1. The main regulations governing the national food reserves and relevant policies in Taiwan are the Food Administration Act and its Enforcement Rules, which detail the country’s rice stockpiling program.

2. A review of the stockpiling systems among selected countries has indicated that Japan has established reserves for imported food wheat, equivalent to 2.3 months of national demand, and for corn and other feed grains of around 1 million metric tons. Additionally, households are advised to have short-term food reserves for 3 to 7 days, and stockpiling guidelines issued by the government are publicly available.

3. In South Korea, the public rice stocks include domestic rice, imported rice, and the earmarked stocks for the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve. Domestic rice and imported rice are stored separately by the government.

4. Singapore maintains a national rice stockpile largely through imports, and requires rice importers to participate in the Rice Stockpile Scheme, with a minimum monthly import quantity of 50 tons, to keep a two-month supply of rice in government warehouses. To mitigate potential import risks, the Singapore government has adopted two approaches: diversifying import sources and investing in overseas food markets to secure a purchase priority through provision of funding and technology.

5. In the case of Thailand, its rice production far exceeds domestic consumption, making it one of the major net rice exporters globally. Therefore, compared to Taiwan, Thailand puts less emphasis on food stockpiling, and the government has so specific requirement for domestic rice stocks—a unique case study among the countries included in the present study.

6. China’s public food reserves policy is formulated by the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration and implemented by the state grain stockpiler Sinograin. Due to its vast territory, China operates reserve systems at both central and local levels, managed by the China Grain Reserve Management Corporation and state-owned “storage enterprises” established by local governments. Currently, the size of both central and local grain reserves in China’s major grain production areas is able to meet domestic demand for three months; the figures for main sales areas and product-sale balance areas are six and four to five months respectively.

7. Regarding the impact of rice stockpiling systems on rice prices, a 2018 OECD study has suggested that, compared to the baseline scenario, reducing national food reserves to a two-week supply of domestic consumption would lead to a decrease in rice prices due to the release from government stockpiles. Conversely, adjusting the reserve level to a three-month stockpile would increase rice prices due to increased domestic and international market demand. Regardless of the stockpiling approach, however, the impact of changes in reserve quantities on prices would return to the original level after around 4 years. As such, short-term changes in the size of the national rice reserve would more or less affect rice prices, but over the long term, market supply and demand would reach equilibrium, and price return to the baseline as producers adjust production quantities.

8. Generally, a larger rice reserve means a stronger buffer against national rice price shocks when an unexpected event (such as food supply shortage) occurs. It also allows for necessary release to meet domestic consumption needs. However, this requires the government to procure a greater amount of rice (whether before or after a rice shortage occurs), which would pose a significant financial burden. As a result, instead of seeking higher stockpile quantities, ensuring a reasonable level for both food reserves and government expenditure would be more desirable.

9. Regarding the WTO consistency of rice stockpiling programs, the agricultural support related to national stocks for food security purposes in Taiwan is not classified as a Green Box measure. And the government has always attached importance to keeping a strategic rice reserve, which is maintained at an adequate level against contingencies. However, government procurement of rice stockpiles is not based on market prices, and can impact domestic rice market to some extent. Therefore, the related domestic support cannot be considered a green box measure. That said, with the actual level of domestic support below the commitment level, as well as compliance with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the Taiwan government’s rice price guarantee program is still allowed under WTO rules, despite its impact on market prices. Considering the rice stockpiling programs of other selected countries, the present research has so far observed no concerns of violations of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.

10. Based on these findings, ensuring food security and insulating from the impact of international events can be done in several ways: reassessing national stockpiling standards based on total calorie intake, establishing grain reserves for soybeans, corn, and wheat, setting up a domestic food security early warning system, promoting local consumption, encouraging rice consumption, and participating in regional food security stockpiling networks.