Rules of the International Trade, Investment, and Financial Systems: What they Deliver, how they Differ, the way Forward
- Gary Clyde Hufbauer
- 2014/12/17
- 已被閱讀 322次
- Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 17 (4), Dec. 2014, pp. 833
Let me begin by tracing my assumptions about the expectations and aspirations various groups hold of international rules. Most people prefer a slowly growing but steady economy to a rapidly growing but volatile economy. People intensely dislike a sudden rise in unemployment or a sudden collapse in asset values (homes and shares). Indeed, in democratic countries, sharp economic downturns often lead to a turnover of political leadership. To summarize, people want the rules to deliver macro-stability, as Michael Gadbaw has rightly emphasized.1 Leaving aside certain hedge funds, business firms not only want macro-stability, they also want the rules to deliver micro-stability in the conditions surrounding business endeavors—such things as land control, tax rates, environmental regulations, and intellectual property rights. Most business leaders subscribe to the broad connection between liberalization and growth, but they seldom welcome liberalization that brings more competition to their own markets. On the other hand, they may accept more competition as the price to pay for better access to foreign markets. Political leaders are sensitive to these preferences. Additionally, in most countries, political leaders realize that lower barriers to trade not only improve per capita income but also raise the growth rate. They hold similar beliefs for foreign direct investment, but are less convinced about the virtues of international finance (meaning international flows of portfolio capital). On the other hand, political leaders are extraordinarily sensitive to policy liberalization that creates concentrated losers, be they rice farmers in Japan, auto workers in America, or small retail shops in France.
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