Published Date: 2023-08-09
Publication:2022.12
Principal Investigator:江文基 Jiang, Wun-Ji
Researchers:李宜靜Li, Yi-Ching
1. The main regulations governing the
national food reserves and relevant policies in Taiwan are the Food
Administration Act and its Enforcement Rules, which detail the
country’s rice stockpiling program.
2. A review of the stockpiling systems
among selected countries has indicated that Japan has established reserves for
imported food wheat, equivalent to 2.3 months of national demand, and for corn
and other feed grains of around 1 million metric tons. Additionally, households
are advised to have short-term food reserves for 3 to 7 days, and stockpiling guidelines
issued by the government are publicly available.
3. In South Korea, the public rice stocks
include domestic rice, imported rice, and the earmarked stocks for the ASEAN
Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve. Domestic rice and imported rice are stored
separately by the government.
4. Singapore maintains a national rice
stockpile largely through imports, and requires rice importers to participate
in the Rice Stockpile Scheme, with a minimum monthly import quantity of 50
tons, to keep a two-month supply of rice in government warehouses. To mitigate
potential import risks, the Singapore government has adopted two approaches:
diversifying import sources and investing in overseas food markets to secure a
purchase priority through provision of funding and technology.
5. In the case of Thailand, its rice
production far exceeds domestic consumption, making it one of the major net
rice exporters globally. Therefore, compared to Taiwan, Thailand puts less
emphasis on food stockpiling, and the government has so specific requirement
for domestic rice stocks—a unique case study among the countries included in
the present study.
6. China’s public food reserves policy is
formulated by the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration and
implemented by the state grain stockpiler Sinograin. Due to its vast territory,
China operates reserve systems at both central and local levels, managed by the
China Grain Reserve Management Corporation and state-owned “storage
enterprises” established by local governments. Currently, the size of both
central and local grain reserves in China’s major grain production areas is
able to meet domestic demand for three months; the figures for main sales areas
and product-sale balance areas are six and four to five months respectively.
7. Regarding the impact of rice stockpiling
systems on rice prices, a 2018 OECD study has suggested that, compared to the
baseline scenario, reducing national food reserves to a two-week supply of
domestic consumption would lead to a decrease in rice prices due to the release
from government stockpiles. Conversely, adjusting the reserve level to a
three-month stockpile would increase rice prices due to increased domestic and
international market demand. Regardless of the stockpiling approach, however,
the impact of changes in reserve quantities on prices would return to the
original level after around 4 years. As such, short-term changes in the size of
the national rice reserve would more or less affect rice prices, but over the
long term, market supply and demand would reach equilibrium, and price return
to the baseline as producers adjust production quantities.
8. Generally, a larger rice reserve means a
stronger buffer against national rice price shocks when an unexpected event
(such as food supply shortage) occurs. It also allows for necessary release to
meet domestic consumption needs. However, this requires the government to
procure a greater amount of rice (whether before or after a rice shortage
occurs), which would pose a significant financial burden. As a result, instead
of seeking higher stockpile quantities, ensuring a reasonable level for both
food reserves and government expenditure would be more desirable.
9. Regarding the WTO consistency of rice
stockpiling programs, the agricultural support related to national stocks for
food security purposes in Taiwan is not classified as a Green Box measure. And
the government has always attached importance to keeping a strategic rice
reserve, which is maintained at an adequate level against contingencies. However,
government procurement of rice stockpiles is not based on market prices, and
can impact domestic rice market to some extent. Therefore, the related domestic
support cannot be considered a green box measure. That said, with the actual
level of domestic support below the commitment level, as well as compliance
with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the Taiwan government’s rice
price guarantee program is still allowed under WTO rules, despite its impact on
market prices. Considering the rice stockpiling programs of other selected
countries, the present research has so far observed no concerns of violations
of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
10. Based on these findings, ensuring food
security and insulating from the impact of international events can be done in
several ways: reassessing national stockpiling standards based on total calorie
intake, establishing grain reserves for soybeans, corn, and wheat, setting up a
domestic food security early warning system, promoting local consumption,
encouraging rice consumption, and participating in regional food security
stockpiling networks.