevant.
24. Record-keeping
and Verification Requirements. The United States has not
rebutted Mexico's prima facie case that, under the
Amended Tuna Measure, the dolphin-safe labelling conditions and requirements
related to record keeping, tracking and verification differ depending on the
geographic area in which tuna are caught, and that this difference is not
even-handed. While the Amended Tuna Measure requires a comprehensive and
independently-verified record‑keeping and tracking system for the dolphin-safe
status of tuna caught within the ETP, it requires neither an independent
verification of the dolphin-safe status of products containing tuna caught
outside the ETP nor an effective means of tracking such status while it is
stored onboard fishing vessels, consolidated with the tuna caught by other
fishing vessels, unloaded at port, brokered through intermediaries,
transshipped, partially processed into loins, processed into finished tuna products,
and imported into the United States.
25. The accuracy of the
dolphin-safe status of tuna products under the Amended Tuna Measure is central
to the assessment of whether the measure is "even-handed". As Mexico
explained in its first written submission, there are insufficient requirements
and procedures under the Amended Tuna Measure to provide the necessary audit
trail for tracking the tuna. As a consequence, accurate information is not
being provided on the dolphin-safe status of tuna products that contain tuna
caught outside the ETP. Considering that U.S. consumers are provided with
accurate information regarding the dolphin-safe status of products containing
tuna caught within the ETP, but with information that is inherently
unverifiable, unreliable, and inaccurate regarding the dolphin-safe status of
products containing tuna caught outside the ETP, the labelling conditions and
requirements related to record-keeping and verification lack even-handedness
and constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination. Tuna
products derived from tuna caught outside the ETP under non-dolphin-safe
circumstances are highly likely if not certain to enter the U.S. market
inaccurately labelled as dolphin-safe. Such tuna products are granted an
illegitimate competitive advantage over otherwise equivalent products
containing non-dolphin-safe tuna caught in the ETP. Consistent with the
Appellate Body's analysis in EC – Seal Products
in the context of the chapeau of Article XX, which found that a prima facie case was established on the basis that seal
products derived from "commercial" hunts could potentially
enter the European market inaccurately classified under the IC Exception,
Mexico is only required to demonstrate that, under the circumstances related to
the design and application of the Amended Tuna Measure's labelling conditions
and requirements, tuna products containing non-dolphin-safe tuna caught outside
the ETP could potentially enter the U.S. market inaccurately
labelled as dolphin-safe. The burden then shifts to the United States to
sufficiently explain how such instances can be prevented in the application of
the Amended Tuna Measure's labelling conditions and requirements. While Mexico
has exceeded the standard required to establish a prima facie
case, the United States has entirely failed to provide any explanation,
much less any evidence, and has therefore failed to meet its burden.
26. Mandatory
Independent Observer Requirements. The United States has
not rebutted Mexico's prima facie case
that the absence of a mandatory independent observer requirement for tuna
fishing outside the ETP meant that the detrimental impact of the Amended Tuna
Measure on imports of Mexican tuna products did not stem exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction and, instead, reflects discrimination against
a group of imported products. If the initial dolphin-safe designation is
inaccurate at the point when the tuna is harvested, the entire audit trail for
the tuna products will be tainted.
27. The United States
argues that it is permitted to make such an arbitrary distinction because it in
fact reflects a "calibration" of the relative threats posed to
dolphins by different tuna fishing methods. This "calibration"
argument, which implies that it is acceptable to provide unreliable information
to U.S. consumers in respect of tuna caught outside the ETP, is totally
inconsistent with the primary objective of the measure, which is contingent on
accurate information, and cannot be reconciled with the relevant policy
objective. The United States cannot justify self-certification by
reference to other regulatory contexts, because it is impossible to
confirm or verify the accuracy of a dolphin-safe certification by way of a
post-entry audit. It is a practical reality of tuna fishing activities that, by
the time tuna arrives within U.S. territory, authorities have no means of
verifying the accuracy of a captain's dolphin-safe certification. The tuna in
question is caught and certified by the captain on the high seas, thousands of
kilometers from shore, and far from the oversight of objective and independent
authorities. As the Appellate Body held in EC – Seal Products and
US – Shrimp, effective verification and
auditing mechanisms are centrally important to whether a measure can be applied
in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary discrimination. Further, the
panels in Argentina – Hides and Leather and Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) held, in the context of Article X:3(a)
of the GATT 1994, that where a legal instrument provides for a private industry party to
participate in the administration of regulations which affect the party's own
commercial interests, this will give rise, in the absence of adequate
safeguards, to an "inherent danger" that the party will administer
the laws or regulations in a manner that is self-interested, i.e., aligned with
its own commercial interests, and therefore lacking impartiality. This is
exactly the situation with the Amended Tuna Measure's labelling conditions and
requirements related to captains' self-certifications of the "dolphin-safe"
status of the tuna caught by their own fishing vessels, and there are no
safeguards to address it.
C. The Amended Tuna Measure
is Inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994
28. The United States has
not rebutted Mexico's prima facie case
that the Amended Tuna Measure is inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4. The United States'
defence consists of relaying on certain findings of the original Panel under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement that were overturned by the Appellate Body and by
relying on an interpretation of Articles I:1 and III:4 that was expressly
rejected by the Appellate Body in EC – Seal Products.
29. In EC – Seal
Products, the Appellate Body held that Article I:1 prohibits
conditions to the granting of an advantage – including regulatory distinctions
drawn between like imported products – that "have a detrimental impact on
the competitive opportunities for like imported products from any Member". The Appellate Body affirmed that a finding
of detrimental impact is sufficient on its own to demonstrate a violation of
either or both Article I:1, or and Article III:4, and no further
analysis of whether the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction (i.e., a "discrimination analysis") is
required under these provisions. Nothing in the Amended Tuna Measure has
reduced or minimized the detrimental impact on imported Mexican tuna products
caused by the regulatory distinction imposed in the original Tuna Measure.
Rather, the regulatory distinction remains substantially the same, and tuna
products of Mexican origin continue to be effectively excluded from the U.S. market.
D. The Inconsistencies with
Articles I:1 and III:4 cannot be Saved by Article XX of the GATT 1994
30. The United States has invoked the general exceptions under
Articles XX(b) and (g) of the GATT 1994. Neither applies to the measure at
issue.
31. The Panel in the original proceedings identified two objectives of
the Amended Tuna Measure – the "consumer
information objective" (the primary objective) and the "dolphin
protection objective" (the secondary objective) – and found
a direct correlation between these two objectives. The primary "consumer
information objective" bears no relationship with the exceptions
set out under subparagraphs (b) and (g) considering that it is unsuccessful in
providing accurate information to U.S. consumers about whether tuna
products contain tuna that was caught in a manner that adversely affected
dolphins. The secondary "dolphin protection objective" is dependent
upon the achievement of the primary objective. Since the measure fails to
fulfil its primary objective, it cannot fulfil its secondary objective.
32. Article XX(b) requires
the measure at issue to be "necessary" to achieve the objective that
it pursues. Due to the above-noted inaccuracies, the Amended Tuna Measure fails
to address the harm caused to dolphins as a result of tuna fishing methods
outside the ETP and, therefore, it does not contribute to the objectives that
it pursues and it is not "necessary". Moreover, there are less
trade-restrictive alternative measures that are reasonably available to the United States
that can achieve the objectives that it pursues. First, establishing independent,
qualified observer and tuna tracking systems outside the ETP that are
equivalent to those maintained under the AIDCP would balance the Amended Tuna
Measure's dolphin-safe conditions and requirements. This would reduce the de facto discrimination against Mexican tuna products and
would therefore be less trade-restrictive. Second, the measure could be revised
to permit the co-existence of labelling schemes that are each required under U.S. law
to provide consumers with full and accurate information regarding: the fishing
method used to catch the tuna contained in the product; the risks of bycatch
related to that fishing method; the sustainability of the fishing method; and
the measures taken to protect dolphins and the type of tracking and verification
system that backs up the protection scheme. This alternative would provide more
reasonable opportunities for Mexican tuna products to access the major
commercial distribution channels of the U.S. market and, thus, it would be
less trade restrictive. Both alternatives would provide more accurate
information to U.S. consumers and would be reasonably available.
33. Article XX(g)
does not apply because the Amended Tuna Measure does not relate to the "conservation"
of dolphins. It is not intended, designed, or applied as a measure necessary to
conserve dolphin stocks in the course of tuna fishing operations in the ETP or
to promote recovery of dolphin stocks. The above-noted information inaccuracies
further undermine any conservation effect that the measure might have. Thus,
the measure does not bear a "substantial relationship"
to the goal of conservation, such that it is not "merely incidentally or
inadvertently aimed at" conservation, as contemplated by the Appellate
Body in US – Gasoline and the panel in China – Rare Earths. Further, the measure is not "made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption". The United States has failed to identify any such "restrictions
on domestic production or consumption", as none can be said to exist.
34. If the Panel finds that
subparagraphs (a) and/or (g) could apply, the Amended Tuna Measure does not
meet the requirements of the chapeau to Article XX because the measure is designed and applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail. Consistent with the analysis established by
the Appellate Body in EC – Seal Products,
the conditions prevailing in the different
countries "that are relevant for the purpose of establishing arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination in the light of the specific character of the
measure at issue" are relevantly "the same" within the meaning
of the chapeau of Article XX. The adverse effects on dolphins
caused by commercial tuna fishing are the same for all countries that are
engaged in commercial tuna fishing and, as a consequence, for all countries
that use the tuna harvested by such commercial tuna fishing in the production
of finished tuna products. Because of these widespread effects, every country
producing tuna products produces at least some tuna products which contain tuna
that was caught in a manner that caused adverse effects on dolphins.
35. The measure is applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination because the differing labelling conditions and requirements for
tuna caught in the ETP and tuna caught outside the ETP are designed and applied
in a manner that lacks even-handedness and constitutes a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination, resulting in regulatory differences that modify
the conditions of competition in the U.S. market to the detriment of tuna
products from Mexico vis-à-vis like
products of U.S. origin and like products originating in other countries.
While all countries produce tuna products that contain tuna that was caught in
a manner that adversely affects dolphins, the Amended Tuna Measure's differing
labelling conditions and requirements are designed and applied in a manner that
de facto precludes only Mexican tuna
products from using the dolphin-safe label. This constitutes clearly
differential treatment of like products from countries in which the same
conditions prevail. This necessarily results in "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination" within the meaning of the chapeau to Article XX. Moreover, this
discrimination cannot be reconciled with, or rationally related to, the Amended
Tuna Measure's objectives. Finally, the unilateral action of the United States
in designing and applying the Amended Tuna Measure's labelling conditions and
requirements in a manner that contradicts and undermines the dolphin-safe
labelling regime under the AIDCP – which was
multilaterally negotiated and agreed between the United States, Mexico,
and other IATTC member countries specifically for the
purpose of establishing a dolphin-safe labeling regime to protect dolphins and
other marine species in the ETP from harmful tuna fishing practices – results in
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. Had the United States first tried
to address its remaining concerns within the AIDCP and been rebuffed, the legal
issue in this dispute might be different. But the United States did not
even try. It simply acted on its own in applying an extraterritorial measure.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
36. On the basis of the
foregoing, Mexico respectfully requests that the Panel find that the U.S. measures
are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Articles
I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. Mexico further requests that the Panel
find that the general exceptions in Article XX of the GATT 1994 do
not apply to the violations of Articles I:1 and III:4.
·
ANNEX B-3
executive
summary of the OPENING Oral STATEMENT of Mexico
AT THE MEETING OF THE PANEL
1. A quarter century ago,
levels of dolphin mortalities occurring in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP)
tuna fishery were universally recognized by Mexico, the United States and
other countries as being unacceptably and unsustainably high. Mexico, the United States,
and the Parties to the IATTC embarked upon a cooperative multilateral effort
that led to the creation of the International Dolphin Conservation Program
(IDCP), in exchange for the United States changing its law and definition
of dolphin safe from a method of capture standard to a standard based on
whether dolphins were killed or injured. It is indisputable that no other tuna
fishery in the world is as highly and successfully regulated for dolphin safety
as the ETP. But Mexican tuna products are not allowed to be labelled
dolphin-safe, while tuna products from all other fisheries are allowed use of
the dolphin-safe label, despite the fact that thousands of dolphins are killed
in those other tuna fisheries each year. This is a genuine tragedy for the
world's environment and also undermines the consumer information objectives
that the United States purports to achieve. Mexico believes that this WTO
claim has helped to focus the spotlight on destructive fishing practices and
lack of protection for dolphins in all the world's fisheries.
2. At issue before this Panel
is whether the Amended Tuna Measure is consistent with the United States'
non-discrimination obligations under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and, in the case of the GATT 1994,
whether the Amended Tuna Measure can be saved by Article XX. Mexico's
written submissions present a prima facie case
in respect of all of the elements of its claims.
I. Mexico has presented prima facie evidence that the United states has not rebutted
3. The United States has
agreed that dolphins are susceptible to being killed in other ocean regions,
including by methods other than dolphin sets, and that such harm includes
unobserved effects. That is consistent with the Panel's findings in the
original proceedings. Moreover, the Amended Tuna Measure purports to assure
consumers with absolute certainty that no dolphin was killed or harmed in the
harvesting of the tuna. However, the U.S. requirements for non-ETP tuna, and
its mechanisms for implementing those requirements, cannot provide that
assurance.
4. The United States
seeks to make a virtue of the fact that, outside of the ETP, no one is
carefully monitoring for harms caused to marine mammals. It argues that without
detailed studies, it must be presumed that dolphins are not being harmed
outside the ETP. To the contrary, Mexico has presented more than enough
evidence to demonstrate that significant numbers of dolphins are regularly
being killed in tuna fisheries outside the ETP.
5. The United States
asserts that the evidence of unobserved harm to dolphins in the ETP is proven
with certitude, when in the original proceedings, the Panel found that "there
is a degree of uncertainty in relation to the extent to which setting on
dolphins may have an adverse impact on dolphins beyond observed mortality." Meanwhile, the United States complains
that Mexico's evidence showing that thousands of dolphins have been killed or
maimed outside the ETP, by fishing methods including dolphin sets, longline
fishing and FAD fishing, are "ad hoc" or too "old". The key
question raised is why the United States applies such widely different
presumptions to the evidence, depending on whether the fishing is conducted
inside or outside the ETP.
6. In its first written
submission, the United States argued that "vessels flagged to
Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Ecuador, Indonesia, and the United States
produce tuna products accounting for over 96 percent of the U.S. market for
canned tuna". In response, Mexico demonstrated that the U.S. assertion was
wrong, in particular because Thailand does not have a major tuna fishing fleet.
In its second written submission, the United States now claims that its
confidential database indicates that Taiwan is the largest supplier of tuna for
tuna products exported to the United States, and the top suppliers also
include China, Vanuatu, and South Korea, none of which it previously mentioned.
For these reasons Mexico re-affirms its position that the United States
has no reliable method for tracking the source of tuna contained in tuna
products made with tuna not caught in the ETP.
7. In this regard, Mexico
notes that the United States defended its reliance on self-certification
by stating that captain's statements, logbooks "and the like" have "always
been a core implementation tool for Members to verify compliance with the
applicable fishing rules." Mexico
submitted evidence that major suppliers of tuna and tuna products to the United States
lack logbook programs and cannot track the sources of tuna imported into their
countries to be made into tuna products. In its second written submission, the United States
now says that it does not care whether foreign governments monitor fishing
practices or the sources of imported tuna, because the United States trusts
that the fishing vessels and the tuna processors have the necessary information
and are accurately reporting it. But the United States also admits that it
lacks jurisdiction over foreign vessels and processors.
8. In its Second Written
Submission, the United States claims that dolphin mortalities in the
Western and Central Pacific are lower than in the ETP. But the report on which
the United States relies presents data on only a fraction of the tuna
fishing in that ocean region. Moreover, there is a long lag time in the
reporting of accurate regional observer program data to the WCPFC. Mexico
believes the evidence suggests the mortalities are much higher.
9. Just a few weeks ago, the
Commerce Department announced that it would require observers, when they are
already onboard U.S. tuna fishing vessels for other reasons, to support the
dolphin-safe certification. This requirement only applies to certain tuna
fisheries in U.S. domestic waters, and does not increase the level of observer
coverage in any of those fisheries. Significantly, the Commerce Department
agreed that no foreign observer programs, other than the ones operating
under the auspices of the AIDCP, are qualified to make dolphin-safe
certifications.
10. To justify not requiring 100
percent observer coverage for non-ETP tuna products, the United States
grossly exaggerates the costs of observer programs, and there are several
problems with its calculations. The observer costs of the AIDCP program are
lower than the United States claims. Other comparative data is provided by
the costs of Mexico's observer program for longline vessels operating in the
Gulf of Mexico, which is provided in an exhibit. The fact that Mexico can
manage to pay to have independent observers shows that an observer program is
reasonably available. The U.S. argument that the U.S. government and U.S.
industry cannot afford to do so is not credible.
II. THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT REBUTTED MEXICO'S CLAIM UNDER ARTICLE
2.1
11. The United States
argues that Mexico's claim falls outside the Panel's terms of reference because
it is premised entirely on aspects of the measure that the DSB did not find to
be in breach of Article 2.1 in the original proceedings and that are
unchanged from the original measure.
12. First, Mexico's Article 2.1
claim challenges the consistency of the Amended Tuna Measure "in its
totality." Mexico agrees with the
European Union that the various aspects of the Amended Tuna Measure are
inseparable from one another, as they "can only meaningfully and reasonably
be considered as a whole." Second,
the Amended Tuna Measure is, "in principle, a new and different measure"
that was not before the Panel and the Appellate Body in the original
proceedings. Third, the Appellate Body has established that a Member is not "entitled
to assume" in Article 21.5 proceedings that an aspect of the measure
that was not decided on the merits in the original proceedings is consistent
with the relevant covered agreements.
13. Mexico agrees with the United States
that the detrimental impact of the measure on Mexican tuna products is caused
by the fact that most Mexican tuna products contain tuna caught by setting on
dolphins in the ETP and are therefore not eligible for a dolphin-safe label,
whereas most tuna products from the United States and other countries that
are sold in the US market contain tuna caught by other fishing methods outside
the ETP and are therefore eligible for a dolphin-safe label.
14. With respect to whether this
detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction
within the meaning of Article 2.1, it is necessary to examine the
regulatory distinction that accounts for this detrimental impact. This "relevant"
regulatory distinction includes the differences in the three labelling conditions
and requirements for tuna products identified by Mexico:
·
Mexico's primary
fishing method is permanently disqualified from being used to catch
dolphin-safe tuna while the fishing methods used by the United States and
other countries are qualified to be used to catch dolphin-safe tuna;
·
Mexico's tuna and
tuna products are subject to strict record-keeping and verification
requirements, while tuna and tuna products from the United States and
other countries are not subject to such requirements and, therefore, can be
mislabeled as dolphin-safe when, in fact, they are not; and
·
In the case of
Mexican tuna, the initial designation of dolphin-safe status is subject to
mandatory independent observer requirements, while, in the case of tuna from
other countries, the initial designation of dolphin-safe status is not made by
independent observers, thereby allowing the tuna to be mislabeled as
dolphin-safe when, in fact, it is not.
15. Mexican tuna products are
being detrimentally impacted because of the regulatory differences in the
above-noted labelling conditions and requirements. The requirements and
conditions that apply to tuna fishing outside of the ETP are deficient. Thus,
contrary to the position advanced by the United States, the Amended Tuna
Measure is not denying eligibility to tuna products that contain tuna caught
outside the ETP in circumstances where a dolphin was killed or seriously
injured.
16. The United States
criticizes Mexico's interpretation of even-handedness because it draws on the
meaning of "arbitrary discrimination" from the chapeau of Article XX.
This criticism has no merit. In EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body recognized that "there are important parallels between the analyses under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement and the chapeau" and that the concept of "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail" is found in both. Although the scope and
application of the provisions differ, it is clearly appropriate to use the
meaning of "arbitrary discrimination" developed under the chapeau of Article XX
as context when interpreting the meaning of "even-handedness" in Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement.
17. The United States
argues that the tracking, verification and observer requirements are part of
the AIDCP and not the Amended Tuna Measure. But the tracking and verification
and observer requirements are included in the Amended Tuna Measure. They apply
equally to the Amended Tuna Measure and the AICDP. Mexico is not challenging
the application of the tracking, verification and observer requirements to the
Mexican fleet. Mexico's position is that the absence of these essential
requirements for tuna products from other countries is not even-handed. Major fishing methods other than pole and line
fishing have significant adverse effects on dolphins. Given these adverse
effects, Mexico has presented a prima facie case
that there is no basis for the Amended Tuna Measure to
qualify all other fishing methods to catch dolphin-safe tuna and, at the same
time, disqualify the method of setting on dolphins in an AIDCP-compliant
manner. This different treatment is not even-handed.
18. The United States has
argued for different approaches to evaluating the even-handedness of the
distinction it makes between dolphin sets and other fishing methods. One
approach is a zero tolerance benchmark, under which a method should be
disqualified if it is believed to cause unobservable effects. Because the United States
agrees that other fishing methods cause "unobserved harm" to
dolphins, if this benchmark is applied it is not even-handed for the United States
not to disqualify those methods as well.
19. The United States has
also suggested that rather than zero tolerance, an approach could be applied
where the applicable criterion would be whether a fishing method is causing a
certain level of observed mortalities comparable to the ETP. With regard to
using the actual level of mortalities in the ETP as the benchmark, those
mortalities have long been reduced to a statistically insignificant level in
relation to the dolphin populations in the ETP. Moreover, it is fundamentally
arbitrary to use the dolphin mortalities associated with Mexico's fishing
method as the basis for justifying the total disqualification of Mexico's fishing
method. Under that test, Mexico's fishing method can never qualify. Meanwhile,
there is a reasonable basis to conclude that thousands of dolphins are being
killed in other fisheries, but the fishing methods used in those fisheries have
not been disqualified.
20. The United States
argues that "setting on dolphin is inherently
dangerous to dolphins". But virtually all the major fishing methods are
dangerous to dolphins. These adverse effects are a reflection of the
characteristics of the fishing methods and, therefore, are equally inherent to those fishing methods.
21. Finally, the United States
argues that "there is only one fishing method that targets dolphins"
and that setting on dolphins involves the "intentional harassment of those
dolphins". There is no rational connection between this statement and the
objective of the Amended Tuna Measure. What matters is whether a fishing method
is known to cause adverse effects on dolphins, even if such effects are "incidental".
All major fishing methods other than pole-and-line fishing have adverse effects
on dolphins. But only in the ETP have positive steps been taken to successfully
minimize the risks of dolphins.
22. Under the Amended Tuna
Measure, the terms "dolphins … killed or seriously injured" are clearly
designed and applied in an absolute way in the context of observed adverse
effects. Tuna caught in a fishing set or gear deployment cannot be labelled as
dolphin-safe if only a single dolphin mortality or serious injury is observed
during the set or deployment. This has important implications for the Panel's
analysis of even-handedness in light of the labelling conditions and
requirements related to tracking and verification and observers.
23. The guaranteed
existence of dolphin-safe and non-dolphin-safe tuna, regardless of the fishery
in which the tuna is caught or the fishing method that is used to catch it,
makes tracking and verification requirements in all tuna fisheries a necessity;
otherwise there is no way to ensure that tuna products are being accurately
labelled. Under the Amended Tuna Measure, they are not so applied, and for that
reason the relevant regulatory distinction is not even-handed.
24. The guarantee of the label
that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured incorporates a "zero
tolerance" standard. In order for the dolphin-safe certification to be
anything more than an arbitrary designation, the information upon which it is
based must be accurate and verifiable. The captain self-certification system
provided under the Amended Tuna Measure is inherently flawed, in that it
creates a very real risk, if not a certainty, that inaccurate dolphin-safe
certifications will be made outside the ETP. To remedy this deficiency in the
Amended Tuna Measure, the observer conditions and requirements must be modified
so that the accuracy of the dolphin-safe status of the tuna can been guaranteed
from the point of initial capture to the retail shelf.
III. THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT
REBUTTED MEXICO'S CLAIM UNDER ARTICLES I:1 and III:4 of THE GATT 1994
25. Mexico has demonstrated
that, for its claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, the
conditions and requirements set forth in the Amended Tuna Measure result in a de facto detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities
for Mexican tuna products in the U.S. market vis-à-vis like tuna products
originating in the United States and other countries by effectively
denying the advantage of access to the dolphin-safe label to tuna products of
Mexican origin. The Amended Tuna Measure, as a whole, is inconsistent with
these provisions.
26. The United States
argues that "Mexico's approach would doom many legitimate and genuinely
non-discriminatory measures." This
argument deliberately ignores the context, design and structure of the GATT 1994
by conflating Article III:4 with Article XX. A Member's right to draw
legitimate regulatory distinctions is protected by Article XX. There is no
justification for imposing a "legitimate regulatory distinction"
analysis into the assessment of discrimination under either Article I:1 or
III:4.
IV. The Amended Tuna Measure's
Violations of Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT are not Provisionally
Justified under Article XX
27. The United States has
the burden of proof to demonstrate that the labelling conditions and
requirements provided under the Amended Tuna Measure fulfil the requirements of
sub‑paragraphs b) and g) of Article XX of the GATT 1994. The United States
has not done so.
28. If the Panel finds that the
measure is provisionally justified under one of these subparagraphs, the
chapeau to Article XX prohibits measures that are "applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail." The
Amended Tuna Measure fails to comply with this requirement.
29. The U.S. claims that the
relevant "condition" for the purposes of the chapeau to Article XX
is the "different harms to dolphins caused by setting on dolphins, on the
one hand, and by purse seine (other than setting on dolphins), longline, and
pole-and-line fishing, on the other."
This argument ignores the fact that the Amended Tuna Measure is
concerned with adverse effects on dolphins; it is not concerned with the "relative"
or "comparative" adverse effects of different fishing methods. Taking
the "pertinent context" of subparagraphs (b) and (g) to Article XX
into account, there are in fact two relevant prevailing conditions that the
Amended Tuna Measure seeks to address. Mexico has demonstrated that all tuna fishing
methods result in harm to dolphins, with the exception of pole-and-line fishing.
As such, the first relevant prevailing condition of adverse effects on dolphins
caused by commercial tuna fishing is "the same" for all countries
that engage in commercial tuna fishing, and by extension, for all countries
that use tuna harvested by such commercial tuna fishing in the production of
tuna products. Second, and as a corollary, every country producing tuna
products produces at least some tuna products that contain tuna that was caught
in a manner that caused adverse effects on dolphins.
30. Mexico has demonstrated that
it is the three labelling conditions and requirements that apply to Mexico's
fishing method, and that differ from the labelling conditions and requirements
that apply to other fishing methods, that give rise to the detrimental impact
that contravenes Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. Consequently,
each of the three labeling conditions and requirements is directly relevant to
the analysis under Article XX as a whole, including the chapeau.
31. While Mexico recognizes that
a violation of a substantive provision of the GATT may not be relied upon as
sufficient to prove a violation of the chapeau to Article XX, the fact
remains that the same circumstances giving rise to a violation of a substantive
provision of the GATT can also result in arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination within the meaning of the chapeau.
32. Mexico has also established
that the Amended Tuna Measure results in arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination pursuant to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. In the
circumstances of this dispute, "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination"
within the meaning of Article 2.1 amounts to "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination" under the chapeau to Article XX of the GATT 1994.
33. Finally, the United States
maintains that "Mexico's position simply ignores the realities of the past
and present of the ETP tuna fishery."
Ironically, it is the United States that has chosen to ignore the
reality that, in all tuna fisheries, commercial tuna fishing activities have
adverse effects on dolphins, and that every country producing tuna products
produces at least some tuna products that contain tuna that was caught in a
manner that caused adverse effects on dolphins. By applying differing labelling
conditions and requirements to tuna products from countries in which these same
conditions prevail, the Amended Tuna Measure discriminates against Mexican tuna
products in an arbitrary and unjustifiable manner. Accordingly, the general
exceptions in Article XX do not apply.
V. CONCLUSION
34. It
is clear from the facts of this dispute and the evidence provided by Mexico
that the United States has not brought itself into compliance with its
obligations under the relevant covered agreements through the adoption of the
Amended Tuna Measure.
·
ANNEX B-4
executive
summary of the first written submission of the united states
I. Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
A. What Article 2.1 Requires
1. The question before the
Panel is whether the amended measure accords less favorable treatment to
imported products "than that accorded to like domestic products and like
products from other countries." To establish this, Mexico must prove that
the amended measure: 1) "modifies
the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of the
group of imported products vis-à-vis the group of like domestic products or
like products originating in any other country"; and 2) that "the
detrimental impact on imports [does not] stem[] exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction rather than reflecting discrimination against the group
of imported products."
2. As to the second element,
it is well established that the complainant must prove that the relevant
regulatory distinctions are not "even-handed." In this dispute, the
Appellate Body determined that the regulatory distinctions of the original
measure were not exclusively "even-handed" because tuna products
could be labeled dolphin safe where the product contained tuna caught outside
the ETP and a dolphin was killed or seriously injured but that same allowance
was not provided to tuna products containing tuna caught inside the ETP. This
analysis is consistent with the analysis done by the Appellate Body in US – Clove Cigarettes, US – COOL, as
well as in US – Upland Cotton. Mexico errs when it
urges this Panel to substitute the analysis used by the Appellate Body in this
very dispute for the one used by the panel in EC – Seal
Products.
B. The
2013 Final Rule Directly Addresses the Concerns Identified by the
Appellate Body
3. The Appellate Body
considered that the detrimental impact did not stem exclusively from legitimate
regulatory distinctions because the original measure prohibited tuna product
from being labeled "dolphin safe" if it contained tuna caught inside
the ETP where a dolphin was killed or seriously injured, but allowed tuna
product to be so labeled if it contained tuna caught outside the ETP where a
dolphin was killed or seriously injured. In this context, the Appellate Body
explicitly acknowledged that the United States did not have to require
observers for all vessels operating outside the ETP for that tuna to be
eligible for the label.
4. The 2013 Final Rule directly addresses the Appellate
Body's concern. The original rule already required a captain's statement for
purse seine vessels operating outside the ETP "to certify that no purse
seine was intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins during the
particular trip on which the tuna was harvested." The 2013 Final Rule
amends the original regulation to now require "a captain's statement
certifying that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets or
other gear deployments in which the tuna were caught using any fishing gear
type in all fishing locations." As to the conditions of eligibility for
the dolphin safe label, the relevant substantive requirements of the challenged
measure (as amended) currently provide that:
all tuna product containing tuna caught
by setting on dolphins is ineligible for the label, regardless
of the fishery, nationality of the vessel, and nationality of the processor;
and all tuna product containing tuna caught
where a dolphin was killed or seriously injured is ineligible for the label, regardless of the fishery, gear type, nationality of the vessel, and
nationality of the processor. The amended measure's substantive
requirements are even-handed.
5. Mexico does not even appear to contest that the amended measure fully
addresses the Appellate Body's analysis with regard to the one regulatory
distinction that the Appellate Body considered relevant to its inquiry. Indeed,
Mexico does not even appear to consider that whether a dolphin is killed or
injured inside or outside the ETP is, in fact, a regulatory
distinction relevant to
this analysis.
6. Article 17.14 of the
DSU provides that adopted Appellate Reports are to be "unconditionally
accepted by the parties to the dispute, and, therefore, must be treated by the
parties to a particular dispute as a final resolution to
that dispute." And it cannot be questioned that the Appellate
Body in this case considered that its own analysis of Article 2.1 resolved the dispute as it relates the Article 2.1
claim. The United States accepted the Appellate Body analysis in this
dispute, studied it carefully, and designed its measure taken to comply to
directly respond to that analysis. Mexico takes a different tack, however. Not
only does it not "unconditionally accept[]" the Appellate Body's
analysis, it completely ignores the
analysis. Mexico does not prove its Article 2.1 claim without putting
forth a prima facie case that the United States
has failed to make "even-handed" the one regulatory
distinction that the Appellate Body considered was not even-handed
in the original proceeding. Mexico has not done so – indeed, it avoids the issue entirely.
C. Mexico's Attempt to "Appeal" the
Appellate Body's Report Must Fail
7. Mexico rejects the
relevance of the single regulatory distinction considered by the Appellate Body
to be the relevant distinction, and argues, in
effect, that the Appellate Body erred by not considering three entirely
different regulatory distinctions of the original measure, all of which are unchanged in the amended measure. Mexico thus seeks to
improperly use this compliance proceeding as a vehicle by which to "appeal"
the Appellate Body's report. Mexico's misguided attempt to claw back what
Mexico failed to achieve in its appeal of the original panel's Article 2.1
analysis should be rejected.
1. Mexico's Claim Falls Outside the Panel's
Terms of Reference
8. Mexico's entire Article 2.1 claim is premised on the theory that
at least one of the following elements is not even-handed: 1) the distinction between the eligibility
for the dolphin safe label for tuna product containing tuna caught by setting
on dolphins in an AIDCP-consistent manner and tuna caught by other fishing
methods; 2) the distinction between the differing record-keeping and
verification requirements required for tuna caught inside and outside the ETP;
and 3) the distinction between the differing observer requirements for tuna
vessels operating inside and outside the ETP. According to Mexico, if any one
of these three elements is not even-handed, the detrimental impact already
found to exist in the original proceeding would reflect discrimination, and
Mexico's Article 2.1 claim would succeed.
9. Yet these three elements
are unchanged from the original measure and
the Appellate Body did not consider
that any of them proved the original measure discriminatory. The only regulatory distinction the Appellate Body found not to
be even-handed was the requirement that tuna product containing tuna caught in
the ETP is ineligible for the label where a dolphin had been killed or
seriously injured but tuna product containing tuna caught outside the ETP could
be so labeled where a dolphin had been killed or seriously injured. And it is this distinction that the 2013 Final Rule addresses.
10. By urging the Panel to find
the United States in breach of Article 2.1 on entirely different
grounds from the Appellate Body, Mexico seeks an unprecedented expansion of the
terms of reference of an Article 21.5 panel. The Appellate Body's Article 2.1
analysis surveyed the original panel's findings and uncontested facts on the
record and determined that one particular regulatory distinction was not
even-handed. The Appellate Body's analysis and findings have resolved this
dispute as it pertains to the Article 2.1 claim. By urging the Panel to find
the amended measure inconsistent with Article 2.1 on entirely different
grounds from the Appellate Body, Mexico "jeopardize[s] the principles of
fundamental fairness and due process" given that the United States
was "entitled to assume" that these unchanged
elements are consistent with the covered agreements.
11. Under Mexico's approach, the
Appellate Body reports need not be "unconditionally
accepted" by the parties pursuant to DSU Article 17.14, and the
Appellate Body report cannot be
considered a "final resolution" to the dispute. Rather, a complainant
is allowed to raise, and re-raise claims and arguments time and time again –
without limit. Such an approach is incompatible with the "prompt
settlement of disputes," which is "essential to the effective
functioning of the WTO."
2. The
Appellate Body Has Already Rejected the Entirety of Mexico's Article 2.1
Claim
12. Even aside from the fact
that Mexico's Article 2.1 claim falls outside the Panel's terms of
reference, Mexico's claim should be rejected on the basis that the Appellate
Body has already considered – and rejected – the entirety of the claim. In this
dispute, the Appellate Body found only one
regulatory distinction to be relevant to the analysis, and has, thus, rejected all other alternative legal theories relating to
this claim. If this were not true, the Appellate Body's report could not be
considered a "final resolution" of Mexico's Article 2.1 claim,
which it clearly is.
13. Nowhere is it clearer that the Appellate Body has already rejected
Mexico's claim than it is with regard to the first element Mexico raises – the
distinction between the eligibility for the dolphin safe label for tuna product
containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins in an AIDCP-consistent manner and
by other fishing methods. While the Appellate Body agreed with Mexico that
Mexico's theory proved a detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products, it rejected Mexico's contention that a detrimental impact alone
proves a breach of Article 2.1.
14. It is also clear that the
Appellate Body rejected Mexico's claim as it relates to the two other
elements: the differing record-keeping
and verification requirements required for tuna caught inside and outside the
ETP, and the differing observer requirements for tuna vessels operating inside
and outside the ETP. The facts that Mexico complains of here were uncontested in the original proceeding, and clearly fell
within the Appellate Body's review of the record. The Appellate Body did not
consider either element as proving the original measure discriminatory. This
result is unsurprising, of course, as these two elements are not relevant to
the Article 2.1 analysis, and, in any event, are completely even-handed.
3. Mexico
Fails To Prove that any of These Three Elements Is Relevant to the Article 2.1
Analysis
15. The Appellate Body has
instructed that not every distinction is relevant to an Article 2.1
analysis – "we only need to
examine the distinction that accounts for the detrimental impact on Mexican
tuna products as compared to US tuna products and tuna products originating in
other countries." Yet none of the
three elements Mexico raises "accounts" for the detrimental impact. Indeed,
Mexico's first element is the
detrimental impact. Further, the detrimental impact does not stem from either
of the other two elements that Mexico raises. That is to say, if the AIDCP
parties agreed to eliminate the record-keeping and observer requirements, the
detrimental impact would not be affected in the least bit.
4. Mexico
Fails To Prove that the Detrimental Impact Does Not Stem Exclusively from
Legitimate Regulatory Distinctions
a. Mexico
Fails To Prove that the Eligibility Conditions Are Not Even‑Handed
16. Mexico's first reason that
the amended measure's detrimental impact reflects discrimination is that the
eligibility conditions are not even-handed. Mexico fails to prove what it
asserts. On the contrary, the relevant eligibility conditions are completely
even-handed. The amended measure contains no exceptions or carve outs, as was
the case in EC – Seal Products and US – Clove Cigarettes. The requirements are equal for all products and nothing
in the design or structure of the amended measure indicates that Mexican
producers are disadvantaged in any way vis-à-vis their competitors in the United States,
Thailand, the Philippines, or elsewhere.
17. Mexico's argument – that the
measure disadvantages Mexican tuna product (and is thus not "even-handed")
because tuna product containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins is
ineligible for the label while tuna product containing tuna caught by other
methods is potentially eligible for the label – is identical in substance to
what it argued before the original panel. Yet Mexico ignores that the original
panel has already fully addressed Mexico's argument and found it lacking.
18. Those findings are
undoubtedly correct. As such, it is difficult to conceive how the amended
measure's distinction between setting on dolphins and other fishing methods is
anything but "even-handed." Indeed, the Appellate Body appears to
analyze whether a regulatory distinction is even-handed in much the same way
that the original panel analyzed Mexico's discrimination argument in the
original proceeding. It is thus not surprising that the Appellate Body rejected
Mexico's argument that the denial of eligibility of setting on dolphins for the
label disadvantages Mexican tuna product producers, as discussed above. In
contrast, Mexico constructs its entire argument as if neither the original
panel nor the Appellate Body has ever examined these issues. It is simply
improper for Mexico to set out its Article 2.1 claim in a vacuum, and urge
the Panel to ignore all of the findings and analysis of the original panel and
the Appellate Body.
19. Rather than addressing the
original panel's analysis, Mexico relies on the assertion that eligible fishing
methods "have adverse effects on dolphins that are equal to or greater
than the disqualified tuna fishing method of setting on dolphins in an
AIDCP-compliant manner." Mexico utterly fails to prove its assertion. Indeed,
the science supports the distinctions of
the amended measure, and directly contradicts
Mexico's approach. And, of course, it is this science that underlies the
Appellate Body's conclusion that "setting on dolphins is particularly harmful to dolphins"; a finding, like so
many others, that Mexico is forced to ignore. In fact, Mexico ignores the
amended measure itself – tuna products containing tuna caught by any method are
ineligible for the label where a dolphin
was killed or seriously injured.
b. Mexico
Fails To Prove that the Record-Keeping and Verification Requirements Are Not
Even-Handed
20. Mexico's second reason that
the amended measure's detrimental impact reflects discrimination is that the
AIDCP mandates certain record-keeping and verification requirements for tuna
caught by large purse seine vessels inside the ETP and the U.S. measure
does not require those same AIDCP-mandated requirements for all other vessels
catching tuna contained in tuna products sold labeled as "dolphin safe."
21. The relevant facts indicate
that the record-keeping and verification requirements imposed by the challenged
measure are entirely even-handed as to Mexican producers vis-à-vis tuna
producers from the United States and other Members. These requirements
are, in fact, entirely neutral as to the nationality of vessel and origin of
the tuna product. Indeed, where the regulations draw distinctions based on
nationality, it is the U.S. canneries and other processors that suffer the
greater regulatory burden, not their foreign competitors. To the extent that
the regulations draw other distinctions, they do so not between Members, or
even the fishing methods of Members, but rather between tuna caught by
AIDCP-covered large purse seine vessels and tuna caught by all other vessels.
22. And this is where Mexico
makes its argument – the AIDCP imposes requirements that are not required of
producers operating in (or sourcing) from other fisheries. The problem with
this argument is obvious – Mexico complains of a "distinction"
created by the AIDCP, not the U.S. measure. Indeed, if the United States
eliminated all references to the AIDCP (and its requirements) from the amended
measure, the regulatory distinction that Mexico criticizes would still
exist.
23. But such is the
impossibility of Mexico's argument. The mere fact that the U.S. measure
acknowledges the AIDCP requirements cannot be considered to be legally
problematic. Indeed, it would seem difficult to conceive of Mexico successfully
arguing that the binding international legal commitments that Mexico has made put its own tuna producers at such a
disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors that the United States
should be considered to have acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations.
24. Moreover, Mexico puts
forward no evidence to support the assertion
that the U.S. Government and its citizens have been defrauded on an
industry-wide scale for over the past two decades. And Mexico's argument
fails right here. It simply cannot be the case that a complainant
establishes a prima facie case on the basis of
a bare allegation – without any evidence –
a point that the Appellate Body has repeatedly found. Of course, the United States
is not aware of fraud on the industry-wide scale that Mexico suggests is
occurring.
25. The fact that Mexico may
consider that the U.S. law imposes "insufficient requirements and
procedures" on non-AIDCP-covered large purse seine vessels is entirely
beside the point. The Appellate Body's legitimate regulatory distinction
analysis is not meant to be a vehicle for any and all criticisms of the
challenged measure that the complainant sees fit to make. Indeed, the sixth
preambular recital of the TBT Agreement "recognizes that a Member shall
not be prevented from taking measures necessary to achieve its legitimate
objectives 'at the levels it considers appropriate,'"
a point that the Appellate Body has repeatedly affirmed.
26. Appearing to acknowledge
that the United States cannot relieve Mexico of its own international legal
commitments, Mexico argues that the United States can only make this
element "even-handed" by increasing the regulatory burden outside the
ETP to the level that already exists inside the ETP. Mexico thus appears to
argue that the record-keeping and verification requirements that Mexico has
agreed to form the "floor" for the requirements that the United States
must impose on itself and all other
trading partners. Mexico cites no legal support for such a proposition, and it
is surely incorrect. As noted above, a Member may take measures "at the
levels that it considers appropriate," a point that Article 2.4 of
the TBT Agreement confirms. However, a Member does not act inconsistently with
its WTO obligations by applying domestic measures that reflect the international
agreements (or lack thereof) of different Members. Under no
circumstances, does Mexico set the appropriate level for the United States.
The United States sets its own "floor."
c. Mexico
Fails To Prove that the Requirement for an Observer Certification Is Not
Even-Handed
27. The U.S. measure's
treatment of observers is entirely even-handed. The requirement for large purse
seine vessels operating in the ETP to carry observers (while other vessels are
not similarly required) stems from the AIDCP,
not U.S. law. Indeed, if the United States eliminated all references
to the AIDCP-mandated observer requirement from the amended measure, the "distinction"
that Mexico criticizes would still exist.
Mexico claims that requiring observers for some vessels and not requiring it
for others is "arbitrary," but, in fact, it is anything but. The
amended measure requires an observer certification where one particular
international agreement requires observers, and does not require an observer
certification where the relevant authority for the fishery does not require
observers to certify as to the tuna's eligibility for a "dolphin safe"
label.
28. The Appellate Body was well
aware of the uncontested fact that large purse seine vessels operating in the
ETP are required to carry observers while other vessels are not, and did not
find that difference proved the challenged measure discriminatory. Mexico now
wrongly urges the Panel to ignore the
Appellate Body's conclusion because "neither the Panel nor the Appellate
Body had before it the facts regarding adverse effects on dolphins set out in
section III of this submission or the facts regarding the unreliability of
captain certifications …" But Mexico is not free in an Article 21.5
proceeding to "appeal" the findings of the DSB. Mexico understood the
facts on the record, and also understood that any eventual adopted Appellate
Body report would constitute a "final resolution" in this dispute. It
was Mexico's own decision to limit its
discrimination claim (and the evidence submitted in support of that claim), and
Mexico cannot now complain that it is unsatisfied with the consequences of its
own decision. Mexico should not get an unfair "second chance" to
re-argue its claim as to unchanged
elements of the challenged measure.
29. Mexico appears to ground its
argument on two assertions: 1) the tuna
product containing tuna caught by vessels other than AIDCP-covered large purse
seine ones is inaccurately or fraudulently labeled; and 2) the captain
statement is "inherently unreliable" and "meaningless." Mexico
fails to prove either assertion.
30. First, Mexico puts forward not a single piece of evidence that any tuna product has
been marketed in the United States as "dolphin safe," when, in
fact, it did not meet the conditions of U.S. law. NOAA conducts extensive
verification of U.S. canneries, which process both U.S. and foreign
tuna, through inspections, audits, and spot checks.
31. Second, Mexico is wrong to
argue that a captain's statement is "inherently unreliable" and otherwise
"meaningless." As a general matter, the United States relies on "self-certification,"
as Mexico puts it, in numerous different contexts. Mexico's suggestions – that
such an approach is inherently unreliable – would be, if true, hugely trade disruptive. Members simply do not have the
resources to require the independent verification of all the activities of
domestic and foreign producers. This is certainly the case with trade in fish
where the vessels operate on the high seas or in the territorial waters of
other Members and an importing Member cannot independently verify every action
taking place (or not taking place) on every vessel that may produce fish for
the domestic market. As such, captain statements, logbooks, and the like have
always been a core implementation tool for Members to verify compliance with
the applicable fishing rules. The fact is that a captain's statement is an
effective vehicle to determine the eligibility of tuna for the label. The U.S. measure
has long relied on a captain statement to certify that the vessel did not set
on dolphins, and the original panel found that this certification does, in
fact, address the observed and unobserved mortality arising from setting on
dolphins. This finding was not only affirmed by the Appellate Body, it constituted the basis of the Appellate Body's finding on
the Article 2.1 claim.
32. Yet, Mexico disagrees,
arguing, in essence, that the original panel and Appellate Body were incorrect,
and appealing to the Panel to correct this (alleged) error. But none of Mexico's exhibits concludes what Mexico asserts –
that the captain's statement is "meaningless" – and much of what is
contained in these documents directly contradicts Mexico's own argument.
33. Mexico contends that the only way the United States can make this alleged
regulatory distinction even-handed is to unilaterally require 100 percent
observer coverage throughout the world. Again, Mexico considers that whatever
commitment it has made to other AIDCP parties must be the "floor"
that all other Members must comply with for continued access to the dolphin
safe label. The tuna or tuna product produced by a Member whose producers are
not in a position to meet such an expensive requirement (because, for example,
there is no international organization that administers an observer program as
is the case in the ETP) must be denied access to the label, even though the tuna caught by that Member's vessels did not
harm dolphins.
34. An importing Member found to
have discriminated against an exporting Member's products always has the choice
as to how to come into compliance. But here Mexico claims that the United States
has no choice – the United States can only raise the
requirements applied to the like product of the other relevant Members. And the
reason that Mexico takes this position is that the difference in requirements does not flow from the U.S. measure, but from the
differing commitments that Members have taken in different RFMOs for fishing on
the high seas and in their own municipal laws for fishing in territorial waters.
Mexico's grievance is not with the challenged law, but with the diversity of
rules for fishing that exist throughout the world.
II. Article I:1 of the GATT 1994
35. Mexico fails to establish
that the U.S. dolphin safe labeling measure is inconsistent with Article I:1
of the GATT 1994. The United States does not contest that the first
three elements of Article I:1 are satisfied here. We do, however, disagree
with Mexico that the "advantage" has not been "immediately"
and "unconditionally" accorded to like products originating in Mexico.
36. The United States
considers that the "advantage" for purposes of Article I:1 is
the access to the dolphins safe label. No tuna product of a Member has a right to the label. Rather, the advantage is subject to
eligibility requirements that all tuna products must meet in order to be
labeled consistent with U.S. law. Those conditions are: 1) no purse seine net was intentionally
deployed on or to encircle dolphins during the fishing trip; and 2) no dolphins
were killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear deployments in which
the tuna were caught.
37. According to the Appellate
Body, the "fundamental purpose" of Article I:1 is "to
preserve the equality of competitive opportunities for like imported products
from all Members." However, the Appellate Body also noted that Article I:1
does not prohibit a Member from attaching any conditions to the granting of an
advantage, and "permits regulatory distinctions to be drawn between like
imported products, provided that such distinctions do not result in a
detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities for like imported products
from any Member."
38. Mexico must, therefore,
prove that the opportunity under U.S. law to label tuna product as "dolphin
safe" if certain conditions are met is not immediately and unconditionally
accorded to Mexican products. This, Mexico fails to do. In fact, the amended
measure provides the same opportunity
for all tuna products to be labeled "dolphin safe." The fact that
some Members elect to take advantage of that opportunity, while others do not,
does not amount to discrimination, as the original panel correctly found. Nothing
prevents Mexican vessels from fishing in a manner that would yield tuna products
eligible for the dolphin safe label, and nothing prevents vessels of other
countries from fishing in a manner that would preclude access to the label.
39. Mexico has not provided any
reason that the findings of either of the original panel or the GATT 1947 panel
do not control the result here. And indeed, Mexico could not do so. The fact is
that the original panel was entirely correct when it determined that any
discrepancy in access to the label between Members is due to the different
choices Members have made, rather than the requirements of the challenged
measure. The eligibility condition regarding setting on dolphins does not "discriminate[]
with respect to the origin of the products."
40. The facts here are in
contrast to the ones in EC – Seal Products
where the Appellate Body recently found a breach of Article I:1. There,
the market access advantage was subject to eligibility conditions related to
immutable characteristics (such as the racial/cultural identity of the seal
hunters) such that while virtually all of the products of Greenland were likely
to qualify for access under the measure at issue, the vast majority of the
products of Canada and Norway were not. But here, fishermen have a choice about
how they fish. By no means is setting on dolphins required
inside (or outside) the ETP to catch tuna. The eligibility conditions – and
therefore the opportunity for the label – are the same for everyone.
III. Article III:4 of
the GATT 1994
41. The United States does
not contest that the first two elements of Article III:4 are satisfied
here. The only question for the Panel to determine
is whether the eligibility conditions of the amended measure provides less
favorable treatment to Mexican tuna products than to like U.S. tuna
products.
42. Mexico must prove that the U.S. measure
has a "detrimental impact on the conditions of competition" for its
products, which requires a "genuine relationship between the measure at
issue and the adverse impact on competitive opportunities for imported products."
Mexico fails to meet this standard.
43. First, Mexico fails to
establish the threshold element that the challenged measure accords different
treatment to U.S. and Mexican tuna products. As discussed above, the
measure sets the same eligibility requirements for
all tuna products sold in the United States – no tuna may be caught by
setting on dolphins and no tuna may be caught where a dolphin was killed or
seriously injured. Second, Mexico completely ignores the original panel's
well-reasoned discrimination analysis, which Mexico apparently considers to be
entirely irrelevant to the analysis of its Article III:4 claim. Even if
Mexico did attempt to prove that the distinction that the U.S. measure
draws between setting on dolphins and other fishing methods is unfounded, such
an attempt would surely fail. As discussed above, Mexico puts forward no
evidence that setting on dolphins could ever be considered "dolphin-safe."
44. Mexico's approach may serve
Mexico's offensive interests in this dispute, but, if accepted, would greatly
undermine a Member's ability to regulate in the public interest. Under Mexico's
approach, the sole relevant consideration is
the effect of the measure. A responding Member is simply not afforded the
opportunity to explain, nor would a panel have the ability to examine, the
underlying rationale and operation of the standard in the discrimination
analysis. The basis of the requirements – indeed, the accuracy
of the label – are wholly immaterial to the national treatment
analysis. The consequences of such an approach cannot be overstated. Many
legitimate measures would be vulnerable to attack where they had not been
before.
45. What Mexico's approach
suggests, therefore, is that a Member must, prior to applying a measure that
sets legitimate standards, survey all current and potential trading partners of
products affected by the measure to determine whether the affected products of
those countries either meet that standard (or whether its producers are willing
to adapt to the new standard). Where a particular country's products do not
meet that standard (and that country's producers are not willing to adapt), the
Member must lower its standards to avoid breaching Article III:4.
Such a "least common denominator" approach greatly undermines a
Member's ability to regulate in the public interest generally.
46. The Appellate Body's
analysis in EC – Seal Products does not suggest a
different conclusion where there were sufficient facts on the record for the
panel and Appellate Body to determine that the challenged measure was de facto inconsistent with Article III:4.
IV. Article XX of the GATT 1994
47. Even if the amended dolphin
safe labeling measure were found to be inconsistent with Article I:1 or
III:4 of the GATT 1994, the amended measure is justified under Article XX(b)
and (g).
48. As to the first element of Article XX(b),
it has already been determined that one of the two objectives of the original
measure was to "contribut[e] to the protection of dolphins[] by
ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing
fleets to catch tuna in a manner that
_adversely affects dolphins,"
and that the original measure "relate[d] to genuine concerns in relation
to the protection of the life or health of dolphins," and was "intended
to protect animal life or health or the environment."
49. _As to the second element of Article XX(b), the
amended measure easily satisfies the "necessary" analysis. First, it
is hardly debatable that the protection of dolphins is an important objective
to the United States. In any event, "the preservation of animal and
plant life and health, which constitutes an essential part of the protection of
the environment, is an important value, recognized in the WTO Agreement." Second,
as both the original panel and Appellate Body have confirmed, the original
measure contributed to its objective. Third, the Appellate Body has already
found that the alternative measure Mexico identified for purposes of TBT Article 2.2
did not prove the original measure "more trade restrictive than necessary"
This is powerful evidence that Mexico will be unable identify a suitable
WTO-consistent alternative for purposes of Article XX(b).
50. The amended measure also
satisfies the standard of Article XX(g). First, dolphins are a living
natural resource and, as such, are finite and exhaustible. Second, the amended
measure is clearly "relating to" the conservation of dolphins. The
original panel found, and the Appellate Body affirmed, that one of the original
measure's objectives is the "protection" of dolphins. Third, the
amended measure imposes comparable restrictions on domestic and imported
products. In fact, the relevant requirements are the same.
51. The amended measure also
satisfies the Article XX chapeau. Only where the panel finds such "different
regulatory treatment" exists, should the panel analyze "whether the
resulting discrimination is 'arbitrary or unjustifiable.'" But here the
eligibility conditions are the same for everyone – the amended measure is neutral as to nationality. Any tuna product containing
tuna caught by setting on dolphins is ineligible for the label – the
nationality of the vessel (or processor) is irrelevant. Rather,
whether tuna product is eligible for the dolphin safe label depends on the
choices made by vessel owners, operators, and captains. Moreover, there is no
evidence to suggest that this particular eligibility requirement singles out
Mexico.
52. In any event, the
eligibility conditions regarding setting on dolphins are neither arbitrary nor
unjustified. As the Appellate Body has recently emphasized, "[o]ne of the
most important factors" in making this assessment is "whether the
discrimination can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy
objective with respect to which the measure has been provisionally justified
under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX." The relevant objective
for both subparagraphs (b) and (g) is to "contribut[e] to the protection of dolphins[] by
ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing
fleets to catch tuna in a manner that
_adversely affects dolphins."
53. _It is without question that the two relevant
eligibility conditions are rationally related to this policy objective. First,
it could hardly be questioned whether the first eligibility condition is
rationally related to the objective, and we do not read Mexico's First Written
Submission to the contrary. Second, the United States has already detailed
the substantial harms that setting on dolphins causes dolphins with regard to
the second eligibility condition. _By making tuna product containing tuna caught by setting
on dolphins ineligible for the dolphin safe label, the amended measure seeks to
"minimize observed and unobserved mortality and injury to dolphins." The
other fishing methods that produce tuna for the U.S. tuna product market
do not cause the same level of harm to dolphins that setting on dolphins does. Indeed,
all of the potentially eligible fishing
methods capture dolphins only by accident, while the whole
point of setting on dolphins is to capture them in a purse seine net.
Setting on dolphins is the only fishing
method that targets dolphins.
·
ANNEX B-5
executive
summary of the SECOND written submission of the united states
I. MEXICO FAILS TO ESTABLISH
THAT THE AMENDED DOLPHIN SAFE LABELING MEASURE IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 2.1
OF THE TBT AGREEMENT
A. Mexico's Claim Falls Outside the Panel's Terms of Reference
1. Mexico's Article 2.1
claim falls outside the Panel's terms of reference.
2. First, Mexico argues that
the Panel should focus on the amended measure "as a whole, and not
elements comprising that measure." But in determining its own terms of
reference, the Panel clearly can look at the specific aspects of the measure. To
say that the Panel is prevented from doing so ignores past Appellate Body and
panel reports that have consistently found that claims against unchanged elements of the original measure fall outside the
compliance panel's limited terms of reference.
3. Second, Mexico argues that
these three aspects of the measure have changed from the original measure,
implying that the line of reports cited by the United States is
inapplicable to this dispute. Mexico is mistaken. The 2013 Final Rule does not
change any of the requirements in ways that Mexico alleges
prove the amended measure discriminatory.
4. Third, Mexico argues that,
even if the aspects of the amended measure that it now complains of are
unchanged from the original measure, the Panel still has jurisdiction to
address Mexico's claim because it has not been resolved on the merits. But that
is clearly wrong. The original panel and Appellate Body did reach the merits of
Mexico's Article 2.1 claim. And, in doing so, the Appellate Body rejected
all three elements of Mexico's Article 2.1 claim.
5. Fourth, Mexico states that "'new
claims against inseparable aspects of a measure taken to comply, which are
unchanged from the original measure' are within a panel's terms of reference
under Article 21.5." Mexico makes no actual argument that these
aspects are "inseparable" from the measure taken to comply, and all
three aspects of the measure clearly fall outside the Panel's terms of
reference.
6. Finally, Mexico does not "unconditionally
accept" the Appellate Body report. Such an approach deprives the United States
of the opportunity to come into compliance with its obligations in accordance
with the DSU.
B. The
Appellate Body Has Already Rejected the Entirety of Mexico's Article 2.1
Claim
7. Mexico's Article 2.1
claim should be rejected on the basis that the Appellate Body has already
considered – and rejected – the entirety of the claim.
8. First, Mexico argues that
the "labelling conditions and requirements that relate to the
qualification and disqualification of the fishing methods" are "different"
in this proceeding than they were in the original proceeding. But of course
that is wrong. The eligibility condition Mexico complains about here is the
same one it complained of previously.
9. The same point holds true
for the other two aspects (record-keeping/verification and observer
requirements) that Mexico raises as part of its Article 2.1 claim. The
AIDCP mandates certain record-keeping/verification and observer requirements
for large purse seine vessels operating inside the ETP that other vessels are
not subject to. This "difference" was uncontested
in the original proceeding and clearly fell within the Appellate Body's review
of the record. What Mexico urges the Panel to do is accept its arguments
without any regard to the DSB recommendations and rulings in the original
proceeding. That is wrong. The Panel's analysis must be "done in the light
of the evaluation of the consistency of the original measure with a covered
agreement undertaken by the original panel and subsequently by the Appellate
Body."
C. Mexico
Fails To Prove that Any of the Three Elements Is Relevant to the Article 2.1
Analysis
10. Not every regulatory
distinction is relevant to the question of whether "the detrimental impact
on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction." According
to the Appellate Body: "[W]e only need to
examine the distinction that accounts for the detrimental impact on Mexican
tuna products as compared to US tuna products and tuna products originating in
other countries. While Mexico appears to agree with this principle, it wrongly
insists that the requirements regarding record-keeping/verification and
observers are relevant to the Article 2.1 analysis. The source of the
parties' differing views on this issue is a disagreement over what the
detrimental impact is in this dispute.
11. For the first step of its Article 2.1
analysis, Mexico relies on the Appellate Body's Article 2.1
analysis and contends that the detrimental impact is caused by the denial of "access
to this label for most Mexican tuna products." However, for the second
step of its Article 2.1 analysis, Mexico changes course and, relying
heavily on the original panel's Article 2.2 analysis, argues that
the "accuracy" of the information is the touchstone of the
detrimental impact finding. The United States disagrees that the
detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities can ever be different for
the two steps of the Article 2.1 analysis. Such an interpretation renders
the analysis meaningless. The entire point of the second step of the analysis
is to determine whether the detrimental impact determined
to exist in the first step "reflects discrimination."
12. The Appellate Body's
conclusions in paragraphs 233-235 of the report show that access
not accuracy was the touchstone of its detrimental impact analysis. Thus the
record-keeping/verification and observer requirements are not relevant to this
analysis, in that neither aspect accounts for the detrimental impact. Not only
does Mexico's argument contradict the DSB recommendations and rulings, but
Mexico puts forward zero evidence
to prove such an assertion. Mexico's attempt to "re-imagine" the
Appellate Body's detrimental impact analysis is another example of Mexico's
attempted "appeal" of the DSB recommendations and rulings.
13. Mexico also errs in arguing
that "further support" for the proposition that the detrimental
impact exists can be found in the "unilateral application" of the
amended measure. First, the DSB recommendations and rulings did not find that
the detrimental impact is a factor of so-called "unilateral"
application. As such, it is unclear why Mexico considers its argument relevant
to the dispute. Second, the Appellate Body has already found that the objective
of the original measure is not to "coerce"
Mexico. Third, Mexico claims that the amended measure "undermines the
AIDCP regime" but puts forward no evidence that the functioning of the
AIDCP has been harmed. In any event, it simply cannot be the case that the United States
has acted contrary to the WTO Agreement by determining for itself what
level of protection is appropriate for the United States.
D. Mexico
Fails To Prove that the Detrimental Impact Does Not Stem Exclusively from
Legitimate Regulatory Distinctions
1. Mexico Fails To Prove that the Eligibility
Conditions Are Not Even‑Handed
14. In its second submission,
Mexico again fails to establish that the eligibility requirements prove the
amended measure inconsistent with Article 2.1. As the United States
has explained, the eligibility conditions are, in fact, entirely neutral, and
thus even-handed. Mexico counters that the Appellate Body determined that the
eligibility conditions result in a detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products.
That is true, but it does not prove that such eligibility conditions are not
even-handed. Further, it is clear from the DSB recommendations and rulings that
the Appellate Body did not agree that the eligibility condition regarding
setting on dolphins was not even-handed, and the fact that the requirement was
neutral across fisheries was key to its finding.
15. Mexico also reasserts its
argument that "fishing methods used outside the ETP have adverse effects
on dolphins equal to or greater than setting on dolphins in the ETP in an
AIDCP-consistent manner." Mexico puts forward no new evidence to support
this assertion nor does it respond to the extensive evidence that the United States
put forward that proves this assertion to be unfounded.
16. More
fundamentally, Mexico is wrong to argue that the United States may not
draw distinctions between different fishing methods. Setting on dolphins is the
only fishing method that targets dolphins. There is nothing about it that is
safe for dolphins, and the measure rightly denies access to the label to tuna
products containing tuna caught by this method.
2. Mexico
Fails To Prove that the Record-Keeping and Verification Requirements Are Not
Even-Handed
17. Mexico argues that, because
the AIDCP mandates certain record-keeping and verification requirements for
tuna caught by large purse seine vessels operating inside the ETP and the
amended measure does not impose those same requirements on other tuna sold in
the U.S. tuna product market, the amended measure is not even-handed. However,
the "difference" that Mexico complained of does not stem from U.S. law
at all, but from the AIDCP. Mexico argues that its "claim is made in
respect of the relevant regulatory distinction in the labelling conditions and
requirements of the Amended Tuna Measure, and not the AIDCP." But Mexico
provides no reason as to why this is so. The actual record-keeping and
verification requirements Mexico complains of are contained in the AIDCP. Thus
it cannot be the case that the amended measure
disadvantages Mexican producers in a manner that could be considered not to be
even-handed.
18. Mexico has failed to submit
any evidence to support its assertion that the U.S. Government and its
citizens have been defrauded on an industry-wide scale by inaccurate labeling
over the past two decades. Mexico denies that this aspect of its claim fails
for lack of evidence based on its theory of its burden of proof. In Mexico's
view, a complainant is not required to prove that this element is not
even-handed. Rather, all that is required is for Mexico to assert that: "tuna
products containing non-dolphin-safe tuna caught outside the ETP could potentially enter the U.S. market inaccurately
labeled as dolphin-safe." But the Appellate Body made clear that nothing
in its Article 2.1 analysis alters the traditional notions of burden of
proof.
19. Next, Mexico fails to
explain how its approach is not inconsistent with the fundamental principle
that "a Member shall not be prevented from taking measures necessary to
achieve its legitimate objectives 'at the levels it considers
appropriate.'" By
contending that the United States must impose AIDCP-equivalent
requirements on all its trading partners, Mexico urges this Panel to adopt an
approach whereby whatever Mexico commits to in an international agreement, the United States
must require of itself and all its other trading partners, irrespective of the
science or any other consideration. Mexico's approach is incompatible with the
sixth preambular recital and, as such, cannot establish that the amended
measure is inconsistent with Article 2.1.
20. Finally, Mexico ignores the
history of the AIDCP. The IATTC Members agreed to different
requirements regarding record-keeping/verification and observer coverage than
other Members have agreed to in other fisheries because the ETP is different. Nowhere else has a tuna fishery caused the
harm to dolphins that large purse seine vessels have caused in the ETP. Accordingly,
it is no surprise that tuna caught by large purse seine vessels in the ETP is
now subject to different rules than tuna caught elsewhere. The fact that the
amended measure requires the AIDCP reference number to be included on the Form
370 is not illegitimate.
3. Mexico Fails To Prove that the Requirement
for an Observer Certification Is Not Even-Handed
21. Mexico again fails to
establish a prima facie case that not imposing
AIDCP-equivalent observer coverage on the rest of the world renders the amended
measure discriminatory.
22. First, the specific
requirements regarding the AIDCP observer program are contained in the AIDCP
and related documents. Such requirements are not repeated in U.S. law.
23. Second, Mexico's approach
directly contradicts the Appellate Body's findings. The Appellate Body was
aware that large purse seine vessels operating in the ETP carry observers while
other vessels do not. Indeed, the Appellate Body noted that the Panel did not
state that imposing a general observer certification requirement "would be
the only way for the United States to
calibrate its 'dolphin safe' labeling provisions" and noted "that the
measure at issue itself contemplates the possibility" of a captain's
certification. Consistently, the Appellate Body did not find the aspect
regarding observers and captain statements to be not even-handed. Rather, the
Appellate Body recognized that the original measure "fully
addresses the adverse effects on dolphins resulting from setting on dolphins"
– both inside and outside the ETP – even though a
captain statement was the certification required for tuna caught outside the
ETP. Mexico now seeks to "appeal" this finding.
24. Third, Mexico contends that
captain statements are "inherently unreliable" and that the amended
measure is "designed and applied in a manner that creates the likelihood,
if not the certainty, that non-conforming tuna will be improperly certified as
dolphin safe." But Mexico does not establish a prima facie
case that the amended measure is inconsistent with Article 2.1 based on
mere assertions. Mexico puts forward no evidence that any tuna that is
ineligible for the label is being illegally labeled as "dolphin safe."
25. Fourth, Mexico argues that
this aspect of the measure is not even-handed because it is "entirely
inconsistent with the objective" of the measure. The Appellate Body has
never mentioned this inquiry as an element of the analysis in either this
dispute or the other two TBT disputes. And the Appellate Body has made clear
that analyses are different under TBT Article 2.1 and the chapeau of GATT Article XX.
Therefore, this issue is not relevant to the analysis.
26. Fifth, Mexico's argument
fails because it: 1) ignores why the
AIDCP was agreed to in the first place; 2) ignores the level of current harms
occurring due to setting on dolphins; 3) ignores the trade consequences of
requiring 100 percent observer coverage; 4) ignores the fundamental principle
underlying the TBT Agreement that "a Member shall not be prevented
from taking measures necessary to achieve its legitimate objectives 'at the levels it considers appropriate'"; and 5) and
requires the United States to impose "a rigid and unbending"
observer requirement on all of its trading partners, regardless of whether it
is needed in light of harm to dolphins in that particular fishery or feasible
given the expense of the program.
II. MEXICO FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE AMENDED MEASURE IS
INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE I:1 OF THE GATT 1994
27. Mexico relies entirely on
the Appellate Body's conclusion in paragraphs 233-235 of its report that the
amended measure causes a detrimental impact on Mexican tuna product containing
tuna caught by setting on dolphins to prove its Article I:1 claim. The
Appellate Body's finding of detrimental impact, as well as the original panel's
factual findings that underlie the Appellate Body's conclusion, is limited to
the ineligibility for the label of tuna product containing tuna caught by
setting on dolphins and the potential eligibility of tuna product containing
tuna caught by other methods. Mexico neither claims nor proves
that any other aspect of the amended measure, including the requirements
related to record-keeping/verification and observer coverage, are inconsistent
with Article I:1.
28. Mexico has failed to meet
its burden of demonstrating that the amended measure is inconsistent with Article I:1.
The "advantage" accorded by the U.S. measure is access to the
dolphin safe label. Nothing prevents Mexican canneries or Mexican vessels from
producing tuna product that would be eligible for the dolphin safe label. Mexico
asserts that the Appellate Body has "effectively rejected the line of
reasoning" on which the U.S. argument relies. We disagree. The
Appellate Body did not reject the original panel's characterization of the U.S. measure
but, rather, what it perceived as the original panel's assumption that
regulatory distinctions not based on "national origin per se
cannot be relevant in assessing the consistency of a particular measure with Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement." The original panel made no findings under Article I:1,
and, therefore, the Panel should now undertake an "objective assessment of
the matter."
29. Mexico asserts that "the
consequences of the United States' unilateral action" in applying the
amended measure "provide further support" for the detrimental impact.
This argument fails. First, the DSB recommendations and rulings did not find
that the "detrimental impact" is a factor of so-called "unilateral"
application. Second, Mexico's characterization of the measure as "intentional[ly]
exerting pressure on Mexico to change its tuna fishing practices" is
incorrect. The original panel concluded that "nothing prevents Members
from using the incentives created by consumer preferences to encourage or
discourage particular behaviours that may have an impact on the protection of
animal life or health." Third, Mexico's reliance on US – Shrimp
is misplaced. Fourth, the DSB recommendations and rulings state that the AIDCP
label does not fulfill the objectives of the U.S. measure at the level the
United States considers appropriate.
III. MEXICO FAILS TO ESTABLISH
THAT THE AMENDED MEASURE IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE III:4 OF THE GATT 1994
30. Similar to its Article I:1
claim, Mexico relies entirely on paragraphs 233-235 of the Appellate Body
report to argue that the amended measure provides less favorable treatment to
Mexican tuna product, inconsistently with Article III:4. The Appellate
Body's findings concerning detrimental impact are limited to the ineligibility
for the label of tuna caught by setting on dolphins and the eligibility of tuna
caught by other methods. Mexico neither claims nor proves
that any other aspect of the amended measure are inconsistent with Article III:4.
31. Further, for the reasons
discussed above, Mexico fails to prove that the amended measure accords less
favorable treatment to Mexican tuna products. Mexico relies heavily on the
Appellate Body's statement in EC – Seal Products
that, under Article III:4, a panel is not "required to examine
whether the detrimental impact of a measure ... stems exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction," yet the analogy to this dispute is
flawed. Mexico's argument concerning the "unilateral[] design[] and
appli[cation]" of the measure is not relevant and fails for reasons
discussed above.
IV. THE AMENDED MEASURE IS JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT 1994
A. The Scope of the Analysis
32. Mexico urges the Panel to
engage in an inquiry that goes well beyond the scope of the subparagraphs (b)
and (g) analyses, as set out by the Appellate Body. Mexico relies exclusively
on paragraphs 233-235 of the Appellate Body report when it alleges that the
amended measure is inconsistent with Article I:1 and Article III:4,
under the theory that the amended measure denies "access" to the
label to Mexican tuna caught by setting on dolphins while tuna caught by other
means continues to have "access" to the label. It neither claims nor proves that any other aspect of the
amended measure is GATT-inconsistent. However, in its consideration of subparagraphs (b)
and (g), Mexico argues that, because "there are no effective record-keeping,
tracking and verification requirements or procedures in relation to tuna caught
by fishing vessels outside the ETP," the amended measure does not protect
animal health and life for purposes of subparagraph (b), nor "relate
to" the conservation of dolphins for purposes of subparagraph (g).
33. This is improper. The
Appellate Body has made clear that "the aspects of a measure to be
justified under the subparagraphs of Article XX are those that give
rise to the finding of inconsistency under the GATT 1994." The United States
need only justify the regulatory distinctions between tuna product containing
tuna caught by setting on dolphins and tuna product containing tuna caught by
other fishing methods, in light of how Mexico has framed (and attempted to
prove) its GATT claims. The portions of Mexico's Article XX response that
address the record-keeping/verification and observer requirements are
irrelevant to this analysis.
B. The Amended Measure Satisfies the Conditions
of Article XX(b)
1. The Amended Dolphin Safe Labelling Measure
Has a Sufficient Nexus with an Interest Covered by Article XX(b)
34. The Appellate Body
determined that the original measure had two objectives: the "consumer information objective"
and the "dolphin protection objective." The amended measure has the
same two objectives. The DSB recommendations and rulings demonstrate that there
is "a sufficient nexus" between the amended measure's dolphin
protection objective and the protection of animal life or health. _The original panel
found, and the Appellate Body affirmed, that the original measure "relate[d]
to genuine concerns in relation to the protection of the life or health of
dolphins," and was "intended to protect animal life or health or the
environment."
35. Mexico ignores the DSB
recommendations and rulings and pursues an unprecedented alternative legal
theory, arguing that the amended measure does not pursue an objective that
falls within the scope of subparagraph (b) because it does not
contribute to that objective enough. This theory fails. Mexico's
focus on the contribution of the measure improperly collapses the questions of
whether the relevant objective falls within the scope of subparagraph (b),
and whether the challenged measure is "necessary" to protect animal life
and health. The level at which the measure contributes to its objective is not
relevant to the former question. Further, Mexico's argument falls outside the
scope of this analysis in that the entire argument is grounded in the aspects
of the measure that Mexico neither alleges nor proves are GATT-inconsistent.
2. The Amended Dolphin Safe
Labelling Measure Is "Necessary" for the Protection of Dolphin Life
or Health
36. A necessity analysis
involves "a process of 'weighing and balancing' a series of factors,
including the importance of the objective, the contribution of the measure to
that objective, and the trade-restrictiveness of the measure." As to the
first element, the United States explained that the protection of dolphins
is an important objective. Mexico concedes this point.
37. As to the second element,
the DSB recommendations and rulings established that the original measure
contributed to the dolphin protection objective to a certain extent. The
amended measure contributes to this same objective at an even higher level. Mexico
disagrees with the findings of the original panel and Appellate Body. Indeed,
Mexico appears to go as far as to contend that neither measure – the original
one or the amended one – makes any
contribution to the dolphin protection objective. In the context of an Article 21.5
proceeding, the underlying DSB recommendations and rulings are taken as a given.
The Panel should reject Mexico's unfounded "appeal" of the Appellate
Body report.
38. As to the trade
restrictiveness of the measure, the Appellate Body in this very dispute stated
that "trade-restrictiveness" "means something having a limiting
effect on trade." Mexico presents three arguments as to why the U.S. measure
is "trade-restrictive." None of these relate to the amended measure's
trade-restrictiveness: the amended
measure does not bar Mexico from selling tuna product in the United States,
and, indeed, Mexican non-dolphin safe tuna product continues to be sold in the United States.
The arguments regarding the other two aspects of the measure,
record-keeping/verification and observers, fall outside the scope of the
inquiry as to whether the amended measure qualifies under subparagraph (b),
and it is difficult to understand how either aspect has any impact on exports
of Mexican tuna product to the United States.
39. Mexico's first alternative
measure is not a "genuine alternative." First, Mexico's description
of it is so brief and vague that it deprives the United States of the
opportunity to evaluate it. Second, the only difference between the amended
measure and Mexico's first alternative is that tuna caught by all vessels other
than large purse seine vessels operating in the ETP would be subject to
AIDCP-equivalent record-keeping/verification and observer requirements. But
only those aspects of the challenged measure "that give rise to the
finding of inconsistency under the GATT 1994" need be justified under the subparagraphs of
Article XX. Third, Mexico has not shown that its alternative is "less
WTO-inconsistent" than the amended measure allegedly is. Fourth, Mexico's
alternative is not less trade restrictive than the amended measure. Finally,
the proposed alternative is not reasonably available. Leaving aside the
start-up costs needed to establish such programs, operating the observer
coverage piece of Mexico's alternative on an annual
basis would cost at the very least hundreds
of millions of U.S. dollars, if not in excess of one billion U.S. dollars.
We would further note that given the size of these costs, it would seem
likewise impossible for industry to entirely fund the costs of such programs.
40. Mexico's second proposal is
for the United States to "allow alternative labeling schemes,"
including the AIDCP label, "coupled with a requirement to provide consumers
detailed information on what the labels mean." This appears to be the same
alternative Mexico put forward in the original proceeding for purposes of TBT Article 2.2.
The Appellate Body noted that, under Mexico's alternative, tuna caught by
setting on dolphins could be eligible for a dolphin safe label, whereas, under
the U.S. measure, such tuna was ineligible. Consequently, Mexico's
proposal would contribute to dolphin protection "to a lesser
degree" than the U.S. measure. The Appellate Body's
finding on Mexico's Article 2.2 claim is clearly applicable to this
alternative. Mexico provides no explanation of how its second proposed
alternative measure is consistent with the Appellate Body report and, in fact,
it is not.
C. The Amended Measure Satisfies the Standard of
Article XX(g)
41. The amended measure
satisfies Article XX(g). First, in its first written submission, the United States
explained that dolphins are an exhaustible natural resource. Mexico concedes
that this is the case.
42. Second, as discussed above,
the original panel found, and the Appellate Body affirmed, that the U.S. measure
pursues the above-quoted dolphin protection objective, and, in fact, does
contribute to that objective. The original panel found, and the Appellate Body
affirmed, that the original measure was capable of achieving its dolphin
protection objective completely within the ETP and partially outside the ETP. The
amended measure goes farther in protecting dolphins by applying a certification
mechanism (captain's statement) that was found "capable of achieving"
the U.S. objective in the context of setting on dolphins outside the ETP
to the certification that no dolphin was killed or seriously injured in
catching the tuna.
43. The amended measure also
imposes comparable restrictions on domestic and imported products. The amended
measure imposes the same
eligibility conditions and requirements on U.S. vessels and on foreign
vessels. Mexico claims that these requirements fall outside the scope of subparagraph (g)
because they do not "distribute
the burden of conservation between foreign and domestic consumers in an 'even-handed'
or balanced manner." But such an approach is incorrect. Under Mexico's
approach and in light of its GATT 1994 Articles I:1 and III:4 claims, subparagraph (g)
would be rendered inutile. Mexico also claims that the amended measure "does
not impose any real restrictions on the tuna that is harvested by the U.S. fleet
outside the ETP." But the Appellate Body has already found that the
original measure "fully addresses" the risks caused by the "particularly
harmful" practice of setting on dolphins both inside and outside the ETP. The
2013 Final Rule expands the certification system that supported this finding to
the risk of death and serious injury outside the ETP.
D. The Amended Measure Is Applied Consistently
with the Article XX Chapeau
44. The amended measure is also
not applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade. Under the chapeau,
discrimination exists only where "countries in which the same conditions
prevail are treated differently." Thus, there are two questions to
answer: 1) whether the amended measure
provides different regulatory treatment to the products originating from
different countries; and 2) whether the "conditions" prevailing in
those countries are "the same." Neither is the case here.
45. As the United States
has explained, the eligibility condition regarding setting on dolphins is neutral as to nationality. This provision has no carve-out
whereby the products of certain Members automatically qualify for different
regulatory treatment, as was the case in the measures challenged in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres and EC – Seal
Products. Whether tuna product is eligible for the dolphin safe
label depends on the choices made by vessel owners, operators, and captains. As
the United States noted previously, at the time the DPCIA was originally
enacted, U.S.-flagged vessels (as well as many other vessels) operated in the
ETP and set on dolphins. The mere fact that, over the past 20 years, vessels
flagged to some Members have adopted methods of fishing that are less harmful
to dolphins (while others have not) does not mean the U.S. measure
provides different regulatory treatment to different countries.
46. Also, the conditions
prevailing in the relevant countries are not the same. Because this eligibility
condition does not distinguish between Members, or even between fisheries, but
between fishing methods, it would appear that the most appropriate "condition"
to examine in this analysis is the different harms to dolphins caused by
setting on dolphins, on the one hand, and by purse seine (other than setting on
dolphins), longline, and pole-and-line fishing, on the other. That comparison
is not even close. The science regarding harms to dolphins fully supports the
distinction the measure draws between setting on dolphins and other fishing
methods. As such, with regard to the protection and conservation of dolphins,
the "conditions" prevailing in a Member whose fleet routinely sets on
dolphins are not the same as those in a Member
whose fleet employs the other methods used to produce tuna for the U.S. tuna
product market.
47. Mexico also appears to make
a separate argument that the alleged difference in the
record-keeping/verification and observer requirements also proves that the
amended measure discriminates where the conditions are the same. This argument
fails. First, Mexico cannot explain why such an argument is relevant to this
analysis. Mexico it does not even allege, much less prove, that the
record-keeping/verification and observer coverage requirements result in a
detrimental impact on Mexican tuna product, which Mexico claims is sufficient
to prove the U.S. measure inconsistent with Articles I:1 and III:4. Second,
these requirements stem from the AIDCP,
not U.S. law, and as such, no genuine relationship
exists between the amended measure and any disadvantage that Mexico perceives
its tuna product industry is operating under. Third, Mexico is wrong that the "conditions,"
as they relate to these requirements, are the "same." The IATTC
Members agreed to different requirements regarding
record-keeping/verification and observer coverage because the ETP is different – nowhere else in the world has tuna fishing
caused the harm to dolphins that large purse seine vessels have caused in the
ETP.
48. If discrimination is found,
one of the "most important factors" in determining whether that
discrimination is "arbitrary or unjustifiable" is "whether the
discrimination can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy
objective with respect to which the measure has been provisionally justified
under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX." The denial of
eligibility for the label to tuna product containing tuna caught by setting on
dolphins is directly related to the dolphin protection objective. As the United States
has demonstrated, setting on dolphins is a "particularly harmful"
fishing method, and other fishing methods do not cause the same level of harm
to dolphins that setting on dolphins does.
49. Indeed, Mexico appears not
to focus at all on whether these eligibility conditions are rationally related
to the dolphin protection objective. Rather, Mexico's focus appears to be more
on the fact that most Mexican-caught tuna, because it is harvested by a large
purse seine vessel in the ETP, is subject to AIDCP-mandated
record-keeping/verification observer requirements that tuna caught outside the
ETP is not subject to. In Mexico's view, this "difference" does not
contribute to dolphin protection outside the ETP. First, and as discussed
above, Mexico's assertion is contrary to the findings of the DSB that the
original measure did contribute to dolphin
protection outside the ETP, with respect to driftnet fishing and setting on
dolphins, and to the Appellate Body's suggestion that captain's statements
would provide a suitable certification. Second, to the extent that the
record-keeping/verification and observer requirements are relevant to this
analysis, which we dispute, we note that the fact that the AIDCP imposes unique
requirements that legal regimes covering other fisheries do not replicate is
indeed related to the protection and conservation of dolphins.
50. Finally, Mexico asserts that
the United States has discriminated arbitrarily and unjustifiably by not
working through the AIDCP to "address[] its remaining concerns about
dolphins and tuna fishing." Again, Mexico is wrong on the law. As noted
previously, a Member may take measures "at the levels that it considers
appropriate," and nothing in covered agreements requires a Member to
adhere to an international agreement, a point that Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement
confirms.
51. Mexico is also wrong on the
facts. The United States has engaged in
multilateral negotiations with Mexico through the AIDCP process. Further, the United States
continued to discuss this issue with Mexico in multiple different fora,
including two meetings held in Mexico City in the latter half of 2009. The United States
would also note, as mentioned above, that Mexico's reliance on US – Shrimp is particularly misplaced. In that dispute, the U.S. measure
was initially found not to be justified under Article XX in part because
of the "rigid and unbending" nature of the measure. Yet Mexico now
claims that the United States must impose "rigid and unbending"
record-keeping/verification and observer requirements on all tuna sold as
dolphin safe in the U.S. tuna product market, regardless of where or how
it was caught, in order to be justified under Article XX.
Mexico's approach turns US – Shrimp
upside down.
·
ANNEX B-6
executive
summary of the opening oral statement of the United States
at the meeting of the panel
I. Mexico's Claim under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement Fails
A. Mexico's Article 2.1 Claim Fails as
It Falls Outside the Panel's Terms of Reference
1. Mexico's Article 2.1
claim falls outside the Panel's terms of reference. Relying on US – Zeroing (Article 21.5 – EC), Mexico now argues
that its Article 2.1 claim falls within the Panel's terms of reference
because the unchanged aspects of the amended measure at issue are "inseparable"
from something that clearly falls within the Panel's terms of reference – the
U.S. measure taken to comply. Indeed, the 2013 Final Rule amends U.S. law with
regard to tuna caught by all vessels other than
those ETP vessels operating pursuant to the requirements of the AIDCP.
2. It is certainly unfair for
a complainant to intentionally stagger its argument in a particular claim over
the two proceedings, as Mexico has done here. In short, Mexico urges the Panel
to fault the United States for failing to come into compliance with an
entirely different set of recommendations and rulings from the one the DSB
actually adopted – a proposition that is blatantly unfair, and unnecessarily
extends this dispute. Indeed, Mexico's approach presents precisely the unfair "second
chance" that the Appellate Body has cautioned against.
B. Mexico's
Article 2.1 Claim Fails on the Merits
3. In any event, Mexico's Article 2.1
claim fails on the merits. Mexico has failed to prove that the regulatory
distinctions that account for any detrimental impact are not "even-handed." Mexico has thus failed to prove the
detrimental impact "reflects discrimination."
4. As to those relevant
regulatory distinctions, it is uncontested by
the parties that the eligibility condition regarding whether a dolphin was
killed or seriously injured in the harvesting of the tuna is even-handed. And
while Mexico disputes that the eligibility condition regarding setting on
dolphins is even-handed, Mexico fails to prove its assertions in this regard.
5. As should be clear, that
prohibition applies to all fisheries as well. And the fact that Mexican vessels
continue to set on dolphins – and thus produce tuna product ineligible for the
label – does not mean that the regulatory distinction is not even-handed. If
that was the case, all Mexico would need to prove is that a detrimental impact
exists, rendering the second step of the analysis meaningless.
6. The fact is that it is
entirely appropriate for the United States to draw a distinction between
setting on dolphins, which is inherently
dangerous to dolphins, and other fishing methods. The science supports the U.S.
approach in this regard, and directly contradicts Mexico's approach. Mexico has
simply failed to prove what it asserts – that all
other fishing techniques "have adverse effects on dolphins that are equal
to or greater" than setting on dolphins.
7. As such, Mexico is forced
to rely heavily on its fall back argument that because the AIDCP requires
different requirements for record-keeping, verification, and observer coverage
of large purse seine vessels operating in the ETP than the amended measure
requires of other vessels, the amended measure is not even-handed. But these "differences"
do not cause the detrimental impact the Appellate Body found to exist, and, as
such, no analysis of either aspect sheds light on whether that
detrimental impact "reflects discrimination." Moreover, Mexico fails to allege, much less
prove, that these aspects, standing alone, cause a detrimental impact on
Mexican tuna product exports to the United States.
8. Mexico argues something
different, however. Mexico alleges that the fact that its competitors operating
outside the ETP do not have to comply with AIDCP-equivalent requirements means
that these competitors have more opportunity than Mexican producers to
illegally market non-dolphin safe tuna product as dolphin safe. In Mexico's
view, this greater opportunity to defraud U.S. consumers means that "Mexican
tuna products are losing competitive opportunities to tuna products that may be
inaccurately labeled as dolphin-safe."
But Mexico puts forth zero evidence to
support its claim. In particular, there is no evidence that non-dolphin safe
tuna product produced outside the ETP is being illegally marketed in the United States
as dolphin safe. Nor has Mexico put forward any evidence that even if one could
find any illegal marketing, this unfortunate occurrence would be happening at a
higher rate than for tuna product containing ETP tuna.
II. Mexico's Claims Under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994
Fail
9. Mexico also fails to
establish that the amended dolphin safe labeling measure is inconsistent with Article I:1
or Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. Under Mexico's theory, it is
simply irrelevant whether the standard is entirely legitimate – or, for that
matter, entirely illegitimate – the result is the same. Given the huge
diversity of production methods, environmental, health, labor standards, and
the like that exist throughout the WTO Membership it seems difficult to believe
that any technical regulation could survive
such a test. Surely there will always be at least one Member whose producers do
not meet a foreign standard, such as for lead paint or organic produce. It is
undeniable that such a legal theory jeopardizes a wide range of legitimate
regulations, and seriously undermines Members' ability to regulate in the
public interest.
10. The advantage of access to
the "advantage" of the dolphin safe label, subject to origin-neutral
requirements, is "immediately and unconditionally" accorded to all
Members, including Mexico, as required by Article I:1. And Mexican tuna
product is not accorded less favorable treatment than the products of the United States,
as required by Article III:4.
11. Mexico is also simply wrong
to allege that this "unilateral action" intentionally puts pressure
on Mexico to change its practices through the amended measure. Such an
allegation is directly contrary to the findings
of the original panel. Moreover, Mexico's argument assumes that the AIDCP
labeling regime is sufficient to fulfill the measure's objective at the U.S.
chosen level of protection. But the Appellate Body has already found that the
AIDCP label does not achieve the U.S. chosen level
of protection. Mexico is asserting that the United States must accept the AIDCP label as sufficient to protect
dolphins, but Mexico gives no reason why this should be the case, and the
argument contradicts the principle that Members can choose their own levels of
protection.
iii. The Amended Dolphin Safe
Labeling Measure Is Justified Under Article XX of the GATT 1994
12. In any case, the amended
measure is justified under Article XX and therefore is not inconsistent
with the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body, in EC – Seal
Products, US – Gasoline,
and other disputes, has made it clear that the focus under Article XX will
be on the aspects of a measure that give rise to the finding of an
inconsistency with the GATT 1994. As already noted, Mexico only challenges
one eligibility condition – no setting on dolphins – as being GATT inconsistent.
Consequently, this would be the only aspect of the measure that could be
relevant to the Panel's analysis under the Article XX subparagraphs.
A. The Amended Dolphin Safe Labeling Measure
Satisfies the Conditions of Article XX(b) and XX(g)
13. The amended dolphin safe
labeling measure satisfies both prongs of the Article XX(b) standard,
namely: its objective falls within the
scope of "to protect ... animal life or health," and it is "necessary"
to the achievement of that objective. The original panel already found, and the
Appellate Body affirmed, that "contributing to the protection of dolphins
by ensuring that the US market is not used to encourage fishing fleets to catch
tuna in a manner that adversely affects dolphins" was an objective of the
original measure. Mexico's efforts to de-emphasize the "dolphin protection"
objective of the amended measure cannot stand. The DSB recommendations and
rulings are clear – the measure "relate[s] to genuine concerns in relation
to the protection of the life or health of dolphins" and is "intended
to protect animal life or health."
14. Likewise, the
recommendations and rulings provide a clear pathway for the Panel to conduct
its examination of whether the amended measure is "necessary" for the
protection of life and health of dolphins. The Appellate Body, relying on the
original panel's findings, found that the measure "fully address[ed] the
adverse effects on dolphins resulting from setting on dolphins" both
inside and outside the ETP. That eligibility condition remains unchanged – it
still relies on captain statements – and still stands. Where the Appellate Body
found fault was with the other condition, which, in the Appellate Body's view,
did not fully address "mortality ... arising from fishing methods other
than setting on dolphins outside the ETP."
The 2013 Final Rule corrects this, and, as such, the amended measure
makes an even higher contribution to the dolphin protection objective than the
original measure did.
15. Finally, the DSB
recommendations and rulings clearly establish that neither of Mexico's two
alternatives prove the amended measure not to be "necessary." This could not be clearer than with regard to
Mexico's second alternative, which is identical to the alternative that the
Appellate Body has already rejected for purposes of Article 2.2 as it
would allow more tuna "harvested in conditions that adversely affect
dolphins," i.e., tuna caught by setting on
dolphins, to be labeled dolphin safe. The Panel should follow the DSB
recommendations and rulings and reject Mexico's second alternative.
16. Likewise, the Panel should
reject Mexico's first alternative, which suffers from any number of defects. Indeed,
it is so vague that the United States does not even understand what Mexico
is actually proposing as to what the programs would consist of, how expensive it
would be to implement such programs, and who would pay for them. Moreover, the
proposal is not less WTO-inconsistent (under Mexico's theory), not less trade
restrictive, and not reasonably available. Mexico's first proposal wholly fails
to accomplish its declared task.
17. The amended measure is also
justified under the standard of Article XX(g). As the DSB recommendations
and rulings already acknowledge, the original measure pursued the objective of "dolphin
protection" and, in fact, contributed to that objective, those
recommendations and rulings apply equally in the context of Article XX(g)
as to Article XX(b). It is also clear that the original measure
contributed to that objective and that the amended measure makes an even
greater contribution – one that easily satisfies the "relating to"
standard of a "close and genuine relationship of ends and means." Furthermore, these eligibility conditions are
not only comparable – they are indeed identical – for
all domestic and imported products.
B. The Amended Dolphin Safe Labeling Measure
Is Applied Consistently with the Article XX Chapeau
18. Finally, the amended measure
meets the standard of the Article XX chapeau. First, the amended measure
is not applied in a way that gives rise to "discrimination" under the
chapeau at all, because it draws no distinctions
"between countries where the same conditions prevail." The setting-on-dolphins eligibility condition
is completely neutral as to nationality:
all tuna product containing tuna caught by setting on dolphins is
ineligible for the label. There are no carve-outs or exceptions for particular
Members' products, and Mexico has presented no evidence that the measure is
applied in a discriminatory manner.
19. Even if one were to consider
that the relevant "conditions" are the choices made by a country's
tuna fishing fleet, there is no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination here.
The harm to dolphins posed by different fishing methods is central to the
objective of the amended measure and thus is clearly "relevant" for
purposes of the chapeau. The United States has demonstrated that setting
on dolphins is uniquely dangerous to dolphins,
in terms of observed and unobserved harms. Consequently, the conditions in
countries whose vessels routinely set on dolphins are not the same
for purposes of the chapeau, as the conditions in countries whose vessels
employ other methods of fishing for tuna.
20. Mexico also argues that the
amended measure draws distinctions with respect to record-keeping and observer
certifications that make it inconsistent with the chapeau. This argument also
fails. First, it is irrelevant. By Mexico's own admission, the circumstances
that supposedly bring about the discrimination under the chapeau are the same
as those that brought about the asserted GATT inconsistency, i.e., the setting-on-dolphins eligibility condition. But
even if the difference between what the AIDCP parties have agreed to and what
other Members have agreed to outside the ETP were relevant, there is no genuine
relationship between them and any supposed disadvantage to Mexican tuna
product, since the amended measure's additional requirements for the ETP stem
entirely from the AIDCP. Of course, these differences are not between countries
where the relevant conditions are "the same." The AIDCP parties have agreed to impose unique requirements on themselves because of the
catastrophic harm their vessels had done to dolphins in the ETP since the 1950s.
It should come as no surprise then that the members of regional fisheries management
organizations (RFMOs) for other fisheries have not made that same commitment.
21. Furthermore, even if
discrimination under the chapeau were found, any discrimination is not
arbitrary or unjustifiable, because the distinctions drawn by the amended
measure are "compatible with" and, indeed, "related to" the
objective of the measure covered by Article XX, namely dolphin protection.
22. The eligibility criterion
relating to setting on dolphins directly relates to dolphin protection. The
evidence shows that setting on dolphins is vastly more dangerous to dolphins
than other tuna fishing methods. And it is the only
fishing method that intentionally targets dolphins and, therefore, the only fishing method where the risks to dolphins are an intrinsic part of fishing operations. Indeed, Mexico does
not even appear to contest that prohibiting tuna product containing tuna caught
by setting on dolphins from being labeled dolphin safe relates to dolphin
protection.
23. To the extent that the
record-keeping and observer requirements are relevant to the Article XX
analysis (and we do not think they are), the distinctions drawn by the amended
measure are not "arbitrary and unjustifiable." As the DSB found in the original proceeding,
captain's certifications do contribute
to dolphin protection. The fact that the AIDCP parties have chosen to impose additional record-keeping and observer requirements on
themselves, in light of the unique harm to dolphins in the ETP, does not mean
that the long-standing reliance on captain statements is illegitimate.
24. The amended dolphin safe
labeling measure imposes eligibility conditions that manifestly relate to its
objective. One condition relates to dolphin mortality and serious injury, and
another relates to fishing methods that, based on all the available scientific
evidence, is not dolphin safe. All other
methods of tuna fishing are potentially eligible for the label (except
large-scale high seas driftnet fishing), and, unlike under the original US – Shrimp measure, individual canneries and vessel
operators can ensure that their product is eligible for the label based on
their own purchasing and fishing choices.
25. Mexico's final argument is
that the United States discriminated arbitrarily by not working through
the AIDCP to "address its remaining concerns" about dolphin
protection. This seems to be an attempt to analogize this dispute to the
original US – Shrimp proceeding, and, as such, it
utterly fails. First, nothing in the covered agreements requires Members to
adopt whatever level of protection is contained in any relevant international
agreement. Second, there is no command in the dolphin safe labeling measure, as
there was in the US – Shrimp measure, to engage in
multilateral negotiations. Third, even if there were, the United States
has actually been negotiating this issue with Mexico and the other IATTC
members, through the AIDCP process, for decades.
_______________
·
ANNEX C
Arguments
of Third Parties
Contents
|
Page
|
Annex C-1
|
Executive summary of the third-party submission of Australia
|
C-2
|
Annex C-2
|
Executive summary of the oral statement of Australia at the meeting
of the panel, and responses to Panel questions
|
C-6
|
Annex C-3
|
Executive summary of the third-party submission of Canada
|
C-8
|
Annex C-4
|
Executive summary of the oral statement of Canada at the meeting of
the panel
|
C-11
|
Annex C-5
|
Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European Union
|
C-13
|
Annex C-6
|
Executive summary of the third-party submission of Japan
|
C-18
|
Annex C-7
|
Executive summary of the oral statement of the Republic of Korea at
the meeting of the panel
|
C-22
|
Annex C-8
|
Integrated executive summary of the arguments of New Zealand
|
C-24
|
Annex C-9
|
Executive summary of the third-party submission of Norway
|
C-28
|
Annex C-10
|
Executive summary of the oral statement of Norway at the meeting of
the panel
|
C-31
|
·
ANNEX C-1
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF THE THIRD-PARTY SUBMISSION OF AUSTRALIA
A. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
PROVISIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF A MEASURE UNDER PARAGRAPH (B) OF ARTICLE XX OF THE
GATT 1994
1. Australia recalls the
Appellate Body's guidance that a Member wishing to provisionally justify its
measure under subparagraph (b) of Article XX must demonstrate that (i) it
has adopted or enforced a measure to achieve the objective specified in that
subparagraph; and (ii) that the measure is "necessary" to fulfil that
objective.[1]
2. To determine whether a
challenged measure has been adopted to achieve the relevant objective, a panel
should examine whether the challenged measure "address[es] the particular
interest specified in that subparagraph" and whether there is "a
sufficient nexus between the measure and the interest protected".[2]
3. To determine whether a
challenged measure is "necessary" to achieve its objective, a panel
should "weigh and balance" a series of factors, "including the
importance of the objective, the contribution of the measure to that objective,
and the trade-restrictiveness of the measure".[3] In addition, the Appellate Body has explained
that "in most cases, a comparison between the challenged measure and
possible alternatives should then be undertaken".[4]
B. WHETHER THE AMENDED TUNA
MEASURE HAS BEEN ADOPTED "TO PROTECT ANIMAL LIFE OR HEALTH"
4. Australia notes that
Mexico's statements with respect to the United States' claimed justification
for the Amended Tuna Measure under Article XX(b) suggest that it considers
an assessment of the contribution of
the Amended Tuna Measure to its objectives is relevant to whether the Amended
Tuna Measure "falls within the range of policies designed to achieve the
objective". For example, Mexico states that "[t]he Amended Tuna
Measure does not fulfill the objectives it claims
to address and, therefore, it does not protect animal life or health within the
meaning of Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994".[5]
5. Australia agrees with the
United States' claim that "Mexico's focus on the contribution of the
measure improperly collapses the distinct
questions of whether the relevant objective falls within the scope of
subparagraph (b), and whether the challenged measure is "necessary"
to protect animal life and health. While the issue of the level at which the
measure contributes to its objective is relevant to the latter, it is not to the former, where the question is whether the
measure at issue 'address[es] the particular interest specified in [the]
paragraph'".[6]
6. Australia considers it
would have been open to Mexico, in questioning whether the Amended Tuna Measure
falls within the scope of Article XX(b), to challenge whether the
"design and structure" of the Amended Tuna Measure indicated the
policy objective of the measure was the protection of animal life or health.[7]
7. However, Australia notes
that this is a separate and distinct question to the contribution
made by the measure to its objectives (i.e. whether the measure
"fulfils" the objectives it claims to address).
C. WHETHER
THE AMENDED TUNA MEASURE IS "NECESSARY" TO FULFIL ITS OBJECTIVE
1. Mexico's arguments with
respect to the trade-restrictiveness of the Amended Tuna Measure
8. Australia notes that Mexico
appears to argue that the Amended Tuna Measure is trade-restrictive in part
because "the Amended Tuna Measure, like the original measure, does not fulfil the two objectives that it claims to
address, as consumers cannot accurately distinguish between dolphin-safe tuna
and non-dolphin safe tuna".[8]
9. In Australia's view, this
approach improperly conflates the contribution of
the Amended Tuna Measure to its objectives with an assessment of the trade-restrictiveness of the measure. Australia submits that, consistent with the
Appellate Body's guidance, the contribution made by the Amended Tuna Measure
and the trade-restrictiveness of the Amended Tuna Measure should be examined by
the Panel as two distinct factors. The Panel
should then examine the interaction of these factors[9], together with the
importance of the interests and values at stake, and any other relevant
factors, as part of the required "holistic weighing and balancing
exercise" to determine whether the Amended Tuna Measure is "necessary"
to fulfil its objective under Article XX(b).[10]
2. The parties' differing interpretations of
trade-restrictiveness for the purposes of assessing the "necessity"
of the Amended Tuna Measure
10. As noted above,
trade-restrictiveness is one factor to be examined by a panel in the
"weighing and balancing" exercise to determine the
"necessity" of a measure under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994.[11] Australia notes the
United States' observation that "the parties differ substantially as to
the meaning of the term 'trade-restrictiveness'".[12]
11. Australia recalls that the
Appellate Body has described this factor as "the restrictive impact of the
measure on international commerce"[13]. Further, in the
context of Article XI:2(a) of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body has
noted that the term 'restriction' "is defined as 'a thing which restricts
someone or something, a limitation on action, a limiting condition or
regulation', and thus refers generally to something that has a
limiting effect".[14] Finally, in considering
the meaning of trade-restrictiveness in the context of Article 2.2 of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Appellate Body found that, used
in conjunction with the word 'trade', "the term 'restriction' means
'something having a limiting effect on trade'"[15].
12. Australia agrees with the
United States that, to the extent that Mexico argues that the Amended Tuna
Measure is trade-restrictive simply because it is discriminatory
(i.e. that an alternative measure that reduces "the de facto
discrimination against Mexican tuna products … would therefore be
less trade restrictive"),[16] this would introduce an
incorrect legal test for assessing the trade-restrictiveness of a measure.
13. Specifically, Australia
submits that a finding of discrimination
(for example, under Article III:4 or Article I:1 of the GATT 1994)
is not per se determinative of the question of
the trade-restrictiveness of a measure.[17] Thus, for the purposes
of the "necessity" analysis under Article XX(b) of GATT 1994,
it is not sufficient to show that the Amended Tuna Measure modifies the
conditions of competition to the detriment of imported Mexican tuna products in
the US market, rather the measure must also have "a limiting effect on
trade".[18]
14. Further, Australia recalls
that the interpretation of the legal standards under specific provisions of the
GATT 1994 and the covered agreements must be "based on the text of
those provisions, as understood in their context, and in the light of the
object and purpose of the agreements in which they appear".[19] Accordingly, where a
measure is found to be inconsistent with one of the non-discrimination
provisions in the GATT 1994 (such as Article III:4 or Article I:1),
it would be inappropriate for a panel to simply transpose its finding of
inconsistency with these obligations to the consideration of the
trade-restrictiveness of a measure under Article XX of the GATT 1994.
15. However, Australia does not
suggest that the facts and circumstances that result in a panel's finding of
discrimination in a particular case (that is, the basis for a finding that the
measure at issue has a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities for
imported products) are irrelevant to
the analysis of trade-restrictiveness under Article XX.[20]
16. Indeed, Australia notes that
panels and the Appellate Body have found a range of factors to be relevant to
the assessment of the trade-restrictiveness of a measure, depending on the
circumstances of the case, including the nature of the measure at issue and the
claimed inconsistency with WTO obligations, the arguments put forward by the
parties, and the nature, quality and quantity of the available evidence.[21] That is, the precise
contours of trade-restrictiveness may vary in any given case, and will depend
largely on the nature of the specific measure at issue and on the specific
claims of inconsistency with WTO obligations.
17. Thus, Australia submits that
the Panel's analysis of the trade-restrictiveness of the Amended Tuna Measure,
in the context of its weighing and balancing exercise under Article XX(b),
should focus on whether the Amended Tuna Measure has "a limiting effect on
trade" or, in other words, on the "restrictive impact of the measure
on international commerce".
18. In the specific
circumstances of this case (including the claimed inconsistency of the Amended
Tuna Measure with Article III:4 and Article I:1 of the GATT 1994),
the effect of the Amended Tuna Measure on the competitive opportunities
available to Mexican tuna products in the US market may be relevant to this
analysis.
·
ANNEX C-2
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF THE oral statement OF Australia
at the meeting of the panel, and responses to panel questions
A. Whether the Amended Tuna
Measure has been Adopted "To Protect Animal Life or Health"
1. Australia
recalls the Appellate Body's guidance that a Member seeking to justify its
measure under subparagraph (b) of Article XX must demonstrate, first, that
it has adopted or enforced a measure to achieve the objective specified in that
subparagraph and, second, that the measure is "necessary" to fulfil
that objective.[22]
2. Australia
notes that the question of whether a challenged measure has been adopted to
achieve a relevant objective is a separate and distinct inquiry to whether the
measure is "necessary" to fulfil that objective.
3. In
determining whether the measure falls within the scope of Article XX(b),
Australia submits that, as a first step, the Panel should consider whether the
Amended Tuna Measure "addresses the particular interest specified in the
paragraph", and whether there is "a sufficient nexus between the
measure and the interest protected".[23]
4. Australia
considers it would be open to the Panel, in considering whether the Amended
Tuna Measure falls within the scope of Article XX(b), to consider whether
the "design and structure" of the Amended Tuna Measure indicates the
policy objective of the measure was the protection of animal life or health.[24]
5. With
respect to the United States' claimed justification for the Amended Tuna
Measure under Article XX(b), Mexico suggests in its written submission
that it considers an assessment of the contribution of the Amended Tuna Measure
to its objective is relevant to whether the Amended Tuna Measure "falls
within the range of policies designed to achieve the objective".[25]
6. However,
Australia agrees with the United States that an assessment of the
contribution of the Amended Tuna Measure to its objective is relevant only to
the question of whether the measure is "necessary" to fulfil its
objective. It is not relevant to the
first question of whether a challenged measure has been adopted to achieve a
particular objective.
B. Whether the Amended Tuna Measure is "Necessary" to
Fulfil its Objective
7. Australia
recalls the Appellate Body's guidance that "… a necessity analysis
involves 'weighing and balancing' a series of factors, including the importance
of the objective, the contribution of the measure to its objective, and the
trade-restrictiveness of the measure".[26]
8. Australia
submits that, consistent with the Appellate Body's guidance, the contribution
made by the Amended Tuna Measure and the trade-restrictiveness of the Amended
Tuna Measure should be examined by the Panel as two distinct
factors. The Panel should then examine the interaction of these factors,
together with the importance of the interests and values at stake, and any
other relevant factors, as part of the "holistic weighing and balancing
exercise", to determine whether the measure is "necessary" to
fulfil its objectives under Article XX(b).[27] Australia further
submits that the Panel's analysis of the trade-restrictiveness of the Amended
Tuna Measure should focus on whether the Amended Tuna Measure has a
"limiting effect on trade". In
other words, the Panel's analysis should focus on the "restrictive impact
of the measure on international commerce".[28]
9. Australia
considers that a finding of discrimination is not per se
determinative of the question of the trade-restrictiveness of a measure. Moreover, it would not be appropriate to
simply transpose a finding of inconsistency with the obligations under another
provision of GATT to the consideration of the trade-restrictiveness of a
measure under Article XX.
10. However,
Australia does not suggest that the facts and circumstances that support a finding
of discrimination are irrelevant to the question of trade-restrictiveness. Rather, Australia notes that the precise
contours of trade-restrictiveness may vary in any given case, and will largely
depend on the nature of the specific measure at issue and the specific claims
of inconsistency with WTO obligations.
11. In
this instance, the effect of the Amended Tuna Measure on the competitive
opportunities available to Mexican tuna products may be relevant to the Panel's
analysis of the trade‑restrictiveness of the measure.
C. BURDEN of PROOF UNDER ARTICLE 2.1 of the tbt agreement
12. In
Australia's view, the Appellate Body's statements in paragraph 216 of US – Tuna and paragraph 272 of US – COOL
indicate the complainant must do more than show the technical regulation at
issue has a detrimental impact on imports to meet the burden of establishing
its prima facie case of less favourable treatment under Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement. This is consistent with
the Appellate Body's prior clarification that not every instance of a
detrimental impact on imported products amounts to the less favourable
treatment of imports that is prohibited under Article 2.1;[29] and thus the existence
of a detrimental impact on imports is not dispositive of less favourable treatment
under Article 2.1.[30]
13. Rather,
as explained in the Appellate Body's statements, the complainant also bears the
burden of adducing evidence and arguments showing that the measure is designed
and/or applied in a manner that is not even-handed (for example, in a manner
that constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination) such
that the detrimental impact on imports reflects discrimination prohibited under
Article 2.1.[31] While such evidence and arguments could
suggest that the detrimental impact on imports does not stem exclusively from a
legitimate regulatory distinction, the complainant is not required specifically
to prove this negative.
14. In
Australia's view, a complainant meets the burden of establishing its prima
facie case of less favourable treatment under Article 2.1 once it has
adduced evidence and arguments showing that a measure has a detrimental impact
on imports and that the measure is designed and/or applied in a manner that is
not even-handed. After this, the burden
shifts to the respondent to show that the detrimental impact on imported
products stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.
·
ANNEX C-3
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF THE THIRD-PARTY SUBMISSION OF Canada
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In its third-party submission, Canada
addresses three key systemic legal issues: the scope of analysis under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement; the legal standard for determining the legitimacy of
the regulatory distinction under Article 2.1; and, the relationship
between the legal standards for less favourable treatment in Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
II. a panel must consider the overall architecture of the measure IN
DETERMINING whether the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a LRD
2. In assessing whether a regulatory
distinction is even-handed under Article 2.1, the Appellate Body has been
clear that a panel must "carefully scrutinize the particular circumstances
of the case, that is, the design, architecture, revealing structure, operation,
and application of the technical regulation at issue."
3. The United States' claim that the LRD
analysis must be limited only to the
distinction that accounts for the detrimental impact limits the scope of the
analysis in a manner that is inconsistent with the jurisprudence. Such a narrow
approach would undermine a panel's ability to make an objective assessment of
the matter before it, contrary to Article 11 of the DSU.
4. The Appellate Body has confirmed that in
examining whether a detrimental impact stems exclusively from a LRD, a panel is
not limited to considering only the regulatory distinction that accounts for
the detrimental impact on imported products. Rather, a panel must consider the
overall architecture of the technical regulation, as designed and applied. In
addition, the Appellate Body has emphasized that the even-handedness of the
challenged technical regulation as a whole is an element of the LRD analysis.
5. There may be other elements of the
measure that are relevant to the analysis of whether the regulatory distinction
is even-handed. Although these elements may not be directly connected to the
regulatory distinction that causes the detrimental impact, they, nevertheless,
may help explain whether the detrimental impact reflects discrimination in
violation of Article 2.1.
6. Not every element of a technical
regulation will be probative of whether a detrimental impact reflects
discrimination. A panel's consideration of the relevance of an element of a
technical regulation must be done on a case-by-case basis.
III. The
examination of the rationale for the regulatory distinction is an integral part
of the even-handedness analysis
7. In its first written submission, Mexico
applied the three-part test articulated by the panel in EC – Seal
Products. That test is incorrect because it requires, in its first
and second elements, an examination of the explanation or justification for the
regulatory distinctions independently of the determination of whether the
regulatory distinction is even-handed.
8. In examining the even-handedness of the
regulatory distinction, a panel should examine the rationale for the regulatory
distinction advanced by the responding Member in light of the identified policy
objective, to determine whether there is a rational connection between the
regulatory distinction and the identified policy objective. In doing so, a
panel must examine whether the regulatory distinction is designed or applied in
a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, such that
it lacks even-handedness. The jurisprudence supports the view that the extent
to which there is a rational connection should not be considered separately
from the determination of the even-handedness of the regulatory distinction. The
presence or absence of a rationale that explains or justifies the regulatory
distinction in light of the identified policy objective is a critical aspect in
determining whether a regulatory distinction is even-handed.
9. The jurisprudence interpreting "arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination" under the chapeau of Article XX can
inform the interpretation of a measure's even-handedness under Article 2.1.
This is consistent with the Appellate Body finding that "there are
important parallels between the analyses" under Article 2.1 and the
chapeau, and that the balance under the TBT Agreement as set out in the
preamble is, in principle, not different from the balance set out in the GATT 1994
between the non-discrimination obligations in Articles I:1 and III:4 and the
general exceptions in Article XX.
10. Although the Appellate Body recently
faulted the panel in EC – Seal Products
for substituting the Article 2.1 LRD test for the chapeau test under Article XX,
this does not undermine the importance of examining, as part of the
even-handedness analysis under Article 2.1, whether the regulatory
distinction is rationally connected to the objective of the technical
regulation.
IV. Although
The legal standards for THE non-discriMInation obligations under Article 2.1
and Article III:4 are not the same, this does not
"undermine a member's ability to regulate in the public interest"
11. In EC – Seal Products,
the Appellate Body confirmed that the legal standard for the non-discrimination
obligation under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement does not apply
equally to claims under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994. For the
purposes of a "less favourable treatment" analysis under Article III:4,
a panel is not required to examine whether the detrimental impact of a measure
on competitive opportunities for like imported products stems exclusively from
a LRD.
A. The GATT 1994 Protects a Member's
Right to Regulate
12. The Appellate Body has confirmed that
under the GATT 1994, a Member's right to regulate is accommodated under Article XX;
therefore, in examining detrimental impact under Articles I:1 and III:4, a
panel must not conduct an additional inquiry into whether the detrimental
impact stems exclusively from a LRD.
13. According to the United States, the legal
standard for the obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
should include an examination of the "underlying rationale and operation
of the standard", otherwise a Member would not be able to adopt measures
that draw regulatory distinctions in the pursuit of legitimate public policy
objectives. This is plainly incorrect. The United States' argument ignores
other provisions in the GATT 1994 that enable a Member to "regulate
in the public interest", including Article XX, which sets out general
exceptions to Members' trade obligations under the Agreement.
B. The
GATT 1994 does not preclude a Member from drawing regulatory distinctions
14. The United States' suggestion that Article III:4
should include an examination of "the underlying rationale and operation
of the standard" at issue, appears to import into Article III:4 an
additional element that considers a measure's policy objectives, such as the
LRD test under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. It also denies any
legal effect to the provisions in Article XX of the GATT 1994, which
protect a WTO Member's right to regulate.
15. The provisions in the GATT 1994
reflect a careful balance between the trade liberalizing objectives reflected
in, inter alia, its non-discrimination
obligations, and the protection of Members' right to regulate in the public
interest, as set out in Article XX. Due to the structure of the GATT 1994,
the analysis of a challenged measure's policy objectives, which can provide a
rationale for the discrimination between like products, is to be conducted
under Article XX.
1. The Panel does not have the authority
to address any perceived imbalance between a Member's right to regulate under
the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement
16. The United States asserts that the scope
of legitimate objectives that can be invoked under Article XX to justify a
violation of the GATT 1994 is narrower than the scope of legitimate
objectives that a Member can invoke under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement,
and that this would create problems where a Member pursues objectives not
listed under Article XX of the GATT 1994.
17. The United States' submissions fail to
demonstrate the accuracy of its assertion. However, even if it were the case
that the scope of legitimate objectives is narrower under Article XX as
compared to Articles 2.1 or 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, as the Appellate
Body has pointed out, any perceived imbalance in the existing rights and
obligations under the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994, is for the WTO
Members to address in negotiations.
·
ANNEX C-4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ORAL STATEMENT OF CANADA
AT THE MEETING OF THE PANEL
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In its third-party oral
statement, Canada addressed the correct test to be applied under TBT Article 2.1
with respect to the "less favourable treatment" element, the question
of the relationship between that provision and GATT Article III:4, and the
sequence of analysis that should be followed under GATT Article XX.
II. TEST for "less favourable treatment" UNDER TBT ARTICLE 2.1
2. The correct test to
determine whether a detrimental impact stems exclusively from a legitimate
regulatory distinction (LRD) is whether the regulatory distinction is
even-handed. There can be a number of factors that can demonstrate
even-handedness, or the lack thereof.
3. Canada considers that the
European Union mis-states the law when it suggests that all regulatory
distinctions are permissible provided that they stem exclusively "from the
pursuit of legitimate objectives". It is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the measure as a whole, including the regulatory distinction, to
pursue a legitimate objective. It is also necessary for the regulatory
distinction itself to be "legitimate". This determination does not
rest on whether the objective pursued is legitimate, but on whether the
regulatory distinction is "even-handed."
III. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 DOES NOT INCLUDE A LRD
ELEMENT
4. The Appellate Body's
findings in EC – Seal Products confirms that the
legal standard for the non-discrimination obligations under TBT Article 2.1
does not apply equally to claims under GATT Articles I:1 and III:4. Therefore,
a panel is not required, under Article III:4, to conduct an additional
inquiry into whether the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a LRD or
consider any policy rationale that the responding Member puts forth to seek to
justify the discriminatory treatment.
5. Canada does not consider
that a Member's ability to regulate in the public interest would be undermined
if a panel is not required to consider the underlying rationale or policy
objective of a measure as part of the analysis under Article III:4. The
balance reflected in the TBT Agreement between the desire of WTO Members to
avoid unnecessary obstacles to trade and the recognition of Members' right to
regulate is given effect, inter alia,
through the inclusion of the LRD element in TBT Article 2.1. This balance
is not, in principle, different from the balance set out between GATT Articles I:1
and III:4, and GATT Article XX. Canada considers that the balance struck
in the GATT 1994 does protect a Member's right to regulate. Any attempt to
introduce an additional inquiry of a measure's underlying rationale into the Article III:4
analysis would disrupt this careful balance, and the established jurisprudence
that has guided the interpretation of the non-discrimination obligations in the
light of Article XX.
6. Further, the United States
does not offer any concrete example to substantiate its concern that the
narrower scope of objectives under Article XX compared to TBT Article 2.1
may undermine a Member's right to regulate.
IV. THE SEQUENCE OF analysis UNDER GATT Article XX
7. The Appellate Body has
recently affirmed, in China – Rare Earths,
that an assessment under GATT Article XX involves a two-tiered analysis.
8. The first step, provisional
justification, requires that the responding party demonstrate that the impugned
measure "address[es] the particular interest specified in that
paragraph", and that "there [is] a sufficient nexus between the
measure and the interest protected". In the context of Article XX(b),
it also requires a responding party to demonstrate that it has adopted or
enforced a measure "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health". The necessity analysis involves a process of "weighing and
balancing" a series of factors.
9. Although Mexico describes
the correct test under Article XX, it fails to apply the correct
"sequence of steps" for assessing consistency with Article XX. Canada
agrees with the United States that the assessment of whether the measure
contributes to the fulfillment of the objective forms part of the necessity
test, and should not form part of the analysis of whether the measure falls
within the scope of Article XX(b).
·
ANNEX C-5
INTEGRATED
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS of the European Union
1. The European Union has a
substantial interest in the matter before the Panel, and we request that our
interests as a Third Party be fully taken into account throughout the panel
process. Specifically, we request that Third Parties be permitted: to be
present throughout the hearing; to comment, at the invitation of the Panel, on
matters arising during the hearing; to receive copies of any questions to the
Parties, their responses and comments; and to be present at any subsequent
meeting of the compliance Panel with the Parties. In order to facilitate the
work of the Panel and of the Parties, the European Union proposes that the
Third Parties should receive all documents in a single copy in electronic
format only. For the same reasons, the European Union also proposes that each
Third Party should be permitted to prepare one integrated executive summary of
all its submissions, of up to 6 pages (as currently provided), within 7 days
(as also currently provided), to be used as the relevant section of the
descriptive part of the Panel Report.
2. Although there is no formal
system of precedent in WTO law, original proceedings and compliance proceedings
are part of a continuous process, and compliance panels are expected to be
guided by their own prior findings.
3. If the same matter that was
placed before the original panel and decided is again placed before the
compliance Panel (that is, the following are unchanged: the law and
clarification of the law; the measure; the facts; and the evidence) then the
compliance Panel can and should simply refer to its prior finding, and re-iterate it. There is no general rule of res judicata in WTO law; but compliance panels are expected
to follow the results of original proceedings.
4. If one or more of the above
elements has changed, then the compliance Panel should take that into account
when making its determinations, whilst at the same time being guided by its
prior findings.
5. The terminology in the US submissions
remains unclear: is it a question of scope, jurisdiction, terms of reference, res judicata, non liquet, the
relationship between different types of DSU proceedings, or the particular
language of Article 21.5? Furthermore, the significance of certain
statements from past cases remains unclear, particularly when they are taken
out of the context of the particular case in which they were made.
6. In the opinion of the
European Union, none of the issues raised by the United States touch on
the concept of jurisdiction.
7. The concept of terms of reference (Article 7 of the DSU) may be
thought of as referring to the "jurisdiction" of a
particular panel, although use of the term "terms of reference"
is more precise and preferable, because that is the term used by the treaty,
and thus helps to distinguish this concept from the concept of jurisdiction. In
this case, Mexico's claim under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement is
clearly in Mexico's Panel Request and thus within the terms of reference.
8. Nothing in Article 3.7
establishes a condition under which a party would be prevented from initiating
proceedings, including compliance proceedings. The only express limitation
referred to in Article 3.7 is that a Member shall exercise its judgement
as to whether action would be fruitful. A Member is expected to be largely
self-regulating in deciding whether any such action would be fruitful. There is
no general doctrine of res judicata in
WTO dispute settlement.
9. Contrary to what the United States
appears to believe, US – Shrimp
does not support its submissions in the present proceedings. On the contrary,
it simply confirms that, once particular measures are properly within the scope
of compliance proceedings, because they are declared or undeclared measures taken
to comply, any claim may be made against them, whether or not made in the
original proceedings, and the compliance panel
must assess and rule on such claim, such ruling being subject to
scrutiny on appeal.
10. In Mexico –
Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US), the compliance panel had been
correct to examine the consistency of the re-determination. It was this
assessment that the Appellate Body reviewed. This case does not support the US
submissions in the present proceedings. It simply confirms that, once particular
measures are properly within the scope of compliance proceedings, because they
are declared or undeclared measures taken to comply, any claim may be made
against them, whether or not made in the original proceedings, and the compliance panel must assess and rule on such claim,
if only to determine that the matter was decided in the original proceedings,
such ruling being subject to scrutiny on appeal.
11. Article 11 of the DSU
requires a panel to make an objective assessment of the matter before it,
including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and to
make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations
or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. This is
consistent with Article 23 of the DSU, which requires Members to have
recourse to the DSU when they seek redress of a violation of obligations under
the covered agreements; Article 3.3 of the DSU, which refers to situations
in which a Member considers there is a violation;
and Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, pursuant to which the rights and
obligations of Members may not be added to or diminished
in dispute settlement proceedings. Similarly, Article 17.12 of the DSU
requires the Appellate Body to address each of the issues raised in accordance
with Article 17.6 during an appellate proceeding. Thus, subject to the
proper exercise of judicial economy (which is not at issue in these compliance
proceedings), when a matter is properly within the jurisdiction and terms of
reference of a WTO adjudicator, that adjudicator is required to assess and rule
upon it. There is no general doctrine of non liquet in
WTO dispute settlement.
12. The concept of the scope of
various different proceedings under the DSU in relation to each other
is different from the concepts of jurisdiction, terms of reference, res judicata and non liquet outlined
above. There are certainly some exclusions and overlaps. For example, the same
measure and matter can be subject to more than one panel proceeding. A
reasonable period of time may be fixed by an arbitrator pursuant to Article 21.3(c)
of the DSU; but in some cases the implementation period is fixed by the
original panel. And so forth. Thus, just because a particular matter or measure
is within the scope of one proceeding or one type of proceeding, that does not
necessarily mean that it is not within the scope of another proceeding or type
of proceeding.
13. The scope of compliance
proceedings is governed by the terms of Article 21.5 of the DSU: it is the
"dispute" that consists of the "disagreement as to the existence
or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings" of the DSB. Such an examination also includes
both declared measures taken to comply; as
well as any undeclared measures taken to comply,
including those that satisfy the close nexus
test. Measures taken to comply, like all measures subject to review in WTO
dispute settlement, may be either actions or omissions
attributable to the responding Member.
14. Once, for whatever reason,
measures are within the scope of compliance proceedings, the complaining Member
is not restricted to challenging the consistency of those measures with the
same provisions of the covered agreements at issue in the original proceedings,
and, furthermore, the defending Member is not free to assume
that such measures are WTO consistent.
15. The scope of compliance
proceedings also includes a disagreement "as to the existence" of a
measure taken to comply. For example, the complaining Member might assert that
no measure taken to comply exists, whilst the defending Member might assert
that a measure taken to comply does exist.
Such disagreement would be within the scope of compliance proceedings, and if
found to exist, the measure would necessarily be characterised as a measure
taken to comply.
16. Another possibility is that
the parties agree that no measure taken to comply exists, but the complaining
Member asserts that such a measure was necessary (that is, should exist),
whilst the defending Member asserts that such a measure was unnecessary (need
not exist), because, for example, through events arising during the passage of time, the inconsistency has ceased. Another way of
expressing this same disagreement is that the complaining Member is complaining
about the defending Member's omission, that
is, its failure to ensure that the measures it adopts or maintains
are in conformity with the covered agreements. This omission, and by definition
the measure to which it refers (that is, the original measure, as maintained), are thus also within the scope of the
compliance proceedings.
17. The United States bases
its submissions on the scope of these compliance proceedings in large measure
on the findings in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5
– India). However, there are in this respect a number of issues that
must be taken into consideration.
18. First, if the clarification
of WTO law to be applied by a compliance panel will not be the same as the
clarification of WTO law that was applied by the original panel (for example,
because of clarifications provided in the original proceedings) then the
reasoning in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) does
not apply.
19. Second, if the measures or
aspects of the measures that are the subject of the compliance complaint are
not the same as the measures or aspects of the measures that were the subject
of the original complaint, then the reasoning in EC – Bed
Linen (Article 21.5 – India) does not apply.
20. Third, given the
circumstances of that case, the facts and evidence were already
frozen on the file of the original investigation. In contrast, if
the investigating authority does re-open the record and collect more information
and evidence, such that the facts or evidence have
changed relative to those at issue in the original proceedings, then
the reasoning in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)
does not apply.
21. Fourth, the aspect of the measure in question
that was challenged by India was separable
from other
aspects of the measure. If that is not the case, the reasoning in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India) does not apply.
22. Furthermore, it is
significant that, in each of the subsequent cases that touch on this matter (US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 –
Argentina); US – Softwood Lumber VI
(Article 21.5 – Canada); US – Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil); US – Zeroing (EC)
(Article 21.5 – EC)), the situation arising was distinguished
from EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India).
Significantly, in the most recent of these cases, US – Zeroing
(EC) (Article 21.5 – EC), in reversing the panel, the Appellate
Body referred to a statement by the panel in US –
Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC)
(upon which the United States seeks to rely in these compliance
proceedings) to the effect that "a new claim on an aspect of the original
measure that was never challenged and remained unchanged" would be
precluded in compliance proceedings, and stated expressly that it disagreed
with that proposition.
23. The European Union considers
that a compliance panel must balance the principles of prompt settlement
and due process, and that both principles must take into account not only the
interests of the parties in a particular dispute, but also the interests of the
system.
24. We are not merely speaking
of an additional delay corresponding to an additional reasonable period
of time. If the relevant matters would be referred to a new panel it would
likely take much longer to return to the current procedural point.
25. In this respect, the
European Union refers to the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ("Articles on State Responsibility" or "ASR"),
which have been frequently referred to in WTO litigation. The ASR (and/or the
associated Commentaries) confirm three points. First, the legal consequences of
an internationally wrongful act (such as the US acts found WTO inconsistent by
the original panel) include cessation and non-repetition (and do not affect the
continued duty of performance). Second, a
concern with non-repetition is particularly justified when the pre-existing
situation is not going to be restored. Third, the focus of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism is on cessation rather than reparation.
26. In short, to the extent that
WTO rules are understood to focus on cessation rather than reparation, there is
already a significant shift in the architecture of WTO dispute settlement away
from the principle of prompt settlement, the burden of the passage of time
being placed on the complainant rather than the respondent. This being so, it
is entirely appropriate, and even essential for the proper functioning of the
WTO dispute settlement system, that there is a reasonable re-balancing in the
form of an effective apprehension by the system of repetition. The precise
moment at which this is achieved is the moment at which the scope of compliance
proceedings is under consideration. In the submission of the European Union,
this issue should be approached so as to permit a compliance panel to
reasonably capture the full extent of what is, in essence, a continuing
situation. The European Union submits that the compliance Panel should bear
these factors in mind when considering the various scope arguments advanced by
the United States in this particular case.
27. In conclusion: The amended
tuna measure is a declared measure taken to comply. Declared measures taken to
comply fall within the scope of compliance proceedings. The European Union
considers that the various elements of the amended tuna measure can only
meaningfully and reasonably be considered as a whole, and are inseparable
from each other. Therefore, the entirety of the amended tuna measure falls
within the scope of these compliance proceedings. The complaints are within the
jurisdiction and terms of reference of the compliance Panel. There is no rule
of res judicata or non liquet.
The compliance Panel must make an objective assessment of the matter before it.
The situation is not the same as the situation that arose in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), and the
reasoning in that case does not therefore apply.
28. As regards the order of
analysis: The European Union suggests that the compliance Panel starts with Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement and then deals with Articles III:4 and XX of the GATT 1994.
A good rule of thumb when considering order of analysis is to begin with the
more specific provision. This allows the adjudicator to remain as faithful as
possible to the intent of the parties to the treaty. Reading the more general
rule and the more specific rule together, or one as context for the other,
gives a WTO adjudicator the best insight into the drafters' intentions. The
recitals of the TBT Agreement confirm that it develops and builds on the GATT 1994.
29. As regards Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, and turning to this particular case, first, the
European Union considers that, in assessing whether or not there is a
detrimental impact on imports, the relevant comparison is between the situation
before adoption of the original measure and the present situation.
30. Second, the European Union
considers that all regulatory change may involve costs that, in the short term,
will inevitably be unequally distributed amongst existing firms and Members as
a function of their past investment decisions. This fact alone does not mean
that the measure breaches. What is important is that, in the long term, all
firms and Members can adjust to the new regulatory regime and enjoy equal
competitive opportunities.
31. Third, the European Union
considers that the mere fact that unit regulatory compliance costs may be
higher for firms or Members with lower production volumes or market share does
not, alone, establish breach. Firms and Members make their own choices about
economies of scale. Propensity to breach WTO law is not a function of the
relative size of Members or their firms or their production volumes or market
shares. WTO law treats all WTO Members as equals, taking their relative size as
a given fact.
32. Fourth, the European Union
considers that the fundamental question is whether or not the legitimate
regulatory distinctions are even-handed. No facts are per se
excluded from that assessment. This is an aspect of the case that will require
the compliance Panel to carefully weigh all of the facts and evidence. In
essence, the question is whether or not the amended tuna measure involves
unjustified discrimination. Existing case law confirms that a mere difference
does not necessarily amount to discrimination, let alone unjustified
discrimination. The compliance Panel will therefore have to consider whether or
not any different treatment within and outside the ETP is even-handed and
justified. In particular, the compliance Panel will need to consider whether or
not any different treatment is appropriately calibrated to different fishing
methods, having regard to the legitimate regulatory objectives pursued by the United States,
framed in a manner that actually corresponds to those legitimate objectives.
The compliance Panel may also wish to consider whether or not there is an
alternative approach, which would consist in significantly narrowing or even
eliminating such differences, whilst still making an equivalent contribution to
the legitimate objectives, and that is reasonably available taking into account
technical and economic feasibility. If this is not the case, the compliance
Panel should defer to the legitimate exercise of regulatory autonomy by the United States.
If it is the case, the compliance Panel should find that the amended tuna
measure is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
33. In response to a question
from the Panel on the even-handedness requirement the European Union has
replied as follows. As explained in our submissions to the original panel and
the compliance panel, the Appellate Body has clarified that an assessment of an
alleged de facto breach of the national treatment obligation under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, contextually informed by the recitals of the TBT Agreement
and by Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, is not in principle
different from the analysis that would take place under Articles III:4 and XX
of the GATT 1994. This informs what is meant by the term
"even-handed". This means that the "rationale" or
"objective" or "purpose" or "objective intent" of
the regulatory distinction criticised by Mexico is indeed relevant to the
assessment, just as it would be relevant in an assessment under Articles III:4
and XX of the GATT 1994.
34. It is possible that the
regulatory distinction neither "assists" nor "hinders" the
overall objective, but merely reflects a calibration of the different measures
to different risks. The mere existence of such differences does not necessarily
mean that there is discrimination, or unjustified discrimination. Under the SPS Agreement,
for example, measures must be calibrated according to both the origin and the
destination of the relevant products. In its consideration of this matter, the
Panel may wish to consider whether or not there is an alternative approach,
which would consist in significantly narrowing or even eliminating such
differences (and any different costs associated with them), whilst still making
an equivalent contribution to the legitimate objectives, and which is
reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility
(that is, cost).
35. In response to an additional
question from the Panel on burden of proof, the European Union has replied as
follows. The European Union agrees that, in interpreting and applying Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement in the case of a claim of a de facto
breach of the national treatment obligation, it should be born in mind that the
balance struck in that provision is not different from the balance struck in
Articles III:4 and XX of the GATT. It is likely that this will be reflected
when it comes to considering the evidence. In particular, it is likely that in
some respects the burden of proof will fall on the defending Member, just as it
does under the GATT.
36. However, at the same time,
the European Union would caution against an excessively mechanistic approach to
this question. Whilst it is true that, under the GATT, it will normally be the
complainant's burden to demonstrate the breach and the defendant's burden to
demonstrate the defence, nevertheless, both of these statements are expressions
of the more general principle that it is generally for the party asserting the
affirmative of a particular fact to adduce evidence in support of its
assertion.
37. Furthermore, we would note
that the concept of the burden of proof refers to the proving of a fact through
adducing evidence. It is distinct from the burden of persuasion, which rather
refers to the making of arguments in order to persuade an adjudicator that a
particular fact) should be characterised in a particular manner. When it comes
to burden of persuasion, what tends to happen is that, at the end of the exchange
of arguments, and having respected due process, the adjudicator will weigh the
arguments and make a finding. We would also make the point that future
hypotheticals or alternative counterfactuals cannot be proved directly.
Finally, we would recall that a panel has the authority to put questions to
either party, in search of any information that it deems necessary, and that
might reasonably be in that party's possession, without however making the case
for either party.
38. In sum, whilst the fact that
Article 2.1 (complainant's burden) corresponds in principle to Articles
III:4 (complainant's burden) and XX (defendant's burden) of the GATT may seem
to pose a burden of proof conundrum, the extent of the difficulties should not
be exaggerated. There are in fact many other provisions of the covered
agreements that raise similar questions, because it is often not entirely clear
when there is a rule-exception relationship, or what the relationships are
between different provisions or covered agreements. The way forward in this
respect does not lie in an excessively rigid approach to burden of proof
issues, but rather in an intelligent use of the panel's authority to question
the parties in order to obtain relevant information.
·
ANNEX C-6
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF THE THIRD-PARTY SUBMISSION OF JAPAN
I. Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement
1. As noted by both parties,
the Appellate Body developed a two-step test for panels to follow in assessing
claims of de facto less favourable treatment under
Article 2.1. The first step consists of an examination of whether the
technical regulation at issue modifies the conditions of competition in the
relevant market to the detriment of the group of imported products vis-à-vis
the group of like domestic products or like products originating in any other
country. An affirmative finding that there is such a detrimental effect is not
sufficient to demonstrate less favourable treatment under Article 2.1. Instead,
there is a second step in which the panel scrutinizes whether the detrimental
impact on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction
rather than reflecting discrimination against the group of imported products.[32]
2. The United States argues
that the regulatory distinctions examined under the second step of the Article 2.1
analysis are limited to the regulatory distinctions that account for the
detrimental impact determined in the first step of the analysis. The United
States finds support for this position in a statement made by the Appellate
Body in the original proceedings.[33]
3. Japan agrees that the
regulatory distinction that accounts for the detrimental impact usually will be
the main focus of the assessment under the second step of the analysis. However, the scope of the assessment is not as
narrow as the United States suggests. Rather, the Article 21.5 Panel must "carefully
scrutinize the particular circumstances of the case, that is, the design,
architecture, revealing structure, operation, and application of the technical
regulation at issue".[34] In Japan's view, this assessment goes beyond
the regulatory distinction that allegedly accounts for the detrimental impact. Thus,
Japan does not support an overly rigid definition of the scope of the
assessment under the second step.
4. Ultimately, in this case,
the parties seem to disagree less about the relationship between steps one and
two, and more about the regulatory distinction that was at the heart of the Article 2.1
analysis in the original proceedings. Japan agrees with the United States that
the clearest description of what the Appellate Body considered to be the
detrimental impact caused by the tuna measure is found in paragraph 284 of the
Appellate Body Report, which states:
In the light of the
findings of fact made by the Panel, we concluded earlier that the detrimental
impact of the measure on Mexican tuna products is caused by the fact that most
Mexican tuna products contain tuna caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP and
are therefore not eligible for a "dolphin-safe" label, whereas most
tuna products from the United States and other countries that are sold in the
US market contain tuna caught by other fishing methods outside the ETP and are
therefore eligible for a "dolphin-safe" label. The aspect of the
measure that causes the detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products is thus the
difference in labelling conditions for tuna products containing tuna caught by
setting on dolphins in the ETP, on the one hand, and for tuna products
containing tuna caught by other fishing methods outside the ETP, on the other
hand. The question before us is thus whether the United States has demonstrated
that this difference in labelling conditions
is a legitimate regulatory distinction, and hence whether the detrimental
impact of the measure stems exclusively from such a distinction rather than
reflecting discrimination. (original emphasis)
5. Nonetheless, Japan
disagrees with the United States that the recordkeeping/ verification and
observer requirements that Mexico has raised in these proceedings are not
relevant to the analysis under Article 2.1. In the second step of the Article 2.1
analysis, the Article 21.5 Panel will have to determine whether the
detrimental impact stems from a legitimate regulatory distinction. In order to
make this determination, the Article 21.5 Panel must "carefully
scrutinize the particular circumstances of the case, that is, the design,
architecture, revealing structure, operation, and application" of the
amended tuna measure.[35] To the extent that Mexico claims that the
recordkeeping/verification and observer requirement aspects of the difference in labelling
conditions cause detrimental impact to Mexico tuna products and shows that such labelling conditions are not even-handed, they
would be relevant to the Article 21.5 Panel's analysis. Indeed, it would
appear that the recordkeeping/verification and observer requirements concern
whether tuna products meet the conditions of eligibility of the "dolphin-safe"
label. Accordingly, Japan fails to see why such requirements should be excluded
ex ante from the Article 21.5 Panel's
assessment.
II. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
6. In the recent EC – Seal Products dispute, Japan and several other WTO
Members expressed the view that the assessment of claims of de facto less favourable treatment under Article III:4
of the GATT 1994 may proceed along the lines of
the two-step test developed by the Appellate Body in the context of Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement. Japan, for example, noted that a consistent
interpretation of both provisions is supported by the fact that both GATT Article III:4
and TBT Article 2.1 address the same "less favourable treatment"
issue. Furthermore, technical regulations are in principle not only regulated
under TBT Article 2.1 but also fall among the types of measures regulated
by GATT Article III:4. The non-discrimination rule under TBT Article 2.1
only applies with respect to "technical regulations".[36] Thus, TBT Article 2.1 would provide
relevant context for the interpretation of Article III:4 when the matter
relates to technical regulations. Japan continues to believe that whether the
detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities of like imported products
stems from legitimate regulatory distinctions is a relevant consideration for
purposes of the assessment of a measure under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
7. The incongruity of having
separate tests under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and TBT Article 2.1
is illustrated by the circumstances in this dispute. As noted earlier, the
United States' position in this dispute is that the amended tuna measure does
not violate TBT Article 2.1 because, in its view, Mexico has failed
to show that the detrimental impact on Mexican tuna products does not stem from
legitimate regulatory distinctions. Let us assume that the United States were
to succeed in its argument. In such circumstances, the amended measure would be
found not to provide less favourable treatment and therefore not inconsistent
with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Yet, under an overly narrow
interpretation of GATT Article III:4 in which the assessment of less
favourable treatment focuses exclusively on the detrimental impact, the same
measure could be found to accord less favourable treatment and therefore be
inconsistent with GATT Article III:4. The notion that the same
technical regulation does not accord less favourable treatment under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, but does accord less favourable treatment for
purposes of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 defies logic.
8. Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
is the more specific provision in the more specific agreement.
TBT Article 2.1 is concerned only with one class of measures:
technical regulations. By contrast, GATT Article III:4 addresses a
much wider class of measures that can potentially fall under the generic
categories of "laws, regulations and requirements affecting [the] internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use". That
a technical regulation can be found to be consistent with the more specific
non-discrimination obligation and yet inconsistent with the more general
obligation makes the outcome all the more incongruous.
9. Japan recognizes that a
measure found to be inconsistent with GATT Article III:4 could
eventually be justified under Article XX of the GATT 1994. However,
the availability of Article XX does not provide a neat solution to the
problem described above. It is an acknowledged fact that the list of policy
reasons that could justify a measure under Article XX is narrower than
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. Moreover, the assessment
under Article XX is not necessarily the same as under the second step of Article 2.1.
Thus, the risk of conflicting findings is real.
10. The outcome is less than
optimal in other respects. It would appear that a WTO Member facing a technical
regulation that it considers to be discriminatory now has an incentive to bring
the claim under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, rather than under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement. This is because its burden under Article III:4
is lower than under TBT Article 2.1. Under an overly narrow Article III:4,
the complainant only has to demonstrate that the measure has a detrimental
impact on the competitive opportunities of the like imported products, at which
point the burden shifts to the respondent to show that the technical regulation
is justified because any regulatory distinctions are legitimate. It follows
from this analysis that TBT Article 2.1 could become redundant and
cease to have much meaning. This surely cannot be the outcome intended by WTO
Members when they negotiated the TBT Agreement.
11. Like the United States[37], Japan is concerned
that excluding any examination of the purpose and nature of the measure at
issue from the assessment under GATT Article III:4 could improperly
undermine many legitimate and genuinely non-discriminatory measures. Japan
therefore urges the Article 21.5 Panel to adopt an interpretation of Article III:4
of the GATT 1994 that is coherent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
and that takes due account of legitimate regulatory distinctions that may
underlie a technical regulation.
III. Article 21.5 of the DSU
12. Proceedings under Article 21.5
of the DSU concern disagreements "as to the existence or consistency with
a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and
rulings". The United States
recognizes that, in these Article 21.5 proceedings, Mexico would be
entitled to:
(a) reassert
a claim where the original panel had exercised judicial economy[38];
(b) reassert a claim that alleges that the new aspects of the amended measure not only fail to bring
the measure into compliance with the provisions that were the subject of the
DSB recommendations and rulings, but are inconsistent with the covered
agreements[39]; and
(c) make a new claim regarding an unchanged
aspect of the measure that it could have brought previously, where that
unchanged aspect is an "inseparable" aspect of the measure taken to
comply.[40]
Nevertheless, the United States argues that Mexico's claim under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement falls outside the Article 21.5 Panel's terms of
reference because it is premised on elements of the measure that were not found
to be WTO-inconsistent and that are unchanged from the original measure.[41]
13. Japan considers it helpful
to begin the analysis of this issue by recalling the relevant DSB
recommendation and ruling stemming from the original dispute. These DSB
recommendations and rulings derive, of course, from the rulings of the
Appellate Body and panel reports in the original proceedings. In the case of Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, Japan believes that the relevant ruling is the
Appellate Body's finding that "the US 'dolphin-safe' labelling provisions
provide 'less favourable treatment' to Mexican tuna products than that accorded
to tuna products of the United States and tuna products originating in other
countries and are therefore inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement".[42] In the light of the DSB's recommendations and rulings, the United
States was under an obligation to eliminate the less favourable treatment
resulting from the measure. To the extent the amended measure continues to
accord less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna products, the United States
would have failed to comply fully with the DSB's recommendations and rulings.[43]
14. The United States asserts
that the DSB's recommendations and rulings are narrowly limited to the
Appellate Body's finding that the original measure prohibited tuna products
from being labelled "dolphin safe" if it contained tuna caught in the
ETP and a dolphin was killed or seriously injured, but allowed
tuna products containing tuna caught outside the ETP to be labelled "dolphin
safe" even if dolphins had been killed or seriously injured.[44] Japan notes that, as part of its reasoning,
the Appellate Body explained that "the US measure fully addresses the
adverse effects on dolphins resulting from setting on dolphins in the ETP,
whereas it does 'not address mortality (observed or unobserved) arising from
fishing methods other than setting on dolphins outside the ETP'".[45] This is, however, the reason given by the
Appellate Body to support its ultimate conclusion that "the US 'dolphin-safe'
labelling provisions provide 'less favourable treatment' to Mexican tuna products
than that accorded to tuna products of the United States and tuna products
originating in other countries and are therefore inconsistent with Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement".[46] The United States therefore appears to confuse the Appellate
Body's conclusion with the particular reasons that provided the basis for that
conclusion.
15. The situation in this case
has similarities with the situation before the Appellate Body in US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 –
Argentina). That dispute concerned the likelihood of dumping
determination, which was premised on the following two factual bases: (i) a
finding of likely past dumping during the period of review; and (ii) a finding
that import volumes declined after the imposition of the anti-dumping duty
order, which was made in the original sunset determination and was incorporated
into the measure challenged in the Article 21.5 proceedings. The original
panel only addressed the first factual basis and as a
result concluded that the likelihood of dumping determination was inconsistent
with Article 11.3 of the Anti‑Dumping Agreement. It did not examine the
second factual basis. In the compliance proceedings, the United States argued
that the second factual basis, i.e. the import volume analysis, which remained unchanged in the U.S.
Department of Commerce's ("USDOC") likelihood of dumping
redetermination, was not part of the "measure
taken to comply" and therefore could not be examined by the
Article 21.5 Panel. The Appellate Body disagreed with the United States'
argument. The Appellate Body held that the original panel's finding of
WTO-inconsistency was addressed to the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping
determination and that USDOC's finding on import volumes is "an integral part of the 'measure
taken to comply'"[47]; as a
consequence, to comply with the original panel's finding, as adopted by the
DSB, the United States had to bring its determination of likelihood of dumping
into conformity with Article 11.3 of the Anti‑Dumping Agreement.[48] The Appellate Body added that the narrow
approach advocated by the United States in that case improperly confused the
original panel's conclusion concerning the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping
determination with the particular reason that provided the basis for that
conclusion.
16. Japan therefore urges the Article 21.5
Panel to find that Mexico's claims are properly within its terms of reference.
·
ANNEX C-7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ORAL STATEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA
AT THE MEETING OF THE PANEL*
1. The Republic of Korea ("Korea")
appreciates this opportunity to present its views to the Panel as a third party.
While the parties to the dispute and the third parties raise several important
issues, Korea would like to briefly focus on the following two systemic issues.
First, Korea would like to share its observation on the issue of this
compliance Panel's terms of reference. Second, Korea would like to comment on
relationship between Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Article III:4
of the GATT.
A COMPLIANCE PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE
2. As the WTO itself
proclaims, the main function of the WTO is to ensure that trade flows as
smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible. In order for the WTO agreements
to be better enforced, the WTO provides its Members with dispute settlement
function. The goal of the WTO dispute settlement is to achieve the prompt
settlement of the dispute, while keeping the due process rights of the parties
to the dispute.
3. That being said, when a
Member's measure is found to be inconsistent with the relevant provisions of
the WTO agreements through the dispute settlement procedures, the measure can
be said to block the flow of trade. At the DSB meeting, therefore, the WTO
requires the Member concerned to bring the measure into the conformity with the
relevant provisions of the WTO agreements. At the time when the inconsistent
measure has been corrected through the RPT, it can be said that the flow of
trade is now recovered.
4. That being so, Korea would like to reiterate its understanding that true finality of a dispute should envisage a situation where the exporters of the aggrieved party
restore their competitiveness which they had enjoyed before the WTO
inconsistent measure imposed by the Member concerned was adopted.
5. In this regard, a
compliance panel's terms of reference is not confined to changed measures;
rather it may cover unchanged measures if the compliance panel's review on the
unchanged measures is necessary to finalize the dispute. Indeed, the Appellate
Body in United States – Zeroing (DS294) clarified
that claims that had not previously been raised could nevertheless be asserted
against an implementing measure in a compliance proceeding "even where
such a measure taken to comply incorporates components of the original measure that
are unchanged, but are not separable from other aspects of the measure taken to
comply."[49]
6. The Appellate Body in
several Article 21.5 disputes has already ruled that measures taken to
comply are not confined to the declared measures by the implementing Member.[50] The Appellate Body in Mexico –
Corn Syrup (Article 21.5) has particularly ruled that
compliance panels have a duty to examine issues of a "fundamental nature,"
issues that go to the root of their jurisdiction on their own motion even if the
parties to the dispute remain silent on those issues.[51]
7. It should be emphasized,
however, that a compliance panel's broad terms of reference must not be
interpreted to allow the second chance for the complaining party to re-litigate.
Therefore, this compliance Panel must strike a balance between the prompt
settlement of the dispute and due process concerns in determining its scope of
review.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 2.1 OF THE TBT AGREEMENT AND ARTICLE III:4
OF THE GATT 1994
8. The WTO does not prohibit a
Member from pursuing its legitimate policy goals, e.g.,
consumers' right to know, safety, and protection of human and animal or plant
life or health, etc. Even more, the WTO allows additional policy space to its
Members through GATT Article XX exceptions. However, the WTO permits a
Member country's policy space only if it meets the rights and obligations under
the WTO agreements. Therefore, the WTO carefully strikes the balance between a
Member country's policy space and the object and purpose of the WTO agreements.
9. As the current dispute
describes, the TBT Agreement allows a Member to pursue its policy goals,
through a discriminatory measure, only if the discriminatory measure stems from
the legitimate regulatory distinction. However, because the concept,
discrimination, lies in both Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Article III:4
of the GATT 1994, the question about the clear relationship between the
two provisions in interpreting and applying the concept of discrimination has
often been raised.
10. Considering the second
recital of the TBT Agreement which states that "[d]esiring to further the objectives of GATT 1994,"
the TBT Agreement seems to be more specified instrument dealing with the
WTO Members' technical regulations, while the GATT 1994 covers broader
measures. In addition, the test for finding a violation of Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement is different from the test for finding a violation of Article III:4
of the GATT 1994. As a result, there is a possibility that a discriminatory
measure under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 may be justified under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement. Although Article XX of the GATT 1994 does
provide certain exceptions, it is well discussed so far that the scope may be
narrower than that of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, because the
two Agreements cover different ambit of trade areas.
11. Considering the rapid
technical changes and ensuing increasing non-tariff barriers through the TBT
measures, Korea respectfully requests this compliance Panel to provide a
guidance on the relationship between Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
12. This concludes Korea's oral
statement. Thank you.
·
ANNEX C-8
integrated
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF the arguments OF New Zealand
I. INTRODUCTION
1. New Zealand's
submission comments on what constitutes "compliance" under Article 21
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU), the nature of de facto
discrimination under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(GATT) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)
and the interpretation of "treatment no less favourable" under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
II. DSU: A MEASURE TAKEN TO COMPLY MUST BE
IMPLEMENTED
2. New Zealand notes the
claim by Mexico that the United States has in effect "unilaterally
granted itself a further extension to the RPT [Reasonable Period of Time for
Implementation] by not enforcing the measure it has introduced for the purpose
of bringing itself into compliance" during a six month "education and
outreach" grace period where the measure is legally in force, but does not
appear to be fully enforced.[52] New Zealand has
concerns about the significant systemic implications for the dispute settlement
process if compliance is found to be achieved when a Member merely announces it
will enforce the rules in the future. This should be strongly discouraged.
Consistency with WTO obligations must involve compliance both in law and in
fact.
3. As stated in Article 21.1
of the DSU, "prompt compliance" with recommendations and rulings of
the DSB is essential for the effective resolution of disputes. The DSU
recognises that immediate compliance may not be possible in all circumstances,
but requires that Members comply within a reasonable period of time as
determined under Article 21.3. New Zealand submits that any grace
periods should be taken into consideration in the determination of the RPT
itself. The Member seeking the grace period could raise this concern in the
course of seeking to agree on a RPT with the complaining Member(s) or during Article 21.3(c)
arbitration proceedings.[53]
III. THE
NATURE OF DE FACTO DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE GATT
AND THE TBT AGREEMENT
4. At their core, the national
treatment and Most Favoured Nation obligations in Articles I:1 and III:4
of the GATT and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement are concerned with
non-discrimination. The Appellate Body has clarified that discrimination under
these articles is not limited to de jure
discrimination, but extends also to de facto discrimination.[54] The Parties appear to
disagree about the extent to which a measure that is origin-neutral on its
face, such that any Member could choose to meet its conditions, can nevertheless
be de facto discriminatory.
5. Mexico's First Written
Submission alleges that the amended measure accords less favourable treatment
to imported products vis-à-vis like
domestic products inconsistent with the obligation in Article III:4 as:
… the Panel and Appellate
Body found that most tuna caught by Mexican vessels, being caught in the ETP by
setting on dolphins, would not be eligible for inclusion in a dolphin-safe
product under the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions, while most tuna caught
by US vessels is potentially eligible for the label.[55]
6. By contrast, the United States submit that:
The amended measure has
no exceptions – the eligibility requirements apply to all tuna products. And
those eligibility requirements relate to fishing methods, which is not an
immutable condition. Any Member may produce non-eligible tuna products one year
and eligible products the next year, depending on the different choices that
its fleet makes year to year.[56]
7. New Zealand does not
comment on whether there is de facto discrimination
in the instant case but would like to make some general observations. New Zealand notes that the Appellate
Body made the following comments on de facto discrimination
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement in the original proceedings:
In its analysis, the
Panel appears to juxtapose factors that "are related to the nationality of
the product" with other factors such as "fishing and purchasing
practices, geographical location, relative integration of different segments of
production, and economic and marketing choices." In so doing, the Panel
seems to have assumed, incorrectly in our view, that regulatory distinctions
that are based on different "fishing methods" or "geographical
location" rather than national origin per se cannot
be relevant in assessing the consistency of a particular measure with Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement. The Panel's approach
is difficult to reconcile with the fact that a measure may be de facto inconsistent with Article 2.1 even when it is
origin-neutral on its face.[57]
8. Like the Appellate Body,
New Zealand considers that there can be de facto
discrimination where a regulatory distinction is based on matters other than
national origin, or characteristics with an inherent relationship with origin.
New Zealand cautions against any approach that would restrict de facto
discrimination to instances where the relevant distinction is inherently
related to origin. Narrowing the ambit of de facto discrimination under
the GATT and the TBT Agreement in this way would significantly limit the
effectiveness of one of the core obligations in the WTO rules. The fact that a
Member could theoretically comply with conditions, or could theoretically
access an advantage, is not an automatic or complete answer to a discrimination
claim. A non-discrimination assessment should continue to focus on whether the
impugned measure modifies the competitive conditions of the relevant market
under Article III:4 of the GATT and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement,[58] and whether an
advantage has been accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products
originating in or destined for the territory of other Members under Article I:1.[59]
IV. "TREATMENT NO LESS FAVOURABLE"
A. Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement
9. The Appellate Body has clarified
that an assessment of "treatment no less favourable" under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement requires panels to assess whether the technical
regulation modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the
detriment of the imported products vis-à-vis like
domestic products or like imported products from another country. However, a
finding of detrimental impact on competitive
opportunities is not dispositive of "less favourable treatment" under
Article 2.1.[60] The Appellate Body has clarified that a regulatory distinction that
is not designed in an even-handed manner will not be legitimate.[61] In determining whether a regulatory distinction is even-handed,
panels have been directed to consider the "design, architecture, revealing
structure, operation, and application of the technical regulation at issue".[62] New Zealand submits that examination of these aspects should
focus on the rationale or objective that the regulatory distinction pursues,
and assess this against the objective of the measure as a whole.
10. In this dispute, the even-handedness assessment would involve consideration of the United States'
rationale for distinguishing between tuna products containing tuna caught by
setting on dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific and tuna harvested by other
methods in other areas of the ocean. New Zealand submits that the Panel
should consider whether this rationale is consistent with the overall objective
of the amended dolphin-safety measure. For instance, does the distinction assist
or hinder the dolphin-safety objective? Is eligibility for the label tailored
to the different levels of dolphin-safety risks arising from the different
fishing methods? In other words, is the rationale for the distinction
consistent with the measure's overall objective?
B. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
11. There appears to be some
disagreement between the parties about whether the purpose of the measure is
relevant to assessing whether it accords "treatment no less favourable"
to imported products vis-à-vis
domestic products. The United States suggests that the purpose and nature
of a measure should be assessed as part of the Article III:4 analysis. The
United States submits that to do otherwise "would doom many
legitimate and genuinely non-discriminatory measures"[63] to inconsistency with Article III:4
of the GATT.
12. The exclusion of the nature
and purpose of the measure from an Article III:4 analysis should not be
viewed in isolation, but in the context of the requirements of that provision
as a whole. The analysis of "treatment no less favourable" contains a
number of elements: in order for there to be a breach, the measure at issue
must "modify the conditions of competition" to the detriment of
imported products;[64] and there must be a "genuine
relationship" between any detrimental impact and the measure at issue.[65] Article III:4 does
not prevent Members from regulating in the public interest, including by
treating imported and domestic products differently. However, it imposes
disciplines on how Members regulate in order to
protect the equality of competitive conditions for like domestic and imported
products. Members may regulate to treat domestic and imported products
differently, so long as this difference does not detrimentally affect the
conditions of competition for imported products. In addition, there will only
be a breach of Article III:4 if this detrimental impact is attributable to
the measure itself because there is a "genuine relationship" between
the measure and the detrimental impact. The exceptions articulated in Article XX
of the GATT provide Members with further freedom to regulate for the public
policy objectives outlined in the paragraphs set out in that article.
13. New Zealand therefore
does not believe that excluding the nature and purpose of the measure from an
examination of "treatment no less favourable" under Article III:4
would restrict a Member's right to regulate for legitimate objectives as the United States
suggests.
14. New Zealand also notes
that a number of third parties have commented on the different tests under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT[66] and the risk of
conflicting findings under those two articles if the nature and purpose of a
measure is excluded from the Article III:4 analysis.[67] This could arise
because Article XX of the GATT contains a closed list of objectives, while
potentially any objective pursued by a regulatory distinction is relevant under
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. A regulatory distinction that
pursues an objection that is not listed in Article XX could therefore
theoretically be consistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement but
inconsistent with Article III:4.
15. The potential for an
incoherent result is most likely to arise where the objective of a regulatory distinction
does not fall within the exceptions enumerated in Article XX. This is not
the situation in the present dispute, where the United States has invoked
the exceptions in Article XX(b) and (g). In any event, New Zealand's
view is that the potential incoherence between Article 2.1 and Article III:4
is unlikely to be resolved as a matter of strict legal interpretation. We refer
to the Appellate Body's statement in EC – Seal Products
that "if there is a perceived imbalance in the existing rights and obligations
under the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994, the authority rests with
the Members of the WTO to address that imbalance."[68]
·
ANNEX C-9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE
THIRD-PARTY SUBMISSION OF Norway*
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Norway welcomes the opportunity to be heard and to present its
views as a third party in this proceeding under Article 21.5 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
2. Norway will not address all of the issues upon which there is
disagreement between the parties to the dispute. Rather, Norway will in this
written submission confine itself to discuss certain aspects of the
interpretation of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
II. GATT 1994 ARTICLE iII:4
A. Introduction
3. GATT 1994 Article III:4 provides in relevant parts that
The products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws regulations and requirements affecting
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution
or use.
4. Mexico and the United States disagree on whether the Amended Tuna
Measure[69]
accords Mexican tuna products "treatment no less favourable than that accorded"
like tuna products from the United States. With regard to the legal standard,
the focus of the disagreement seems to be whether the underlying rationale –
the basis – on which the member is regulating, must be part of the examination
when assessing "less favourable treatment" under the GATT 1994 Article III:4[70],
or if it is sufficient to demonstrate that the measure "has a detrimental
impact on the competitive opportunities for imported […] products […] vis-à-vis domestic […] products".[71]
Accordingly, the Parties seems to disagree on whether or not there is a need to
assess if the detrimental impact "reflects discrimination against like
imported products, including an "additional inquiry" as to whether
the detriment is related to the foreign origin of the product"[72]
5. Norway takes no position on the facts of the dispute, but will in the
following submit its views on the legal interpretation of what constitutes "less
favourable treatment" under GATT 1994 Article III:4.
B. Less Favourable
Treatment
6. There are several prior
panel and Appellate Body reports in which the term "treatment no less
favourable" in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 has been
interpreted. In EU – Seals, the
Appellate Body held that "the following propositions are well established"
as a result of these prior reports:
First, the term "treatment
no less favourable" requires effective equality of opportunities for
imported products to compete with like domestic products. Second, a formal
difference in treatment between imported and domestic like products are
necessary, nor sufficient, to establish that imported products are accorded
less favourable treatment than that accorded to like domestic products. Third,
because Article III:4 is concerned with ensuring effective equality of
competitive conditions for imported products, a determination of whether
imported products are treated less favourably than like domestic products
involves an assessment of the implications of the contested measure for the
equality of competitive conditions between imported and domestic like products.
If the outcome of this assessment is that the measure has a detrimental impact
on the conditions of competition for like imported products, then such
detrimental impact will amount to treatment that is "less favourable"
within the meaning of Article III:4. Finally, for a measure to be found to
modify the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of
imported products, there must be a "genuine relationship" between the
measure at issue and the adverse impact on the competitive opportunities for
imported products.[73]
7. Article III:4 applies
to both de jure and de facto discrimination.[74] In considering claims of de facto discrimination,
a panel "must take into consideration 'the totality of facts and
circumstances before it', and assess any 'implications' for competitive
conditions 'discernible from the design, structure, and expected operation of
the measure'".[75] The assessment must be
founded on a careful analysis of the contested measure and its implications in
the marketplace.[76]
8. The Appellate Body has held
that distinctions between imported and like domestic products may be drawn
without necessarily according less favourable treatment to the imported
products. However, there is a point at which the differential treatment of
imported and like domestic products amounts to "treatment no less
favourable" within the meaning of Article III:4. [77] According to the Appellate
Body, that is when the regulatory differences distort the conditions of
competition to the detriment of imported products. If that happens, "then the
differential treatment will amount to treatment that is less favourable within
the meaning of Article III:4."[78] A further inquiry into the
rationale of, or the justification for, the regulatory differences is not
required for a finding of a violation under GATT 1994 Article III:4.
9. It is worth noting, that
the legal standard for assessing "treatment no less favourable" under
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 differs from the legal interpretation
of the identical term in Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). Under Article 2.1
of the TBT Agreement, there
is a second step in the legal analysis, in addition to the examination of
whether the contested measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment
of imported products. The extra step involves an inquiry into whether the
detrimental impact (where found) can be explained from stemming exclusively
from a legitimate regulatory distinction. As explained above and, and as stated
by the Appellate Body in EU – Seals,
this second step, is not required under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994:
We do not consider […]
that for the purposes of an analysis under Article III:4, a panel is
required to examine whether the detrimental impact of a measure on competitive
opportunities for like imported products stems exclusively from a legitimate
distinction.[79]
10. The difference between the
legal standards under GATT Article III:4 and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement is due to the "immediate
contextual differences" between the TBT Agreement
and the GATT 1994.[80] Under GATT 1994 Article III:4,
any justifications for the regulatory distinction giving rise to the
detrimental impact may be considered pursuant to the exceptions set forth in
this Agreement, notably under Article XX. The TBT Agreement does not contain a
general exceptions clause similar to that of the GATT 1994. Instead, the
sixth recital of the preamble of the TBT Agreement
indicates that a Member has a right to adopt measures necessary to fulfil
certain legitimate policy objectives, provided they are not applied in a manner
that would constitute a means of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance
with the provisions of the Agreement.[81] In this context, the
Appellate Body has set out that, under Article 2.1, if a regulatory
distinction has a detrimental impact on imports, a panel may assess its
legitimacy under Article 2.1
itself.[82]
III. CONCLUSION
11. Norway respectfully requests the Panel to take account of the
considerations set out above.
·
ANNEX C-10
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF THE ORAL STATEMENT OF NORWAY
AT THE MEETING OF THE PANEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Norway
welcomes this opportunity to present its views on the issues raised in these
panel proceedings.
2. In its
written statement, Norway addressed certain aspects of the interpretation of Article III:4
of the GATT 1994. We will not repeat these arguments
here. Rather, we would like to draw the Panel's attention to two issues of
relevance to the interpretation of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).
3. The legal
standard for establishing a violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
involves a finding of less favourable treatment, which again involves a
two-step analysis. First, the complainant must establish that the technical
regulation at issue modifies the conditions of competition in the market of the
regulating Member to the detriment of the group of imported products vis-à-vis the group of domestic or other foreign products.[83]
Second, it must be shown that the detrimental impact on imported products does
not stem exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction (LRD).[84]
Both of the questions that we will comment upon today are related to the second
step.
II. the Scope of the analysis
4. The first
question that we will address is: what is the scope of the Panel's analysis
when determining whether the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a LRD.
In the view of the United States, the scope should be confined to those
aspects of the measure forming the regulatory distinction.[85]
Norway agrees with Canada that the approach proposed by the United States
is not in line with the standard articulated in the jurisprudence.[86]
5. In previous TBT cases, the Appellate Body has concluded that "a panel must carefully scrutinize the
particular circumstances of the case, that is, the design, architecture,
revealing structure, operation, and application of the technical regulation at
issue, and, in particular, whether that technical regulation is even-handed".[87]
6. In other
words, while the regulatory distinction that accounts for the detrimental
impact naturally will be in focus of the examination, the panel must look
further when undertaking its analysis. Indeed, in accordance with what the
Appellate Body has articulated, rather than conducting a limited inquiry only
into those parts of the measure constituting the regulatory distinction, the
Panel must undertake a thorough assessment on a case-by-case basis of the
different elements of the technical regulation. In its determination of whether
the detrimental impact reflects discrimination in violation of Article 2.1,
the panel must carefully consider the overall architecture of the technical
regulation as designed and applied and the even-handedness of the measure as a
whole.
III. the test for determining
whether or not the detrimental impact stems exclusively from a lrd
7. The second issue, on which we would like to make a few comments,
is related to which test should
be applied when determining whether the detrimental impact stems exclusively
from a LRD. In the so-called TBT Trilogy Cases, the Appellate Body has articulated
that the relevant inquiry when making this determination, is whether the
regulatory distinction is designed and applied in an even-handed manner, or
whether it lacks even-handedness, for example because it is designed or applied
in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.[88]
8. In its first written submission, Mexico acknowledges this, but
in addition, submits that the panel in EU –
Seals has set out the most recent elaboration of the test to be
applied when analysing the legitimacy of the regulatory distinction. [89]
That test included three steps; "step 1" addressing the rational
connection between the distinction and the objective of the measure; "step 2"
considering whether an otherwise rationally disconnected distinction can be
justified by some other "rationale"; and "step 3"
addressing whether the distinction is applied in an even-handed manner.
[90]
9. In Norway's view, the three steps articulated by the panel in EU – Seals does not properly reflect the
analytical framework developed in the previous TBT cases. In particular, the
test by the panel in EU – Seals
seems to be at odds with previous jurisprudence when setting up separate
inquiries (steps 1 and 2) into the measure's policy objective or other
justifications for the regulatory distinction. In the previous cases, the
consideration of whether there is a rational connection between the policy
objective and the regulatory distinction, or, in the absence of such rational
connection, whether there are other cogent reasons explaining the regulatory
distinction, has been an integral part of the even-handedness analysis. Indeed,
this consideration played an important role in the even-handedness analysis
both in US – Clove Cigarettes and
US – COOL.
10. The analytical framework relied on by the Appellate Body in this
regard, is not the same as the analysis used in the context of Article XX
of the GATT 1994. The need to conduct independent analyses under these two
provisions was recently confirmed by the Appellate Body in EU – Seals[91].
At the same time, however, the Appellate Body has underscored that there are "important
parallels between the analyses" to be applied under Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement and the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.[92]
In light of this, the even-handedness analysis under Article 2.1 may be
informed by the jurisprudence interpreting the term "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination" under the chapeau of Article XX. This
supports our view that the assessment of the identified policy objectives, or
other justifications for the distinction, must take place as part of the even-handedness analysis
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
11. Mr. Chairman,
distinguished Members of the Panel, this concludes Norway's statement today.
__________
[1] Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.169, citing Appellate Body Reports US –
Gasoline, p. 22 DSR 1996:I, p. 20; US – Shrimp,
paras. 119 and 120; and US – Gambling, para. 292
(footnotes omitted).
[2] Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.169, citing Appellate Body Reports US –
Gasoline, p. 22 DSR 1996:I, p. 20; US – Shrimp,
paras. 119 and 120; and US – Gambling, para. 292
(footnotes omitted).
[3] Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.169, citing Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164; US – Gambling, para. 306; and Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 182
(footnotes omitted).
[4] Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.169, citing Appellate Body Report, US –
Gambling, para. 307.
[5] Mexico's Second Written Submission, para. 252 (emphasis
added).
[6] United States' Second Written Submission, para. 157 (emphasis
added).
[7] Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences,
paras 7.201-7.202.
[8] Mexico's Second Written Submission, para. 272, with respect to
trade-restrictiveness.
[9] See Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.215.
[10] For example, the Appellate Body stated in Korea –
Various Measures on Beef (para. 163) , that: "[a] measure
with a relatively slight impact upon imported products might more easily be
considered as 'necessary' than a measure with intense or broader restrictive
effects". The Appellate Body stated in EC – Seal Products (para. 5.215) that: "the EU
Seal Regime, even if it were highly trade-restrictive in nature, could still be
found to be 'necessary' within the meaning of Article XX(a), subject to
the result of a weighing and balancing exercise under the specific
circumstances of the case and in the light of the particular measure at
issue".
[11] Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.169, citing Appellate Body Reports US –
Gasoline, p. 22 DSR 1996:I, p. 20; US – Shrimp,
paras. 119 and 120; and US – Gambling, para. 292.
[12] United States' Second Written Submission, para. 164.
[13] Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
para. 143, citing Appellate Body Report, US –
Gambling, para. 306 and Korea – Various Measures
on Beef, para. 163. See also Korea –
Various Measures on Beef, para. 163 (stating that in respect of
a measure inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, it is the
extent to which the measure produces "restrictive effects on imported goods"
that should be examined).
[14] Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials,
para. 319 (emphasis added); cited in Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 319.
[15] Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico),
para. 319. Australia notes that, while the term "restriction" in
Article XI does not appear in Article 2.2, the Appellate Body in US – Tuna II (Mexico) relied
on the Appellate Body's interpretation of "restriction" in the
context of Article XI(2)(a) to define "trade-restrictiveness"
under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement as "something having a
limiting effect on trade".
[16] Mexico's Second Written Submission, para. 281.
[17] Australia considers that the same argument would apply to a finding
of discrimination under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and the separate
and distinct analytical enquiry of the trade-restrictiveness of a measure under
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
[18] United States' Second Written Submission, para. 165.
[19] Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.129.
[20] To this end, Australia notes the Appellate Body's comments in US – COOL that "[a]lthough the Panel expressed the view
that a technical regulation's non-conformity with Article 2.1 is not per se an issue for that technical regulation's conformity
with Article 2.2 in general or the 'trade-restrictive' element in
particular, it nevertheless relied upon findings that it had made in its Article 2.1
analysis to find that the COOL measure is trade-restrictive within the meaning
of Article 2.2": Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, footnote
756 to para. 381.
[21] See, for example, Panel Report, India – Autos, para. 7.270
(noting the phrase "limiting condition" suggests the need to identify
"a condition that is limiting, i.e. that has a limiting effect" and
"in the context of Article XI, that limiting effect must be on importation itself” (emphasis added); Appellate Body
Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 163
(referring to "the extent to which the compliance measure produces restrictive effects on international commerce, that is, in
respect of a measure inconsistent with Article III:4, restrictive effects on imported goods") (emphasis added); Appellate Body
Report, China – Publications and Audio-Visual Products, para. 300
(noting the panel, in a finding upheld by the
Appellate Body, considered the "restrictive impact the measures at issue
have on imports of relevant products"
and on "those wishing to engage in importing,
in particular on their right to trade" (emphasis added); Appellate Body
Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 150
(referring to "restrictive effects on international trade as severe as
those resulting from an import ban"); Appellate Body Report, US – COOL paras. 477 and 479 (noting that the panel's
findings" suggest it considered the measure to have a considerable
degree of trade-restrictiveness insofar as it has a limiting effect on the competitive opportunities for
imported livestock as compared to the situation prior to the enactment of the
COOL measure" and concluding that "[o]verall, in our view, the Panel's
factual findings suggest that the COOL measure…has a
considerable degree of trade-restrictiveness") (emphasis added); Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry,
para. 7.236 (noting that "panels have also considered whether a
measure makes effective a restriction by evaluating the measure's impact on competitive opportunities available to imported
products") (emphasis added).
[22] Appellate
Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169,
citing Appellate Body Reports US – Gasoline,
p. 22 DSR 1996:I, p. 20; US – Shrimp,
paras. 119 and 120; and US – Gambling,
para. 292 (footnotes omitted).
[23] Appellate
Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169,
citing Appellate Body Reports US – Gasoline,
p. 22 DSR 1996:I, p. 20; US – Shrimp,
paras. 119 and 120; and US – Gambling,
para. 292 (footnotes omitted).
[24] Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences,
paras. 7.201-7.202.
[25] Mexico's Second Written Submission, para. 252.
[26] Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.169; see also Appellate Body Report, China –
Publications and Audiovisual Products, paras. 239-242.
[27] Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.165.
[28] See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres,
para. 143, citing Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling,
para. 306 and Korea – Various Measures on Beef,
para. 163; and Appellate Body Report China – Raw Materials,
para. 319, cited in Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico),
para. 319.
[29] Appellate
Body Reports, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 182;
US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 215; US – COOL, para. 271.
[30] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes,
paras. 180-182.
[31] Appellate
Body Report, US – COOL, para. 271.
[32] Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products [hereinafter
US – Tuna II (Mexico)], WT/DS381/AB/R (16
May 2012), para. 215
(referring to Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes [hereinafter US – Clove Cigarettes], WT/DS406/AB/R (4 April 2012), paras.
180, 182 and 215).
[33] Second Written Submission of the United States of America (22 July
2014), para. 66 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II
(Mexico), para. 286).
[34] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes,
para. 182.
[35] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes,
para. 182.
[36] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes,
para. 97.
[37] Second Written Submission of the United States of America, para.
142.
[38] See Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti‑Dumping Measures on Oil Country
Tubular Goods from Argentina (Article 21.5 – Argentina) [hereinafter
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5
– Argentina)], WT/DS268/AB/RW (12 April 2007), paras. 141, 150-52.
[39] See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti‑Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type
Bed Linen from India (Article 21.5 – India) [hereinafter EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India)], WT/DS141/AB/RW (8
April 2003), para. 88.
[40] Second Written Submission of the United States of America, para. 48.
See Appellate Body Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating
Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") (Article 21.5 – EC) [hereinafter
US – Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 – EC)], WT/DS294/AB/RW
(14 May 2009), para. 433.
[41] First Written Submission of the United States of America (27 May
2014), para. 202(1).
[42] Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico),
para. 299.
[43] See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5
– Japan) [hereinafter US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5
– Japan)], WT/DS322/AB/RW (18 August 2009), para. 158.
[44] First Written Submission of the United States of America, para. 192
(referring to Appellate Body Report, US - Tuna II (Mexico),
paras. 289-292).
[45] Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico),
para. 297 (referring to Panel Report, United States – Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products,
WT/DS381/R (15 September 2011), para. 7.544).
[46] Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico),
para. 299.
[47] Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 – Argentina), para. 146.
* The Republic of
Korea requested that its oral statement serve as its executive summary.
[49] See
United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping
Margins (“Zeroing”) – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European
Communities,
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS294/AB/RW, 14 May 2009, para. 432.
[50] E.g.,
Appellate Body
Reports, US-Softwood Lumber IV (Article 21.5
– Canada); US-Zeroing (Article 21.5
– EC).
[51] Appellate
Body Report, Mexico-Corn Syrup (Article 21.5),
para. 36, quoted in US-Countervailing Measures
on Certain EC Products (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 7.35.
[52] Mexico First Written Submission, 8 April 2014, para. 99.
[53] See Award of the Arbitrator, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU,
WT/DS75/16, WT/DS84/14, 4 June 1999, DSR 1999:II, p. 937, para. 47
where the arbitrator noted that a thirty day grace period was required for the
enforcement of certain measures under Korean law and included this additional
period after the promulgation of the amendments to the legislation as part of
the RPT.
[54] Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures
Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R,
adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VI, p. 2985, para. 78; Appellate Body
Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April
2012 (US – Clove Cigarettes), para. 181;
Appellate Body Reports, European Communities –
Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products,
WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014 (EC – Seal
Products), para. 5.101.
[55] Mexico First Written Submission at para. 329 (footnote omitted).
[56] United States First Written Submission at para. 312.
[57] Appellate Body Report, United States –
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012 (US – Tuna II
(Mexico)), para. 225.
[58] See, for example, Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.116 and US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 237.
[59] Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.86.
[60] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes,
para. 182, as followed in Appellate Body Reports, US –
Tuna II (Mexico), para. 215 and Appellate Body Reports, United States –
Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements,
WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July 2012 (US – COOL), para. 271.
[61] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes,
para. 182 as followed in Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL,
para. 271.
[62] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes,
para. 182 as followed in Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL,
para. 271.
[63] United States Second Written Submission, para. 142.
[64] Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.101 (referring to Appellate Body Reports, US –
Clove Cigarettes, para. 179; Appellate
Body Report, Thailand – Customs and
Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, DSR 2011:IV, p. 2203 (Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines)), para. 128; and
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 5, para. 137).
[65] Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.101 (referring to Appellate Body Report, US – COOL,
para. 270 that in turn quotes Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II
(Mexico), footnote 457 to para. 214, in turn referring to Appellate
Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines),
para. 134).
[66] Canada third party submission, paras. 43-46, Japan third party
submission, paras. 10-15 and Norway third party submission, paras. 9-10.
[67] Japan third party submission, paras. 11-13.
[68] Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products,
para. 5.129.
* Norway
requested that its third party submission serve as its executive summary.
[69] The measure is described in the Parties' submissions, see i.a.
Mexico's First Written Statement part II and United States' First Written
Submission part II.A.
[70] United States' First Written Submission para. 304.
[71] Mexico's Second Written Submission para. 219.
[72] Mexico's Second Written Submission para. 219.
[73] Appellate Body Report, EU – Seals, para. 5.101
(footnotes omitted).
[74] See, e.g. Panel Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5
– EC), para. 8.159.
[75] Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, para
269 (footnotes omitted).
[76] Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5
– EC), para. 215.
[77] Appellate Body Report, EU – Seals, para 5.109.
[78] Appellate Body Report, Thailand –
Cigarettes (Phillippines), para. 128.
[79] Appellate Body Report, EU –
Seals, para. 5.117.
[80] Appellate Body Report, EU – Seals,
para. 5.125.
[81] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes,
para. 109.
[82] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes,
para. 109.
* Norway
requested that its oral statement serve as its executive summary.
[83] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 180.
[84] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 181-182.
[85] United States' First Written Submission,
paras. 191 and 222.
[86] Canada's Third Party Submission para. 10.
[87] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para 182.
[88] Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 182 and
Appellate Body Report, US – COOL,
para. 271.
[89] See Mexico's first written
submission para. 240. The Appellate Body in EU – Seals found that the measure in that case was not a
technical regulation and declared "moot and of no legal effect" the
findings and conclusions of the Panel with respect to the TBT Agreement,
including this particular test.
[90] Panel Reports, EU – Seals, paras. 7.259 and 7.328.
[91] Appellate Body Reports, EU – Seals, para. 5.313.
[92] Appellate Body Reports, EU – Seals, para. 5.310.