Russian Federation – Measures on the
importation of live pigs, pork
and other pig products from the European Union
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Union
The following
communication, dated 27 June 2014, from the delegation of the European Union to the
Chairperson of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article
6.2 of the DSU.
_______________
My
authorities have instructed me to request the establishment of a panel pursuant
to Article 6 of the WTO Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) with
respect to the adoption, maintenance and application of certain measures by the
Russian Federation (Russia) affecting the importation of live pigs and
their genetic material, pork and certain other pig products from the European
Union (Russian Federation – Measures on the Importation of Live Pigs,
Pork and Other Pig Products from the European Union - DS475).
On 8 April 2014, the European
Union (EU) requested consultations with Russia pursuant to Articles 1 and
4 of the DSU, Article 11 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and Article XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), concerning certain Russian
measures affecting the importation of live pigs and their genetic material,
pork and certain other pig products ("the products at issue") from
the EU, purportedly because of concerns related to a limited number of cases of
African swine fever (ASF)[1].
The consultations took place on
30 April and 1 May 2014 with a view to reaching a satisfactory settlement of
the matter. Unfortunately, the consultations failed to settle the dispute. The EU therefore requests that a panel be
established pursuant to Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, Article 11 of the SPS
Agreement and Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 to examine the matter based on the
standard terms of reference, as set out in Article 7.1 of the DSU.
The EU challenges certain
Russian measures adopting, maintaining or applying an import ban or import
restrictions, which prevent the importation of the products at issue from the
EU into Russia.
The specific
measures at issue are:
·
A ban on imports
from Lithuania as described in the administrative notice from the Russian Federal
Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision of 25 January 2014
(FS-EN-8/1023). This notice announced a temporary restriction on imports of
"live pigs and its genetic material; pork products (which were not heat
treated no less than 72ºC for at least 30 minutes); products from slaughter of
wild boars; horn-hoofed and leather, intestinal materials; bristles; feed for
pigs; hunting trophies, which were not subjected to full taxidermy treatment;
previously used equipment for maintenance, transportation, slaughter and
cutting of pigs" from Lithuania as of 25 January 2014. This measure was
notified to the WTO on 10 February 2014 (G/SPS/N/RUS/48);
·
A ban on imports
from Poland as described in the administrative notice from the Russian Federal
Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision of 27 February 2014
(FS-NV-8/2972) announcing a temporary restriction on imports of "live pigs
and its genetic material; pork products (which were not heat treated no less than 80ºC for at least 30 minutes);
products from slaughter of wild boars; horn-hoofed and leather, intestinal
materials; bristles; feed for pigs; hunting trophies, which were not subjected
to full taxidermy treatment; previously used equipment for maintenance,
transportation, slaughter and cutting of pigs" from Poland as of 27
February 2014. This measure was notified to the WTO on 4 March 2014
(G/SPS/N/RUS/49);
·
A ban on imports
from Lithuania and Poland as described in the administrative notice of the
Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision of 2 April
2014 (FS-EN-8/5081). This notice announced the extension of the import
restrictions in force to processed products containing pork excluding
ready-to-use feed for cats and dogs which underwent thermal treatment (temperature
not lower than 70ºC, duration of treatment not less than 20 minutes), from
Lithuania and Poland as of 7 April 2014. These measures were notified to the
WTO on 4 April 2014 as updates to the original WTO notifications
(G/SPS/N/RUS/48/Add.2 and G/SPS/N/RUS/49/Add.1);
·
The refusal by
Russia to accept imports of the products at issue from the entire EU, amounting
to an EU-wide ban. The EU identifies this specific measure at issue both as an
action (an import ban or restriction) and, in the alternative, as an omission
(failure to accept imports from the EU). The EU seeks review of this specific
measure at issue as such and as applied, de jure and de facto (that is, based on all the relevant facts). The EU
also seeks review of this specific measure at issue both insofar as it is
written, and insofar as it is unwritten. The EU notes the letter sent to the EU
dated 29 January 2014 (FS-SA-8/1277) from the Russian Federal Service for
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision referring to certain export certificates
previously used for certain exports from the EU to Russia, and notably the
phrase "healthy animals grown in farms and/or administrative territories
officially free from contiguous animal diseases, including African Swine Fever
during 3 years in the whole territory of the EU except Sardinia." In this
respect, the Russian authorities made the following statement: "veterinary
doctors in the EU Member-States must stop certification of the abovementioned
products. Otherwise these products accompanied with these veterinary
certificates issued after 27.01.2014, cannot be allowed into the territory of
the Member States of the Customs Union and are subject to returns."
This
measure was confirmed and re-iterated in a letter of 14 February 2014 (НF-12-26/1650) from the Ministry of
Agriculture of the Russian Federation, stating that "this incident considerably changes
the epizootic status not only of Lithuania, but of the whole EU". Since the end of January 2014, imports of the products at issue
were no longer accepted, as evidenced inter alia by:
- an official announcement
of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision
from 6 February 2014, according to which the importation of pork products
(frozen heads and hearts) of Austrian and German origin was banned in the Tver
and Pskov regions, because of alleged ASF risks in the whole EU.[2]
- Before the imposition of
the import ban against Poland, Russia already rejected a frozen pork meat
consignment that was subsequently re-imported to the EU on 31 January 2014. The
reason for rejection was that in the export certificate, the situation on ASF
would not be correctly certified as regards ASF outbreaks on the territory of
Lithuania.
Each of the measures at issue appears to be inconsistent with Russia's
obligations under the following provisions of the SPS Agreement and the GATT
1994, except as stated otherwise in the following paragraphs.
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, because Russia has not ensured,
and does not ensure, that the measures at issue are not applied beyond the
extent necessary to protect human or animal life or health. It is not necessary
from a safety point of view for Russia to restrict imports from disease-free
and, therefore, unaffected areas in the EU[3];
and to restrict imports of those products that pose no risk of disease transmission.
Further, Russia did not ensure that the
measures at issue were based on scientific principles. There is no scientific
basis, whether specific or general, for restricting imports from non-affected
areas of the EU and for restricting imports of those products that
pose no risk of disease transmission. Russia failed and fails to ensure that
the measures at issue are not maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence.
Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the SPS
Agreement, because the Russian measures are neither "based on" nor "conform
to" the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations,
as provided for in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS Agreement. Furthermore, they
are inconsistent with Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, as there is no
scientific justification for departing from the relevant standards, guidelines
or recommendations, nor are the measures at issue a consequence of the level of
sanitary protection sought by Russia.
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement, because Russia does not ensure
that the measures at issue are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the
circumstances, of the risks to human or animal life or health, taking into
account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations, as required by Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. Russia has
neither provided, nor referred to, any such risk assessment.
Moreover, in adopting, maintaining and/or
applying the measures at issue, Russia did not and does not take into account
available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods;
relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; the prevalence of specific
diseases or pests; the existence of pest- or disease-free areas; the relevant
ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or other treatment.
Russia has provided no evidence that it has taken these matters into account,
as required by Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. Had Russia properly taken
these matters into account, it would have concluded that the measures at issue
are unnecessary and unjustified.
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, because Russia has failed to
comply with any of its requirements: in this case, it is incorrect to proceed
on the basis that relevant scientific evidence is insufficient. The measures at
issue do not appear to be provisional. Russia did not proceed on the basis of
available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international
organizations, as well as from sanitary measures applied by other Members.
Although Russia obtained the information necessary for a more objective
assessment of risks, it has not shown, and does not show any sign of, reviewing
the sanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
Articles 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, because Russia has not ensured,
and does not ensure, that the measures at issue are adapted to the sanitary
characteristics of the area from which the products at issue originate and to
which they are destined. In assessing the sanitary characteristics of the
affected area, Russia failed to take into account, inter alia,
the level of prevalence of ASF, the existence of eradication and control
programs (immediately implemented in accordance with international standards
laid down by the OIE), and appropriate criteria or guidelines developed by the
relevant international organizations.
Furthermore,
Russia fails to recognise the concepts of pest-
or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, as required by Article 6.2
of the SPS Agreement. Russia also does not make any determination with respect
to such areas based on factors such as geography, ecosystems, epidemiological
surveillance, and the effectiveness of sanitary controls. Russia fails to
recognise the EU territory, excluding the restricted areas, as disease-free
areas, despite the implementation of appropriate regionalisation
measures.
With
respect to Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement, the EU considers that it has
provided the necessary evidence to objectively demonstrate to Russia that the
EU territory, excluding the restricted areas due to the presence of ASF, is a disease-free area or area of low ASF prevalence. For this purpose, access has been given,
upon request, to Russia, for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures.
Articles 5.3, 5.4 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, because, in assessing the risk
to animal health and determining the measures to be applied for achieving the
appropriate level of sanitary protection, Russia failed to take into account
all relevant economic factors referred to in Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement,
including the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting
risks.
Further,
when determining the appropriate level of sanitary protection, Russia failed to
take into account, or properly take into account, the objective of minimizing
negative trade effects, as required by Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement.
Russia
failed and fails to ensure that the measures at issue are not more
trade-restrictive than required to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary
protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility, as required
by Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. Russia failed to take into account that
there are other measures, which are reasonably available taking into account
technical and economic feasibility, that achieve Russia's appropriate level of
sanitary protection and that are significantly less restrictive to trade.
The
alternative measures would be those that take into account the principle of
regionalisation (zoning) provided for in Article 6, as further set out in the
OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code on Zoning and Compartmentalisation (Chapter
4.3), and as also reflected in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code on ASF
(Chapter 15.1). Russia should recognise the EU territory (excluding the
restricted areas due to the presence of ASF), as a non-affected area. The alternative measures would also involve a narrower definition of
the products at issue.
Article 2.3 and Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, because the Russian measures
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where similar
conditions prevail, including between the Russian territory and that of other
Members.
For
example, while Russia applies the measures at issue to imported products from
the entire EU territory, it does not
apply similar measures with respect to like domestic products, and their
internal movement within the Russian territory. In this context, it is noted
that Russia does not appear to effectively control the spread of ASF in its own
territory. Since its introduction in the Russian territory from the Caucasus
region in 2007, ASF spread westwards and northwards, infecting the feral and
domestic pig population. According to the notifications of Russia to the OIE,
around 400 ASF outbreaks in farms affecting 500.000 domestic pigs and
around 600 cases in wild boar were detected since 2007. The cases found
in Lithuania and Poland, and later in Latvia, were located on the border with
Belarus where the disease is also present, due to the spread of the disease
from Russia. The genetic sequencing of virus isolates show a 100% homology
between Lithuanian and Polish wild boar cases and the viral isolates
circulating in Belarus and Russia.
Furthermore,
as regards restrictive measures relating to ASF against other Members,
according to the letter of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and
Phytosanitary Supervision of 15 January 2014 (FS-NW-8/528), despite the finding
of ASF in wild boars in a forester-hunting ground in the Luhansk Region of
Ukraine, close to the Russian border, Russia restricted imports of live pigs
and pig products from the said Luhansk region only and did not apply a de jure or de facto ban on
all pigs and pig products originating in Ukraine.
In
this respect, it is also noted that Russia lifted certain import restrictions
against Belarus despite the fact that ASF has been identified and notified in
two regions of Belarus since June 2013. The movement of live pigs and pig
products from pig farms and meat processing companies of the Mogilev Oblast,
Belarus, was allowed by virtue of the administrative notice from the Russian
Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance of 27 January 2014
(FS-EN-8/1093).
Russia
continues refusing regionalisation with regard to the territory of the EU and
its Member States. Thus, Russia is applying the measures at issue in a manner
that constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade. Russia fails
to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers
being appropriate in different situations, and such distinctions result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
Article 8 and Annex C.1(a), (b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement, because Russia failed and fails
to modify the measures at issue in order to permit the resumption of imports to
Russia of the products at issue from non-affected areas in the EU and/or with
respect to appropriately treated or processed products. The EU repeatedly
approached Russia since early February 2014 in order to achieve an adaptation
of the measures at issue to the regional conditions in the EU. Russia was
provided with all requested information, in addition to further information,
provided at the EU's own initiative. Furthermore, a series of bilateral
meetings were held between the EU authorities and the Russian authorities
between February and June 2014, at which further information and explanations
were provided. The resulting undue delay is reflected, inter alia,
in:
- the letter of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and
Phytosanitary Supervision of 12 March 2014 (FS-SD-4/3620);
- the failure to reply to invitations by
EU authorities of 31 January and 14 February 2014 for urgent
meetings;
- the failure to reply to additional
information and explanations provided by the EU, with letter of 21 May 2014;
- requesting answers to questions where
the EU already provided exhaustive replies – with a letter dated 16 May 2014,
which however reached the EU only on 4 June 2014 (FS-EN-8/7999);
- requesting answers to questions
irrelevant to the case (e.g. information on establishments in unaffected areas
graded by production volume and biosecurity);
- the belated provisions of invitations
for visas for a technical meeting agreed on 21 February to take place
24-25 February 2014, which finally only took place on 7 March 2014.
Accordingly, Russia failed to observe the provisions of Annex C of the SPS
Agreement on the operation of control, inspection and approval procedures and
otherwise failed to ensure that its procedures are not inconsistent with the
provisions of the SPS Agreement, as required by Article 8 of the SPS Agreement.
Furthermore,
Russia failed to ensure, with respect to its procedures for checking and
ensuring the fulfilment of sanitary measures, that such procedures have been
undertaken and completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner
for imported products than for like domestic products, as required by Annex
C.1(a) to the SPS Agreement.
With
respect to Annex C.1(b) to the SPS Agreement, Russia failed to ensure that the
standard processing period of each procedure is published or that the
anticipated processing period is communicated to the applicant upon request;
that when receiving an application, the competent body promptly examines the
completeness of the documentation and informs the applicant in a precise and
complete manner of all deficiencies; that the competent body transmits, as soon
as possible, the results of the procedure in a precise and complete manner to
the applicant, so that corrective action may be taken if necessary; that even
when the application has deficiencies, the competent body proceeds, as far as
practicable, with the procedure if the applicant so requests; and that upon
request, the applicant is informed of the stage of the procedure, with any
delay being explained.
Finally,
as regards Annex C.1(c) to the SPS Agreement, Russia failed to ensure that
information requirements are limited to what is necessary for appropriate
control, inspection and approval procedures.
Article 7 and
Annex B paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the SPS Agreement, because
certain measures at issue were taken by Russia against Lithuania on 25 January
2014 (ref. FS-EN-8/1032), but only notified to the WTO on 10 February 2014,
that is, 16 days after their imposition. Another measure at issue, namely the
import ban relating to the entire EU territory, has, to the knowledge of the
EU, neither been published, nor notified to the WTO.
Specifically,
Russia failed to notify changes in its sanitary measures and to provide
information on such sanitary measures in accordance with the provisions of
Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
With
respect to the ban concerning Lithuania on the products at issue as notified in
(G/SPS/N/RUS/48), Russia failed to immediately
notify other Members, through the WTO Secretariat, of the products covered,
with a brief indication of the objective and the rationale of the regulation,
including the nature of the urgent problem. Russia also failed to provide
copies of the regulation to other Members and to allow other Members to make
comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take the comments
and the results of the discussions into account.
With
regard to the EU-wide ban, Russia failed to ensure that the relevant measure
was published promptly in such a manner as to enable the EU and its Member
States to become acquainted with them. It also failed to allow Members a
reasonable interval between the publication and the entry into force of the ban
to allow time for producers in exporting Members to adapt their products and
method of production to the requirements of the importing Member. Further,
given that the measure was not substantially the same as the content of the
international standards, guidelines or recommendations and given that it had a
significant effect on trade of the EU and its Member States, Russia failed to
publish a notice at an early stage in such a manner as to enable interested
Members to become acquainted with the proposal; to notify at an early stage
other Members, through the Secretariat, of the products to be covered together
with a brief indication of the objective and rationale of the proposed
regulation so that amendments could still be introduced and comments taken into
account; to provide upon request to other Members copies of the proposed
regulation and identify the parts which in substance deviate from international
standards, guidelines or recommendations; without discrimination, allow
reasonable time for other Members to make comments in writing, discuss these
comments upon request, and take the comments and the results of the discussions
into account.
It is
noted that, insofar as the EU-wide ban is concerned, were it to be the case
that Russia considered that urgent problems of health protection arose, Russia
failed to immediately notify other Members, through the WTO Secretariat, of the
products covered, with a brief indication of the objective and the rationale of
the regulation, including the nature of the urgent problem. Russia also failed
to provide copies of the regulation to other Members and to allow other Members
to make comments in writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take the
comments and the results of the discussions into account.
Article I:1 of
the GATT 1994, because Russia is not
granting the products at issue originating in the EU, immediately and
unconditionally, the same advantages in respect of their importation, as it
does to like products originating in any other country, in particular to
products originating in Ukraine and Belarus, as already described in relation
to claims on Article 2.3 and Article 5.5
of the SPS Agreement.
Article III:4
of the GATT 1994, because the
measures at issue accord less favourable treatment to the imported products at
issue than that accorded to like products originating in Russia, with respect
to laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
Article XI:1 of
the GATT 1994, because the Russian
measures constitute an import prohibition or restriction other than duties,
taxes or other charges.
* * *
The
Russian measures at issue adversely affect exports to Russia of live pigs,
fresh pork and the other products at issue originating in the EU and its Member
States, and they nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the EU and its
Member States directly or indirectly under the cited agreements.
This request
relates to the measures at issue and to any amendments, supplements,
extensions, replacement measures, renewal measures and implementing measures.
__________
[1] Since January 2014, ASF was confirmed in the following cases in the
EU: on 24 January in two wild boars in Lithuania, on 17 and 19 February in two
wild boars in Poland. On 30 May 2014 two additional ASF cases were confirmed in
wild boar in Poland, inside the already established restricted area. On 26 June
2014 ASF was confirmed in Latvia in three wild boars and in three pigs in a
backyard farm in an area that has already been restricted due to Classical
swine fever. All cases occurred very close to the Belarus border.
[2] http://fsvps.ru/fsvps/news/8935.html.
[3] Commission Implementing Decision concerning animal health control
measures relating to African swine fever in certain Member States
(2014/178/EU), OJ L 95, 29.3.2014, p. 47, defines the affected areas in the EU
in which protective measures apply, i.e. Sardinia and certain areas in South-eastern
Lithuania and North-eastern Poland, bordering Belarus (so-called
“regionalisation measures”). As regards the most recent cases of ASF in
South-eastern Latvia, see the Commission Implementing Decision concerning
certain interim protective measures relating to African swine fever in Latvia.